

# Mao Tse-tung and China's "Poor Peasants," 1927-1957

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It is generally assumed that after the Communists were driven underground by the Kuomintang in the summer of 1927, the outgrowth was the agrarian revolution in the Kiangsi-Hunan-Fukien area. However, the genesis of the agrarian revolution went back at least to 1925, when Mao Tse-tung, serving at that time as Director of the Peasant Movement Training Center in Canton, directed peasant organization work in his native province, Hunan.<sup>1</sup> The experience which Mao gained in this period laid the foundation of the agrarian revolution which spread through Central China after 1927 and ultimately led to the completion of "socialist transformation" thirty years later.

Few documents in modern Chinese history are more significant than the "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," which Mao wrote in February, 1927.<sup>2</sup> In this report, Mao spoke with clarity and conviction about the necessity for the Chinese Communist Party to work with the Poor Peasants as a class in order to win the revolution. According to Mao, China's peasant masses were undergoing a process of internal split. The Rich Peasants, who together with the landlords represented 10 per cent of the population but owned 50 per cent of the land, were feudalistic and opposed to revolution. The Middle Peasants, who represented 20 per cent of the population and owned 15 per cent of the land, were self-sufficient and non-exploiting, but capable of being made friends of the revolution. The logical followers of the Chinese Communist Party as

the party of the proletariat, however, were the vast class of the Poor Peasants, who represented 70 per cent of the population and owned only 10-15 per cent of the land. Whether they were peasants with too little land to be self-sustaining (whom Mao called the "Secondary Poor") or hired hands with no land at all (whom Mao called the "Naked Poor"), they formed the greatest propelling force for revolution. So Mao advocated a militant program to rely on the Poor Peasants, ally with the Middle Peasants, and liquidate the Rich Peasants and the Landlords.<sup>3</sup>

In the spread of the Chinese soviets in the Kiangsi-Hunan-Fukien area from 1927 to 1934 (that is, from the Ching-kan-shan experiment to the Long March), the crucial instrument which the Party used to organize the Poor Peasants was the Peasant Association. According to eyewitness accounts, the function of the Party was to organize and direct the P'in-Nung-T'uan (Poor Peasant Corps), which in turn supervised the Ku-Nung-T'uan (Hired Hands Corps) and the K'u-Li-Kung-Hui (Coolies Union). Activist elements from these bodies were selected to be the chairmen and members of the Peasant Associations at the *hsiang* level.<sup>4</sup> Whenever the Peasant Associations met, the soviets sent officers to direct their proceedings. Likewise, whenever the soviets met, the chairmen of the Peasant Associations were invited to attend. But the Peasant Associations always supported—never supplanted—the decrees of the soviets.<sup>5</sup>

In several vital areas, the Party was able to enlist the enthusiastic support of the Poor Peasants. First, of course, the Poor Peasants supported the Party in the liquidation of the village bosses and the gentry, the confiscation and redistribution of their land, and the establishment of a revolutionary government. Second, the Poor Peasants willingly met the requisitions of grain. Third, they organized themselves, as directed by the Party, into labor-exchange brigades and labor teams, for the sake of increasing production. Fourth, they answered the draft for the Red Army, and developed guerrilla warfare which engulfed the Kuomintang forces in six major campaigns (1930-1933). The success of these measures made it possible to win over most of the Middle Peasants to the cause of the revolution.<sup>6</sup> During these years, the fact that the peasant masses feared falling again under the control of the Kuomintang government and landlordism con-

tributed much to their continued support of the Communist Party and its program.<sup>7</sup>

The Communists were driven out of Kiangsi not because of the failure of this program but because of Kuomintang blockade. However, after they moved to northern Shensi in 1934-1935, the situation changed. Here, in the northwest, the Poor Peasants represented only 25 per cent of the rural population. Many factors which bound the Party and the peasant masses together were absent.<sup>8</sup> The Yen-an government, therefore, abandoned the land reform program and turned to the reduction of rent and interest.<sup>9</sup> The objective was to win the support of all classes of peasants rather than to work with the Poor Peasants alone against the rest of the rural population. Thus during the years from 1934 to 1937, the working relationship between the Party and the Poor Peasants was at its weakest. Communist policy in this period leaned heavily on exploiting the issues of resistance against Japan, which ultimately led to the Sian kidnapping of General Chiang Kai-shek, the formation of the "united front," and the outbreak of total war against Japan.<sup>10</sup>

