

A Heavy Hand in the Examination Halls: The Earliest Attempts of the Kuomintang to Staff A Modern Civil Service, 1928-1937

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After the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928, the Chinese Kuomintang set about interpreting, codifying, and carrying into concrete, institutional practice the heritage of theory left it by Sun Yat-sen. Upon taking stock of the situation in 1928, it was clear to KMT leaders that China must have genuine *leadership* (as opposed to routinized, bureaucratic *administration*)¹ in government service if her quest for political modernity was to be sustained on more than just the elite and/or theoretical levels. The entire nation had been fragmented by warlordism since the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, and no national leadership elite had emerged after 1905 to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the *ancien régime*; regionalism still swaggered ominously in 1928.

All of Sun's designs for a bona fide constitutional democracy in China were underwritten by the kind of vital, activist leadership which he himself displayed and which he had self-righteously insisted be infused at the grass-roots level into "his" Nationalist movement—a vitalism founded on the unity of perceptive knowledge and exemplar action (the "good men make good works" ideal well within the Confucian ideological tradition being a basic component of Sun's elitism). The leadership ideal of "action

is easy and knowledge is difficult" was no more elusive to Sun's followers than to those of Chū Hsi. As a matter of record, one cannot but notice a high degree of agreement in the pronouncements of Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, Tai Chi-t'ao, Ch'en Li-fu, and others in the late twenties and early thirties regarding the importance of properly unified knowledge-and-action leadership vis-à-vis the syncretic excellence of the institutions prescribed in Sun's theoretical legacy.²

The leadership problem was clear enough for the small coterie of KMT elders headquartered in Nanking in 1928. The entire nation was in desperate need of spiritual guidance and remolding as well as physical reconstruction. Having written a commitment to Sun's post-military unification Period of Tutelage (*Hsün-cheng*) into the records amidst the fervor and excitement of the Third National Party Congress in March, 1929, the KMT had pledged itself to select worthy officials to begin the process of Tutelage at the county (*hsien*) level and up at once. Whether or not the many necessary processes could be completed in the six years before all citizens of China were to be enfranchised with the political responsibilities of a constitutional democracy is a moot point; given an even longer period of time and presupposing wholly adequate resources and an entirely favorable environment, however, such an undertaking would still have been a tremendously large and diversified one calling for a highly efficient leadership recruitment program.

This paper is designed as a case study of the Kuomintang's earliest institutional response at the national level to the problem of staffing its government with a modern civil service. Calling a study of KMT response to the situation in 1928 "institutional history" would, I fear, render the term too shallow descriptively unless taken with its very broadest connotations. Kuomintang leaders were by no means merely performing functional, semimechanical operations typical of the Weberian-type institutionalized bureaucrat. Faced with the urgent necessity of becoming politically modern—and operating as they were on a rather tight timetable—KMT elders were still social revolutionaries, now turned high-level administrative planners, attempting to square theory with current practical realities.

Practical reality consisted of a number of formidable problems which confronted the KMT and which any systematic analysis of political institutions in the republican era must take into account. The need for reconstruction has already been noted. Legendary are the ". . . continuing tensions which existed between the aspirations of Government at the national level and the actualities of power at the regional and local levels. At the local level, a number of provinces and/or districts . . . were virtually autonomous during much of the period; administrative and territorial fragmentation was a persistent symptom of the political and military maladies of the times."³ Though it grew less and less dramatic as the decade of the thirties wore on, separatism always haunted attempts to implement Tutelage on any truly national scale (by most counts Nanking firmly controlled only five or six provinces along the eastern and northeastern seaboard). If, indeed, Nanking's rule was accepted even symbolically from 1928-1937, semi-independent, peripheral leaders—Chiang Hsueh-liang, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, Chang Fa-k'uei, T'ang Sheng-chih, Ch'en Chi-t'ang, and Ho Ch'en are some names which come immediately to mind—probably did not accept many practical manifestations of Tutelage reorganization which would have cut deeply into their bailiwicks. The events which surround Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, and Chien Kung-po's attempt to found a rival regime in Canton in 1931 defy brief summary but demonstrate powerfully the factionalism rampant among KMT leadership itself. At more than one juncture during the thirties, both Chiang Kai-shek and the National government became *primus inter pares* focal points around which various power groups vied for a hearing of their causes or their institutional interpretations of Dr. Sun's teachings, or simply for power.

Weak and chaotic China was also the whipping boy of Japanese aggression after 1931—the semaphore of modern Asian imperialism. The high priority which Chiang gave the five Communist "bandit suppression" campaigns until 1934 was a constant and sizable drain on both the budget and the morale of the government, whose primary financial affiliation was with middle- and upper-class Chinese coastal entrepreneurs. At the local and re-

gional levels, strong residual vestiges of village-elder and landed-gentry elitisms were powerful forces which would have to be served their due in some way or another. Viewing the lower levels of Chinese society from the somewhat remote vantage point of the writings of those who saw it firsthand in the thirties, one can suggest that in KMT-controlled territory the common people and laborers were receptive to genuine reform (especially land reform and abolition of the *likin* and the host of other unjust tax levies) and slightly intrigued with the prospect of popular participation in government for the first time.⁴

The volatile youthful segment of the population, however, appears to have been hostile to the Nanking government from the very beginning. John Israel⁵ has documented recently the very real self-inflicted damage to its image of the KMT as a result of its summary handling of the Chinese student movement in the late twenties. In the spring of 1929, the newly appointed Minister of Training (*Hsün-lien-pu pu-chang*) Tai Chi-t'ao prohibited the Eleventh National Student Association Congress from meeting the following September, as a warning to all students to stay clear of political involvement. Shortly thereafter, regulations were promulgated banning nearly all nonacademic student associations. The outlet for student political expression had been plugged; KMT elders intended students to stay out of politics until some later date. The students' growing dissatisfaction with government machination against their freedom of participation in politics undoubtedly drove large numbers of them away from the ambitious reconstruction programs devised by the Nationalist party—though undoubtedly many young people desired to see the nation recreated along constitutionally democratic lines. That it was Tai Chi-t'ao (concurrently president of the Examination Yuan) who was linked with the crackdown did little good for the success of leadership-recruiting efforts of that Yuan after 1930.

In the summer and fall of 1928, the KMT fashioned its response to the complex challenge of Tutelage demands upon the Examination Authority (*K'ao-shih-ch'üan*) which Sun had made an integral part of his ideological legacy. In the name of the imperial examination system of Chinese tradition (which was

intellectually just barely his tradition), Sun attempted to create for his movement the theoretical moorings for a modern and efficient means of qualifying candidates for popular election on the one hand and of recruiting talented, efficient civil servants on the other. Whether or not the synthesis of the judicial, executive, and legislative powers of the West with the examination and control (censorial and impeachment) powers of traditional China—which Sun acclaimed as the best of both East and West worlds—was actually urged on him from his marginal Western experience,⁶ the Examination Authority which he fused into the Five Power Constitution partially satisfied Sun's anxiety over rescuing something from the legitimacy of the Chinese past.

