

# The Meiji Restoration

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A century ago Japan was weak, divided, unstable, and poor. Its leaders were conscious of the fact that Japan was well behind much of the Western world, and they were convinced that political reorganization and centralization were urgently needed to close the gap. Two feudal baronies agreed on a general proposal for change which they argued in this language:

"Our first great duty is to seek out the national polity and structure of the Imperial Country of old so that we may face all nations without shame. For that purpose we must restore Imperial rule and study to establish an order of government within the land, of such a nature that future generations will not regret our actions." After laying out the evils of decentralization, they went on to deplore the fact that, as a result of the feudal divisions, "some do not even realize that there is an Emperor. When one thinks about this with the world in mind, is there anywhere else a national polity like this? It is evident that we must reform our regulations and return political power to the court, form a council of feudal lords, and conduct affairs in line with the desires of the people as expressed in this manner; only then can we face all nations without shame and establish our national polity."<sup>1</sup>

There is here a self-conscious contrast between Japan and the outside world; one notes the urgent need to centralize around the emperor, the intention to consult opinion broadly, and a determination to create something for which future generations will not need to feel shame. The Charter Oath of the Meiji Emperor, issued in April 1868, continued these aims: a council chamber to be established; all classes to achieve their just aspiration; wisdom to be sought throughout the world; and absurd customs of the past to be discarded. And all this so that the foundations of the empire might be established and made firm.

Looked at from the vantage of a century, we have to agree that these goals were achieved. It is true that a few decades ago Japanese did indeed feel shame, a shame greater even than their grandfathers knew, but that too is past. In recent decades all classes have certainly achieved their just aspirations, absurd customs have been discarded, and the foundations of the empire have never seemed more firm. Japan stands as one of the world's great powers in all the ways that count, and represents, after the United States, the Soviet Union, and all of Western Europe, the largest potential of productive power in the world. In the 1870's Japanese voyagers to Europe still felt themselves a half century behind the West. But in the 1960's Japanese travelers found their technology superior to that of Europe. A recent series of reflections by the sociologist Katō Hidetoshi concludes that Japan and the United States, alone in the world, have passed through modernization into what he calls "contemporary society"; one characterized by a high-mobility, mass-consumption society, its tastes and desires regulated by mass media, and its members dedicated to constant, and upward, motion.<sup>3</sup>

Japan's century of change ought to provide a variety of conclusions and reflections on the course and pace of modernization. Some have general applicability for modern histories everywhere, but most take us back to the distinctive social and cultural patterns within Japan itself.

October 23, 1968, was the official centennial of the event that has been taken to mark the beginning of modern Japan. A century earlier the boy-emperor Mutsuhito reached for a sacred lot in a Shinto ceremony and selected a slip. It bore the Chinese characters "bright" and "rule," selected from *The Book of Changes*; read together they make "Meiji," designating the year or era of "enlightened rule" that would extend until the emperor's death in 1912. I have used the same language in "The Meiji State," p. 95 in James B. Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York, 1970). The decree which announced the change in designation of the era made clear that thereafter there would be only one era name per sovereign. History would now enroll in emperor-sized units, instead of being divided into eras set off at the discretion of the government in accordance with numerological wisdom. Thus a development that began in China with the Ming dynasty in 1368, one that signified the final stage in imperial absolutism, came to Japan in

1868. Not war, or even defeat and a new beginning in 1945, would require a new year designation. All that counted was the continuity of imperial rule.

A few weeks before this the court had renamed the feudal capital from Edo to Eastern Capital, Tokyo. In November the boy-emperor set out on a visit to his new capital. A procession of three thousand men had at its center the great palanquin in which he sat. It was topped by a phoenix, and carried by a swarm of yellow-robed bearers. He was a full six feet above the ground, and upon the approach of this strange conveyance, a contemporary reporter tells us, "a great silence fell upon the people. Far as the eye could see on either side, the roadsides were densely packed with the crouching populace. And as the phoenix car with its halo of glittering attendants came on . . . the people without order or signal turned their faces to the earth. No man moved or spoke for a space, and all seemed to hold their breath for very awe, as the mysterious presence, on whom few are privileged to look and live, was passing by."<sup>8</sup>

Thus modern Japan came into being with silence and awe, rather than with noise and celebration. It is true that fighting came before this, and continued after it. The shogun's vassals thought, quite correctly, that he had been cheated and double-crossed, and that the early terms on which he was asked to surrender his powers had been forgotten in the eagerness to get at his lands and wealth. The entry into Tokyo was an act of psychological and political warfare that accompanied the military campaigns against his followers, a civil war that came to an end only in the early summer of 1869. And there was some celebration as well, not least because the emperor's visit to Tokyo was accompanied by free distribution of *sake* as an expression of imperial benevolence.