No immediate change occurred after the commencement of the war. Beginning with 1939, however, the "united front" began to break; and the Kuomintang once again instituted a blockade to throttle the economy of the Communist region in the northwest. Under the circumstances, the need for higher production within the area again brought the Party and the peasants into a closer relationship. Drawing his lesson from certain types of group farming practiced in Kiangsi days,<sup>11</sup> Mao Tse-tung now ordered the formation of Pien-Kung-T'ui (Labor-exchange brigade) and Cha-Kung-T'ui (labor-pool brigade). Under the former, the peasants exchanged labor with one another so that every fragment of farm land was carefully cultivated without fail. The labor days spent by one peasant on the farm of another were cancelled against the labor days spent "the other way around." Any differential after the mutual cancellation was compensated in wages paid by the recipient of the uncanceled labor. Under Cha-Kung-T'ui, the Poor Peasants with insignificant amounts of land were hired by other peasants to devote their surplus labor to the cultivation of their farms.<sup>12</sup>

The outcome of these measures was a noticeable increase in

production. In his lecture "On Cooperatives," Mao said that two peasants now produced what it took three to produce under the individual system.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, with heightened enthusiasm aroused among the peasant masses, the Party met with widespread support in embarking upon other forms of mass organization, notably the consumers' cooperatives, the transportation cooperatives (especially for the transport of salt), the credit cooperatives, and the handicrafts cooperatives.<sup>14</sup> So in the latter years of the war (1943-1945), the Communist Party discovered that "cooperativization" not only helped increase production but could open up powerful means for manipulating the support of the peasant masses.<sup>15</sup>

The decade following the end of the war witnessed the extension of Communist control from North China to the entire country and the successful achievement of "socialist transformation." The tasks involved were stupendous. Yet the concepts and techniques of working with the peasant masses, as developed in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods, were adhered to with remarkable continuity. The following sections of this study will be devoted to a close-up view of these developments.

First, let us examine the extension of land reform from North China to the rest of the country. It will be recalled that the war against Japan was followed by the great civil war which ended in the defeat of the Kuomintang government in 1949. There was therefore a continuous process of "liberation" from north to south. In all of Northwest China, and in the Old Liberated Areas<sup>16</sup> of North China and Northeast China, the land reform movement was completed by the winter of 1947-1948. In the New Liberated Areas of Northeast China, it was completed by the winter of 1948-1949; and in the New Liberated Areas of North China, a year later. As to land reform in the rest of the country, the work began with the adoption of the Land Reform Law of June 30, 1950,<sup>17</sup> and was completed by the close of 1952.

The guidelines for the last phase of this gigantic operation were contained in two basic documents. The first document was "Decision concerning the Classification of Percentages of Rural Classes" adopted on August 4, 1950.<sup>18</sup> Five classes were enumerated: Landlords, Rich Peasants, Middle Peasants, Poor Peas-

ants, and Farm Laborers. This was in effect a restatement of the Kiangsi document "How to Analyze Rural Classes." The second document was "Organic Law of the Peasant Associations."<sup>19</sup> Again it was a reaffirmation of the Kiangsi program. The majority of the members of the Peasant Associations were Poor Peasants, while Middle Peasants were encouraged to join and Rich Peasants were excluded.<sup>20</sup>

A standard procedure was followed by every village undergoing land reform. In the first stage, Party cadres were sent from the provincial capital. They began their work by visiting the Poor Peasants. Soon they would "sink roots and form links," that is, organize party cells among the Poor Peasants. Then followed public meetings where the Poor Peasants were encouraged to air their grievances. In the second stage, the Party would lead the Peasant Associations to define the class status of every individual, and on that basis proceed to redistribute land. This task consisted of five steps: exchange of opinion; discussion and adjudication; examination; adoption of decision; and ratification. Upon ratification, a public celebration would be held to mark the emancipation of the peasants. In the third and final stage, the Party cadres would doublecheck the ownership status and class status of the peasants. This was to eliminate abuses or "secret deals" that might be made by some Poor Peasants with the Rich Peasants. Upon satisfactory ratification, deeds would be issued to the new owners. At this point, a special effort would be made to strengthen the Poor-Peasant leadership in the Peasant Associations.<sup>21</sup>

The most notable effect of the land reform movement was liquidating the landlords and easing the lot of the Poor Peasants. The popular slogan at the time was "fan sheng" ("turn over oneself," meaning a change of fortunes). However, it also enabled the Communist government to exercise direct and complete control over the masses, since no intervening class now stood between the government and the governed.