When he looked beyond military unification to the time when the government would be sustained by direct popular participation, Sun evolved a curious electoral method most accurately described as a "permanent guided democracy." From an elitist posture, Sun distinguished between "control over the right to be popularly elected" (*liang-chih pei hsüan-chü-ch'üan*, or "controlled electoral candidacy") and "controlled popular elections" (*liang-chih hsüan-chü*). The latter was unfair, Sun maintained, because voter participation usually hinged on such things as property qualifications; however, controlled candidacy for elective public office was justified because candidates should be eligible for the ballot only if they possessed talent, virtue, and ability—traits which could (Chinese tradition had proved it!) and should be determined by examination.⁷ Such reasoning seems to have appeared in no way illogical or inconsistent with the Western democratic experience to Sun, and he often severely criticized American popular voter judgment in Muckraker-like terms: "In [American] popular elections, those who are eloquent can flatter the public and be returned to office while those who are learned and righteous often receive no attention. Hence in [American] Assemblies sit many stupid and ignorant men. The [American electoral] history is a farce"; "the corruption and inefficiency of American politics is unparalleled in the whole world"; "as a result, crafty and cunning individuals use their term of office to sell their dishonesty [for even greater personal gain]."⁸

In spite of the fact that provisions for examination of candidates for public office were paid lip service in a provisional constitution as early as 1934, they were never attempted in mainland China on any broad scale. Judging from a purely theoretical standpoint, moreover, serious difficulties would probably have vexed any attempt to implement and sustain such a plan permanently on a national basis. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng's critical appraisal of the naïveté of Sun's scheme is still the classic:

If the examination were technical, none but technically trained persons would be eligible for elective offices. That would certainly be the undoing of all popular elections. If, on the other hand, the examination were a kind of qualifying test loosely applied, it would be superfluous. It would be better to prescribe a few qualifications for an elective office than to subject the candidates for that office to a loose kind of examination. In neither case would the examination be both sensible and practicable.⁹

Ch'ien concludes, and rightly so, that Sun had probably over-extended a potentially good thing to the point of uselessness.

The other primary responsibility of Sun's Examination Authority—and the one on which the KMT followed up in 1928—was the selection, classification, and registration by examination of a national civil service to administer the modern Chinese state as the traditional examination system had peopled the select governing apparatus of Imperial China. Sun had in fact praised the British and American civil service systems; but he asserted that when the power of examination was wielded by whichever party happened to be in power at any given moment (through the executive branch in the United States, for example) real talent was inevitably buried in the corruption of the system.¹⁰ Therefore, he designated the Examination Authority a wholly independent branch of government, though without any definite suggestions as to how it should be formally organized or upon what basis its interaction with the other four powers was to be regularized. As a result of Sun's untimely death in 1925, institutionalization was left to the first president of the Examination Yuan.

One wonders if Sun's attempt to legitimize civil service recruitment with zealous appeals to one of the institutional

mainstays of amalgamated Confucianism was consistent with the post-May Fourth anti-traditional bias of Chinese youth—the principal reserve which Sun and all other social revolutionaries hoped to tap in reconstructing the nation. Sun's KMT had stood outside the events surrounding May Fourth. Generally speaking, KMT leadership had been slightly suspicious (perhaps "envious" is more accurate) of the student masses roused to fever pitch in Peking and elsewhere with cries of "Overthrow Confucius and Sons!" and "Down With Confucian Wineshops!" Now, in 1928, having gained at least a limited military victory and basking in the afterglow of Sun's charisma, KMT elders were again preaching a selective nationalistic gospel—this time from a national platform in Nanking—which held that some core segments of Confucian tradition, really complemented Western concepts of political modernity after all.

It was difficult, however, to get restless and embittered students to accept the kind of qualifying explanations necessary to make such an embattled ideological position at all tenable; unable to participate, the students were simply unwilling to listen. For its part, the KMT (after Sun's death) seldom attempted to qualify the relative goodness or badness of any of Sun's dogmas; absolute and wholly uncritical acceptance of Sun Yat-sen—the thinker—is most fully represented in the person of Tai Chi-t'ao. In effect, after the most progressive and potentially energetic and imaginative segment of society had rejected tradition as tired, decadent, and not modern; KMT theoreticians (for example, Tai on the Examination Yuan and Ch'en Li-fu on the New Life Movement) were still contending that a fusion of Western technology and learning and Confucian social values could square China with the modern world. In no instance was this kind of ideological reliance on questionably popular traditions more pronounced than in the institutionalization of the Examination Yuan.

THE EXAMINATION YUAN IN OPERATION ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE

On October 8, 1928, Tai Chi-t'ao was appointed president of the Examination Yuan by the standing committee of the Central

Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.¹¹ The selection of state councilors, a government chairman, and five yuan presidents on that day officially set in motion the processes of government outlined in the Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China, which had been promulgated by a plenum of the KMT Central Executive Committee five days earlier. Although the Organic Law was subject to minor revision several times before its adoption in final form in December, 1931, the changes made in no way affected the provisions of the original document concerning the Examination Yuan, which have remained essentially the same through all revisions to the present day. The specific provisions under the heading "Examination Yuan" were so laconic as simply to reaffirm what Sun's theoretical schema had rendered obvious: that the Examination Yuan was the highest examining authority in the national government; that this yuan was responsible for conducting examinations and determining the qualifications for entry into public service of all civil servants; and that no public functionary could be appointed until he had passed an examination and fulfilled the requirements for admission to the civil service as determined by law. How the yuan was to be organized internally was left to Tai himself, subject, of course, to the approval of the State Council. The selection of Tai Chi-t'ao to head this government organ and the fact that his personality and designs so completely dominated it until his death in 1949 deserve closer scrutiny.

Tai had had a long and fascinating career in the KMT.¹² He joined the *T'ung-meng-hui* as a Japan-returned law student in Southeast Asian exile in 1910. From that time until Sun's death in 1925, he was concurrently Sun's personal and Japanese foreign secretary, confidant, and ghost writer. At Sun's death, it was Tai, together with Wang Ching-wei, who brought Sun's will back to the South from Peking. Subsequently, Tai took the name he preferred to be known by in public from his relationship with Sun: *Ch'uan-hsien*, or "Propagator [of the teachings] of the Worthy Sage." In the summer months of 1925, Tai wrote several anti-Communist tracts in support of the growing rightist movement within the Kuomintang demanding the purge of all Communist and leftist elements. The first, *The Philosophical*

Foundations of Sun Yat-senism (*Sun-wen chu-i chih che-hsüeh ti chi-ch'u*), proposed that the highest ethical values of Sun's teachings were, in actuality, extensions of the virtues of the traditional kingly sages and Chinese philosophers of antiquity. From this theoretical position, Tai argued that the Marxian concept of class warfare was not in keeping with the traditional Chinese emphasis upon the love of all men for each other. Several months later, in the late summer of 1925, Tai published a scathing attack upon the organizational tactics of the Chinese Communist party and its Youth Corps under the title *The National Revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang* (*Kuo-min ko-ming yü Chung-kuo Kuomintang*).