But most of all there was confusion. The certainties of long centuries of a structured and stratified feudal society were soon in process of change, but the nature and degree of that change were far from clear. Uncertainty extended from the ranks of the feudality to the peasants. The feudal lords were not sure how things would come out, shocked by the sudden revelation of shogunal weakness and uncomfortable about their own pledges and role. Most of them sat it out and left the fighting to a few diehard Tokugawa vassals and an equally few ambitious southwestern fiefs whose leaders styled themselves the emperor's army. Many assumed another war would follow among the winners,

and one group of allies had a full set of plans ready to make off with the emperor in the event of such a war so that they could not end up on the "disloyal" side. Even after the war was over the feudal lords were uncertain how to behave in the new order. How did one live his life without the ritual decorum established during the years of feudal status? We find one baron sending in a remarkably detailed set of questions to the new government: Should he go to restaurants or not? If he does, can he call for singing girls? Is it all right to call them to his residence? If he heads for the licensed quarter with his men, should he do so openly or even secretly? "At this time of innovation," he explains, "we would like to know the correct way to conduct ourselves."<sup>4</sup>

Some, even among the leaders, never found how to conduct themselves. Yödö, lord of Tosa, troubled in his conscience and contemptuous of his associates among the Restoration daimyo, went on a colossal drunk that scandalized his retainers and killed him a few years later at the age of 45.<sup>5</sup> But most others, burdened with debts and grateful to be relieved of their responsibilities, accepted appointment as governors of their fiefs, then accepted bonds in place of feudal revenues, and finally, in 1884, patents of nobility in a new, European-style peerage. One finds their descendants today in all walks of life. A very few are elected governors of the areas their ancestors ruled. Others hold posts of social honor in the Red Cross, museums, or similar organizations; but most, with the abolition of the peerage and the land reform that followed World War II, have disappeared into the urban throng.

Ordinary samurai were no less confused. Those who had fled their lords to fight for the imperial cause, and whose intrigues and free-wheeling activism had helped create the ferment of change, were told that though their activities were much appreciated and "It is owing not a little to their ability of taking initiative that the Imperial Court has come to be restored to power again," the time for free wheeling was at an end. "Now all policies are to be decided by the Emperor Himself. It is hoped that those who had previously left their clans will return to their original prefectures, properly registered, abide with faith and justice, mind their conduct, and cooperate with and assist the Government."<sup>6</sup> The revolution is over, gentlemen, thank you very much. And so the samurai were gradually deprived of their incomes, swords, and privileges. First they were reclassified into

two major groups instead of the multiple military ranks in which they had been arrayed. Five years later, plans for universal manhood conscription signaled an end to their monopoly of violence, and at the same time a graduated pension system took them off the tax rolls in what it was hoped would be easy steps toward self-reliance and support. Within a decade they were forbidden to carry the swords that had been their insignia of class. Many, of course, were needed to run the new government, and they staffed it at all levels. But the rationalization of administration that resulted from making fifty prefectures out of some 300 fiefs, each of which had had its own bureaucracy, put most of them out of business and many of them into poverty. Where expectations were the highest, in the southwestern domains that had led the restoration, a crescendo of rebellions culminated in the great Satsuma revolt of 1877. Long thereafter samurai relief was an important consideration in economic and political planning.

And what of the commoners who crouched along the roadside as the phoenix car carrying the emperor was carried along? Their confusion and fears were scarcely less. Perhaps fortunately for Japan, and certainly for the new government, their expectations were few and their participation slight. Discipline and order remained intact. Still, the substitution of new for familiar forms of rule produced sporadic distress and nearly 200 local rebellions or protests within the first decade. Some were based on groundless fears, some on resistance to change, some on local and specific outrage, and some represented revolutionary discontent. But overall there is no reason to question Thomas Smith's assertion that the lack of a revolution from below permitted the government to institute a revolution from above; that the aristocrats could be revolutionary because they did not have to look behind them.<sup>7</sup> And so the commoners soon found themselves with the dignity of family names; with rights of occupancy, sale, and residence of land; and blessed with rights and duties of education and conscription. In the future they would follow their emperor and fight for him, instead of being fought over and crouching by the roadside in silence while their betters swaggered by.

