In the Fall of 1999, the Taipei City government held an exhibition of “Old Maps of Taipei” that brought together approximately thirty-five different types of maps, dating from 1654 to 1995. The exhibition was held not in City Hall, as one might expect, but rather in the Qing dynasty yamen that had been recently restored and opened to the public. According to the official brochure, these maps were produced by the “different ethnic groups” that have “lived on Taiwan over the last four hundred years,” and the purpose of the exhibition was to demonstrate how “Westerners, Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese have all used cartography to record the Taiwan that they knew.” In this way, the exhibition was a graphic manifestation of the emerging interest in describing the island as “multi-cultural” (duoyuan) and the exhibition, for practical as well as ideological purposes, was dominated by maps from the Japanese period. In the ten years leading up to this exhibition (following the lifting of martial law in 1987), there had been the gradual articulation of a new type of civil society in Taiwan: more socially diverse, more politically democratic, and more intellectually open. This exhibit was just a small phrase in that complex articulation.

That official narrative was furthered developed in 2004 when the Metropolitan Cultural Affairs Bureau sponsored a second exhibition as part of the celebration of the 120th anniversary of the building of the city wall. This exhibition, held this time at the February 28th Memorial Hall, included maps, photographs and other materials from the past hundred years. The full title of the exhibition says much: Viewing Taipei through Time and Space: 120th Anniversary of Taipei City Wall: An Exhibition of Maps, Images, Documents, and Historical Relics. Not only was the range of materials displayed in this exhibition much wider than the first, the supporting paraphernalia were also far richer and the exhibition technically more sophisticated—the catalogue itself was substantial and well-designed. In his preface to the catalogue, Taipei mayor, Ma Yingjiu, said that the purpose of the exhibit was “to recover lost remains, restore original conditions distorted by the historical record, deepen cultural understanding of Taipei city, and to build a new consciousness of the people of Taipei.” The Commissioner of Cultural Affairs, Liao Xianhao said that in addition to celebrating the wall, there was “a need to promote the

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1 “Tabei gu tudi zhan.” Principal sponsor, Taibeishi minzhengju. August 21-October 31, 1999. The exhibition brochure (no pagination) speaks of 70 different types of maps, but I counted approximately only 35 in the main exhibition halls.
3 Ibid., 3.
foundational work that had been long neglected” in order to “restore the memory of the wall.” Of course, the promotional nature of this exhibit required Ma and Liao to speak in these positivistic terms, leading to this assertion that there is a physical reality that these materials (especially maps) can recover. There is, indeed, much to be recovered through the agency of those maps, but that recovery is conditioned by materials that are ideologically embedded, both in their construction and in their rediscovery. The presence of materials from the Japanese colonial period in this project of recovery was exceptionally strong in the second exhibit, even stronger than that in 1999. For example, we find that of the approximately thirty-seven maps (or details) that appear in the catalogue, twenty-nine are from the Japanese period; even more startling is that there is only one map from the post-war period. Why was this? Again, this was partly conditioned by what was available: the Japanese colonial government was well-known for its detailed cartographic records and plans; in contrast, during early years of the KMT (Nationalist Party) rule, records of the city were much less well-maintained.

This discrepancy results not only from on-the-ground conditions of the city, but also from the position that the city held in the vision of the respective ruling authorities: for the Japanese, Taihoku was their first and most important colonial capital, while for the Chinese KMT government, Taipei was a temporary capital of a government in exile. There also are, however, contemporary social and political conditions surrounding these exhibits that bring prominence to the Japanese materials, and it appears that those conditions have solidified over the five years from the first to the second exhibit.