As a result of his subsequent adoption as unofficial theoretician by the rabidly anti-Communist Western Hills clique that winter (he was captured, detained, and thus prevented from actually attending the November, 1925, meetings by Feng Tzu-yu's even more radically right wing KMT Comrades Club in Peking), Tai nearly fell from the graces of Chiang Kai-shek, who obviously was not yet ready to break with the CCP. However, Chiang apparently did maneuver to keep Tai on the Central Executive Committee of the party at its Second National Congress meeting of January, 1926—much to the further disgruntlement of Borodin and the high incensed CCP membership). When Chiang actually broke with the Communists—that is, after the Shanghai purge in April, 1927—Tai was among that select group of conservative party elders who gained quick ascendancy (through "parallel structuring and appointing") to the highest ranks of both the Kuomintang party and the National government. At the time of his selection as president of the Examination Yuan in 1928, Tai was also a member and recording secretary of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, a state councilor (one of sixteen), chancellor of Sun Yat-sen University in Canton, and a member of the board of directors of the Central Party Affairs (cadre training) School (*Chung-yang tang-wu hsüeh-hsiao*, in 1929 changed to the *Chung-yang cheng-chih hsüeh-hsiao*). The following year (1929), he was appointed Minister of Training. Tai was an ultra-Nationalist conservative and an arch-Confucianist extremely well versed in Chinese historical tradition

and classical philosophy. A superficial knowledge of Marxism was as far into Western political theory as he ever ventured. As we shall see, it was precisely his enchantment with the traditional imperial examination system—which made him a “natural” for the presidency of the Examination Yuan in the first place—that urged him into an unfortunately illogical attitude vis-à-vis the practical operation of the Examination Yuan.

According to the Organizational Law of the Examination Yuan proclaimed by the National government on October 20, 1928, the yuan was to be organized around an Examination Selection Commission (*K'ao-hsüan wei-yüan-hui*) and a Ministry of Personnel (*Ch'üan-hsü pu*), each with a full complement of officers and secretarial assistants, from the chairman and vice-chairman on down. Subsequently, on December 17, 1928, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Personnel further specified that it should consist of the following: a Secretarial Bureau (*Mi-shu chü*) in charge of the correspondence involved in the ministry's day-to-day affairs; a Registration Board (*Teng-chi szu*) responsible for keeping the records of registration and classification of all civil servants; a Merit Evaluation Review Board (*Chen-ho szu*) responsible for the review of the credentials of all incumbent officials to determine ratings for promotion, demotion, hiring and firing, and rotation; a Salary and Pension Board (*Yü-ts'ai szu*); and a Commission of Personnel Investigation (*Ch'üan-hsü shen-ch'a wei-yüan-hui*) charged with determining the qualifications for civil service of all applicants. Article 1 of the December 17 law rather broadly classed civil servants under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel as civil officials (*wen-kuan*), judicial personnel (*fa-kuan*), diplomatic and consular officials, and all other civil servants selected by examination for the entire nation.¹⁸

Tai and his small secretarial staff, headed by the reliable General Secretary Ch'en Ta-ch'i, spent the remainder of 1928 and the first months of 1929 establishing a headquarters for the new yuan in Nanking. Meanwhile, Tai was heavily burdened with his numerous other responsibilities to the Third National Congress of the party which convened in March, 1929. When, on August 1, 1929, the Organic Law for the Examination Selection Commission—which provided merely that the Commission would

be in charge of all examinations and provided for a chairman and vice-chairman—and the Organic Law for the National Board of Examiners (*T'ien-shih wei-yüan-hui*) were promulgated, the internal organization of the Examination Yuan was completed.

As early as October, 1928, Tai had begun staffing his agency with individuals whose educational backgrounds and/or conservative political viewpoints mirrored his own. The prominent moderate-conservative Sun Fo (Sun's only son and a once prominent liberal-leftist, now considerably subdued) was given the vice-presidency of the yuan as an interim political plum until a more prestigious vacancy in the presidency of the Legislative Yuan appeared for him in the 1932 reshuffling following Hu Han-min's withdrawal from the Nanking government. As a result, a precedent was established: the vice-presidency of the yuan became an honorific political spoil for services rendered the party; those who held the position were not expected to (and did not) serve it actively. After having himself selected chairman of the Examination Selection Commission in December, 1929, Tai chose the prominent arch-conservative Shao Yuan-ch'ung, a veteran of the Western Hills faction, to be vice-chairman, and as Commission members, Ch'en Li-fu, the nephew of Chiang Kai-shek's former benefactor Ch'en Ch'i-mei and subsequently chief theoretician of Chiang's Confucian-oriented New Life Movement, and Western Hills factionalists Lju Lu-yin, Chiao I-t'ang, and Kuei Ch'ung-ch'i. The previous month Tai had also selected as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the Ministry of Personnel the conservative loyalists Chang Nan-hsien, former chief of the Reconstruction Bureau (*Chien-she t'ing*) of the Canton government, and Ch'ou Ngao (*Ao*), who had served Sun's Nationalist cause in a wide variety of positions since *T'ung-meng-hui* days. Thus the high-level staffing of the yuan was completed with the kind of "poralization to the right" characteristic of government staffing after 1927-1928.

The organizational planning of the Examination Yuan during the fall of 1929 reveals some interesting facets of its leadership's—that is, Tai's—view of the organ's ability to perform the

tasks for which it was designed. In the first place, in his fervor to make certain that the Examination Yuan would be a practical working example of Sun's theory that the stage of Tutelage need last only six years, Tai proposed to the State Council, on September 11, 1929, a four-year timetable for the complete implementation of the various programs of the yuan and the harmonious integration of those programs with the other reconstruction efforts of the National government as a whole. The scheduled completion date was the end of 1932; the period 1929-1932 being further subdivided into three overlapping two-stage phases, each with specific goals: a preparatory period (1929-1930) to be devoted—as it was—to purely organizational affairs; an implementation period (1930-1931), the preliminary stage to be devoted primarily to the investigation and evaluation of incumbent civil servants at the central, provincial, and local levels, and the second stage mainly concerned with carrying out the first series of examinations for recruitment of civil servants as well as examinations for aspirants to county assemblies (*hsien-ts'an-i*) and group leaders at the *ch'ü*, *hsiang chen*, *lü*, and *lin* (sub-*hsien*) levels, in accordance with the Ministry of the Interior's preliminary requirements for local self-government; and a target completion period (1931-1932) devoted to continuing expansion of the examinations for county magistrates (*hsien-chang*) and city mayors (*shih-chang*).¹⁴

By any standards, such an undertaking was extremely large and ambitious. For China as a whole, such a program probably could not have been carried out in the allotted time if the entire energies and resources of the Kuomintang had been devoted exclusively to this undertaking. Tai and his comrades were undaunted, however; and when they failed to meet the timetable and were forced to postpone implementation repeatedly, they blamed the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 for their failures. The invasion, of course, had some effect, but to assign the entire blame to that historical turning point is to use a patriotic shibboleth (*chiu-i-pa*) to explain away Tai's devastatingly incorrect appraisal of the capacity of the KMT to implement social reform and reconstruction.