A centennial provides an opportunity to remember the past and to think about its significance. In the case of the Meiji centennial, it is particularly interesting to examine its leadership, its setting, and its significance for Japanese since Meiji.

## Leadership

As Japan looks back on the Restoration, the printed page and television screen are full of reminders of the heroism that accompanied it. The individual figures who struck out against their normal bonds of loyalty and duty get the praise. The story is full of reminders of the insecurity and weakness that Japan felt a century ago in the face of a world dominated by maritime imperialist giants. There is much talk of the wisdom or fortune of the decisions made and plans carried out by men who begin to seem larger, and wiser, and stronger than life. The poignancy of this recollection is the sharper for the quickness of the recollection that two decades ago Japan was again weak, defenseless, and defeated in its confrontation with the powers it had tried to challenge. And yet it somehow has been able to regain, almost overnight, its standing as one of the world's great powers.

The significance of the Meiji Restoration, we now can see, is that it marked the emergence of a *modernizing elite*, a group firmly committed to the goals of making of their backward country a modern nation state. Their goals were expressed in terms of the models of which they had knowledge: the capitalist, representative, dynamic, industrial, and maritime powers of the Atlantic world. Negatively their goals were fixed by the misfortunes of their immediate neighbors in China, where resistance to change had brought defeat, humiliation, and disunity. Instinctively their thoughts of unity and strength were formulated around the figure of the imperial symbol, a remembered good and a viable alternative to feudal disunity. A new idea is almost always easier to explain in terms of an old one, and the phoenix car carrying the boy emperor had the multiple symbolism of rebirth and return, restoration and reform, mystery and majesty, festival and force. The car could be related to every portable shrine carried through a festive village crowd by chanting youths: heavy, but light upon the multitude of backs that support it; awesome, but not of substance. And so the Meiji Emperor provides a permanent subject of interest for the student of Japanese history and psychology; used but deeply venerated and loved by his ministers, popular but remote from his people, and in his maturity a believable, somewhat crusty sovereign who expressed opinions only to have them set aside out of greater deference to his authority. Deified in death, he is also venerated in memory, and the centennial program is centered about his name and

figure. Books, museums, statues, halls, parks, and forests spring up on every hand, and from life insurance to chocolate there is no better name.

The real leaders, the true modernizers, were the little group of men from the southwestern fiefs who designed the new state structure. The seven of them who survived to become genro averaged twenty-five years of age at the time of the Restoration.<sup>8</sup> They were samurai of middling rank, experienced in administration and leadership but barred from real power in the old system. They were aware of the power of the West, several through personal experience of it, but able to resist the characterization of being overtly pro-West or Western specialists. They were instead pro-Japanese, able to abandon an initial position of alliance with Japan's Asian neighbors in favor of an understanding with the West, and ultimately to join with the West at the cost of China and Korea. They were pragmatists, not ideologists, who recognized and spoke the language of power. In the world they knew the sinews of power were those of iron and steel, in railroads, factories, and warships. A people trained to use these through education and conscription, trained to participate through representation, and guided by imperial pronouncements about loyalty and patriotism was the guarantee of national survival.

Although some outshine the others, no one of this group could be permitted to obscure the greater glory of the Meiji Emperor. One looks in vain for Yamagata squares or streets, or Itō parks. True, there is an Itō statue, and his image is on the paper money. But the heroes of the process seem less those who made the grade, and who need no sympathy, than those who failed or those who resisted bravely the erosion of the old feudal bonds. Saigō Takamori, who led the last great samurai revolt in 1877, comes in for much more praise and evaluation than does Itō. The historian Takeuchi Yoshimi has said that Saigō's values and goals centered after all on man, his character and his happiness; while Itō's and Ōkubo's lay with the state and its power. For the one the state was a means, for the other it was the end-all.<sup>9</sup> The commemoration of the Meiji centennial has focused as much on the tragedy and the failures as on the success and the result. Television serials recount the lives of those who strove and died, like Sakamoto Ryōma, more than those who lived to lead, like Yamagata Aritomo.

There are a number of reasons for this. One is the lament



that noble spirits did not survive to affect the later history that was dominated by hardheaded pragmatists. There is also the appeal of the idealism and universalism of values of the Tokugawa men, a generation educated and grounded in a selfless, Confucian cult of loyalty. Thus Japanese long accustomed to think in terms of the Meiji goals of wealth and strength see something new in the instructions Yokoi Shōnan, who fell to an assassin's sword, gave his nephew when he left to study at Rutgers: "Do not restrict your goals to national wealth and national strength, but proclaim the great purpose—*taigi*—throughout the world."<sup>10</sup> This is somehow more satisfying, and moving, than the Meiji acceptance of the hierarchy of civilized countries, and Aoki Shūzō's exclamation that with the revision of the treaties in 1894 "Japan has joined the ranks of civilized countries!" So the centennial evokes thoughts of what might have been as well as of what was.