These two displays can be read as part of a new narrative that is being written about the meaning of Taipei City (and Taiwan in general) in which its specific historic conditions have become a leitmotif, it is argued, for a unique cultural identity. This narration, which includes statements about a pluralist society that I mentioned above, is very much an argument against Chinese nationalism. The salient position of the Japanese maps held in these exhibits (and by the implication the full acknowledgement, if not celebration, of the Japanese period) strikes at two agents of Chinese political domination: first, the oppressive post-war KMT regime with its strongly anti-Japanese rhetoric; and second, the looming Chinese Communist government, which claims Taiwan as an integral part of its nation. It strikes against the KMT by performing what Ma Yingjiu called the recovery of “lost remains” and the restoration of “original conditions” that were distorted in the post-war years. It strikes at PRC policy by celebrating that “new consciousness of the people of Taipei” that makes them fully aware of not just how different they are from their contemporaries on the mainland, but also how they are different. It gives them a “story to tell about themselves.” Moreover, the second exhibition’s growing silence on the post-war period denies the ideology of Chinese nationalism that is shared by standard KMT, PRC and US rhetoric—the so called “one China policy.” In its place is offered a more local nationalism determined by the post-colonial condition of the island, arguing that citizens of Taipei are “less Chinese” and more cosmopolitan.

It is not coincidental that the promotion of these ideological views manifests itself in a review of the cartographic record. Maps offer a visualization of the “nation” that seems to be

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4 Ibid., 4.
5 Andrew Morris, “Baseball, History, the Local and the Global in Taiwan” in The Minor Arts of Daily Life: Popular Culture in Taiwan (Honolulu, U of Hawaii, 2004), makes a similar argument for the status of baseball in contemporary Taiwan.
immediate, concrete, and unambiguous. The Japanese maps of Taiwan are ideally suited for the purposes of the “recovery and restoration” of a Taiwan consciousness. They break the geographic linkage of island and continent, replacing it with one in which the island stands alone in the sea, sometimes with the Japanese home islands looming on the horizon. They also promote the island as a site of early modernization—city planning, railways and industry were extensively mapped—at a time when the Chinese continent was slogging through decades of devastation and mismanagement (principally at the hands of the KMT). Finally, these maps represent the very materials and thoughts that were hidden from public view and debate by the shroud of KMT martial law and its accompanying white terror. What had been seen in the 1950s, 60s and 70s as the “dirty laundry” of colonial collaboration and servitude has become the “retro-fashion” of the 1980s and 1990s. But to look at these exhibits, especially the one in 2004, one might think that during the post-war, martial law period, Taipei had disappeared from the consciousness, if not from the maps. This is a question that will have to await discussion at a later time.

Here I will review the history of Taiwan cartography from its beginning to the end of the Japanese period. I am concerned with both the construction of Taipei in its initial mappings and how those representations are re-contextualized in contemporary cultural knowledge. This distinction is what Denis Cosgrove has called “mapping meaning into the map” vs. “mapping meaning out of the map,” or what we might call the authorship and readership of the map.

The Earliest Maps

The detailed cartography of the Taipei basin begins on an oddly European note, with maps by Spanish and Dutch colonialists from the seventeenth century, both of whom had extended their colonial aspirations from Southeast Asia (Philippines and Indonesia) to Taiwan in order to gain a foothold on East Asia trade. Due to the ascendancy of their control over northern Taiwan, as short lived as it was, the Dutch maps are particularly revealing (this was the time when Holland was also at the center of modern European cartography). If Chinese maps prior to this time recorded Taiwan at all, they did so in an extremely perfunctory way, reflecting the common view that the island was but a “ball of mud beyond the seas.” Emma Teng has described the pre-1684 vision of the island by Chinese authorities:

Taiwan’s location “beyond the seas,” [haiwai] therefore, placed it definitely outside the natural territorial boundaries of China proper. Late Ming and early Qing descriptions of the island reinforced the notion of Taiwan’s separation from China. Taiwan was commonly described as “faraway overseas,” “hanging alone beyond the seas,” “an isolated island surrounded by ocean,” or “far off on the


7 Edward S. Casey, Representing Place: Landscape Painting and Maps (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002), 258.