No sooner had the land reform movement been completed than the government proceeded to urge "Let's Organize." This was the drastic step to move from land reform to socialization. Elaborating the concept of "cooperativization" which Mao dis-

covered in Yen-an, this new phase of Communist policy in effect asked the peasants to give up what they had just gained, and to embark upon "socialist transformation" which actually nullified land reform.<sup>22</sup>

The Communist authorities carried out "socialist transformation" progressively, establishing in succession: (1) mutual-aid team, short-term type; (2) mutual-aid team, long-term type; (3) low-grade producers' cooperative; and (4) high grade producers' cooperative. In the first three stages, which were carried out in 1952-1955, the government relied on the Poor Peasants but continued to seek the cooperation of the Middle Peasants. In the fourth and last stage, accomplished in 1955-1957, however, the Middle Peasants were reduced to the same level as the Poor Peasants, thereby achieving the full effects of socialization.<sup>23</sup>

Under the short-term type of mutual-aid team, the pooling of labor during the cropping season carried tremendous appeal to all classes (the Middle Peasants as well as the Poor Peasants) owing to the overall increase in production. Then, the government moved on to the long-term type of mutual-aid team, under which draft animals and farm equipment were likewise pooled and the team continued on a permanent basis instead of disbanding after the harvest. In this stage, new incentives were created for the Poor Peasants because they derived immense benefits from the use of the animals and equipment of the Middle Peasants, and because the permanence of the team assured them that these valuable assets would not be taken away from them.

This was the method by which the Communist government developed new potentials of mass support during the first two stages of socialization. Up to this point, each peasant selected the crop he wished to plant on his land. In other words, ownership of the land was effectively exercised by the individual peasant.

With the formation of the low-grade producers' cooperatives, which embraced from twenty to fifty households, the pooling of land took place. Here, private ownership was maintained only in principle, since the choice of crop was made by the Party cadres for the entire membership of the cooperative. When the crop was harvested, a certain portion was first set aside for the government. The next portion was earmarked for seeds for the following

season. The balance was then divided among the members on the basis of their respective investments, in accordance with this ratio: land, to count for 30 per cent; labor, 60 per cent; and animals and equipment, 10 per cent.

The pooling of land under the low-grade producers' cooperative was a step of tremendous significance to the Poor Peasants and the government alike. Once land was placed under the cooperative, the Poor Peasants would always have land to cultivate, while the government became better able to manage the totality of the means of production. Thus the identification of the government and the Poor Peasants was further strengthened. That the government was fully aware of this fact was borne out by an abundance of evidence. For instance, in Huai-yin district (in Kiangsu), over 95 per cent of the support for the establishment of these cooperatives came from the Poor Peasants, while 50 per cent of the Middle Peasants were either hesitant or negative.<sup>24</sup> In Hunan, the government took energetic steps to build up Poor-Peasant predominance in the cooperatives, insuring a two-thirds majority of the membership.<sup>25</sup> In certain cooperatives in the Changsha area, Party cadres gave special support to the "righteous views" of the Poor Peasants and publicized their model accomplishments until the Middle Peasants fell in line.<sup>26</sup> In other cooperatives, loans and credits were given extensively to the Poor Peasants to make it possible for them to "perform their work in peace." Similar experiences can be cited in many other parts of the country.<sup>27</sup>

Throughout the three stages discussed so far, the government's success was attributable to a number of factors. First, the sense of becoming a successful independent farmer was too weak among the Poor Peasants to develop into any effective resistance against government orders. Second, the Poor Peasant was in constant danger of being overtaken by the Middle Peasant, and consequently welcomed the strong hand of a third party (that is, the government) to restrain such competition. Third, the Poor Peasant believed that his lot would not be worse if he worked as a member of a cooperative.<sup>28</sup> Fourth, the Poor Peasant knew from the experience of the Yen-an days that when "Let's Organize" was put into effect, the new form of production brought a larger

yield for the village as a whole. These elements of Poor-Peasant psychology were characteristic of the changes in China in these years, changes which were radically different from those under Stalin in Russia.

