

Joseph C. Grew and Turco- American Rapprochement 1927-1932

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I

In March, 1932, when Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew and his family left the Republic of Turkey, Turkish Premier Ismet İnönü wept as he said farewell to Mrs. Grew.¹ This emotional reaction to Grew's departure, symbolizing the feelings of the proud and nationalistic Turks, suggests that Grew's five-year mission in Turkey had succeeded, at least on a personal level. And the mission had been eminently successful on the diplomatic level as well. G. Howland Shaw, counselor of embassy in Turkey, in a dispatch to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, described the tangible results of Grew's work, emphasizing the value of his sympathetic, direct, and sincere approach. As Shaw explained it, Grew had

represented the United States in Turkey in the truest sense of the word, not by practicing a complicated art or science of diplomacy but by exemplifying day in and day out those qualities which win people the world over and draw them, not only to one's self as an individual, but to what one represents. Perhaps, after all, diplomacy is at the same time a simpler and a more difficult thing than some of us imagine.²

President Herbert Hoover's selection of Grew as ambassador to Japan implies that he shared Shaw's evaluation of Grew's work in Turkey.

Turkish-American rapprochement between 1927 and 1932 was due in part to the nature of Grew's approach and his excellence as a diplomat. The establishment of close ties with Turkey after a ten-year period of severed diplomatic relations was a substantial diplomatic achievement. Grew reflected the benevolent attitude of the United States toward a rampant Turkish nationalism in a period when Turkish policy forced some curtailment of American privileges and interests. Turkey's attitude toward the United States, while definitely tinged by stubborn nationalism, exemplified the new republic's attempt at international responsibility. Historians and the general public are more familiar with Ambassador Grew's work in Japan between 1932 and 1942 than with his earlier work in Turkey. This article emphasizes Grew's achievements but seeks also to shed some light on an important period in interwar Turkish-American relations.

II

While minister to Switzerland in 1922-1923, Grew ably represented the United States at the Lausanne Conference, serving as chief of the American delegation at the gathering's second phase between April and August, 1923. The Lausanne deliberations, made necessary by the success of Kemal Atatürk's nationalist movement and concurrent Allied inability to enforce the moribund Treaty of Sèvres (1920), resulted in a new Allied-Turkish treaty which restored Turkish sovereignty. A separate convention demilitarized the Straits under the supervision of an international commission headed by Turkey. On August 6, 1923, Grew and Ismet İnönü, the chief Turkish delegate, signed a new Turkish-American treaty designed to restore diplomatic relations (broken in April, 1917) and settle other outstanding problems.³ As undersecretary of state, a position he assumed soon after the Lausanne meetings, Grew helped direct the effort to secure Senate approval of the treaty.

Between 1924 and 1927, Grew and other advocates of the Lausanne pact faced an increasingly vocal opposition professing concern about the plight of the persecuted Armenians, the "selfish" American oil and tobacco interests in Turkey, and the

character of Kemal Atatürk's government.⁴ The major basis for opposition in the Senate was political; the Democrats in their 1924 platform recorded displeasure with the treaty negotiated by a Republican administration. Democratic Senators Claude A. Swanson of Virginia and William H. King of Utah, with strong vocal support from Armenian and other anti-Turkish groups in the United States, led those hostile to the treaty. The Senate vote on January 18, 1927, was 50-34, six short of the necessary two-thirds majority.⁵

Many American newspapers criticized the Senate action and assigned the defeat to politics and lack of understanding about the new Turkey.⁶ Grew and others who had worked for approval of the treaty agreed. Years later Grew observed that the treaty issue

was purely a question of domestic Democratic politics at the time--the Armenian element in New York having been strong enough to get their case included in the Democratic platform and to enlist the support, undoubtedly by copious funds to the Democratic campaign, of a small but aggressive group of American senators and bishops. Senators King and Swanson were not open to argument, and Borah, leading the defense, was not sufficiently interested to fight with his usual fire; he merely read long excerpts from printed reports and everybody went to sleep, while Swanson and King used all the oratory at their command to persuade the Senate that I had bartered away the interests of the United States for a mess of pottage in a "nefarious" treaty, and they won by 6 votes which swung to them at the last moment.⁷

Typical of Turkish reaction was the comment in the Istanbul *Djoumhouriet*: "We must bear in mind that America does not know Turkey. We realize full well, moreover, the campaign which has been waged . . . to prejudice Americans against us Realizing as we do that the truth will prevail, we need not feel the slightest alarm or nervousness over the strange action of the American Senate, which has been dictated entirely by prejudice and emotion instead of reason."⁸ President Atatürk expressed similar views, as Admiral Mark L. Bristol, United States high commissioner in Turkey, recorded in his diary: "It was his [Atatürk's] belief that irrespective of 'recent events' there existed

no fundamental reason why a complete harmony should not exist between the enlightened product of the New World and the new product of the Old World."⁹

Senate rejection of the treaty did not prevent the State Department from restoring diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1927. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg instructed Bristol to explain to the Turkish government "that the executive branch of your Government has spared no efforts to obtain the approval of the treaty by the Senate, and that the explanation of the negative action of the Senate is to be found in the domestic political situation in the United States." On February 17, 1927, Bristol and Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşdü Aras exchanged notes providing for restoration of formal diplomatic relations through an exchange of ambassadors, later negotiations on major outstanding issues, and continuation of a commercial *modus vivendi* originated in 1926.¹⁰ Through executive action, the State Department implemented some of the Lausanne terms and provided a basis for later regularization of Turco-American relations.

III

Grew's experience in Turkish affairs qualified him for the ambassador's post, and it was no surprise when rumors that he would get the position proved true in May, 1927. Grew's personal relations with Secretary Kellogg had not been notably cordial, and there was dissension in the Department about foreign service appointment procedures, one of Grew's concerns as chairman of the Personnel Board.¹¹ But Grew's qualifications overrode these handicaps and he wanted the new appointment, as he indicated in a letter to his uncle:

I am very keen about the job as there is some important constructive work to be done in Angora [Ankara] and I am keenly interested in the development of the new Turkey . . . I wanted a working rather than a social post and Turkey fills the bill in that respect.¹²

Grew's designation was generally applauded, but challenges from recognized opponents of Turkey, including Senators King and Swanson, helped delay Senate approval until April 13, 1928.

In addition to being Democrats in opposition to a Republican treaty, King and Swanson were influenced strongly by anti-Turkish Armenians in the United States as well as by religious groups and leaders who considered the Turkish government unacceptable on moral grounds. In the Senate debate on the nomination, King argued that the February, 1927, notes and the exchange of ambassadors were "a serious and unwarranted infringement by the Executive on the constitutional powers of the Senate and a violation of both the spirit and letter of the constitution."¹⁸

Grew and his family reached Turkey on September 18, 1927, several months before his confirmation. The remarks of Bertha Carp, a veteran secretary at the Istanbul embassy, describe their arrival:

Well the Grews are arriving Sunday with femme de chambre, valet de chambre, chambermaid, maitre d'hotel, and ninety nine more on his string. The van has arrived and it took weeks to assure the Turks that the States is not contemplating war on them when they saw such a thing that weighed tons with loaded stuff which had to pass "unopened." Finally we convinced them and then people came from all quarters to see this huge van and gaze at it.¹⁴

While Mrs. Grew began the task of redecorating the embassy, Grew saw Foreign Minister Aras on September 22, 1927, and President Atatürk formally received him on October 12.¹⁵ Thus his mission as the first post-World War I ambassador to Turkey began.