8 Quoted from Yu Yonghe’s late seventeenth century travelogue; see Emma Jinhua Teng., Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures. (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 2.
edge of the oceans.” This, despite the fact that Taiwan is located less than 100 miles from China’s shore.9

Under these conditions there obviously was no incentive for the Chinese to engage, to say nothing of to map, the island. We should recognize, however, Teng’s arguments are much informed by her contemporary cultural and political conditions; she is very forthright in that she sees colonialism lurking behind the current cross-straits ideological battles:

In the contemporary construction of Taiwan as a renegade province that must be “reunified” with the mainland in order to restore China’s territorial integrity, we see the lasting impact of Qing expansionism on the imagined (and imaginary) geography of the modern Chinese nation-state.10

In passing, I would note that the now common cartographic practice of representing the island with the Chinese coastline just in view (as opposed to the Philippines, for example) has now graphically established the assumption that Taiwan is “off the coast of China.” While this might seem geographically obvious, it is not geologically accurate: Taiwan is not part of the continental shelf (as is Hai’nan Island, for example) but belongs to the maritime archipelagoes of Japan, Ryukyus, Philippines, and Indonesia. The ideology of this assumed continental orientation currently haunts Taiwan with a particular political vengeance.

For the Dutch, Taiwan was also “just off the coast of China,” but just as importantly it was along the ocean trade routes from colonial Batavia (Jakarta) to Japan. They saw the island as an entrepot for trade with and within East Asia, and their maps clearly display that interest. Among the many and varied maps of Taiwan coming from the Dutch period (1624-1661), we have, for example, a relatively detailed coastal map of the entire island dating from 1638.11 Yet, since the Dutch concentrated their occupation in the southwestern part of the island, with Fort Zeelandia situated on the coast near present-day Tainan city, most maps are of that harbor and surrounding area.12 The one exception to this southwest focus was their presence in the Keelung (Jilong) and Tamsui (Danshui) harbors on the northeast coast of the island. This occupation began in 1642 when they replaced the Spanish, who had first established military outposts there in 1626 and 1628, respectively. A comparison of the Spanish and Dutch maps illustrates the changing economic and ideological assumptions of those early occupations.

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9 Ibid., 38.

10 Ibid., 248.


[Figure 1] The Spanish map dates from 1626, shortly after their arrival in the Keelung harbor. We are provided a generalized aerial view, with a few coastal details and notes in the harbor area (Rancheria de los naturales [town of natives], Puerto donde suregen los navios [port where the ships anchor], etc.). The perspective is oblique and off-shore, giving an unencumbered view of these few important sites. Despite its rather late date, the map is much in the illustrative style of the early Renaissance, eschewing modern cartographic conventions of the time. For our interests, the map does incidentally include the Tamsui harbor, but since it dates before the construction of Fort Santo Domingo, it has no details. The Tamsui River, labeled Rio grande, is but a stub of itself and the interior is an undifferentiated series of vague mountains, with no hint of the large basin that lies just upriver from the estuary.

[Figure 2] The first of the two Dutch maps continues this coastal orientation. This map is associated with a planned expedition by the Dutch governor in Zeelandia, Pieter Nuyts (aka Peter Nuits), against his rival Spanish colonialists in the north. In a 1629 report to authorities in Batavia, Nuyts outlined the necessity of this effort almost entirely in economic terms: the Spanish, because of the “large capital at their disposal,” would be able to wrest trade away from the Dutch, thus they should be expelled. The map, which results from the yacht Domburch’s reconnaissance of the two Spanish sites, reflects not only the limits of the Dutch plans, but also their nearly one-dimensional vision of the north coast: this was to be a punitive strike at the Spanish coastal emplacements, with no immediate interest in the interior. Similar to the earlier Spanish maps, the Dutch map details the two harbors, along with a thin band of mountains; in the Dutch rendering, however, the view is from the sea, positing their offensive position toward the coast. Moreover, these coastlines float in a sea of graticules and rhumb lines, accompanied by a compass rose describing the southward, onshore orientation. Despite these navigational notations, the map is generally pictorial and local; a practical design meant only to aid in the attack on the specific Spanish holdings of the two forts and small villages. Three locations (one could say “targets”) are marked with the capital letters A,B,C and described in a small legend; there also appears to be a scale marking. This is not a map of occupation, only of planned assault. The Dutch capture of the northern installations had to wait twelve years; in 1642 they took possession of both the Tamsui and Keelong installations from the then much-weakened Spanish forces.