THE EXAMINATION YUAN: THE PROBLEM OF AN INCUMBENT (*HSIEN-JEN*) BUREAUCRACY

The remainder of the organizational phase (1929-1930) of the Examination Yuan's evolution can most conveniently be discussed in terms of the troublesome problem of an incumbent bureaucracy which confronted the KMT throughout the early 1930's. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist government has never acknowledged that a problem did indeed exist; however, my research indicates that the failure of the Examination Yuan to provide the government with adequate leadership is to a very great extent correlated to the government's inability to curb abuses perpetrated in appointing to the post-1928 civil service vast numbers of unexamined, questionably qualified, and selfishly motivated incumbent civil officials.

The problem became acute in the late summer of 1929. The Nanking regime was in immediate need of a vastly enlarged civil bureaucracy to maintain, consolidate, and—most important, as far as the loyalties of the peasants were concerned—tutor and reconstruct the areas which had been "unified" by the Northern Expedition. Several decades of strife (in some areas, nearly forty years) had conditioned the peasants to an almost automatically negative reaction to prolonged military administration. Moreover, military leadership simply did not have the competence to do the job. Perhaps just as vital a consideration for the regime in Nanking was the fact that, given the curious mentality of the Chinese peasant and his penchant for believing façades, any government which claimed to be national had better be prepared to demonstrate its control of the nation by having a legitimizing representative at the local level. By September, 1929, the National government was nearly a year old. For its part, the Examination Yuan offered no real hope for immediate large-scale recruitment of a qualified bureaucracy via the legally constituted examination route. The urgency of the need for civil servants demanded even more immediate results than those promised by Tai's projected three-stage timetable. The way in which the government and the Examination Yuan co-operated in dealing with this problem is extremely significant for the entire future of the Examination Yuan as a viable political institution.

On October 29, 1929, the Regulations for the Appointment of Public Officials (*Kung-wu-yüan jen-yung shou-lich*) were promulgated by the National government. Articles 2, 3, and 4 established the following standards:

Article 2—Requirements for the Selected (*Chien-jen*, Highest) rank (one of the following must be met):

1. Must be incumbent to or have held this rank and have passed evaluation and have been certified; or
2. Must be incumbent to or have held the Recommended (*Chien-jen*, Middle) rank for two years or more and have been certified; or
3. Have given special effort to the Party or have labored on behalf of the Revolution for ten years or more; or
4. Have achieved especially skilled or talented experience in one or another of the Arts.

Article 3—Requirements for the Recommended (*Chien-jen*, Middle) rank (one of the following must be met):

1. Must have passed the Highest (*Kao-teng*) civil service examination; or
2. Must be incumbent to or have held this rank and have passed evaluation and have been certified; or
3. Must have been a ranking Delegated (*Wei-jen*, Lowest) rank official for three years or more and have passed evaluation and have been certified; or
4. Have labored on behalf of the Party or worked for the Revolution for seven years or more; or
5. Be a recognized (by the Ministry of Education) graduate of a Chinese or foreign university and have acquired from such institution technical "know-how."

Article 4—Requirements for the Delegated (*Wei-jen*, Lowest) rank (one of the following must be met):

1. Must have passed the Ordinary (*P'u-t'ung*) civil service examination; or
2. Must be incumbent to or have held this rank and have passed evaluation and have been certified; or
3. Have labored on behalf of the Revolution for five years or more; or
4. Have graduated from a Chinese or foreign university or high-level technical school.¹⁵

Strangely enough, however, this proclamation was not accompanied by any indication of how or when these regulations were to be enforced.

The following day, October 30, 1929, the Regulations for the Evaluation of Incumbent Public Officials (*Hsien-jen kung-wu-yüan chen-pieh shen-ch'a shou-lieh*) were also promulgated by the National government. Article 2 defined an incumbent as "any official of any one of the three civil service ranks who was appointed prior to the implementation of the Regulations for the Appointment of Public Officials and has served continuously in that capacity." Ch'en T'ien-hsi, in his biography of Tai, says that the Examination Yuan and the government had decided that all incumbents must be evaluated before implementing the Regulations for the Appointment of Public Officials.¹⁶ No written, official government promulgatory directive to that effect seems to have been issued; however, there can be no doubt that that was precisely the arrangement. What the central government did by recognizing incumbent status in the civil service was, in effect, to give official recognition to the fact that it had delegated the responsibility of recruitment of a civil bureaucracy vertically downward, from the earliest founding of the government in Canton to the present time (1929), trusting all the while that responsible superiors (in their capacity as appointive recruiters) had followed some acceptable standards for appointment of civil servants. This is but another significant example of the KMT's implicit trust in the virtue of her servitors.

It appears, however, that the government's faith that men's consciences would altruistically overcome the extralegality ("legality" from the viewpoint of Sun's theoretical legacy and Examination Yuan Organizational Law) of the incumbent arrangement was misplaced. Within months after the founding of the Nanking regime the government was being petitioned by provincial governments to put a stop to the widespread corruption and nepotism which was rife among the many recently appointed functionaries at all levels of government service.¹⁷ When the subject was placed on the agenda of a KMT Central Executive Committee meeting in November, 1930, the following revealing report

of committee discussion on the matter was published by the official government news agency:

... Staff members of various Government organs are employed with little or no regard to their qualifications. Nepotism is rife. Friends and relatives of the responsible heads secure appointment while others having real talent and ability are being discarded, with the result that Government offices swarm with incompetent staff members. Hereafter, the sole criterion in the selection and employment of any Government official should be high qualifications and character.¹⁸

Before examining the questions of the socioeconomic origins and performance in office of the incumbents, it is crucial that we establish the relative numerical significance of the movement into office by way of the incumbent route and its relationship to the future of the Examination Yuan. It is possible to determine how many public officials entered office by means of direct appointment from an immediate superior only indirectly, that is, by examining the number of incumbent officials evaluated between 1930 and 1934 by the Ministry of Personnel's Commission of Personnel Investigation and by assuming that the evaluation was a complete, or relatively complete, one. The evaluation which began in the summer, 1930, was based on four general categories of standards: party and/or revolutionary efforts; education; experience; and examination performance. The specific requirements for each of the three civil service ranks were as follows:

Article 5—Requirements for the Selected rank (must qualify in one category):

1. Toward the Party have given special effort or have labored for the Revolution for ten years or more; or
2. Be a recognized (by the Ministry of Education) graduate of a Chinese or foreign university and have acquired from such institution technical "know-how"; or
3. Have been in government service in the capacity of a Selected rank official for at least one year or Recommended rank for two years or more; or
4. Have been a National University professor for three years or more.