The fact that the institutional changes in these years of socialization were unfailingly accompanied by increased production which brought tangible benefits to the peasant masses, is especially worthy of note. It avoided the unfortunate experiences of Stalinist Russia when tremendous pressure was exerted for institutional changes only thereby bringing on a class war at once brutal and destructive. In the Chinese situation, the authorities used "mutual benefit" to induce "voluntary joining." By the phrase "voluntary joining," Peking really meant that when the socialization process was coupled with increased production, the extent and tempo of the institutional changes were less harsh, more flexible, and consequently more acceptable.

The low-grade producers' cooperative, however, fell short of the ultimate objective of the Communist government. While land was pooled, its ownership was not frozen. The fact that land counted 30 per cent in the division of income operated to the advantage of the Middle Peasants. In time they could form a new class of thriving peasants, to whom certain Poor Peasants would once again lose their meager holdings.

Moreover, during these same years, the First Five-Year Plan went into effect. To accumulate domestic capital for industrial construction, the government needed full access to the nation's agricultural output—to feed city workers, to furnish raw materials to the industries, and to send exports abroad in exchange for industrial equipment. The "capitalistic" operations of the Middle Peasants had to cease in order to remove any threat to the government's program. For a while—from the autumn of 1953 to the spring of 1955—the government resorted to planned buying and distribution of foodgrains by the state. This gigantic undertaking was enforced with reasonable success. However, the Communist authorities realized that so long as private ownership existed, the government would in the end be the loser. The state monopoly could serve as a *modus vivendi*; it could not bring the

permanent solution.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, by the summer of 1955, the government decided to embark on the fourth and final stage of socialization, namely, the establishment of the high-grade producers' cooperatives.<sup>30</sup> In the following paragraphs, the term "collective" will be used interchangeably with the term "high-grade producers' cooperative"; and the term "collectivization" denotes the fourth and final stage of "cooperativization."

For some time prior to this, experiments with collective farms had been going on in Manchuria.<sup>31</sup> The satisfactory outcome of these experiments, which included large-scale land rearrangement, unified planting of the same crop, improved farming techniques, change from single crop to double crop, change from low-production crop to high-production crop, and better utilization of manpower, convinced the authorities in Peking that collectivization on a nationwide scale would be entirely feasible.<sup>32</sup>

The new program was made public in Mao Tse-tung's historic speech on "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation" on July 31, 1955.<sup>33</sup> By November, 1955, the movement was in full swing. In the high-grade producers' cooperatives thus set up, each had a membership of some 300 households as a rule.<sup>34</sup> This advanced-type cooperative differed from its predecessors in that no peasant received any compensation for the use of his land. Other means of production such as draft animals and farm equipment taken into the cooperative likewise ceased to count as bases for differential remuneration.<sup>35</sup> In this way, all vestiges of private ownership were replaced by collective ownership. Rent, profit, and interest were outlawed, leaving wages as the only form of income. From now on, the Middle Peasants ceased to exist as a class that operated to the detriment of both the Poor Peasants and the government.

Those Poor Peasants who had neither land nor animals nor equipment to contribute to the collective at the time of its establishment acquired membership with the assistance of the State Bank, which granted loans to finance their payment into the "Fund in Shares." The Poor Peasants contracted to repay these loans out of their wages over a period of five years. This was further proof of the government's policy to equalize the class

status of all peasants.<sup>36</sup> This leveling process was perhaps the most revolutionary measure in the entire course of the socialization of Chinese agriculture.

A word is necessary here to underscore the careful procedure followed by the Communist authorities to insure the success of collectivization. It is true that Rich Peasants in China did not possess the economic strength of the kulaks in Russia. Still Peking took steps well in advance to undermine whatever strength they did possess. In the Old Liberated Areas, the percentage of the Rich Peasants had been reduced to 1 per cent, and in the New Liberated Areas to 3 per cent, at the time of collectivization. The admission of members also followed a neat procedure. All the Poor Peasants (that is, currently landless) and the New Middle Peasants (landless prior to 1949) were taken into the collectives without exception. But the Old Middle Peasants (that is, self-sustaining and with the status of Middle Peasants prior to 1949) were kept under observation and were not admitted until after they had successfully undergone "political reform." As to the former Rich Peasants, landlords, and counter-revolutionaries, they were kept out until the collective had become a going concern, with 75 per cent of the region's total population enrolled as members.<sup>37</sup> This is what Anastas Mikoyan meant when he said: "The Chinese comrades, guided by Russian experience, are avoiding our mistakes and are overcoming difficulties more easily. The Chinese Communist Party has manifested great wisdom, courage, and organizing ability."<sup>38</sup>