[Figure 3] Our second Dutch map, dating from 1654, not only provides a substantially detailed description of the Taipei basin, it also maps the official nature of the Dutch presence there after another twelve years. The map hints at modern maritime navigation, with a compass rose and abbreviated rhumb lines ending at the coast. Along with the harbor and coastal illustrations that we have seen in earlier maps, including the depictions of both Fort Santisma Trinidad and Fort Santo Domingo, we have full illustration of the Taipei basin as well. This illustration includes details of major rivers (as far south as middle reaches of the present-day

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14 In the Shiqi shiji Helanren annotations (I, 136), it says that the assault was not successful; but in Davidson (21) he clearly says that the expedition was not authorized and did not take place.
Xindian and Dahan creeks), along with settlements and forested areas that line those waterways. These all mark the lines of trade that the Dutch developed in the area. We should note that there are numerous references to trading activity in the Taipei basin area before the arrival of the Dutch, by both Chinese and Japanese agents; these visitors must have had maps to guide them, but none of them are, to my knowledge, extant, and even if they were it is doubtful they would have mapped settlement of the basin. The Dutch map does just that, but it is not a map of Dutch or Chinese settlement, but rather of aboriginal people, with which the Dutch traded through licensed Chinese agents—the relatively blankness of the lands beyond the river banks may reflect more Dutch lack of knowledge than actual settlement patterns, however. Yet, in a very European projection of land-ownership concepts, we find the Taipei basin in this map divided into regular rectangles of what appear to be plot-lines, similar to those found in the Dutch cadastral maps of the time. This implies the plans that the Dutch had beyond trading local products with the native population—agricultural development based on Chinese immigration, which the Dutch had promoted successfully in the south.

This 1654 Dutch map is prominently placed in almost all recent reviews and narratives of the development of Taipei city. It is a map that is exceedingly satisfying for those, like myself, who want to construct a narrative of the city; it is an illuminating beginning because it is detailed in those areas that allow us to “envision” the city—accurate turns of the rivers through the basin so that each site can be recognized. Most recently Gao Chuanqi accompanied a full color reproduction of the map with this very anachronistic note: “this is the earliest known map presenting a detailed description of conditions of greater Taipei.” A monograph devoted to the map, entitled Greater Taipei: Investigations of an Old Map, is concerned primarily with tracing the development of given sites through the Aboriginal, Dutch and Chinese names to the present. The 1654 map is also satisfying to the critics who want to project the “multi-cultural” nature of Taiwan, although in reality the legacy of Dutch and aboriginal cultures in Taipei is very limited. The attention the map brings to the river settlements of the aboriginal people does remind us, however, of what is missing from descriptions of the basin (and Taiwan in general): the mapping (if not the maps) that must have been a significant part of the lives of the Kaldagelan and other basin people—that mapping may have been ephemeral and strategic, but it must have existed. We can now only imagine what that mapping must have represented: certainly not a penetration from the coast into the basin, but rather something more interior and interconnected.

**Early Chinese Mapping**

[Figure 4] Dutch colonial control of Taiwan would not last long enough to see the Chinese settlement of Taipei basin. In 1662 the Dutch were overcome by the forces of Ming

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15 Wei and Gao, *Chuanyue shikong kan Taipei*, 10-11, say this mapping shows the dependence of the aboriginal people on the river. I don’t deny the river was important, but Chinese mapping 100 years later suggests that aboriginal settlement in the basin was quite uniformly distributed.