One of Grew's first tasks was to persuade Turkish ambassador-designate Ahmed Mouhtar to leave immediately for the United States. The Turks claimed they needed time to arrange for housing and a staff in Washington, but Grew suspected that Mouhtar's distaste for ocean travel contributed to his tardiness in leaving home.¹⁶ Because bitter enemies of Turkey, especially Armenians, severely criticized Mouhtar and even threatened to assassinate him, the Secret Service protected him from the time of his arrival in New York until he was established in a Washington hotel. In his diary Grew expressed his concern for Mouhtar's safety and his own: "If the Armenians in the United States get old Mouhtar, the Government might just as well send a

battleship for my remains without waiting for the event, for it won't take long." Although Grew did make explanations, the Turkish government understood the situation and recognized the sincere cordiality of the United States government.¹⁷

IV

The Turkey encountered by Grew in 1927 presented many contrasts to the nation which a decade earlier had broken diplomatic relations with the United States. Successfully overcoming the restrictions of the harsh Treaty of Sèvres, the Turks quickly re-established themselves in an important position on the international scene and initiated a vast program of domestic reform speedily reflected on the face of the nation.¹⁸ These changes forced the American people to alter their thinking about Turkey and forget the ancient but outmoded stereotype of the "Terrible Turk." Grew, who often confided to his diary great admiration for Turkey's accomplishments under Atatürk's rule, recognized that the Turkish revolution was due to "a keen and forceful nationalistic spirit," similar to that in America in 1776. On his return to the United States in 1932, Grew praised the Turkish people for their rapid progress, and declared outdated such expressions as "Terrible Turk" and "Sick Man of Europe."¹⁹

As part of his constant effort to improve the Turkish image in the United States, Grew stressed to the Turkish government the need for good public relations to counter anti-Turkish comments frequently appearing in American newspapers. He urged Turkish officials to write articles for American publications and promoted the filming of a movie of Atatürk at his model farm near Ankara.²⁰ To promote cordial Turco-American relations, Grew capitalized on the visits to Turkey of Americans like Russell Boardman and John Polando, who in July, 1931, set a new world's record when they flew from New York to Istanbul nonstop in forty-nine hours. Grew, perhaps uncritically enthusiastic, thought the feat did "more to consolidate the affections of Turkey for the United States than could have been accomplished by years of careful diplomacy" and that "the beneficial effects of the flight on Turco-American relations and on our

work here are incalculable. . . ."²¹ In a letter to Boardman, Grew wrote:

If you can now . . . give our own people a few plain facts about what modern Turkey is trying to accomplish and [point out] that the Turk himself is not such a bad sort of person and deserves the friendship and support of public opinion at home, you will be adding to the great work which you have already done. The real Turk, with all his good qualities, has never really been known or understood in our country. . . .²²

Grew's public relations activities helped prepare the ground for his more formal diplomatic work, to which this article now turns.

V

Historically, from the late eighteenth century, trade had been one of the major bases for Turco-American contact; the first treaty between the two countries, signed in 1830, was essentially a commercial treaty. Grew worked almost constantly to facilitate trade and promote its expansion. When he arrived, trade relations operated on the basis of the *modus vivendi* originated in February, 1926.²³ The Department of State desired a new treaty, but it hesitated to open negotiations which "might encourage further anti-Turkish agitation in the United States and . . . compromise the growing sentiments of friendliness toward Turkey . . ." Grew worried about this basis for delaying negotiations: "If I have to tell the Ruschdi [Foreign Minister Aras]," Grew wrote to a State Department friend, "that we are frankly unwilling to negotiate a treaty with Turkey for fear of stirring up further anti-Turkish agitation among the public and the Senate, are they going to bear with us sympathetically or are they going to climb up on their high horse? You can guess as well as I can." Grew did feel that the Turks should not be approached on treaty matters with a hat-in-hand attitude and that the United States would benefit if Turkey familiarized itself with accepted treaty forms through negotiations with other countries.²⁴

In September, 1929, after overtures from the Turkish government, Grew negotiated a short treaty, highly satisfactory to

both countries, in which each extended most-favored-nation treatment on import and export duties and guaranteed equal treatment in matters of prohibition or restrictions on imports and exports.²⁵ Grew described the ease of the negotiations in his diary:

Practically all of our conferences were informal and there was no initialing of paragraphs or anything of that kind, and no stenographers were present except at the opening plenary session. Once a point had been orally accepted, no matter how informally, we simply put it aside and it appeared in the final text. In fact, after the first plenary session the negotiations developed into a series of informal conversations which made them much simpler and more agreeable and both sides were able to talk much more openly and freely than if the discussions had been formal.²⁶

The Turks were eager to sign this treaty, Grew believed, because of their favorable balance of trade with the United States, their hope to attract American companies and capital for public works programs, and recognition of the "moral prestige" accompanying such a treaty. Furthermore, as Grew put it, Turkey "understands the danger of another rebuff in the United States Senate and does not want to jeopardize the treaty's ratification by insisting upon unreasonable provisions with us."²⁷

State Department officials, including Secretary Stimson, were elated with the treaty but anxious about possible Senate opposition. Grew, worried about his personal position, wrote to Howland Shaw: "Let us pray. If the Senate refuses this treaty I don't see how I can continue to face the Turkish Government—and I don't believe I could or would." Resistance in the Senate, led by Claude Swanson, the perennial opponent of Turkey, proved limited, and the group gave its approval on April 10, 1930.²⁸ Years later, Grew summed up his feelings: "By that time the Armenians . . . had shot their bolt, and, while this second treaty was not one-half as favorable to American interests as the first one [1923], it passed the Senate *viva voce* without even a tallied vote. Such are politics! But I was satisfied."²⁹

This agreement, a significant milestone along the path of Turco-American rapprochement, provided the basis for subsequent negotiations for a treaty of establishment and residence.

The Turks suggested such a treaty and provided a formula for it when they signed the commercial treaty on October 1, 1929. The State Department declined to move until after the Senate approved the commercial treaty; when that was accomplished Grew urged fast action. He thought it would be better to deal with the Turks while they were in a receptive frame of mind, and, if necessary, delay submission of the treaty to the Senate, than to postpone negotiations.³⁰ The Department allowed Grew to inform the Turkish government "in strict confidence" that negotiations could begin late in September, 1930, with the hope that the completed treaty could be sent to the Senate when it convened in December of the same year. The Department felt that this procedure would demonstrate American sincerity and "obviate the risk of organized opposition in the United States . . . which might develop were there to intervene a considerable period between the treaty's signature and its presentation to the Senate."³¹

Grew participated actively in twelve months of hard and complicated negotiations culminating with the signature of the treaty on October 28, 1931. Technical questions delayed accord, but the crucial point became clear at the initial negotiation session when the Turks insisted on inclusion of an article stating that "all previous treaties between Turkey and the United States of a similar nature would thereby terminate." Grew, thinking of Armenian-Americans, told the Turks that the provision was inadmissible since, as he noted in his diary, "it would unquestionably give valuable ammunition to Turkey's enemies in the United States, of which there were still plenty, and . . . it would undoubtedly wreck the treaty. . . ." The State Department, disagreeing with Grew, observed that "such a Turkish interpretation would be of great assistance to the United States Government eventually in the presentation of claims against Turkey, because it would prevent the Turks from claiming then that the American capitulatory rights in Turkey ended in 1914." Grew was instructed not to reject the Turkish proposal and to "bear in mind that the treaty of 1830 must be disposed of eventually . . ."³² Later the Turks presented a new formula stating that "there exists between the two countries no provisions regulating

the conditions" of establishment and sojourn. The State Department rejected this because the 1927 notes did contain such provisions, and American agreement might imply recognition that the Capitulations had been legally abrogated in 1914. Grew perceived that Turkish fear of the Capitulations and refusal of the United States to accept their abrogation as of 1914 were weighty obstacles in the path of successful negotiations. Demonstrating his virtuosity and tact, Grew, with the State Department's permission, told Prime Minister Ismet İnönü

that the Department is fully alive to the changes which have taken place in Turkey in recent years; that its sole desire is that the development of treaty relations between the two countries should proceed upon the basis of these changed conditions; . . . that it is a matter of sincere regret to the Department that the anxiety of the Turkish Government with respect to the past should have on more than one occasion delayed the complete regularization of the treaty relations between the two countries.

When Grew and Foreign Minister Aras signed the completed treaty, Grew reaffirmed the statement.³³

Basically, the new treaty provided for most-favored-nation treatment in regard to establishment and sojourn, fiscal charges, and judicial competence. On the day it was signed, Grew noted in his diary: "It is a profound satisfaction to have our treaty relations with Turkey now pretty well established, provided the Senate ratifies this last one, and I can't see how it can refuse to do so." The Senate did approve the settlement on May 3, 1932, with the only noticeable opposition coming from Senator King of Utah, who argued that the treaty was one of a series designed to circumvent the defeat of the Lausanne Treaty.³⁴ The treaty of establishment and sojourn, by guaranteeing most-favored-nation treatment for Americans residing in Turkey, eliminated their previous informal status. In arranging this pact, a significant and valuable companion to the new commercial treaty, Grew again exhibited his skill in diplomacy and further stimulated Turkish-American rapprochement. Not insignificant was the fact that the exchange of ratifications made it possible for the two countries to proceed to the settlement of another old and difficult issue, the claims problem.³⁵ As time passed and

tempers cooled, the task of regularizing Turco-American relations became easier. Slowly but surely the gap left by the rejected Treaty of Lausanne narrowed.

