

# The Socialization of the Chinese into Malaysian Politics: Some Preliminary Observations

ROBERT O. TILMAN

*Yale University*

The sage Confucius said that "in the Heaven there cannot be two suns, and on earth there cannot be two emperors." [Dato Cheah Toon Lok, President, MCA, 1962.]

Despite their importance, the Chinese of Malaysia remain relatively unknown to the political scientist. Constituting about 36 per cent of the population of present-day Malaysia, and clearly recognized as an important political force, little attention has nevertheless been devoted to rigorous political studies of the Hua-ch'iao community.<sup>1</sup> This void is particularly evident in the more specific field of political socialization studies, despite the fact that for at least two decades almost all interested observers, as well as most practicing politicians, have recognized that Chinese political assimilation constitutes the single most pressing problem facing Malaya and Malaysia. In part, this apparent lack of intellectual concern may be a reflection of the relative newness of our use of "political socialization" as an analytical concept in the social sciences; in part, it may stem from the linguistic and cultural obstacles inherent in any study of a Chinese community; and, in part, it may reflect the fact that American social scientists only in relatively recent times "discovered" Malaysia.

It is not that there is a complete absence of material on the Malaysian Chinese—although it certainly is not plentiful—but the problem is that what is available is of little value in the study of

political socialization. The late Victor Purcell, the distinguished Cambridge historian and former Chinese Affairs Officer in Malaya, wrote extensively on the Malaysian Chinese and must be regarded as an outstanding authority on the community as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Maurice Freedman, of the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, has done pioneering work on the Hua-ch'iao in the urban setting of Singapore.<sup>3</sup> Recently William Newell has published a detailed anthropological study of a Teochew village in northwest Malaya,<sup>4</sup> and T'ien Ju-k'ang's short monograph on the Chinese community of Kuching is well known and frequently cited.<sup>5</sup> In addition to these, there are a number of Asian and European works dealing with various aspects of Chinese life in Malaysia.<sup>6</sup> Material on the Malaysian Overseas Chinese community is not voluminous, but it does exist.

The problem that we face in political science more involves the scarcity of material suitable for understanding the processes of political socialization. Purcell's work is primarily historical and descriptive. His studies are of great value in answering questions about the Chinese regarding number, location, origins, periods of migration, language, etc., background material that is necessary but not sufficient. Freedman is more concerned with kinship and rituals, an essential part—but again only one part of the total socialization experience. In addition, Freedman's research, of necessity and not of choice, was restricted to the Chinese population of crowded, urban Singapore; and, as he has pointed out, generalizing from Singapore to all of Malaysia is hazardous indeed. Newell's recent monograph is fascinating to read, though for the purposes of socialization studies it has serious limitations. Newell attempted almost literally to record everything of any anthropological significance that happened in his village during his period of research, and it is difficult indeed to extract the politically relevant social influences from this plethora of unfocused detail. Moreover, this is a study of a Teochew farming village, which, in statistical terms, is also not representative of the Malaysian Chinese population. T'ien's very useful study of the Kuching Chinese community is probably of most value in the study of political socialization, but it too has serious limitations. Most important, it is now dated, for much has happened in Sarawak since 1950. In addition, T'ien devoted considerable attention to clan groups,



particularly among the older Chinese, and it seems doubtful that these are now of the importance that they perhaps were some fifteen years ago. Finally, and this is a comment that applies equally to all studies of the Hua-ch'iao community, for the time being socialization studies of the Chinese will have to distinguish between the several geographic units of Malaysia if they are to be meaningful.<sup>7</sup>

It is not my intention here to criticize others for failing to provide suitable data for political socialization studies, for, of course, this was not the goal in any of the studies cited. Rather, it is my intention only to point out that our knowledge is limited and that much of my discussion here must be based on unsystematic observations and sometimes even on pure speculation. This essay, if it achieves its goal, will raise far more questions than it answers. It is, as its subtitle indicates, only tentative and preliminary. This essay addresses itself only to the task of outlining the major contours of the socialization processes among the Malaysian Chinese community of the peninsula. The next logical step is a rigorous research design for collecting and analyzing the necessary information, but this will require time, energy, and patience. Most of all, it will require persons prepared to do field research among the Nan-yang Hua-ch'iao.

#### POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AS AN ANALYTICAL CONCEPT

Political socialization, in general terms, means the process by which children and adults are introduced to various roles in the political game. During the course of socialization individuals form a perception of the general outlines of the political game and are introduced to the rules by which they are expected by their peers to play the game (or possibly to disrupt the game). In the American context this includes such diverse educational experiences as fairy tales heard in early childhood, the daily reading of "Little Orphan Annie," junior high school civics (or perhaps Americanism) courses, professors intentionally or unintentionally influencing a captive audience, TV commercials, personal contacts, and an infinite variety of other experiences that are impossible to catalogue in their entirety. This simple listing is adequate to demonstrate

that even in our own familiar environment we may never have a complete picture of the socialization process. Rather, we shall probably have to content ourselves with an analysis of the broad contours of socialization by concentrating mainly on the most significant factors influencing our choices of political values. And, in the study of unfamiliar political cultures, our brush strokes for the foreseeable future must be considerably broader and longer.

Following the lead of Almond and Verba,<sup>8</sup> I accept that the most significant kinds of socializing institutions involve (1) the family, (2) the school, and (3) the place of work. Similarly, I too would place less emphasis on very early childhood experiences.<sup>9</sup> I would also agree that there is a feedback effect: just as socializing institutions in a sense control the destiny of the political system, so too does the political process affect, if not actually shape, the configurations of the institutions of socialization. This feedback effect is particularly evident and significant in an environment where the political values of the minority may be in conflict with those of the majority, which is precisely the situation that exists in Malaysia today. Clarifying a point that was mentioned earlier, socialization may lead to the acceptance of the rules of the political game by an individual, or it may convince him that the rules are bad and should be changed. In other words, the concept of political socialization is itself neutral in the sense that it implies nothing about the nature of the values inculcated in the socialization experiences. Finally, the process of political socialization may be a discontinuous one, as Verba has pointed out.<sup>10</sup> Family and school may work at cross-purposes, with the latter attempting to "resocialize" students into a new set of political values.

### THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAMILY

While we know little about the Chinese family in Malaysia, research by Freedman and Newell suggests certain salient facts of concern to us. First, the Hua-ch'iao family is a less tightly knit social unit than is its counterpart in China, and with this goes a concomitant tendency for the children to be less intensively and extensively influenced by the views and conduct of the parents. Secondly, just as the Hua-ch'iao are not linguistically and geographically representative of the mainland Chinese, so too are they



not culturally representative. By this I mean that in China a broad cultural spectrum is to be found, ranging from scholars at one end to peasants at the other, but those who migrated to Southeast Asia were the very ones who by leaving China had the least to lose and the most to gain. Although there was an occasional middle- or upper-class Chinese adventurer or political exile who found his way to Malaysia, on the whole the Hua-ch'iao were peasants or unemployed coolies in or around the politically troubled coastal cities of southern China.

It may seem to go against the grain of our present-day liberalism to suggest that these peasants were any less "Chinese" than court Mandarins, but in a cultural sense a strong argument can be made in support of this contention. The lower-class society of the migrants was one characterized by struggling, poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and authoritarianism. It was not the refined luxury of the Chinese gentry, the showy opulence of the wealthy landlord, or even the genteel poverty of the scholar-philosopher. Yet the meat of Chinese culture has grown on these aristocratic bones. In this sense, while a Chinese of the Nan-yang was undoubtedly aware that a great Chinese culture existed, it was not one in which he had actually participated. Chinese parents might pass on to their children stories about the cultural splendors of ancient China, and in school these children might learn by rote passages from the Confucian classics, but for the most part it remained a culture that was only imperfectly understood though highly valued. One only has to observe some of the grotesque collections of expensive knickknacks that pass for works of art in the homes of many well-to-do Malaysian Chinese to realize that the desire to identify with Chinese tradition has far exceeded the capacity to comprehend this tradition. The confusion and frustration produced by desire out-running capacity has left its mark on the Chinese community, a point to which I shall later return.