Still, in the Meiji group that led there is enough to praise and examine. Through common origin, restricted numbers, and shared experience, they developed an extraordinary ability to work, and disagree, and nevertheless cooperate in the face of challenge or danger. Stability and continuity of purpose have rarely been more evident in a group of founding fathers. Most of them went abroad for eighteen months a mere four years after the Restoration, and came back to find their jobs waiting for them. Evidently they respected each other's feelings in defeat, and concealed their own exultation in success. One recognizes them in the village councils our social scientists describe.<sup>11</sup> There, too, men have learned to work together for a very long period of time, and for some of the same reasons; a consciousness of the importance of the group and the collectivity of belonging and representing, rather than owning and disposing, and an awareness that cooperation will be necessary again tomorrow.

The Meiji leaders, with their agreement on goals of modernization, tended to share power. It is true that in specialized bureaucracies like the army a Yamagata built up prolonged tenure and personal power. But in the more visible posts the rotation and balance between factions came almost to resemble the monthly alternation—*tsukiban*—of Tokugawa administrative practice, and led to the natural and rather innocent question of the emperor during a council to select a new prime minister: "Why don't you just take turns?"<sup>12</sup>

No doubt there were many reasons for this. Jealousy and

rivalry were present. No one man or faction could dominate. There seems to have been considerable reluctance and distaste for the confinement of administrative responsibility, particularly on the part of a man like Itō. And with maturity, each of the surviving oligarchs tended to become the center of a little hierarchy of his own, a little emperor, his influence extended (as Ishida Takeshi once put it) by retainers who professed to speak for him. At this stage, influence almost seems proportional to inaction.

Whatever the cause, the modernizing oligarchy made no attempt to perpetuate itself. This is worth some comment, for they sprang from a patriarchal, hereditary class. It is true that they had risen in protest against its inefficiencies. It is also true that much of the modern world of which they gained knowledge was moving in an opposite direction, but not, of course, all of it. In fact some of the Germans who helped devise the Meiji constitution assumed that Japan would have both a working emperor and a self-perpetuating aristocracy in the successors to the oligarchs they knew. But neither came to pass. The original group averaged 73 years of age, but the last of them died in 1924. If one includes Saionji, then the last of the group died in 1940, but only the crises of the 1930's brought Saionji back to prominence. Why was there so little lineal succession? One might mention Makino or Kido Kōichi. But almost without exception the oligarchs performed their last service by failing to provide powerful progeny. The abolition of the peerage after World War II ended even ceremonial honors, and today one finds their heirs scattered throughout society, sometimes in universities, and certainly far from power.

Most of Japanese society and tradition reinforced this aversion to individual eminence. The nail that sticks out, as the proverb has it, is hammered down. The collectivity has its demands. But it is particularly true that in politics nothing could be allowed to seem to overshadow the emperor. This was true even in the dynamic 1930's, when no fascist type of leader could emerge. And today, in milder form, we see it in the assumption of Liberal-Democrat party faction leaders that they should have a fair chance to share power. In the Meiji period the entire apparatus of behind-the-scenes consensus tended to make prolonged stays in power unlikely. Recent studies by Akita and Najita show how jumpy Yamagata became if someone seemed to be getting too well entrenched in the Prime Minister's office. Everything

worked for rotation. Seen in length of cabinets, the story is one of constant change; but seen in consistency of incumbents and continuity of purpose, it is one of remarkable continuity. In 1914 Inoue Kaoru visited Ōkuma Shigenobu. The two fell into recollection of the days when they had worked together in the early Meiji ministry of finance. "We couldn't have done it without you," Inoue said in effect, and Ōkuma modestly answered that they had in fact done very well without him. But then they both caught themselves and remembered to say that without the august virtue of the Meiji Emperor it never could have been done at all.<sup>18</sup>

### *The Background and the Setting*

It would not do to let our appreciation of the Meiji statesmen blind us to the advantages of the situation in which they worked. It is true that contemporary observers saw little future for Japan, emphasized its weakness, and exaggerated its instability. But the interest in modernization of the last decade and more has radically changed our picture of the nineteenth-century setting for the Meiji Restoration. It will suffice to simply remind ourselves of its features.