16 Ibid, 10.

loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), which in turn were destroyed by the Qing imperial armies in 1683, at which time Taiwan became nominally part of the Qing empire. The following year, administrative control of the island was given to Fujian province; an account of that process (*Fujian tongzhi*) includes the earliest Qing map with a representation of the Taipei basin. As one would expect, the map is concerned primarily with military emplacements. The Taipei basin, which was outside of the area of military contention and is at the very edges of the map, is represented by a relatively vague depiction of the Tamsui River in an exaggeratedly large plain. Three settlement names are included in the basin: Tamsui Fort (*Danshui cheng*) and two aboriginal villages—Qigui and Shouhuang (the latter of which can be identified on the Dutch map as Sirongh, in present-day Yonghe area).\(^{18}\)

For most of the late imperial period, Taiwan remained “a ball of mud” beyond the direct concerns and interests of the imperial government. Since the island was seen primarily as a source of trouble, trade and emigration to the island was restricted off and on throughout the 18th century, and even when restrictions were lifted there was very little active promotion of emigration until the very end of Qing rule.\(^{19}\) Thus, Chinese settlement of the island proceeded by fits and starts, driven primarily by population and economic pressures on the southern Fujian-Guangdong coast, and over time the island attracted the entrepreneurial attention for which the people of that region are known. In this fashion, the island, particularly the Taipei basin, was occupied late and haphazardly by waves of Chinese agricultural settlers—the beginning of Chinese settlement of the Taipei basin is usually dated to 1709, when the first official land deed was issued to Chen Laizhang of Quanzhou, Fujian.\(^{20}\) Official mapping of the island continued in a similarly haphazard and limited way—again we must recognize that local mapping, this time by the Chinese settlers, would have been extensive and had a very different set of assumptions and purposes than the maps issued by various authorities.

During the 18th century, the Taipei basin appears at the terminal end of several scroll maps of the island, which unroll, as did settlement, south to north, along the west coast. These maps, which blend traditional cartographic systems and landscape painting, have been described in detail by Emma Teng in terms of the emerging gaze of imperial China toward the island. Of the early Qing maps, she writes:

Seventeenth and eighteenth-century scroll maps of Taiwan conventionally depicted the island face-on from the perspective of the China coast rather than from a bird’s-eye perspective. Taiwan is thus shown in isolation and not part of

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\(^{18}\) Weng Jiayin, 59.

\(^{19}\) John Shepherd discusses the details and ramifications of the vacillation in Qing policy between conservative status-quo advocates and those with more pro-colonialist ideas: *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*. (Stanford, Stanford UP, 1993),137-176; policies are summarized in a chart, 140-41.

the larger Qing empire. The Taiwan Strait is pictured in the foreground, standing between the viewer and the island.\textsuperscript{21}

Over time there is, however, a progressive change in the maps as they graphically chart the evolution of imperial colonialist policies that began to draw the island into the empire. In the later maps, the straits fall away and the western slope of the central mountains rise up blocking the gaze, producing a portrait of “half” of the island. Teng summarizes:

Thus, where the sea had once served as the boundary between the Chinese domain and the realm beyond the pale, the island of Taiwan itself now served as this boundary. . . . As a hedgerow, Taiwan occupied a somewhat liminal position: it was neither fully outside the Chinese domain nor fully within it; rather, it was itself a boundary between the inner and outer.\textsuperscript{22}

It was during this period when Taiwan was becoming liminally part of the Qing empire that Taipei basin began to become part of Chinese-occupied Taiwan.

\textbf{[Figure 5]} The most commonly cited Taiwan scroll maps from the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century are the “Qianlong Taiwan yutu,” (Map of Taiwan from the Qianlong Period) dating from 1759 and “Taiwan minfan jie\'zhi tu” (Map of the Border between Savage and Subject Settlement) from 1760. The formal quality and wide-spread reproduction of these maps have attracted the attention of many scholars.\textsuperscript{23} If, for our purposes, we focus on their depictions of the Taipei basin, which are only small sections of the whole maps, we note an emerging vision of that space. The detail in the “Qianlong” map’s representation of the plain is remarkable: in addition to many aboriginal settlements spread throughout the plain, we have signs of the very beginnings of Chinese settlement. Most notable is the walled settlement of Dusi Jianpan (currently Bali) that lies just outside the basin on the north bank of the Tamsui River, and the village of Xinzhuang (Xinzhuang \textit{jie}) on its southern branch (currently Dahan \textit{xi}) within the basin itself. Across the Tamsui from Xinzhuang we find our first indication of settlement in the Taipei city area: “Mengjia Ferry” (Mengjia \textit{zhoudutou jie}) and Guting Village (Guting \textit{cun}). Mengjia (currently the Wanhua neighborhood) will be the name of the earliest settlement in the Taipei city core area, with its Longshan temple dating from 1738. Elsewhere throughout the basin we find iconic depictions of Chinese farms (\textit{zhuang}) with their tiled roofs interspersed among the aboriginal settlements (\textit{she}) with their thatched-roof buildings (both duly labeled). Similarly, cultivation of the area is marked with “crop fields” (\textit{tian}) and “gardens”(\textit{yuan}), although it is not clear whether these belong to the new Chinese settlers or the aboriginal settlements—some of these details are visible in figure 6.