VI

In addition to the treaties he negotiated, one must note Grew's successful handling of the more mundane duties of a diplomat in the field. His approach to everyday problems, based on a realistic appraisal of Turkish nationalism and a practical conception of diplomacy, perhaps contributed more than the treaties to the cementing of close Turkish-American friendship.

For example, Grew devoted much time to economic concerns—the protection and promotion of American trade and business interests, assistance to potential American investors in Turkey, and encouragement of Turkish efforts to secure American assistance with their economic development plans.³⁵ There were obstacles and frustrations for Grew in his efforts to expand economic relations. The Atatürk government's fear that foreign economic activity in Turkey might mean political domination was not the least important; the legacies of the Capitulations and the Ottoman public debt continued to irritate the Turks and discourage foreign investment.³⁷ The unfortunate collapse of the so-called Chester Concession in 1923, because the American group involved failed to meet the contract terms, left a bad impression with the Turks. Grew observed that the Chester episode "materially injured Turkish faith in American business concerns. . ."³⁸ Turkish laws on taxes, banking, and labor also deterred American investors and traders.³⁹

In 1930, after overtures from Turkish officials, Grew encouraged the sending of a financial mission seeking loans in the United States, even though he doubted that the group would succeed, given the development of the Depression. Grew told Secretary Stimson that the mission headed by former finance minister Sükrü Saracoglu "affords an excellent opportunity to develop favorably the relations of the two countries. . ." and that "his observations of American business conditions, systems and methods will prove useful to his own country." The cordial

reception the Saracoglu mission received in the United States had beneficial effects on Turco-American relations, even though the group failed to secure any money.⁴⁰

Grew participated in three series of negotiations on loans and concessions between the Turkish government and American concerns. Discussions in 1927 involving the American-Oriental Bankers Corporation of Delaware and the Fox Brothers International Corporation of New York did not lead to final contracts.⁴¹ In 1930, the Turkish-American Investment Corporation of Delaware contracted to lend Turkey \$10,000,000 in gold bars in return for a twenty-five-year monopoly of the match industry. The company had shipped \$8,500,000 in gold to Turkey by 1932 when its parent, the Swedish International Match Company, went bankrupt. Although the contract was not fully implemented because of the Depression, the Turkish-American Investment Corporation's large loan and its match monopoly was the only significant instance of American participation in Turkish economic development during Grew's tenure in Turkey.⁴²

VII

Ambassador Grew's most difficult and time-consuming task was caring for the interests of American missionary-educators. Traditionally, the educational enterprises of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had been the most important American commitment in Turkey, and although somewhat scaled down after World War I, continued to be important. In missionary activity especially, Americans encountered the rampant and xenophobic nationalism characteristic of Turkey in this period. By the time Grew arrived the secularization movement, begun slowly when Atatürk came to power, had increased in intensity.⁴³ American schools were Christian institutions in a Muslim nation, and the Turks were aware of the role American missionaries played in propagating the "Terrible Turk" stereotype. They suspected that mission schools would be used as vehicles for the spread of foreign culture. A Turkish newspaper, when complaining about "unnamed Christianity," asserted that American schools aimed to plant in Turkish pupils "gradually

and unconsciously Christian ways and beliefs under the name of character building . . ."⁴⁴ Grew worked diligently to protect legitimate missionary interests, but he recognized these Turkish attitudes and fears. As he noted, "It is not religion but cultural nationalism that is the stumbling block. Christianizing to the Turk means the weaning of Turkish youth away from Turkish nationalism and all that the term implies."⁴⁵

In 1927 American educators in Turkey faced difficult problems. Several schools closed during World War I and after had not been allowed to reopen; classrooms were to be free of religious symbols and instruction; certain subjects could be taught only by government-appointed Turkish teachers; all teachers needed government approval; and potentially crippling special taxes had been levied.⁴⁶ After weathering a series of crises, Grew left Turkey in 1932 confident that he had succeeded in protecting American educational interests without seriously antagonizing Turkish nationalism. Although there were problems in dealing with Turkish officialdom on the schools question, the Turkish government generally acted responsibly; certainly Grew's personal attitude and his diplomatic approach helped ensure continuation of the American educational effort.⁴⁷ In a diary entry describing one of his first trips to the Turkish capital, Grew clarified his attitude:

I don't want them [the Turkish government] to feel that every time I come to Angora it is for the purpose of asking for something, nor do I want them to feel that I am going to use my position to demand all sorts of rights for American scholastic and philanthropic institutions in opposition to their own wishes. If they don't want American schools and other institutions, it is not for us to cram them down their throats; the days of the capitulations are over. . . .

About the same time Grew wrote to a friend, "I shall not be rushed into anything by the missionaries and educators."⁴⁸ Grew faithfully represented these Americans, but he did not support their petitions when he thought they were unjustified or when he suspected that in so doing harm would result to the friendly relations between the two countries.

Illustrative of the schools problem was the proselytizing controversy in 1928 at the mission school at Bursa. Some Muslim

girls studying at the school, apparently attracted to Christianity through examples set by three American teachers, recorded their feelings in diaries which fell into the hands of Turkish officials. After an investigation the government charged the teachers with violations of Turkish laws against proselytizing and closed the school on the grounds that it was guilty of disseminating religious propaganda.⁶⁰ Two tasks faced Grew: to protect the interests of the accused teachers, and to get the school reopened. The fact that Turkish newspapers gave extensive notice to the events at Bursa complicated Grew's work; the nationalistic inclination of the Turks as reflected in the press demonstrated that this was something more than a mere question of the conversion of some Turkish girls. Grew reported to Secretary Kellogg that "the Turkish press . . . has been inflammatory and has called upon Turkish parents to take their children away from these mission schools lest they be contaminated by foreign influence" and that in the Bursa case "the religious issue was subordinate . . . but the interpretation of the religious issue as an anti-nationalistic tendency was of serious moment and called forth the Government's drastic action. . . . Cultural-nationalism was the underlying cause and determining factor."⁶¹

Because Grew believed that the Turks had a valid case against the teachers, he found it difficult to intervene directly. He summed up his feelings in a letter to his friend Howland Shaw: "The school incident is bad, very bad. But they had it coming to them and it came." To Kellogg he wrote that it was quite clear the teachers at Bursa broke faith with the Turkish government and that the government's actions "cannot properly be resented." Grew was franker in his diary about the mission schools: ". . . while they may not conduct open religious propaganda their main purpose is to proselytize and the teachers aim to accomplish this quietly by showing themselves living examples of the benefits of Christianity."⁶² When the Turks closed the school, Kellogg suggested informal contacts, stating that "publicity now on this particular issue [religious propaganda] can only bring unfortunate results [in the United States]."⁶³ Grew agreed, believing that the Turkish government would "ultimately appreciate my having kept out of the row while it was at its

height and for this very reason will be more kindly disposed when the time for action is ripe than if I had gone off at half cock." In informal talks with Foreign Minister Aras on February 7, Grew accentuated the adverse effects closing of the school had on public opinion in the United States and the harm that a continued drastic policy would do to Turco-American relations. Grew asked Aras to discourage the hostile press campaign in Turkey, state that the incident was sporadic and did not compromise other institutions, avoid prosecution of the teachers, and consider reopening the Bursa school. Aras agreed to all but elimination of the trial, but later backed down on his pledge to consider reopening the school.⁸³

While Grew negotiated quietly in Ankara, State Department officials discussed the Bursa case with Turkish representatives in Washington. The stress in these talks was not on the substance of the charges but rather on adverse effects the case might have in the United States on congressional opinion, church circles, women's organizations, and individual opponents of Turkey. "Trying in a Turkish court on a charge of carrying on religious propaganda of three American women will do much to convince the American public of Turkey's still being fanatically Moslem," the Turks in Washington were told.⁸⁴