Linguistic heterogeneity, passed on through family ties, has also influenced the nature of the socialization process. In China each village had an exclusive dialect, and this common language permitted communication across all social lines. Though in Malaysia there may have been some areas of linguistic concentration, if not exclusiveness, in general, Hua-ch'iao found themselves living in close physical proximity with other dialect groups with whom it

was difficult, and often impossible, to communicate. Thus while living closely together, there was the tendency to circulate within a single linguistic orbit, to interact economically and socially with those with whom they could communicate. Language groupings did not provide the absolute parameters of social intercourse by any means, but linguistic barriers did encourage the growth of a cellular social system within the total Chinese community. These barriers were punctured somewhat by the introduction of Kuo-yü as the medium of instruction in Chinese schools in the 1920's and by the growth of literacy in the English language, but the barriers remained sufficiently intact even after the Second World War that it was possible to recognize particular political characteristics predominating among speakers of a given dialect. The most outstanding example of this is probably to be found among the Hainanese, where the Communists had been most effective in penetrating the Hailam schools, particularly the Hailam night schools for adults.

That the Chinese family exerts considerable control over the activities of the offspring cannot be disputed, but it is difficult to estimate the extent to which such control affects the political socialization of the young. Many observers have pointed out that juvenile delinquency rates among the Hua-ch'iao communities in the West are significantly lower than those for other groups, and anyone with experience in Southeast Asia has observed the effective pressures applied by parents to children in school, work, and leisure-time activities. The family also passes on to the children a complex set of motivations best described by McClelland as the basic need for achievement, which is present in varying degrees in all societies.<sup>11</sup> All of this undoubtedly influences the child's perception of the political world about him, but in what manner and to what extent are questions that we are poorly equipped to answer at this time. Moreover, we also are faced with certain obvious exceptions to our neat generalizations about the control functions of the family, for it is clear to any observer in the field that the gum-chewing, black-leather-jacketed Chinese youth with a duck-tail haircut gyrating through the twist or the frug in a noisy Kuala Lumpur cabaret does not fit our ideal model. And, while this is doubtlessly one of the less attractive perquisites of modernity, there have always been some aberrations. Secret-society gangs, probably



the best-known examples, did not emerge in response to the same forces that introduced the frug and other terpsichorean re-enactments of African fertility rites.

Without more careful research than is presently available, observations about the role of the family in socializing the young into the Malaysian political game must remain highly speculative. Such speculation, which I shall not eschew however tentative and hazardous it may be, will be presented in brief in the concluding section.

### THE INFLUENCE OF THE SCHOOL

Chinese education has been a thorny issue for a half-century. Colonial officials and present-day Malaysian politicians alike have recognized the tremendous influence exerted on young minds by teachers and textbooks. There was a time in Malaya when Chinese schools were purely Chinese in character—that is, the funds came exclusively from the Chinese community, the subject matter concerned China rather than Malaya, the language was Chinese, and the teachers were imported from China. Today most of these schools receive government assistance, the curriculum and syllabus are dictated by the government, subject matter concerns Malaysia, most of the teachers are Malaysian-born, and many of the teachers have received some training in government-sponsored and -controlled institutions. This dramatic change was no accident of history, and a brief review of Chinese education in Malaya sheds considerable light on the school as an instrument of political socialization.

Regardless of socio-economic status, the Chinese have always placed a great emphasis on education, and the concrete manifestation of this has been the establishment of schools wherever the Chinese are to be found. From the very beginning in Malaysia the Chinese community was willing to educate itself, and the British, largely for economic reasons, were content to let them do it. Thus, while the British invested some public funds in Malay, and to a lesser extent Indian, education, very little support was provided for Chinese education. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Malaya's Chinese schools were numerous, but their quality was generally poor. Anyone who was literate was regarded as qualified to teach; pedagogic techniques were those used in the

village schools of old China where rote memory was accepted as education; physical conditions, while varying greatly depending upon the clientele, were generally very unsatisfactory and sometimes deplorable; teachers' pay was pitifully low; each school was managed by a school committee that often took an active hand in the substantive as well as the administrative side of school operations; the subjects of study were almost always Chinese and never Malayan; and, finally, even within the same areas of Malaya each dialect group maintained its own particular school, teaching in the mother tongue.