\textsuperscript{21} Emma Teng, 54-55.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, 59.

\textsuperscript{23} Emma Teng and Gao Chuanqi discuss the later; while Wang Cunli and Hu Wenqing (14) summarize the Chinese studies of the former: they refer to it as “the most informative of the Qing dynasty Taiwan scroll maps; it is the finest representative of the Taiwan maps using the traditional landscape techniques.”
As its title suggests, the second, 1760 map’s primary representational goal is to delineate space “available” (and not available) for Chinese settlement: a red/blue-line nominally marks the division between land “reserved” for aboriginal settlement (primarily foothills and mountains) from which Chinese settlers were restricted, and the available plains areas. Taipei basin falls completely within the “available” space.

While these maps do offer a relatively idealized view of early Chinese settlement in Taipei basin, if we compare these representations with the area around Tainan (see Fig. 7), it is clear that Taipei basin was still at the edge of Chinese imagined settlement and control of Taiwan. The southern part of the island depicted in these maps is filled with both formal Chinese settlement areas (numerous walled towns) and imperial presence (marked by the banners of military encampments). The area around Tainan is by that time almost devoid of marked aboriginal settlements, having been displaced or erased by Chinese colonization. Conversely, the northern part of the island is represented as being still primarily a space for the aboriginal “other,” with Chinese settlement seen for what it was, a growing infringement; and we must remember that a major part of the island was still completely “off the map.” Over the next hundred years, the Qing vision of Taiwan and the position that the Taipei basin held in that vision undergo radical change.

The New North

The strategic importance of northern Taiwan emerges partly in response to new “foreign” (non-Chinese) threats to the island (coming this time from Japan in 1875 and from France in 1885), as well as in response to developing natural resources for emerging technology (coal for steam vessels). Needless to say these were interrelated issues. In 1874, the Japanese government sent a large military force to the island, ostensibly to respond to an aboriginal attack on shipwrecked Ryukyu sailors on the south-east coast of the island. Negotiations of this conflict induced the Qing government to revise their arguments and claim the entire island as their territory, sending Shen Baozhen, Director-General of the Fuzhou Navy Yard, to shore up the defenses of the island against Japanese incursions and an impending war. Following Beijing’s completion of negotiations with the Japanese, Shen issued a series of memorials, proposing widespread reform of the island. These included incorporation of the entire island, including the interior mountains, into active rule of the Qing, as well as the establishment of a northern prefecture (Taipei fu) to manage the emerging northern third of the island, especially Taipei basin area, of which he said: “Mengjia lies between Jilong (Keelung) and the twin peaks of Guilun, in a fertile plain encompassed by two rivers, with towns and villages, highways and markets, constituting a grand sight . . . therefore we should organize the establishment of what

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would be called Taibei Prefecture.” Following the submission of this memorial, the new prefecture was established by imperial decree and the first Prefect, Lin Daquan, was appointed by Shen in 1877. Prefectural headquarters remained at Danshui ting (current, Xinzhu) until 1879, whereupon Chen Xingju, the second Prefect, decided to build a new prefectural city in the Mengjia/Dadaocheng area.