The three teachers were tried, convicted on April 30, 1928, and sentenced to three days house imprisonment and fines of three lire each. When he reported the trial to Kellogg, Grew observed: "It seems to me quite clear that the teachers were not fairly convicted on the evidence and that the verdict was a foregone conclusion, due either to direct instructions from Angora or to the unwillingness of the judge to place the Ministry of Public Instruction in an embarrassing position by an acquittal." Earlier, Grew wrote in his diary: "I hear that the witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense lied with equal facility so that no particular advantage was gained on either side in that respect."⁸⁵

In the long run, the Bursa case did little harm to American missionary-educators in Turkey; the light sentences and the absence of any widespread reprisals suggested that the Turks were not campaigning to eliminate all foreign schools, as Grew

had first suspected. In general, missionary interests felt that the Bursa case did not weaken their position. One missionary described it as "a blessing in disguise" and thought "it may be the means to clarifying our position and helping us to estimate the real value of our education work under present restrictions. I think more good than evil will come out of it...." The American Board report for 1928 pointed out that relationships between the missionaries and the Turkish government "continued to improve" after the Bursa episode and that "the whole influence of the... incident had been to clarify the position of the American Board in Turkey and to make more clear to the officials of the Turkish government our genuine purpose to be of service to their people."⁵⁶

This moderate settlement of a serious problem can be attributed not only to the enlightened attitude of the missionaries and the moderation of the Turkish government, but also to Grew's skillful approach as a diplomat. In commenting on the informal methods he used during the Bursa events, Grew remarked: "It helped the Turks to save their face and brings results far more effectively than pugnacity...." Fred Field Goodsell, American Board leader in Istanbul, testified to Grew's contributions: "Our Ambassador, Mr. Grew, has been wonderfully friendly during these days. I cannot find words to express my admiration both for his kindly attitude and his diplomatic skill." In a case so directly involving Turkish nationalism, Grew performed with tact; he avoided forcing the clash between secularism and religious teaching to a head, and acted responsibly and effectively in meeting his obligations to American national interests. Grew's management of the Bursa affair illustrates his sophistication as a diplomat.⁵⁷

VIII

In a less obvious and never sensational manner, American social, cultural, and philanthropic interests in Turkey helped to further Turkish-American cordiality. Among these activities was the medical work of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, which operated three hospitals in Turkey when

Grew arrived. He aided these institutions when they needed diplomatic representation, most notably to secure permission for American doctors to work in them.⁵⁸ Grew discovered when he arrived in Istanbul that the independent American hospital there, founded in 1920, was on the verge of closing because of financial difficulties. In February, 1928, the advisory committee of Americans supervising the hospital's operations actually decided to begin its liquidation.⁵⁹ Grew, believing that the American hospital should continue not only because it served the American community but also because it was a symbol of American good will, took leadership in the campaign to save it. Although he failed to secure funds from two original contributors to the hospital—the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Red Cross—he did persuade J. Pierpont Morgan to donate \$6,000 when he visited Istanbul in April, 1928. This contribution and others from the American colony kept the hospital alive for the time being; Grew's work was a decisive factor. When the hospital was faced with another financial crisis in 1930, Grew and Admiral Bristol sparked a successful fund drive in the United States.⁶⁰

Grew also assisted in arrangements for the construction of a new American hospital in Turkey, established with \$1,000,000 provided in the will of Morris Schinasi, a Turkish immigrant to the United States who made a fortune as a wholesale tobacco merchant and manufacturer of Turkish cigarettes. Mrs. Schinasi and Turkish officials laid the cornerstone for the new hospital in the city of Manisa in May, 1930. The Turkish government co-operated by donating the land for the hospital and admitting free of customs duties its initial shipments of equipment and drugs.⁶¹ The Schinasi hospital was an example of the kind of American philanthropy highly valued by Ambassador Grew and the Turks.

In addition, Grew encouraged the work of American-sponsored archaeologists, another stimulus to friendship between Turkey and the United States. Shortly before Grew arrived, an archaeological expedition headed by Dr. Hans H. Von der Osten of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago began operations in Turkey. The group, interested mainly in the Hittites, excavated a large mound near the Anatolian village of

Alishar and later expanded its operations over a large area of Asia Minor, believed to have been the seat of the Hittite Empire. Von der Osten, actually a German national, established excellent relationships with the Turkish government, which generously permitted him to take specimens of his archaeological finds out of Turkey to the United States, a practice normally prohibited by Turkish law. Grew thought this group made substantial contributions to cementing Turco-American ties. "It is my opinion," he wrote to Stimson in 1930, "that this expedition and its members have added considerably to America's prestige in Turkey . . ."⁶²

Also contributing to the development of Turkish-American friendship was the progress Grew made in his efforts to eliminate the illicit narcotics traffic. The Turkish government was reluctant to impose strict controls on the production and export of narcotics because they were an important source of income, but Grew and his successors worked hard to alleviate the problem, and the Turks in general co-operated. In 1930 and 1931, when federal agents in New York seized several illegal shipments, Grew and Turkish Ambassador Ahmed Mouhtar pointed out to Foreign Minister Aras that these activities provoked very unfavorable publicity for Turkey in the United States. Grew's representations helped influence the Turkish government in February, 1931, to seal the narcotics factories temporarily and to place strict controls on the manufacture and shipment of narcotics.⁶³ Grew became even more emphatic in his protests when he discovered that illicit shipments continued. Before he left Turkey in 1932, Grew told the Foreign Office that the narcotics problem was the "one unfortunate element which could exert an adverse effect . . ." on the good relationships between Turkey and the United States. Grew laid the groundwork for later effective curtailment of the illegal traffic in narcotics.⁶⁴

IX

A final significant area of Grew's diplomatic activity related to instruments to ensure peaceful settlement of disputes and the avoidance of war. Grew went to Turkey at the time Secretary

of State Kellogg was promoting a series of bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties. When he explained this program to Grew, Kellogg suggested that such treaties, presumably acceptable to the United States Senate, "might furnish an effective commencement of treaty relations between the two Governments" and give the Turks "the satisfaction of having formal treaty relations with the United States." Grew believed that the Turkish government "would welcome the moral effect of such a treaty . . ." and even before he could make proposals, Aras broached the subject to Grew.⁶⁵ When Grew presented the draft treaties, it became obvious immediately that the Armenians would be a major obstacle to agreement. Aras indicated his willingness to sign the treaties if they included clauses making it impossible for the United States to invoke them on behalf of the Armenians, suggesting that a formula to this effect "could be phrased in such a way as to avoid any possible offense to American public opinion or to the American Senate." Such a procedure was of course unacceptable to both Grew and the Department. Aras further complicated the negotiations with his explanation of the term "domestic jurisdiction," which he insisted covered "questions involving sovereignty and . . . questions which international law leaves to the exclusive competence of States"; this meant he would not consent to invocation of the treaty in problems the Turks considered purely internal, including the Armenian question. Because Aras and Grew were a long distance apart, they ceased negotiations for several months.⁶⁶ Aras did not provide grounds for agreement when he reopened the subject in an *aide-mémoire* to Grew in January, 1929. Alluding to the old Turco-American treaty of 1830 and the still disputed Capitulations, Aras suggested a clause "to insure that the provisions of the treaty of arbitration shall not be applicable to disputes and litigations arising from events which originated previous to the putting into effect of the treaty." Grew considered the possibility of accord remote at the time. The "bugaboo of the Treaty of 1830 and the Capitulations . . .," he told Kellogg, would have to be eliminated before the problem could be solved. After the ratification of the treaty of residence and sojourn in 1932, the State Department informally sounded out the Turkish govern-

ment on reopening talks, but it still would not accept the American formula.⁶⁷ Thus, while Grew did not succeed in these negotiations, the two countries did exhibit their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Another demonstration of this commitment during Grew's years in Turkey involved the famous but ill-fated Kellogg-Briand Pact. While the pact was being negotiated, Foreign Minister Aras expressed great interest, and considered proposing formally to the Paris conferees that they provide for automatic neutrality of all third countries in a bilateral dispute. But he agreed not to make this suggestion when Grew argued that it would further complicate the already difficult negotiations. Grew did urge Kellogg to invite Turkey to join the original signatories, believing that such a move would enhance American prestige, promote the westernization of Turkey, and draw that country somewhat away from Soviet influence. Grew also thought that "the moral effect of including the leading power of the near and middle East would be considerable in the eyes of the world."⁶⁸ Kellogg rejected Grew's suggestion, feeling that if Turkey was invited various other countries would have to be also, delaying the conclusion of the pact. On August 27, 1928, when the pact was signed in Paris, Grew suggested to Aras that Turkey utilize its provisions for ratification by non-original signatories. Aras indicated that Turkey would adhere without reservations, and, no doubt as a prestige effort, the Turkish government resolved to be the first nation to ratify the pact after the United States. On December 12, 1928, Aras advised Grew that the proposal to ratify the Kellogg-Briand Pact was on the calendar of the Grand National Assembly and that it would be considered the minute the United States Senate had given its advice and consent. Grew requested Kellogg to send him a "flash" telegram when the Senate acted.⁶⁹ The Senate approved the pact on January 16, 1929, and the Turks followed suit three days later.