Article 6—Requirements for the Recommended rank (must qualify in one category):

1. Toward the Party have given special effort or on behalf of the nation have labored for the Revolution for seven years or more; or
2. Same as number 2 under Article 5; or
3. Have been in government service in this rank for one year or more; or
4. While in government service have passed the Highest (*Kao-teng*) examination for civil servants.

Article 7—Requirements for the Delegated rank (must qualify in one category):

1. Have labored on behalf of the Revolution for five years or more; or
2. Have graduated from a recognized (by the Ministry of Education) high school of merit, "old style" academy (*ch'iu-chih chung-hsüeh*), or higher ranking institution; or
3. Have been in government service in this rank for two years or more; or
4. While in government service have passed the Ordinary examination.¹⁹

The method of processing the evaluations was simple. Two-part forms were distributed in May, 1930, to the responsible superiors, who in turn were expected to distribute the "qualification" (*tsu-ke*) portion of the document to the individual public servant, to be filled out and returned to the office of the superior. The "achievement" (*ch'eng-chi*) portion was to be filled out by the superior as an indicator of the quality of the servant's performance in office. Both forms were then returned to the Ministry of Personnel, where they were channeled to the Commission of Personnel. When the servant's qualifications (or lack of them) were determined, the commission's decision was forwarded to the responsible superior, who was asked either to confirm in rank the qualified, or to dismiss the unqualified. Unlike the Examination Selection Commission of the Examination Yuan, the Ministry of Personnel never established provincial or local branch commissions, and all evaluation work was carried out in the capital itself. The following chart shows a running-cumulative total of the number of incumbents evaluated between 1930 and 1934:

TABLE I
 CUMULATIVE EVALUATION OF INCUMBENT OFFICIALS
 BY THE MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL,
 1930-1934²⁰

Date	Rank	Total Number Evaluated	Total Number of Successful Evaluations
1930 ^a	Selected	238	234
	Recommended	465	427
	Delegated	2,713	2,571
	Total	3,416	3,232
1930- Feb., 1932 ^b	Selected	305	191
	Recommended	3,899	2,918
	Delegated	28,735	23,769
	Total	32,939	26,878
1930- June, 1933 ^c	Selected	758	640
	Recommended	6,658	4,853
	Delegated	48,534	38,529
	Total	55,950	44,022
1930-1933 ^d	Total	56,857	44,645
1930-1934 ^e	Total	59,625	47,163

^a *Shen-pao nien-chien* (The Shen Pao Yearbook), in Chinese (Shanghai, 1933), p. J-8; hereafter, *SPNG*.

^b *Ibid.*, pp. J-8-12.

^c *Ch'üan-hsü nien-chien* (The Ministry of Personnel Yearbook), ed. Ch'ün-hsü-pu mi-shu-ch'ü (The Secretarial Bureau of the Ministry of Personnel) (Nanking, 1934), p. 444.

^d *Min-kuo cheng-fu tien-tu Nan-ching yi-lai chü-yao shih-yeh chih chin-pu* (A Statistical Handbook of the Major Accomplishments of the National Government at Nanking), ed. Chung-yang ts'ung-chi ch'ü (The Central Statistical Bureau) (Nanking, 1935), p. 58.

^e Ch'en T'ien-hsi, *Tai Chi-t'ao hsien-sheng pien-nien ch'uan-chi* (A Chronological Biography of Tai Chi-t'ao) (Taipei, 1958), p. 114.

On the basis of these statistics, there can be no question that tremendous numbers of officials had flooded into office from 1924 until well after the National government was officially established in 1928. These forty-seven thousand plus incumbent officeholders confirmed in one or another of the three ranks at all levels of gov-

ernment service prior to 1935 represent at least twenty-five times the total number of officials who entered the civil service by passing examinations before 1938. The inescapable conclusion is that, by 1934, the extralegal route to office had won the day. Thus from the very beginning, the paradoxical situation in which the government found itself and the way out of that situation which the Examination Yuan (in co-operation with the government) chose impregnated the yuan with the seeds of its own undoing by relegating successful individuals in the examinations to a minority position in the civil bureaucracy.

The time required for evaluation of incumbents forced frustrated Examination Yuan planners to delay full implementation of the program. In May, 1930, when the "achievement and qualification" forms were distributed, the Examination Yuan informed the central government of its intention to have the evaluation completed by the end of the year. On December 30, 1930, the deadline was extended to June, 1931. After five additional extensions, the deadline was finally set for March 1, 1933; and, in fact, this session of incumbent evaluations did not terminate until sometime in early 1934.

The end of this earliest era of incumbent evaluation (trailing off as it did in the first few months of 1934) did not by any means terminate the direct appointment of civilian officials who were not first qualified by examination. The Law Governing the Appointment of Public Officials was finally promulgated on March 11, 1933, simultaneously with regulations for its strict enforcement beginning April 1, 1933. The requirements for qualification in one or another of the three ranks were identical with those promulgated in 1929. The 1933 law differed from the Regulations for the Evaluation of Incumbent Public Officials in one important respect, however: officials who were directly appointed by responsible superiors were required to be screened for qualification by the Personnel Investigation Commission *before* the appointment would be legally sanctioned or salaried by the central government. In an attempt to give the law some teeth, it was specified that, if the appointment was made without a prior qualification screening and the appointee served in his appointed capacity for a period of more than three months, his superior

was personally held responsible for repayment of any moneys expended on the appointee's salary.²¹ Under this system, an estimated 25,447 persons became bona fide rank-holding civil servants between April, 1933, and the end of 1937 (1,201 in 1933; 2,772 in 1934; 4,827 in 1935; 8,166 in 1936; and 8,481 in 1937) without first having passed civil service qualifying examinations.²² No doubt this system eliminated some of the abuses perpetrated under the old incumbent arrangement, but almost certainly wide-scale flouting of both the spirit and the letter of the law continued in spite of the slightly strengthened regulations.

Undoubtedly the most intriguing question of all raised by the incumbent and direct-appointment movements into office concerns the educational status and socioeconomic backgrounds of the appointees. Unfortunately, no one has been able to provide more than educated guesses based on both firsthand experience and full knowledge and acceptance of the fact that, in the end, the collapse of the system was in no small measure a result of the weight of its own corruption. In the absence of any knowledge about their socioeconomic backgrounds, KMT figures indicating that to the end of 1933 just over two-thirds of the incumbents confirmed as bona fide civil servants at the central, provincial, and local levels were not affiliated with the party tell us little.²³ If, as Theodore White, Analec Jacoby, Graham Peck, Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, and a host of others have suggested, the National government simply confirmed the leadership of the old order (which, in many cases, went back to the gentry-landlord-village elder syndrome of late Ch'ing times) and large numbers of unscrupulous political hangers-on, it is no wonder the incumbents and the direct appointees provided little effective leadership or even conscientious administration in the countryside.