R. P. Dore's studies of education and literacy have shown that Japan was scarcely behind the Western world in her percentage of literate adults, and that a very large proportion of the population got some schooling outside the family. The importance of this for appropriation of other learning requirements in modern administration and industrialization, and the gain for unity through the government's ability to post its notices and have them read, to issue pamphlets and have them reach their target, must have been incalculable. The studies of political thought by Webb, Harootunian, and Earle have shown how Confucian scholarship assimilated the imperial tradition and blended with Shintō nationalism. Grant Goodman has traced the rise and spread of interest in the scientific learning of the West via the Dutch at Nagasaki, so that despite the centuries of seclusion there was a lively vogue for Western learning long before the coming of Perry. Thomas Smith showed how developments in agriculture transformed it from the extended family production of late medieval times into the modern small-holding village with its responsiveness to market advantages provided by the

great Tokugawa cities. And Robert Bellah analyzed the codes of merchant values and practicality that accompanied this development in town and country. John Hall best describes the complexity of bureaucratic rationality that replaced the simple feudal controls of early Tokugawa times, and Albert Craig and I have tried to show how these currents came to focus in individual lives and particular domains in the crisis years of the 1860's. Nationalism was sufficiently pervasive, loyalty sufficiently unchallengeable, and economic and political problems sufficiently burdensome to make most feudal lords glad to surrender their authority in return for honor and reward when the Meiji government asked them to.

Perhaps most important of all was the sense of crisis that stirred the military elite as the centuries of seclusion were broken by the appearance of the West. Confrontation with new weapons, techniques, and enemies, opportunity to compete in appropriation of these possibilities, changed forever lives that had seemed stuck in the torpor of inherited rank and traditional authority. The discovery that their country was incapable of resisting the Western threat was decisive for a generation of samurai. It stirred them to individualism, idealism, resistance, terror, and finally reform, and out of it came a determination to avoid for their descendants the shame and fear that they had experienced.

The nineteenth-century Japanese thought themselves unlucky to be so pressed, and many foreign students have agreed. There is a large literature which explains the inadequacies of modern Japan's experiment with representative rule in terms of the short time-span in which it had to be compressed. But there needs to be more of a literature emphasizing the elements of good fortune. For it was probably a good deal easier to catch up in the nineteenth century than it has been in the twentieth century. Japan still had a modest population, and the death rate did not fall until industrialization had been begun. Antibiotics might have complicated the picture enormously. And Japan's speedy change, by contemporary needs, may even seem leisurely. Robert Ward points out that "in a number of important respects the amount of time required for the political modernization of Japan has not been much shorter than that required in the classic Western cases."<sup>14</sup> And Professor Katō, the sociologist I referred to earlier, groups Japan and America partly because, he suggests,

their industrialization began at about the same time, after the civil strife of the nineteenth century.

Even the international climate could have been a good deal worse. The Western countries alarmed but they did not really threaten Japan. China and Korea could not help, but neither did they obstruct, and Japan's greater success quickly established her as the most likely recipient of outside help. Japan grew to power under the protection of the British fleet.

None of this would have sufficed of itself, and none of it lessens the achievement. But it should help to keep us from making easy transfers from the Japanese experiences to that of more recently developing societies. The lessons to be drawn are those of the importance of preparation, nationalism, of political stability, and steady motivation, rather than more specific items of comparison and application.

### *In Retrospect*

There is another dimension of an event like the Meiji Restoration. It is what it has come to mean for the Japanese. And it is of relevance to note that while no historian can deny its paramount importance for Japan and indeed for the modern world, neither can he forget what sharply divided responses it has stirred within Japan.

It began in the 1860's. The quick coup that outmaneuvered the Tokugawa shogun and drove him into the position of rebel brought distrust and doubt from many parts of the country. Then, as the Meiji government grew in strength, its rivals—the leaders of the popular rights movement, and conservatives who disapproved of the degree of westernization—began to see it as a new kind of interest group, or shogunate, standing between emperor and people. The textbooks of the public education system unwittingly worked to reinforce some of these doubts. They taught that the emperor was virtuous and his people loyal, both by definition and instinct. The only thing that could go wrong therefore was the government, whose ministers sometimes pursued selfish ends and betrayed their trust. And since politics is necessarily imperfect, the thrust of the Confucian-moral teaching was one of disapproval for government, out of professed love for the emperor beyond it.