Grew described the events in his diary:

The Turkish Grand National Assembly yesterday unanimously ratified the Kellogg Pact, Tewfik Rushdi Bey [Aras] getting out of a sickbed especially to make the speech necessary to put it through and then returning to bed immediately thereafter. It looks as if he

did wish to be the first to ratify after the United States and I imagine that he has succeeded. This ought to make a good impression at home. . . . I feel rather proud that this promptness on the part of the Turkish Government . . . may be due, in some small measure, to my various talks with the Minister on the side lines. . . .⁷⁰

In practice, of course, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was almost useless, and Turkey, even though anxious to emulate the United States in ratifying the document, contributed to its ineffectiveness. A dispute erupted between China and the Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway, causing Secretary Stimson to invoke the pact in July, 1929, and again in the following November when local military action took place. On December 1, 1929, Stimson sent special instructions directing American representatives to ask the signatory nations, including Turkey, to make statements invoking the pact similar to the one he had just addressed to China and indirectly to the Soviet Union. The Turks declined Stimson's request, ostensibly because China and the Soviet Union were involved in direct negotiations aimed at settling the controversy. Grew reported that "the Russian Ambassador at Angora has held the ear of . . . [Aras] constantly and has convinced him that White Russians, serving with Chinese troops and inciting them, engineered the attacks in Manchuria." Grew continued: "The obviously biased, and in my view, unsatisfactory nature of the Turkish statement clearly is owing to the Foreign Minister's leaning toward Russia, perhaps based more on *viva* than love . . ."⁷¹ Later in December, Turkey and the Soviet Union extended for two years a treaty of friendship and neutrality originally signed in December, 1925. The Turkish government assured Grew that this protocol was not an alliance and that "no obstacle whatever exists to the development and the consolidation of Turco-American relations in every domain and that such development and consolidation is in no way whatever opposed by the recently signed protocol."⁷²

Quite obviously Turkish policy was determined by the realities of the situation, and the fact that the Turks merely paid lip-service to the Kellogg-Briand Pact at the time of its first challenge did not represent a personal diplomatic failure for

Grew. Turkey's initial response to the pact and its eagerness to ratify it demonstrated its similarity of views with the United States on the maintenance of international peace. On balance, the Kellogg-Briand Pact made a tangible contribution to Grew's personal efforts to strengthen Turco-American friendship.

X

This account of the career of Joseph Clark Grew as United States ambassador to the Republic of Turkey has revealed that Grew's diplomatic abilities, personal attitudes, and conceptions of his role contributed substantially to Turco-American rapprochement. Given the serious problems existing in relationships between the two countries when Grew arrived in 1927, his record was one of remarkable success. Certainly the improvement in Turkish-American relations cannot be explained exclusively in terms of Grew's personal role—Turkish national interest was also served—but it was an important factor. Grew understood the Turks and the realities of Turkish nationalism and based his relationships with the Turkish people and government on this understanding. A different, less discerning approach undoubtedly would have created further problems when it seemed essential for the United States to avoid such disputes. One has only to look into Grew's account of his years in Turkey in *Turbulent Era* and his personal papers to feel his enthusiasm for his work and to discover the basis for his success. To a friend in Boston, Grew wrote in June, 1928:

This is a great post; I wouldn't swap it for any other in the service—until they beg me to take the Court of St. James. The methods of the Turks sometimes make one furious but I certainly take my hat off to them for what they have accomplished in the last four years and are still accomplishing at an amazing pace. It is not particularly easy for an oriental nation to westernize themselves overnight, but that is what they are aiming at and it looks as if they were going to get away with it.⁷³

As Grew departed, the Turkish press praised his work and there were many expressions of personal regard, illustrated by his description of his last days in the Turkish capital:

I have never in my life seen such hospitality as the Turks have shown us. The other night Elsie [Grew's daughter] admired an oil painting of the Ankara citadel in Shukri Kaya's house; the next day it came to her with his good wishes. Ismet Pasha's secretary gave her a lesson in backgammon the other night and the next day around comes a beautiful new backgammon board with Ismet's compliments. Elsie remarked quite casually to Safvet that she was disappointed never to have had a chance to hear the Gazi's [Atatürk's] orchestra; the next day we were informed that a special concert had been arranged and we were asked to choose the program and bring any friends we wished. We asked for Tchaikovsky's Fifth Symphony, because it will always remind us of Turkey and the Bosphorus.⁷⁴

After he left the country Grew did not forget Turkey and the Turks did not forget him. As late as 1954, Grew spoke to the American Philosophical Society about his experiences at the Lausanne Conference.⁷⁵ When he died in May, 1965, there were expressions of deep sympathy from Turks. Altemur Kilic, information counselor at the Turkish Embassy in Washington, was among those who paid tribute:

The passing away of Ambassador Joseph C. Grew is a sad occasion for Turks. He was, indeed one of the first American diplomats who recognized the greatness of Atatürk and importance of the new Turkish Republic. It was he . . . who planted the seeds of Turkish-American friendship after 1927. He was held in high esteem by Atatürk during his service in Ankara. When I visited him in Washington in 1957, I realized that his admiration for our country and his efforts for Turkish-American friendship were not limited to his service in Turkey—but were deep-rooted. I would like to pay tribute to his memory.⁷⁶

Surely Grew made his mark, not only in the minds and hearts of the Turks but also in the annals of American diplomacy.

NOTES

1. Diary, March 3, 1932. *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1943*, ed. Walter Johnson (2 vols.; Boston, 1952), II, 916. A recent full-length biography of Grew is by Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Boston, 1966).

2. G. Howland Shaw to Henry L. Stimson, March 25, 1932, file 123 G861/475, Department of State Archives (National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59). State Department archival records hereafter cited as DS followed by file number.

3. For information on Grew's work at the Lausanne Conference, see *Turbulent Era*, I, 475-605, and John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis, 1963), pp. 128-166. For the text of the treaty and accompanying documents, see *Congressional Record*, 69 Cong., 1 Sess., LXVII, pt. 6, 6250-6256. For background, see Laurence Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924* (Baltimore, 1965).

4. Information on the treaty struggle and Grew's role can be found in *Turbulent Era*, I, 674-681; DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies*, pp. 153-166; and Roger R. Trask, "The Relations of the United States and Turkey, 1927-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1959), pp. 42-59. President Coolidge submitted the treaty to the Senate on May 3, 1924. See *Cong. Record*, 69 Cong., 1 Sess., LXVII, pt. 6, 6250. Manuscript collections with useful materials on the treaty struggle include the Joseph C. Grew MSS and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions MSS in Houghton Library, Harvard University; the William E. Borah, Calvin Coolidge, and Mark L. Bristol MSS in the Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; and State Department materials in Record Group 59 of the National Archives.

5. See *Turbulent Era*, I, 678, n. 20, for information on the 1924 stand of the Democratic party. King's resolution on the treaty, presented to the Senate on December 22, 1926, summarizing the stated reasons for opposition, is in *Cong. Record*, 69 Cong., 2 Sess., LXVIII, pt. 1, 910-911. See also the *New York Times*, December 24 and 26, 1926; the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 19, 1927; Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927* (3 vols., Washington, 1942), III, 766 (hereafter cited as *FR 1927*).