In sum, it would appear that the central government leadership—especially men like Tai and Ch'en Li-fu—had put too much emphasis on the altruistic rule of men and too little emphasis on the strictly enforced rule of law. The Regulations for the Evaluation of Incumbent Public Officials and the Law Governing the Appointment of Public Officials, for example, were promulgated as reasonable guidelines for responsible government superiors in the righteous and altruistic spirit of the Confucian value sys-

tem; however, the interpretation and enforcement of those regulations and the law seem to have been characterized by the worst abuses of the imperial civil service system in the last fifty years of the Manchu dynasty. The government's laws were undermined not only by the vestiges of corruption so infamously a part of traditional Chinese society, but also by the tremendous dislocations which a century of revolution and social upheaval in China had caused in society as a whole.

THE EXAMINATION YUAN: CIVIL SERVICE RECRUITMENT BY EXAMINATION

As we have already noted, the specific way in which the KMT selectively institutionalized Sun's theories dictated that the success or failure of the examination system was to be the ultimate test of the success or failure of the Examination Yuan. Tai himself took on the chairmanship of the Examination Selection Commission; and more than any other feature of the yuan's operation, the examination system bore unmistakably the authoritarian elements of Tai's own personality.

On December 29, 1930, the Examination Yuan promulgated the qualifications for the two most important categories of competition, the Higher (*Kao-teng*) and the Ordinary (*P'u-t'ung*) examinations. (A third category, called the Special [*T'ê-chung*] examination, was, just as its name indicates, to be used only in special cases. It was designed to recruit individuals for government positions requiring special technical or scientific skills and was used most extensively after the Japanese invasion of south China in 1937.)²⁴ Among the categories first opened for Higher Examination competition were financial administration, educational administration, health administration, auditing and statistics, diplomatic consularships, judgeships and consultant lawyer posts, and prison administration. Examinations for similar positions of less importance and lower rank were offered in Ordinary Examination competition. As the Regulations and Laws Governing Appointment of Public Officials had specified, successful examinees of the Higher Examination could expect to receive a Recommended (Middle) rank appointment in good standing to

an appropriate position in the National Government; successful examinees of the Ordinary Examination were to receive appointment to the Delegated (third or Lowest) rank. The Selected (Highest) rank in the civil service was accessible by promotion only. The eligibility requirements for both the Higher and the Ordinary Examinations were promulgated in 1930 and indicate, among other things, that the Higher Examination was oriented primarily toward college graduates with training in the social sciences and/or business, but preferably both. This is yet another indication of the relative importance Tai and others attached to the rule of "men." Candidates planning to take the Higher Examination, for example, had to be graduates of a national or well-established private or foreign university or technical school three years previously, with a liberal arts curriculum and specialization in such fields as law, political science, sociology, economics, finance, or commerce preferred. One could also qualify for the examinations by having satisfied completely the Qualifying Examinations (normally held twice yearly), or by having passed the Ordinary Examination three years previously and having filled a Delegated rank position responsibly for that length of time. The Higher Examination itself was divided into three sections, with a required minimum average score of sixty for passing the two written parts and satisfactory performance expected in the final oral session. The written examinations were extremely comprehensive, as the required subject matter for a position in the general administration (*p'u-t'ung hsing-cheng*) category reveals:

Examination 1

Part I: National Language: (1) A Stylized Essay; and (2) Composition of Public Documents.

Part II: Party Principles (*Tang-i*): (1) *San Min Chu I*; (2) Outline of National Reconstruction; (3) Plans for National Reconstruction; and (4) Important Manifestoes and Decisions of the KMT.

Examination 2

Required Subjects: (1) Organic Law of the National Government; (2) Civil Law; (3) Criminal Law; (4) Administrative Law; (5) History of Modern Chinese Administration; (6)

Economic Theory; (7) Theory of Finance; (8) Regulations of the Laws of Self-government; and (9) Regulations of Labor Law.

Optional Subjects (must choose three):

(1) Various National Political Systems; (2) Economic Policy; (3) Social Policy; (4) Land Law Regulations; (5) Theory of Statistics; (6) Theory of City [Government] Administration; (7) International Law; (8) Scientific Principles; and (9) Foreign Languages.²⁵

The first Higher Examination was held in Nanking in July, 1931, with all the pomp and circumstance of the imperial capital examination. Tai's every action in setting up and carrying out the examinations—even to the point of keeping the 2,185 candidates and their examiners locked incommunicado in the examination compound for several days while the tests were administered—was a rather anachronistic play on the past.²⁶ When the results were announced, 101 were found to have passed, representing just under 5 per cent of the total number of candidates. The total number of successful candidates in the various categories were as follows: general administration, 43; educational administration, 24; financial administration, 7; diplomatic counselor positions, 6; and prison administration, 19 (two persons qualified in two categories).²⁷ Before 1938, the Higher Examination was given three additional times. In 1933, 101 of 2,639 examinees were successful in seven categories, and in 1935, 251 of 3,941 were successful in eight categories, representing approximately 4 per cent of the total in 1933 and just over 6 per cent of the 1935 total.²⁸ In 1936, a Provisional (*Lin-shih*) Higher Examination was given in Nanking, and a total of 121 examinees were declared successful in nine categories.²⁹

A sampling of the results for 1931—a typical year—indicates that 62 (5 per cent) of 1,202 candidates presenting college degrees as competition qualification passed, which represents just over 61 per cent of the total number of successful candidates. Approximately one-quarter of the examinees qualified by having had higher technical training (564); however, only 12 actually passed, representing 2 per cent of those who attempted the examination and 12 per cent of the total number of successful examinees.

Curiously enough, of the 200 former Delegated rank officials (for at least three years—in this case, at least since 1928) who attempted the examination, 12 (9 per cent) passed, representing 12 per cent of the total number of successful examinees.⁸⁰

Having passed the examination itself, successful examinees were assigned by the Ministry of Personnel to one or another government yuan, ministry, department, bureau, or provincial government where they were to be usefully integrated into the existing organization. No provisions were made for rejection of the appointees by the recipient government agencies, and Tai's personality was strong enough to assure that no one would challenge a Ministry of Personnel assignment. Appointment by the Ministry was not, however, the final step to full recognition in the bureaucracy for the bulk of successful examinees. Only those few who scored in the "very highest honors" category were given immediate recognition as Recommended Rank Substantial Appointees (*Chien-jen shih-shou*), which carried with it full tenure in the civil service. A high grade on the examination earned one recognition as a Recommended Rank Post-Examination Probationary (*Chien-jen shih-shu*), while a good test score relegated one to the Recommended Rank Post-Examination Trainee (*Chien-jen hsüeh-hsi*) rating. A Post-Examination Trainee had to serve a one-year apprenticeship in his newly appointed position before he could qualify as a Post-Examination Probationary, in which capacity he was required to serve satisfactorily for another year before finally being eligible for promotion to the Substantial Appointee rating and fully recognized status and tenure in the bureaucracy. After the 1933 examination session, for example, 22 of the 101 successful examinees were assigned Recommended Rank Post-Examination Probationary status, while 47 were designated Recommended Rank Post-Examination Trainees (the 32 successful examinees in the judges and lawyers category were subject to a different set of post-examination qualification standards. Of the 101 examinees appointed in 1933, 77 were assigned positions in yuans, ministries, and bureaus of the central government, and 24 were assigned to provincial and city governments.⁸¹

The evolution of the Ordinary Examination system is re-

markably similar to that of the Higher level examinations. The Ordinary Examination was designed primarily for high school, "old-style" academy, or lower-level technical school graduates, and qualified the successful examinee for appointment in the Delegated (Lowest) rank, with immediate recognition and full tenure in the civil service. The examination itself, while much less rigorous than the Higher level examinations, set high standards for high school graduates:

Examination 1

Part I: National Language: (1) A Stylized Essay; and (2) Composition of Public Documents.