So it is striking to find that political radicals of all persua-

sions have claimed for themselves the mantle and purity of the Restoration activists. The anarchist Kōtoku Shūsui, executed in 1911 for alleged complicity in an attack on the emperor's life, styled himself a *shishi*—a man of high purpose—of the Restoration;<sup>15</sup> and the ultranationalist and military terrorists of the 1930's claimed that they, no less, were working for a Shōwa restoration that would complete the work left unfinished by their Meiji forebears. Thus Nishida Mitsugi wrote in 1922 that those who followed the Restoration leaders "did not understand the ideal and forgot the true principles. They severed the direct relations between the people and their sacrosanct, sublime and beloved Emperor, and put between them a barrier made of stupid, wicked, and unscrupulous men."<sup>16</sup> In present-day Japan one finds the struggling rightist organizations making determined efforts to capitalize on the historical effusion of the centennial and the remembered patriotism of the Meiji Restoration to prepare for another, or perhaps the same, Shōwa Restoration. Indeed, no one seems quite persuaded the Meiji Restoration finished its work. The Marxist historians who have long dominated the Japanese academies continue to write voluminously of the ways in which the Restoration stopped short of fundamental change, and often evoke a curious correspondence with their right-wing foes.

It would require a different, and longer, discussion to explore all the reasons for these views. One reason is certainly the association of morality with politics, a notion as old as Shintoism and one renewed by the Restoration claim for the unity of politics and worship. Total claims produce total discontent, and the failure of political overturn to produce solutions, at one blow, has frequently seemed conclusive for headstrong young men impatient with process and insistent on perfection.

In addition, of course, during the years since World War II there has developed a new and deeper sort of discontent with what the modern state achieved, and a determination that the injustice and the cost of militarist Japan shall not be forgotten in praise for the modernization that made it possible.

Out of this comes a setting in which the centennial celebration is, in the truest sense, controversial. It has awakened the decades-long argument between intellectuals and government, education ministry and teachers; it has stimulated both the right and left wings to a flurry of activity, fund-raising, and pronouncement. And, taken in conjunction with the time for re-

new or reappraisal of Japan's security links with the United States in the 1970's, it has acquired a dramatic relevance for the historian who looks for links between his times and those that have gone before.

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## NOTES

1. Satsuma-Tosa argument quoted in Marius B. Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton, 1961), p. 300.

2. Katō Hidetoshi, "Kindaika to gendaika" (Modernity and contemporaneity), *Chūō Kōron* (Feb. 1968), pp. 66-85.

3. Quoted in F. V. Dickins and S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes* (London, 1894), II, 98.

4. Quoted by Maruyama Masao, "Kaikoku" (Opening the country), in *Kona: gendai rinri* (Symposium: contemporary ethics) Vol. II: *Tenkanji rinri shisō* (Ethical thought at periods of critical change; Tokyo, 1959), p. 98.

5. Hideo Michiō, *Yamamoto Yōmei* (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 236 f.

6. Maruyama, "Kaikoku," p. 102, quoting *Daijōken nishū* (Council of state diary) No. 49.

7. Thomas C. Smith, "Japan's Aristocratic Revolution," *Yale Review*, Spring 1961.

8. See Roger F. Hackett, "Political Modernization and the Meiji Genso," in R. E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton, 1968).

9. "Tahin no seishin to kōsō" (The spirit and concept of the restoration), *Tembō* (June 1968), p. 44.

10. Irokawa Daikichi, in *ibid.*, p. 42.

11. See, for example, R. K. Beardsley, J. W. Hall, and R. E. Ward, *Village Japan* (Chicago, 1959), pp. 354-55; and Robert E. Ward, "The Socio-Political Role of the *buraku* (hamlet) in Japan," *American Political Science Review*, LXV.4: 1030 f. (Dec. 1951).

12. See Tsuda Shigemayo, ed., Sasaki Takayuki, *Meiji Seijō to shin Takayuki* (The sacred Meiji emperor and his subject Takayuki; Tokyo, 1928), p. 730.

13. *Segai Inoue Kō den* (Biography of Inoue; Tokyo, 1933-34), 5:352.

14. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan*, p. 589.

15. F. G. Nozhefner, "Kōtoku Shūmei: Portrait of a Japanese Radical" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968).

16. From *Mugen shiron* (Shallow and private view), reprinted in Hashikawa Bunzō, ed., *Chōkaishu shugi* (Ultrationalism), Vol. 31: *Gendai Nihon shisō taikei* (Outline of contemporary Japanese thought; Tokyo, 1964), p. 72. I owe this reference to Mr. Ben-Ami Shillony.