6. For examples of pro-treaty editorials, see Frank B. Kellogg to Mark L. Bristol, January 21, 1927, *FR 1927*, III, 769-770, and General Committee of American Institutions and Associations in Favor of Ratification of the Treaty with Turkey, *American Public Opinion Condemns the Failure to Ratify the American-Turkish Treaty* (New York, 1927). For editorial comment favoring the Senate action, see the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 25, 1927.

7. Grew to Mrs. J. Pierrepont Moffat [1936], *Turbulent Era*, I, 679. See also Joseph C. Grew, "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XCVIII (February 1954), 1-10.

8. Quoted in "Turkey and America," *The Living Age*, CCCXXXII (March 15, 1927), 491-492. See also Charles E. Allen (Consul, Istanbul), "Review of the Turkish Press," January 16-29, 1927, DS 867.9111/172. The Bristol MSS, Box 12, contains a large collection of Turkish press clippings and translations of articles on the treaty and related matters.

9. Bristol, "Confidential Diary," January 31, 1927, DS 867.00/1954.
10. Kellogg to Bristol, January 18, 1927, *FR 1927*, III, 766-767. Texts of the February 17, 1927, notes are in *ibid.*, 794-799. Originals are in Bristol to Kellogg, April 1, 1927, DS 711.672/587. Bristol's observations on his negotiations with Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşdü Aras are in his "Confidential Diary," January 22, 1927-February 17, 1927, Bristol MSS, Box 26.
11. Grew to Thomas S. Perry, February 27, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. IV; Grew to Arthur B. Lane, April 16, 1927, *ibid.*, 1927, Vol. III; the *New York Times*, May 18, 1927; Frederick (Maryland) *News*, March 19, 1927, clipping in Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. II; Grew to William R. Castle, Jr., September 11, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, I, 652-653; editor's note, *ibid.*, 698-699, 702-704; Grew to Alexander C. Kirk, July 15, 1927, *ibid.*, 705.
12. Grew to Henry S. Grew, May 25, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. III.
13. See Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. II, for a large collection of clippings on the Grew appointment. For an example of opposition sentiment, see James W. Gerard to Kellogg, letter made public on June 22, 1927, quoted in *Turbulent Era*, II, 710, n. 3. Grew was given an interim appointment in May, 1927; the formal nomination reached the Senate on December 6, 1927. See *Sen. Ex. Journal*, 70 Cong., 1 Sess., LXVI, pt. 1, 47. For information on the confirmation, see *ibid.*, 643, 650, 655-656, 671; diary, April 6, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, II, 772; Grew to Robert W. Bliss, June 9, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. I; *Cong. Record*, 70 Cong., 1 Sess., LXIX, pt. 6, 6142-6143.
14. To Admiral and Mrs. Bristol, September 18, 1927, Bristol MSS, Box 12.
15. Diary, September 27 and October 12, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; diary, September 22, 1927, *Turbulent Era*, II, 719-722.
16. Diary, October 31 and November 15, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; conversation, Grew and Aras, November 3, 1927, *Turbulent Era*, II, 744-745; the *New York Times*, November 15, 1927.
17. The *New York Times*, November 28, November 29, and December 1, 1927; the *Washington Post*, November 29, 1927; Kellogg to Grew, November 29, 1927, DS 701.6711/213A; diary, November 15, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; diary, December 10, 1927, *Turbulent Era*, II, 749; Grew to Bristol, December 23, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. III; diary, January 10, 1928, *ibid.*, 1928, Vol. III.
18. For information on the Turkish reform movement, see Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, 1959); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York, 1961); Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950* (Philadelphia, 1951); Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Transformation* (Philadelphia, 1939); and Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).
19. Editor's note, *Turbulent Era*, II, 708; the *New York Times*, April 12, 1932. See Selma Ekrem, *Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl* (New

York, 1942), for impressions of the "Terrible Turk" stereotype as the author encountered it in the United States.

20. Diary, February 15, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, II, 763-764; Grew to G. Howland Shaw, August 1, 1928, DS 867.00/1998; Shaw to Grew, August 6, 1928, *ibid.*; diary, November 11, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; Grew to Jefferson Patterson, January 26, 1931, *ibid.*, 1931, Vol. I. The film, because of certain objections by the Turkish government, was never circulated.

21. Diary, July 27-August 10, 1931, *Turbulent Era*, II, 888-899; the quotations are on pp. 888 and 890.

22. October 12, 1931, Grew MSS, 1931, Vol. I.

23. For information on the 1830 treaty, see Leland James Gordon, *American Relations With Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia, 1932), pp. 8-12. The text is in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1956* (2 vols.; Princeton, 1956), I, 102-105. Text of the *modus vivendi* is in Bristol to Kellogg, March 1, 1926, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926* (3 vols.; Washington, 1941), II, 999-1000. The arrangement was renewed in July, 1926, February, 1927, May, 1928, and April, 1929, pending negotiation of a regular commercial treaty. See Grew to Kellogg, May 22, 1928, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928* (3 vols.; Washington, 1942-1943), III, 953 (hereafter cited as *FR 1928*); Grew to Henry L. Stimson, April 9, 1929, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929* (3 vols.; Washington, 1943-1944), III, 814-818 (hereafter cited as *FR 1929*).

24. Kellogg to Grew, December 26, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 962-963; Grew to Shaw, February 27, 1929, Grew MSS, 1929, Vol. II; Grew to Shaw, November 21, 1927, *ibid.*, 1927, Vol. IV.

25. For information on the negotiations, see Kellogg to Grew, March 18, 1929, *FR 1929*, III, 809; Stimson to Grew, August 6, 1929, *ibid.*, 821; Grew to Stimson, September 11, 1929, *ibid.*, 825-829; Grew to Stimson, September 24, 1929, *ibid.*, 832-833; Grew to Stimson, September 25, 1929, *ibid.*, 833-835. See also *Turbulent Era*, II, 832-837, for a summary of the negotiations by Grew.

26. Diary, September 14-October 1, 1929, *Turbulent Era*, II, 836-837.

27. *Ibid.*, 835. Grew expressed the same sentiments in a letter to Shaw, October 12, 1929, Grew MSS, 1929, Vol. II.

28. Stimson to Grew, October 2, 1929, DS 711.672 (1929)/2614; Shaw to Grew, October 2, 1929, DS 711.671 (1929)/26; Grew to Shaw, October 12, 1929, Grew MSS, 1929, Vol. II; memo, Wallace Murray, "The American-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of October 1, 1929," January 7, 1930, Borah MSS, Box 546; Claude A. Swanson to Joseph P. Cotton (Undersecretary of State), February 3, 1930, DS 711.672 (1929)/48; Cotton to Swanson, February 6, 1930, *ibid.*; Cotton to Borah, February 17, 1930, Borah MSS, Box 547; *Cong. Record*, 71 Cong., 2 Sess., LXXII, pt. 4, 3779-3780.

29. Grew, "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923," p. 2.

30. Grew to Stimson, October 2, 1929, *Papers Relating to the Foreign*

Relations of the United States, 1930 (3 vols.; Washington, 1945), III, 852 (hereafter cited as *FR 1930*); Stimson to Grew, *ibid.*, 853; Grew to Murray, January 8, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. II; Grew to Murray, February 26, 1930, DS 711.679 Residence and Establishment/13.

31. Cotton (Acting Secretary of State) to Grew, March 17, 1930, *FR 1930*, III, 855.

32. Diary, October 18, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; Grew to Stimson, November 19, 1930, *FR 1930*, III, 868-869; Stimson to Grew, November 21, 1930, *ibid.*, 869-870. The Turks unilaterally abrogated the Capitulations on September 9, 1914. See *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914* (Washington, 1922), pp. 1092-1095.

33. Grew to Stimson, November 25, 1930, *FR 1930*, 871. The State Department instructed Grew to alter the opening statement to read: "The Department is fully alive to the changes which have taken place in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic." The Department felt that reference to "recent years" might imply acceptance of the abrogation of the Capitulations as of 1914. See Stimson to Grew, November 26, 1930, *ibid.*, 872; and Grew to Stimson, November 28, 1930, *ibid.* The text of the treaty is in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931* (3 vols.; Washington, 1946), II, 1042-1045.