Part II: Party Principles: (1) *San Min Chu I*; and (2) Plans for National Reconstruction.

Examination 2

Required subjects: (1) Basic Principles of Law Systems; (2) Basic Principles of Economics; (3) Explanation of Contemporary Law Regulations; (4) Chinese and Foreign History; and (5) Chinese and Foreign Geography.

Optional subjects (must choose two): (1) Political Science; (2) Sociology; (3) Administrative Law; (4) Regulations of the Laws of Self-government; and (5) Moral Philosophy.³²

Prior to 1938, the Ordinary Examination was given thirteen times to approximately ten thousand examinees, of whom roughly twelve hundred (12 per cent) passed.³³ Generally speaking, the Ordinary Examinations were administered either by provincial governments or the city administrations of the larger metropolitan areas such as Peking, Sian, and Shanghai. As a matter of unwritten policy for the Ordinary Examinations, the Examination Yuan appears to have relied heavily upon the initiative of other central government agencies, branch organs, and provincial administrations to make requests for additional staff members, whereupon the Examination Yuan would schedule examinations in hopes of recruiting an adequate supply of officials to fill their requests.

The attempted recruitment of a workable civil service by examination was a rather disastrous failure for several reasons. The relatively small numbers of successful examinees between 1931 and 1938 (in both the Higher and Ordinary categories of

competition) were simply overwhelmed and their status completely undermined by the numbers of those who entered the bureaucracy by direct, unexamined appointment. Any desirable exclusiveness which should, by all normal expectations, have been attached to entrance into the civil service via the examination route was destroyed further by requiring all successful Higher examinees to undergo an additional period of probation and/or training before being given fully accredited status as servants of the state. Even the successful Ordinary rank examinees, who were immediately given tenure in office, soon discovered that the road to advancement within the various government agencies was nearly always paved with a highly favorable recommendation from one's immediate superior, and in that regard the incumbents nearly always seem to have got there first with the most. Clearly, the road to fully recognized status in the civil service was too long and arduous when one could skirt all that with the aid of a nepotistic or unscrupulous official and an interpretive loophole in the general regulations of the Law governing the Appointment of Public Officials.

The primary reason that so many failed the examinations derived from Tai's unwitting attempt at an exclusiveness which the national government could ill afford. Moved by the authoritarianism of his own personality, Tai gave ideological conformity inordinately heavy emphasis in grading the examinations. Strict adherence to party principles and conformity with current political beliefs (which may or may not have been in keeping with Sun's Examination Authority ideals) forced the examinees to recite mechanically huge quantities of dull political dogma. Tai obviously justified his actions from the rationale that only the knowledgeable vanguard should be given leadership positions, and one understands "true knowledge" only through properly unified understanding of and action upon party principles. In view of the legendary *avant-garde* leftism in the 1930's of Chinese youth—many of whom may have been willing and even anxious to take part in the reconstruction of China were it not for the necessity of committing themselves on a humiliating examination to a conservative, nationalist political ideal—the Examination Yuan's policy of demanding ideological conformity tended

to discourage many of the most creative and innovative youths from taking part in the examinations.⁹⁴ The examinations themselves, moreover, were much too comprehensive for the general level of competition; and the successful examinees were awarded positions too small in financial remuneration and too low in social status to stimulate really widespread participation.

The other kind of exclusiveness Tai perpetuated to the detriment of the recruitment of civil servants by examination was derived from tradition. He evidently became so enchanted with the numerical exclusiveness of the imperial examination tradition that he attempted to infuse the civil service exams of modern China with that same kind of elitism. How else to explain the tremendously large percentage of failures among those graduates of Chinese colleges and high schools who attempted the Higher and Ordinary examinations while their fellow graduates were, at the very same time, compiling a brilliant record for overseas Chinese scholarship in Europe and the United States? In moments of discouragement, Tai blamed the entire educational establishment in China!

CONCLUSIONS

In both its theoretical and institutional forms, the Examination Yuan does not appear at first glance significantly inferior to either the imperial Chinese or Western democratic civil service models which Sun and his followers emulated. Closer examination, however, reveals that both the theory and the practice were severely hampered by self-imposed limitations which Tai Chi-t'ao urged in one way or another upon this institution which he headed. To a very great extent, Tai's high-level institutional planning was undermined by impatient ideological inflexibility, an unrealistic elitist exclusiveness based primarily upon an over-estimation of the value and place of tradition in social reformation, and a naive and dangerous assumption that the power of moral example of superior men would triumph over corruption. Those self-imposed inadequacies, combined with situational limitations (such as the corruption and decadence induced in society by economic dislocation, for example), left the Examination Yuan

fatally weakened as a political institution in its formative years. One of the obvious values of a case study of the Examination Yuan, then, is that it serves as a point of departure for distinguishing between self-imposed sterility and the vast, murky reservoir of situation limitations which were the inherited burdens of any government claiming to be "national" in the 1930's. On a still more important level, given the high degree of "parallel structuring" of KMT elders with high-level government positions and responsibilities throughout the late twenties and the thirties, isolating typical institutional examples of the discrepancy between theory and practice and generalizing on those examples in a responsible way is a means of sharpening our insight vis-à-vis Kuomintang leadership on the mainland prior to 1949.

NOTES

1. This observation has been made by Franz Schurmann in his *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966), p. 251. Schurmann's work is the most profound study to date of the Communist Chinese distinction between "leadership" and "administration"—that is, the "red"—"expert" dichotomy.

2. See, for example, Tai Chi-t'ao's representative statement (in *Sun-uen chü-i chih che-hsiieh ti chi-ch'u* [The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yat-senism] [Shanghai, 1925], p. 5): "If one understands the Three Principles of the People, then and only then is he a 'true-knower' (cheng-ch'ueh chih-chih) of the Chinese people and of the Revolutionary army."

The single prominent dissenting voice to Sun's elitist concept of leadership after 1927 was Hu Shih. As David Nivison has pointed out ("Knowledge' and 'Action' in Chinese Thought since Wang Yang-ming," in *Studies in Chinese Thought*, ed. Arthur F. Wright [Chicago, 1953], pp. 138-159), Hu's critiques of the authoritarianism of party ideology ("... as one knows, one acts a little better, and as one acts, one knows a little more," and "Dr. Sun's theory, 'Action is easy, knowledge is difficult,' teaches us that everybody can act and only a small number of people are charged with the task of knowing and discovering. The great number of people ought to look up to intelligence and knowledge, obey their leaders and follow their plans") drew immediate and sharp rebuff from KMT elders.