In part a reflection of Chinese nationalism and in part an effort to consolidate schools and improve the quality of education, leaders of the community began to press for the use of Kuo-yü as the medium of instruction in all Chinese schools in 1920, a movement that paralleled similar nationalist drives in the decade following the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911. Better-qualified Kuo-yü-speaking teachers were imported from China and the standard of education rose considerably in many of the Hua-ch'iao schools of Malaya. Along with this, however, also came an increase in the Chinese character of the schools. Teachers who were proficient in Mandarin and who were willing to migrate to the Nanyang were usually also those strongly committed to the nationalist cause, and they brought with them new teaching material that glorified the revolution and its leaders. The results were twofold so far as we are concerned here: First, the use of Kuo-yü began to bridge the linguistic chasms that had separated even the educated youth of the past, and thereby contributed to a feeling of being "Chinese" rather than a Hakka, Hokkien, Teochew, etc. Secondly, feeding on this new ability to communicate as well as contributing to the process was the new nationalist spirit that was infused into the overseas community by the apparent success of the revolution and the evidence that a new China might be emerging. Yet this new China was not monolithic. Marxism-Leninism was also competing for recognition and legitimacy.

Communism arrived on the Malayan scene about a decade after the first arrival of nationalist teachers and soon made inroads into the educational system. In time it was apparent that some schools had been "captured" by the Communists, while others belonged to the Kuomintang. In some cases schools had actually split into two competing institutions each supporting one of the rival ideologies.



In brief, the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to the Japanese occupation of 1942 might be summarized as follows. Prior to 1920 the Chinese community was heterogeneous within itself and unassimilated into the indigenous culture. From 1920 onward for about a decade the community moved toward increased homogeneity, but in the process its lack of assimilation was becoming even more striking. With the introduction of Communist doctrines into some of the schools in the 1930's and the resulting competition between the two ideologies, the community was becoming polarized, but the intensity of this peculiarly Chinese competition made assimilation into Malayan society even more difficult.

In an effort to exercise some control over the content of Chinese education the FMS began to create machinery for supervision in the mid-1920s, and from 1924 onward the government made modest per capita grants to private Chinese schools. However, throughout the period to 1942 this machinery for supervision was rudimentary and overworked; the means of control in the hands of the FMS was minimal.

The dramatic break in the history of Chinese education in Malaya came with the Japanese occupation and the ensuing outbreak of the Communist-inspired emergency in 1948. The Chinese school problem could no longer be ignored, and, while the colonial administration failed to suggest any sweeping changes that might integrate Malaya's chaotic educational structure into an orderly system, the government did at least begin to wrestle with the problem. Increasing control was exercised over school instruction, and those schools most blatantly advocating a Chinese ideology were simply closed, the usual objects of this ultimate sanction not surprisingly being those exhibiting strong Communist leanings. It remained for Malayan leaders themselves, however, to bring about the major educational reforms that were so long overdue.

The theme that Malayan political leaders adopted in formulating educational policy was well stated initially by the Central Advisory Committee on Education in 1951:

The last racially [read "linguistically"] segregated Vernacular primary school in Malaya will cease to exist when the parents of the children attending it believe that a local National School would provide a more acceptable education. The Fenn-Wu Report [on

Chinese education] . . . suggests that day may never come. We believe it will come. We also believe its advent may be hastened by persuasion and inducement but delayed by dictation and compulsion.<sup>12</sup>

Adopting this tactic of gentle but firm persuasion, the government began to offer greatly increased grants-in-aid to Chinese schools willing to undergo increased supervision and improvement of teaching standards. The emphasis here was on content of the curriculum, not on the medium of instruction. The Razak Committee of 1955 had as its terms of reference to make recommendations for the creation of

a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic, and political development as a nation, having regard to the intention to make Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of other communities living in the country.<sup>13</sup>

From the Education Act of 1957, which implemented the Razak Committee Report, to the Talib Committee Report of 1960 and its eventual implementation in the reforms of 1962, the emphasis was on the first part of the Razak statement above. The focus was on a national system, but one that observed, if not fostered, cultural pluralism. From 1962 to the present time the emphasis has shifted to the second part of the statement—that is, a national system that fosters national unity while taking cognizance of communal cultures. Present regulations provide that full support will be given to Chinese schools that agree to teach at least two-thirds of the curriculum in the Malay or English languages (preferably the former), offer the other one of these two as a second language, and relegate Chinese to the status of a third language that can be offered only as an academic subject. The system of partially aided schools was abolished, these either conforming and becoming fully aided or not conforming and thereby losing all public assistance. Universal free primary education was introduced at the same time, thus making it doubly difficult to resist the government's offer of full support. Though there was considerable public discontent expressed in the press, these pressures were highly effective and by the time of the creation of Malaysia in September, 1963, better than 85 per cent of the almost 1,200 full-time Chinese schools had opted



for governmental assistance. In fact, at that time Chinese remained as the principal medium of instruction in only 120 schools in the Peninsula,<sup>14</sup> and it is likely that this number has been further reduced today.