34. Diary, October 28, 1931, Grew MSS, 1931, Vol. II; *Cong. Record*, 72 Cong., 1 Sess., LXXV, pt. 8, 9227-9228; *ibid.*, pt. 9, 9484.

35. The two nations signed a claims settlement on October 25, 1934, more than two years after Grew left Turkey, but he deserves much credit for his work in preparing the way. For information on the claims question, see Fred K. Nielsen, *American-Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of December 24, 1923, and Supplemental Agreements Between the United States and Turkey, Opinions and Report* (Washington, 1937), and the Fred K. Nielsen MSS (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.), Boxes 14-16. Nielsen headed the United States group negotiating the claims settlement.

36. A more comprehensive study of these activities by Grew and his successors in Turkey is Roger R. Trask, "The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid During the Atatürk Era," *Business History Review*, XXXVIII (Spring 1964), 58-77.

37. See Samuel Goldberg, "General Developments in Turkey" (mimeographed letter, European Section, Division of Regional Information, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to District Office Managers, December 28, 1927), file 449.0, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 151); D. C. Blaisdell, "American Investment in Turkey: A Forecast," *Levant Trade Review*, XV (December 1927), 525. For information on the Ottoman debt, see memo, K. Carlson (State Department), "The Ottoman Public Debt," June 28, 1929, DS 867.51/387½; Grew to Stimson, November 28, 1930, DS 867.51/433; Shaw to Cordell Hull, May 29, 1933, DS 867.51/529.

38. Diary, July 30, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III. For detailed accounts of the Chester Concession, see John A. DeNovo, "A Railroad for Turkey: The Chester Project, 1908-1913," *Business History Review*, XXXIII (Autumn 1959), 300-329, and DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies*, pp. 58-87, 210-228.

39. Documents illustrating these problems are: diary, October 3, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; Frederick P. Small (president, American Express Company) to Hull, May 9, 1933, DS 867.516/71; Shaw to Hull, July 17, 1933, DS 867.516/78; Charles H. Sherrill to Stimson, June 29, 1932, DS 867.504/4; John V. A. MacMurray to Hull, November 3, 1936, DS 867.504/24.

40. Conversation, Grew and Ismet İnönü, April 9, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; conversation, Grew and Aras, April 22, 1930, *ibid.*; conversation, Grew and Aras, July 24, 1930, *ibid.*; Grew to Stimson, November 12, 1930, DS 867.51—Shukri Bey Mission/1; Grew to Stimson, September 23, 1931, DS 867.51—Shukri Bey Mission/3; Grew to Stimson, October 5, 1931, DS 867.51—Shukri Bey Mission/23; diary, January 5, 1932, *Turbulent Era*, II, 908.

41. Information on the American-Oriental and Fox Brothers negotiations can be found in: D. C. Poole (chargé d'affaires, Berlin) to Kellogg, January 4, 1928, DS 711.67/63; diary, conversation with Marcus Reich (American-Oriental representative), January 31, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; diary, February 2, 1928, *ibid.*; memo, Wallace Murray, "The American-Oriental Banker's Corporation," March 7, 1928, DS 867.51 A.O.B. Corporation/14; Kellogg to Embassy, May 2, 1928, DS 867.51 A.O.B. Corporation/23; Grew to Kellogg, September 27, 1928, DS 867.51 A.O.B. Corporation/32; Grew to Kellogg, October 26, 1927, DS 867.77 Fox Brothers/1; Grew to Kellogg, March 14, 1928, DS 867.77 Fox Brothers/14; Grew to Kellogg, April 25, 1928, DS 867.77 Fox Brothers/21.

42. Julian E. Gillespie (commercial attaché, Istanbul), Special Report No. 5, "Turkey Obtains \$10,000,000 Loan in Return for Match Monopoly," July 10, 1930, DS 867.51 Turkish-American Investment Corporation/9; Jefferson Patterson (chargé d'affaires) to Stimson, June 16, 1930, DS 867.51 Turkish-American Investment Corporation/1; Patterson to Stimson, June 17, 1930, DS 867.51 Turkish-American Investment Corporation/5; Wilbur J. Carr (Acting Secretary of State) to Embassy, April 27, 1932, DS 867.51 Turkish-American Investment Corporation/13.

43. In 1927, the American Board had fourteen hundred students in eight primary and secondary schools in Turkey (schools at Adana, Mersin, Irmir, Tarsus, Bursa, and three at Istanbul) and International College of Irmir. See *The One Hundred and Seventeenth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* [1927] (Boston, n.d.), pp. 63-77. Two other American institutions, Robert College and Istanbul Women's College, operated with private support. For the background of American educational work see Gordon, *American Relations With Turkey, 1830-1930*, *passim*, and DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies*, pp. 8-18. For a more detailed account of American educational work in Turkey during the interwar period,

see Roger R. Trask, "'Unnamed Christianity' in Turkey During the Atatürk Era (Part I)," *Muslim World*, LV (January 1965), 66-76, and "'Unnamed Christianity' in Turkey During the Atatürk Era (Part II)," *ibid.* (April 1965), pp. 101-111. For information on the secularization movement, see the works cited in note 18, above; "Turkey: Islamic Reformation" in Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in the Modern World* (New York, 1959), pp. 165-208; Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," in Richard N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957), pp. 41-68; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," *ibid.*, pp. 69-107; and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964).

44. Quoted in "'Unnamed Christianity' in Turkey," *Missionary Review of the World*, XLI (June 1928), 468-469.

45. Crew to Godfrey L. Cabot, January 19, 1929, Grew MSS, 1929, Vol. I.

46. *The One Hundred and Fourteenth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* [1924] (Boston, n.d.), pp. 67-68; Lynn A. Scipio, *My Thirty Years in Turkey* (Rindge, N. H., 1955), pp. 212-215.

47. A movement in Turkey in 1929 to found an "Association for the Expulsion of Missionaries" failed, apparently because of opposition by the Turkish government. The United States consul in Istanbul observed: "It is not so stated but it is probably that the authorities recognize that the creation of such an organization might produce an unfavorable effect on international public opinion. Moreover, it is not to be doubted that the government considers the missionary schools as a necessary part of the public instruction system for the time being." See Charles E. Allen, "Review of the Turkish Press," June 15-July 10, 1929, DS 867.9111/255 (source of the quotation above).

48. Diary, December 9, 1927, *Turbulent Era*, II, 748-749; letter to Shaw, December 17, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. IV.

49. Diary, January 22, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, II, 755-756; Grew to Kellogg, January 22, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 964-965; the *New York Times*, February 1, 1928; John K. Birge to E. W. Riggs, January 26, 1928, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions MSS (Houghton Library, Harvard University), ABC 16.9.1, Vol. III, unnumbered (found between documents 60 and 61) (American Board documents hereafter cited as ABCFM MSS).

50. For press reactions and comments, see *Literary Digest*, May 19, 1928, p. 28; translation of clipping from *Hayat* (Turkish magazine), February 2, 1928, in ABCFM MSS, ABC 16.9.1, Vol. IV, no. 224; Allen, "Review of the Turkish Press," January 12-25, 1928, DS 867.9111/210. The quotations are in Grew to Kellogg, February 1, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 967, and Grew to Kellogg, May 8, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, II, 780. In his *Survey of International Affairs, 1928* (London, 1929), p. 209, Arnold J. Toynbee stated that the main reason for aroused public feeling in Turkey on the Bursa incident was "a nationalistic suspicion that Turks who adopted the American religion were in effect adopting the American nationality into the bargain."

51. To Shaw, February 1, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. II; to Kellogg, Febru-

ary 1, 1929, *FR 1928*, III, 968; diary, January 22, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III.

52. Kellogg to Grew, February 1, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 965-966. Kellogg was indirectly referring here to the continued hostility toward Turkey by certain groups in the United States. Also important was the fact that the Senate had not yet confirmed Grew's nomination to his Turkish post. For interesting comments on the latter point, see the letters of Bertha Carp to Admiral and Mrs. Bristol, February 13, 1928, Bristol MSS, Box 13; to Mrs. Bristol, February 18 [1928], Box 15; and to Admiral Bristol, March 18 [1928], Box 15.