The amazing aspect of the entire collectivization drive was its speedy success. Mao Tse-tung himself was surprised. In 1953, the government estimated that 20 per cent of the peasant households would be incorporated into the high-grade producers' cooperatives by 1957. Yet once the drive was launched in the summer and autumn of 1955, more than 60 per cent of the nation's peasant households joined such collectives during the winter of 1955-1956. By the following winter, the figure had reached 90 per cent, leaving only certain remote regions beyond collectivization. Thus by early 1957 the battle for the socialization of agriculture had been won by Peking.

From 1957 onward, Communist agricultural policy moved

into a new epoch. As "socialist transformation" gave way to "socialist construction," the problem was no longer one of institutional revolution by utilizing the Poor Peasant class to achieve "cooperativization." The problem of the new epoch was to mobilize the total agricultural population, now without class distinction, in quest of new formulas for economic growth, such as the "Great Leap Forward" and the Commune movement. Yet it must be stressed that neither of these drives would have been possible but for the foundations laid prior to 1957. The inception, evolution, and perfection of a revolution, based specifically upon the support of the Poor Peasant sector, represented a historical development of supreme importance. It was this long drawn-out process, stretching over thirty years and bearing the imprint of Mao Tse-tung's leadership at every stage, that destroyed the old order and gave strength to the new.

Mao Tse-tung's contributions to the theory and practice of Communism, of course, do not stop with "cooperativization." Currently, new and interesting developments are taking place in the Communes. The prospect of self-sufficiency in the rural townships (*hsiang*) and of subsidiary industrialization in the very midst of agriculture is no less significant than the program reviewed in this study. But the issue is no longer the utilization of the Poor Peasants, and consequently comes under a separate heading and calls for a separate study.

## NOTES

1. There were a million members in Peasant Associations of various descriptions at the commencement of the Northern Expedition in June, 1926, according to Mao's report in 1927. See footnote 2.

2. See 湖南農民運動考察報告, 見毛澤東選集卷一 pp. 220-222.

3. The Poor Peasant class as defined by Mao Tse-tung was roughly identical to the destitute mass called "P'i Tse" by the gentry. The Chinese Communist Party's official definition of peasant classes, which was contained in the document "How to Analyze Rural Classes" published in Juichin in 1933, was in essence an elaboration of Mao's classification in the 1927 Report.

See 怎樣分析農村階級, (中共, 1933).

4. In Hengshan district (Hunan), the officers of the Hsiang Peasant Associations comprised: Naked Poor, 50 per cent; Secondary Poor, 40 per cent; Poverty-stricken intellectuals, 10 per cent. See Mao's 1927 Report.

5. One of the best eyewitness accounts of this period is:

成安昌:赤区土地问题, 见《国闻週報》 Vol. 10, Nos. 22, 26, 28 (June 5, July 3, July 17, 1933). See also 漆琪生:赤区土地分配的干绩与程序, 见《国闻週報》 Vol. 12, Nos. 7, 16 (Feb. 25, Ap. 29, 1935).

6. Victor H. Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets* (New York, 1934).

7. It is interesting to note that after the Communists were dislodged from Kiangsi in 1934, the Kuomintang restored landlordism in the former soviet areas.

8. This was an area where an independent Communist leader, Kao Kang, had been organizing the peasants. Judging from his lack of success, Mao concluded that to introduce the Kiangsi-type agrarian revolution would bring more popular disaffection than popular support.

9. Only the land of the absentee landlords was confiscated during this period.

10. For conditions in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region during this period, see eyewitness accounts by Huang Yen-pei, Edgar Snow, Gunther Stein, and Harrison Forman.

11. Rudimentary forms of labor-exchange and mutual-aid were practiced in the Kiangsi soviets, when teams comprising six or seven households used their labor, tools, and animals to full capacity in cultivating, planning, weeding, and harvesting. Nothing was left idle; everything was done on time. Larger yields were obtained in the autumn. The smaller unit of such a team was known as "tso"; the larger unit was known as "shih." See

经济问题与财政问题, 见毛泽东选集卷四 pp. 36-44.