Due to a shortage of trained teachers, generally low literacy in Malay among the Chinese community, a growing but still inadequate supply of Malay-language textbooks, and emotional resistance on the part of individuals, the Chinese schools even in the peninsula have not yet been fully neutralized, much less harnessed as instruments of socialization into a Malaysian society that is predominantly Malay. Nevertheless, unlike the situation in Singapore and Sarawak, the role of the school in perpetuating the uniqueness of the Chinese community in the peninsula has declined dramatically since the beginning of the Second World War. It seems impossible to imagine a Malaya of the future where Chinese is not heard in every urban center, but it is similarly apparent that the Chinese educational process, regardless of language of instruction, is now promoting political values that are much more Malaysia-oriented than China-oriented.

#### THE RESULTS OF SOCIALIZATION: THE CHINESE IMAGE OF THE POLITICAL WORLD

At this point in history the average Malaysian Hua-ch'iao must be terribly confused, suffering as he probably does from an identity crisis of major proportions. Wolfgang Franke has recently written of the English-educated Malayan Chinese population that they acquire only a superficial education, an education that offers a comfortable income but leaves the Chinese spiritually adrift with "no values except money. . . . Physically and emotionally they are Chinese, but culturally and spiritually they are neither Chinese nor English nor Malay. They do not know themselves what they are."<sup>15</sup> Similar generalizations, with appropriate modifications, could probably be applied to most of the Chinese community of Malaysia.

Among this English-speaking group with which Franke is concerned are probably also to be found the most Malaysian-oriented of the Hua-ch'iao community. Almost all of these are Malaysian-born, Malaysian- or Commonwealth-educated, and all undoubtedly have achieved some degree of success within the

existing system. Most are educating their children bilingually (Chinese and English) and many insist on trilingualism (Chinese, English, and Malay). While acknowledging with pride their Chinese heritage, they are also outspokenly Malaysian in the political sense. The size of this segment of the community, while in my view growing, is nevertheless still very small. For the most part these Malaysian Chinese are to be found in the higher echelons of the ruling Alliance, in the civil service, and to a much lesser extent among the wealthier commercial groups. In the eyes of the moderate Malay politicians these Chinese serve as the model of what the community should look like politically, though all recognize that the realization of this goal is far off.

In Malaysia there is also quite apparently a segment of the community best described as Chinese chauvinists, those who believe firmly in the innate superiority of the Chinese community, whether it be intellectually, culturally, linguistically, or in business acumen. For these the only acceptable long-range political solution is a Chinese Malaysia, and it seems likely that for most of these this would be equated to a Chinese Malaysia that was sympathetic to, if not linked with, mainland China. These chauvinists can be expected to continue influencing youth to share these same views, though given the present political situation and the attitudes of the governing elite, it is not likely that their opportunities to spread their message overtly beyond the family will be very great. The size of this segment of the Hua-ch'iao community cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy, but it seems probable that the hard core is, happily, very small. Here the major threat probably comes from those who cannot be labeled as "hard core" but whose political sympathies lie in varying degrees in this direction. This marginal group, in my own view, is sufficiently large that it should be of far greater concern to the Federation government than it appears to be.

Between the two extremes of the Malaysian nationalists and the Chinese chauvinists lie the great bulk of the Hua-ch'iao community. Apathetic and confused, their political importance must be estimated in terms of potential. Given some concrete manifestations of hope and sympathetic leadership by Malay as well as Chinese politicians, this group could become an important middle-class base for the successful functioning of the democratic process. Given the leadership of a reckless demagogue with a messianic message of quick political salvation, this group might form the nucleus of a



revolutionary movement that could bring a new period of political unrest to Malaysia reminiscent of the years 1948-1960.