53. Diary, February 2, 1928, *Turbulent Era*, II, 758; report of conversation with Aras, February 7, 1928, *ibid.*, 759-761; Grew to Kellogg, February 12, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 971. In the midst of the Bursa controversy Grew pressured the Turks to reopen other closed American Board schools. See note 57 below.

54. Kellogg to Grew, February 14, 1928, *ibid.*, 972.

55. Grew to Kellogg, May 8, 1928, *ibid.*, 975; diary, March 6, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III. Because of procedural questions a Turkish Court of Appeals annulled the convictions in August, 1928; after the court at Bursa, following a new trial, affirmed the convictions and sentences, the Court of Cassation, considering the case on appeal, upheld the lower court's decision. See Grew to Kellogg, August 30, 1928, and Grew to Kellogg, September 27, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 980; diary, March 6, 1929, *Turbulent Era*, II, 804-805.

56. Grew to Kellogg, February 1, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 969; Fred F. Goodsell (Istanbul) to Mabel E. Emerson, February 8, 1928, ABCFM MSS, ABC 16.9.1, Vol. IV, no. 223; *The One Hundred and Eighteenth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* [1928] (Boston, n.d.), p. 68.

57. Diary, March 6, 1929, *Turbulent Era*, II, 805; Goodsell to Emerson, February 8, 1928, ABCFM MSS, ABC 16.9.1, Vol. IV, no. 223. The other school problems Grew had to deal with during his years in Turkey cannot be considered here. For a detailed account of his campaign to reopen closed schools, tax problems, and teacher and curriculum regulations, see "Un-named Christianity' in Turkey During the Atatürk Era (Part II)," 101-107.

58. *The One Hundred and Seventeenth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* [1927] (Boston, n.d.), pp. 4, 77-78; Grew to Kellogg, April 6, 1928, DS 867.1281/22; diary, December 16, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; Grew to Bristol, January 25, 1931, *ibid.*, Vol. I.

59. Scipio, *My Thirty Years in Turkey*, pp. 188-189; radio address by Grew in *Turbulent Era*, II, 856-858; diary, October 7, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; diary, February 22, 1928, *ibid.*, 1928, Vol. III. Bristol played a leading role in founding the American hospital, which was renamed the Admiral Bristol Hospital in 1940.

60. Conversation, Grew and Ralph Collins (Near East representative, Rockefeller Foundation), November 19, 1927, *ibid.*, 1927, Vol. I; Grew to Judge Payne (American Red Cross), February 23, 1928, *ibid.*, 1928, Vol. III; diary, March 1, 1928, *ibid.*; Grew to J. Pierpont Morgan, April 8, 1928, *ibid.*,

1928, Vol. II; Grew to Morgan, April 10, 1928, *ibid.*; "The American Hospital at Constantinople," *Levant Trade Review*, XVI (October 1928), 379; diary, January 13, 1930, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; *Turbulent Era*, II, 856-858; diary, June 28, 1931, Grew MSS, 1931, Vol. II; Scipio, *My Thirty Years in Turkey*, p. 189. Construction of a new hospital building began in 1938. See *The One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* [1938] (Boston, n.d.), p. 12.

61. The *New York Times*, September 11, 12, and 29, and October 7, 1928, and May 1 and 20, 1930; Grew to Stimson, January 15, 1932, DS 367.1162 Schinasi Memorial/24; Shaw to Hull, August 31, 1933, DS 367.1162 Schinasi Memorial/28.

62. For information on the project see Erich F. Schmidt, *Anatolia Through the Ages: Discoveries at the Alishar Mound, 1927-29* (Chicago, 1931); H. H. von der Osten, *Explorations in Hittite Asia Minor, 1927-1928* (Chicago, 1929); H. H. von der Osten, *Expeditions in Hittite Asia Minor, 1929* (Chicago, 1930); and H. H. von der Osten, *Discoveries in Anatolia, 1930-31* (Chicago, 1933). For Grew's role, see diary, December 11, 1927, Grew MSS, 1927, Vol. I; Grew to Stimson, October 6, 1930, DS 867.927/51; Grew to Stimson, October 17, 1930, DS 867.927/52.

63. The *New York Times*, May 22, 1931; diary, December 17-23, Grew MSS, 1930, Vol. III; S. Lowman (Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) to Stimson, September 17, 1931, DS 867.114 Narcotics/300; Grew to Stimson, December 23, 1930, DS 867.114 Narcotics/99; conversation, Grew and Aras, January 11, 1931, Grew MSS, 1931, Vol. II; conversation, Grew and Aras, February 16, 1931, *Turbulent Era*, II, 885-885.

64. Grew to Stimson, November 3, 1931, DS 867.114 Narcotics/363; diary, November 17, 1931, Grew MSS, 1931, Vol. II; conversation, Grew and Shukri Kaya (Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs), February 29, 1932, *Turbulent Era*, II, 913-914. Grew's successor, Charles H. Sherrill, used his personal friendship with Kemal Atatürk to put pressure on him concerning the narcotics problem. Before the end of 1932, Turkey adhered to several international conventions on the narcotics trade and adopted new legislation regulating cultivation, production, and trade. See Sherrill to Stimson, July 26, 1932, DS 867.114 Narcotics/635; Sherrill to Stimson, December 26, 1932, DS 867.114 Narcotics/781; Sherrill to Stimson, January 16, 1933, DS 867.114 Narcotics/777; Department of State, *Press Releases*, No. 173 (January 21, 1933), p. 35.

65. Kellogg to Grew, March 23, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 940; diary, March 24, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; Grew to Kellogg, April 11, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 942; Kellogg to Grew, April 19, 1928, *ibid.*, 945; Grew to Kellogg, April 20, 1928, *ibid.*, 945-946.

66. Conversation, Grew and Aras, April 19, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; Kellogg to Grew, April 25, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 946-947; Grew to Kellogg, June 24, 1928, *ibid.*, 947-948; conversation, Grew and Aras, May 19, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; Grew to Kellogg, July 3, 1928, DS 711.6712A/24; Kellogg to Grew, August 16, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 948-949; conversation, Grew and

Aras, August 21, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; Kellogg to Grew, October 9, 1928, *FR 1928*, III, 949-950.

67. Grew to Kellogg, January 16, 1929, DS 711.6712A/31; Grew to Kellogg, January 16, 1929, DS 711.6712A/32; Murray to Grew, November 12, 1929, DS 711.6712A/33; Murray to Charles M. Barnes (State Department Treaty Division), May 20, 1932, DS 711.6712A/47; Stimson to Embassy, June 2, 1932, DS 711.6712A/46.

68. For a detailed account of the pact, see Robert H. Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New Haven, 1952); text of the pact is on pp. 266-269. See also Grew to Kellogg, April 25, 1928, DS 711.6712 Anti-War/3; editor's note in *Turbulent Era*, II, 796; Grew to Kellogg, August 11, 1928, DS 711.6712 Anti-War/5.

69. Kellogg to Grew, August 13, 1928, DS 711.6712 Anti-War/6; Aras to Grew, September 6, 1928, *FR 1928*, I, 195-196; conversation, Grew and Aras, December 12, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. III; Grew to Kellogg, December 12, 1928, DS 711.6712 Anti-War/52.

70. January 20, 1929, *Turbulent Era*, II, 797-798.

71. See Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933* (New Haven, 1957), pp. 45-67, for a survey of these events. See also Stimson to certain diplomatic representatives, December 1, 1929, *FR 1929*, II, 371-373; Grew to Stimson, December 5, 1929, *ibid.*, 390-391; Grew to Stimson, December 10, 1929, *ibid.*, 414-415; Department of State, *Press Releases* (December 14, 1929), pp. 101-102.

72. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression*, p. 60; Grew to Stimson, December 20, 1929, *FR 1929*, III, 842-844; Francis White (for Stimson) to Grew, January 7, 1930, *ibid.*, 844-845. See also Grew's diary, January 31, 1930, *Turbulent Era*, II, 839-842, for his opinion of the effects of the protocol on Turco-American relations. Grew seconded the Turkish view.

73. Grew to Eliot Wadsworth, June 22, 1928, Grew MSS, 1928, Vol. II.

74. Diary, March 3, 1932, *Turbulent Era*, II, 915-916.

75. His talk was published as "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923" (see note 7, above).

76. Letter to the editor, the *Washington Post*, May 31, 1965.