3. From an unpublished paper by Howard Boorman, "Provincialism and Politics in Republican China, 1911-1957," prepared for presentation to the International Conference of Asian Historians Meeting in Hong Kong, September 3, 1964.

4. This interpretation is not universally accepted by any means. Many argue that the lower classes merely sought a way out of the high rent-low

price-forced loan syndrome, caring not at all for what the party offered in the way of participation.

5. *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937* (Stanford, 1966), pp. 35-40.

6. See Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949* (Chapel Hill, 1966), pp. 354-357.

7. See Sun's speech of July, 1921, "Wu-ch'üan hsien-fa" (The Five Power Constitution) in *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi* (The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen) (Taipei, 1957), VI, 93-95.

8. From Sun's speeches "San Min Chu I yü Chung-kuo min-tsu chih ch'ien-t'u" (The Three Principles of the People and the Future of the Chinese Race), *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi*, III, 8-9 (trans. in Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals*, p. 344), and "Ts'ai-yung wu-ch'üan fen-li-chih yi ch'ou san-ch'üan ting-li chih pi" (Selective Adoption for the Five Power [Constitution] System as a Means of Correcting the Maladies of the Three Power [System]), *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi*, III, 150-151.

9. *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 233.

10. Sun's speech "Ts'ai-yung wu-ch'üan fen-li-chih . . .," p. 151.

11. The single most complete sourcebook for information on Examination Yuan organization is *K'ao-shih-yuan chih-cheng pien-nien-lu* (A Chronological Account of the Operations of the Examination Yuan, 1928-1941), ed. Ch'en T'ien-hsi (Chungking [?], 1944), hereafter cited as *KSYNL*. I am grateful to Mr. Ch'en of Taipei, Taiwan, for his generous assistance during my East-West Center study tour there in 1964-1965. Mr. Ch'en's position as Tai's private secretary and biographer as well as his continuous service in the Examination Yuan from 1928 to 1949 make him eminently qualified to record the institution's evolution. His biography of Tai (see n. 12, below) is extremely helpful in understanding the rationale behind many of Tai's organizational decisions which are not explained in *KSYNL* and which would otherwise be difficult to understand.

12. This thumbnail sketch is based on Ch'en T'ien-hsi's *Tai Chi-t'ao hsien-sheng pien-nien ch'üan-chi* (A Chronological Biography of Tai Chi-t'ao) (Taipei, 1958), hereafter cited as *TCTCC*, and my continuing research on Tai's role in the anti-Communist faction of the KMT.

13. Kuomintang definitions of terms like "civil officials" have always been broad. As Ch'en Tuan-sheng points out (*Government and Politics*, p. 149, n. 8), it is comparatively easier to define the limits of the bureaucracy negatively—that is, "it did not include the armed forces, police, employees of Government corporations engaged in business, and teachers in Government schools other than those directly maintained by the Central Government."

14. *KSYNL*, pp. 40-48.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

16. *TCTCC*, p. 64.

17. See, for example, the Chekiang Provincial Government's undated Petition to the Central Executive Committee of the KMT reported in *Chinese Affairs*, No. 90-91 (July 30, 1930), pp. 3-4.

18. *Ibid.*, No. 106-107 (November 30, 1950), pp. 2-3.

19. *KSYNL*, pp. 53-55.

20. The most comprehensive and easy to use sourcebooks on Examination Yuan statistics are the *Shen Pao Yearbooks* (in Chinese) for 1933-1936 and 1944 (hereafter cited as *SPNC*). The "Examination" (*K'ao-shih*) section of each yearbook is based entirely upon synopses of the various statistical yearbooks of the Ministry of Personnel and Examination Selection Commission of the preceding year. The various Examination Yuan yearbooks are unevenly accessible in this country, though valuable when obtainable. Statistics contained in the *Chinese Yearbooks* (in both Chinese and English) are, for the most part, too general to be of any value.

21. For a more detailed explanation of this law, see *The Chinese Yearbook, 1944-45* (English edition; Shanghai), pp. 254-255.

22. See *Ch'üan-hsü chih-tu* (The Personnel System), ed. Hsing-cheng-yuan hsin-wen-chü (The Information Bureau of the Executive Yuan) (Nanking, 1949) for an appended, unpaginated chart entitled "Kung-wu-yuan jen-jung an-shen-ch'a" (Evaluated Appointments of [Directly Appointed] Public Officials, [1934-1948]).

23. *The Ministry of Personnel Yearbook* (*Ch'üan-hsü nien-chien*) (Nanking 1934) charts on pp. 445-446 and 447. The ratio of non-party appointments to party-member appointments, broken down by civil service rank, were Selected rank, 50:50; Recommended rank, 60:40; and Delegated rank, 70:30.

24. See *The Chinese Yearbook, 1944-45*, p. 257, for a chart on the use of the Special Examinations.

25. *KSYNL*, pp. 57-59.

26. The events surrounding this examination session are recounted in minute detail in Hui Wen-chang's Ph.D. dissertation, "The Development of the Civil Service Examination System in China Since 1911" (Stanford University, 1952), pp. 404-410.

27. *SPNC*, 1933, p. J-3.

28. *Ibid.*, 1934, p. 299; and 1936, p. 95.

29. *TCTCC*, p. 81.

30. *SPNC*, 1933, p. J-3.

31. *Ibid.*, 1935, pp. 212-214.

32. *KSYNL*, pp. 146-147.

33. The figures in various sources conflict now and again. The figure 10,000 was arrived at by computing the examinations results in *SPNC* for 1934, 1935, and 1936, and in *TCTCC* through 1937.

34. The following criticisms by Lo Lang-chi, originally published in the *Crescent Moon* magazine (in Chinese, no date given) and subsequently translated in *Pacific Affairs* (III [June 1950], 578-588) under the title "My Frank Criticisms of Kuomintang [sic]," may be considered representative of leftist student skepticism of KMT institutions: "... the Council of Examinations of the National Government puts Party Principles as the first subject in the

examination for civil service. And in an interview given by the President of this Yuan, he states that one of the first qualifications for candidates for civil service is to have had a record in the Party. . . . It took the United States several decades of tireless effort before this evil [the Jacksonian spoils system] was eradicated. There is now a civil service system based on the following principles: (1) Civil servants are responsible to the State, not to the Party. They are not affected by Party changes; (2) The Board of Civil Service Examination is responsible to the State, not to the Party—no political party should constitute more than two-thirds of the membership on the Board; (3) The system is designed to safeguard the sanctity of freedom of thought and belief—there should be no tests on religious belief or political convictions given to the candidates; (4) Civil servants owe allegiance to the State, not to any political party—they should have no part in party activities of any kind. . . . If those who are eligible for office must be Party members then those who seek office will get into the Party. We do not mean that every Kuomintang member is an office seeker, but every office seeker will join the Kuomintang. A professional office seeker has no scruples."