Sinologists such as Fenn, Wu, and Franke have argued that the only safe course for Malaysia is to make these Hua-ch'iao into loyal political Malaysians while permitting them to retain their Chinese linguistic and cultural identity. The government, after considerable deliberation, decided that this was too dangerous a gamble. The present goal is the eventual assimilation of the Chinese minority into a Malaysian political culture that is predominantly Malay, chiefly by means of the national educational system and the Malay language. If the Sinologists are correct, then the government has probably set out on a collision course with renascent Chinese communalism. If the government is right, then there may be smooth sailing ahead for the Malaysian ship of state. The political values currently being learned will affect in no small degree the future of Malaysia, but the unfortunate fact is that we—and one strongly suspects the Malaysian government also—really know very little about this process of political socialization. It is platitudinous to point out that the Hua-ch'iao of a decade or so hence in Malaysia will be behaving differently politically, but this is perhaps the only observation that can presently be made with a high degree of certainty. It remains for future research to try to discern the direction and magnitude of these political changes.

## NOTES

1. Throughout this paper several well-known Chinese terms will be employed without explanation. Most common are Hua-ch'iao (Overseas Chinese) and Nanyang (literally, South Seas, but usually employed in Chinese to designate Southeast Asia). Less well known terms and citations, where necessary, will be phoneticized in the Wade-Giles system.

2. Purcell's best-known work, revised only shortly before his death, is *The Chinese of Southeast Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

3. See his *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore* (London: HMSO, 1957). Freedman had originally intended to work in the peninsula but permission to undertake this research was not granted by the local colonial government.

4. *Treacherous River* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1962).

5. *The Chinese of Sarawak* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1953).

6. A useful handbook on the Overseas Chinese has been published by the Taiwan government. See Hua Ch'iao Pien Tsuan Wei Yuan Hui, *Hua Ch'iao Chih Tsung Chih* (rev. ed.; Taipei, Taiwan, 1964) [Overseas Chinese Statistical Committee, *Gazetteer of Overseas Chinese*]. This is probably the best single source on the distribution of Hua-ch'iao throughout the world.

7. This is a caution that will not always be heeded in the present essay. It is apparent, however, that most of the observations here apply more to the peninsular than to the Bornean Chinese.

8. Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). Working with a group of only about 50 per cent literacy one might be tempted to question the importance of the school, but evidence in Malaya suggests that the politically relevant strata of Chinese in Malaysia are disproportionately literate. This essay will focus on the first two of these institutions of socialization while excluding the third. This is necessary in view of the diversity of employment of the Chinese and the absence of any hard data on which to base even the most tentative conclusions. From the census reports one can easily discover the types of occupations filled by Chinese, but it is impossible to be certain how these various occupations in turn influence political attitudes.

9. For a study that does focus more on early childhood experiences see the seminal work of Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). Also, it might be noted that the Freudian approach to the analysis of political behavior, which passed through a period of considerable popularity in the United States, in one sense was dealing with the problem of political socialization. For a recent revival of some of these ideas, incorporated into a larger framework of identity crises in the modernization process, see Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

10. This point is best made in Sydney Verba, "The Comparative Study of Political Socialization" (a paper presented before the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association). It also emerges less explicitly from his concluding essay in Lucian W. Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 512 ff.

11. David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).

12. Federation of Malaya, Central Advisory Commission on Education, *Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1960), para. 12. The Fenn-Wu Report is a document that merits careful attention. It contains the basic arguments of most Sinologists who have looked at the problem of Chinese education in Malaysia—that is, that the Chinese language is too viable, and indeed too important, ever to be submerged by Malay. Therefore, so the arguments run, Malaysia will have to reconcile itself to remaining a multiracial, multilingual state, though hopefully there will emerge a common political loyalty that will unite all Malaysians. See William P. Fenn and Wu Teh-yao, *Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951). The authors went considerably beyond their terms of reference, and for this, as well as for the substantive content, their report has been widely criticized.

13. Quoted in Educational Review Committee, 1960 (Talib Committee), *Report* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1960), para. 12.

14. Douglas P. Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," *China Quarterly*, No. 20 (October-December 1964), p. 89.

15. "Chinese into Malaysians," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 47: 459-61 (March 12, 1965).