12. On peasant movements under Communist leadership during the years of the war against Japan, see 郑位与编:抗日救国与农民运动.

13. See 论合作社, 见毛泽东选集卷四 p. 207.

14. See 组织起来, 见毛泽东选集卷四 p. 217.

15. In Mao's lecture "On Cooperatives," it was actually envisaged that the process of socializing agriculture should start with mutual-aid teams and producers' cooperatives and culminate in collectives.

16. The adjectives "Old" and "New" in this usage denote "pre-1947" and "post-1947" respectively.

17. 土地改革重要文献集 (北京, 1951).

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. See Article 2, Section 4 of "Organic Law of the Peasant Associations."

21. 土地改革重要文獻彙集 (北京, 1951).

22. Article 34 of the "Common Program" said: "In all areas where land reform has been thoroughly carried out, the government should organize the peasants and all labor force applicable to agriculture, in order to develop agricultural production and other auxiliary enterprises; the government should also lead the peasants to move gradually and according to the principle of voluntary entry and mutual advantage to form all kinds of mutual-aid and cooperation for production. In November, 1951, a "Directive concerning Work in Rural Villages after Land Reform" urged the peasant masses to move from individual to collective production and set up producers' cooperatives.

23. For a sympathetic account see Solomon Adler, *The Chinese Economy* (New York, 1957), pp. 104-127. A more skeptical view is contained in

李天氏: 中共与农民 (香港, 1958).

24. 经济部的全面规划. (中共淮陰地委生產合作社, Oct. 1955).

25. 周振文: 长沙縣高山鄉武塘農業合作社成立標誌中農佔優勢  
变为貧農佔優勢的. 見湖南"互助合作"第九期 July 26, 1955.

26. *Ibid.* The government's role in helping to build up Poor-Peasant pre-eminence in the cooperatives can be seen from the following editorial in the magazine *Mutual-aid and Cooperativization* (Changsha, July 26, 1955): "In the process of cooperativization, we must pay attention to: (i) Present-day Poor Peasants who are still hard pressed in their livelihood; (ii) Low Middle Peasants among the New Middle Peasants; (iii) Low Middle Peasants among the Old Middle Peasants. We should first of all take these groups by batches into the cooperatives, as they would more readily accept socialist transformation. . . . Any cooperative must establish and maintain the superiority of the Poor Peasants. In composition, they should represent 3/5 of the membership, while the Middle Peasants might form 2/5."

27. See, for example, 誰說鷄毛不能上天. (中共淮陰地委合作運動辦公室  
見河南日報 Nov. 2, 1955). See also 中共中央文獻室編: 中國農村的社會

主義高潮 (北京, 1956), pp. 35-47.

28. 李天氏: 中共与农民. pp. 106 ff.

29. See *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1957* (United Nations, 1958), pp. 97-98.

30. In contemporary literature, the high-grade producers' cooperative was often referred to as the "Large Cooperative," in contrast to the low-grade producers' cooperative which was commonly called the "Small Cooperative."

31. The process of cooperativization was first tried out and proved to be feasible in Kirin, in Manchuria, during the years 1947-1950. It went through these stages: (i) Mutual-aid team system; (ii) Labor-day unit system; (iii) Production quota system; and (iv) Fund-in-Shares system.

(i) 互助生产制 (ii) 标准工制 (iii) 生产保证制 (iv) 土地入股制

This pioneer cooperative took its cue from the "Let's Organize" experience of Yen-an days. Later it became the model for the drive for socialization

for all of China in 1955-1957. See 徐玉坤等著-全时能农村生产合作社

(上海, 1952).

32. See 大社的优越性. (中共新海连市委宣传 Sept. 21, 1955).

33. 农业合作化问题. (中共, 1955).

34. This was the general rule in the plains. The average size of a high-grade producers' cooperative in hilly regions was 200 households; and in mountainous areas, 100 households. It may be recalled that average size of a low-grade producers' cooperative in the plains was 20 to 50 households. Hence, as explained in footnote 25, the high-grade producers' cooperative was referred to as the "Large Cooperatives" while the low-grade producers' cooperative was referred to as the "Small Cooperative."

35. Animals and equipment taken into the collectives were paid for by instalments in three to five years, after which their ownership belonged to the collectives.

36. 高级农业生产合作社示范章程. (北京, 1956).

37. 同上.

38. *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, VIII (October 31, 1956), 6 ff.