[Figure 8] An important map from 1879 helps project the rise of Taipei city in Taiwan’s transition toward modern, post-imperial times. This map, the first detailed map of the entire island produced by the Qing, not only reflects new nineteenth-century cartographic methods, which blended European and Chinese mapping conventions, but also plots the Qing government’s growing concern with the entire island as “its” property, as Shen Baozhen argued. Emma Teng says “This map . . . at last showed both sides of the island with equal density. It projects an image of eastern Taiwan not as an empty wilderness but as a terrain that has been “prefectured and countied.” The map rivals the best of the European maps of the same period.

[Figure 9] An illuminating comparison can be made with the 1882 British map “North Formosa,” in which the island is represented in entirely European cartographic terms, including the first hachure-line depiction of its mountain terrain. Among the many details of these two maps, the presence of the new Taipei City is clearly marked. Yet, while the geographic position appears to be accurate in both maps, the shape of the wall in the 1779 map is oddly circular—the Taipei wall was nearly rectangular, which is how it appears in the British map. This oddity can be explained because the former map was describing a city not yet built or even fully planned in 1879. Late imperial Chinese city walls, including all those theretofore in Taiwan, were constructed around already occupied areas, accommodating their organic, usually circular, shape. The ubiquity of these circular walled settlements in the Taiwan western plain is seen (marked in red) in the 1879 map and described by Chiang Tao-chang. Given these local conditions, the wall that would actually be built for Taipei prefectural capital would be configured in a way that this map could not foresee. That city would boast a rectangular, stone-faced wall, standing in the relatively undeveloped land outside the established Chinese settlements. We might argue that the rectangular depiction of the wall in the British map results in part from its distance from the conventional assumptions of Chinese city plans; but we also should note that in 1882 the city wall had been designed and construction was underway. In this way the British cartographers had the advantage. In effect, this prefectural city was a monument to the imperial government’s growing attention to the island; it was also a construction that distanced itself from local power and ethnic politics.


27 Teng, 233.

Taipei in Transition

There are several important Taipei city maps clustered around 1895 when the prefectural capital (Taipei 觀, 1878) and provincial capital (Taiwan 衛, Taipeh cheng, 1887) of the Qing empire suddenly became the colonial capital, Taihoku, of the Japanese Meiji government. The abruptness of this change has been well documented, but cannot be overstated. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 announced a new balance of power in the region, with Japan emerging not only as dominant over China, but also as a challenge to European and American imperialists. In the treaty conditions of that war, the presentation of Taiwan to Japan was in many ways a mere consolation prize: in geopolitical terms the control of northeast Asia was far more important. The Qing quickly abandoned any claim to the island, which fell into chaos and internal bickering and battles. The attempt by some local Mandarin elite figures to establish a “Republic of Taiwan” (Taiwan minguo), while often celebrated in recent social-political rhetoric, was a belated and rather equivocal response to the swiftly changing conditions. When the Qing governor and erstwhile President of the Republic, Tang Qingsong, gave up the Republic after twelve days and fled to the mainland, the city easily fell into Japanese hands. While it took months, even years, to take full control of the island, Taihoku was occupied within a few days. Upon the invitation of the local elite, the Japanese armies marched through Northgate into the city on June 8th with little local resistance and welcoming crowds. If the Qing officials were surprised by the military rise of Japan, the residences of Taipei area must have been completely dumbfounded by their arrival.

[Figure 10] While the provenance of a block-printed map of 1896 is not clear, I think we can argue that it depicts a local, Chinese conception of the city prior to Japanese occupation.

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29 An overview, with accompanying sources, of this period is available in Harry Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” Taiwan: A New History, 203-209.
31 Ibid., 17-18.
32 The sources quoted in Morris, “Republic,” suggest the Japanese were welcomed to pacify the city, which had suffered from several weeks of chaos and violence. How widespread and warm that welcome was is somewhat problematic—the sources (principally British diplomatic and media documents) may have had their own ideological agenda. A commonly reproduced oil painting, e.g. in Yang Mengzhe’s Taiwan lishi yingxiang (Taipei: Yishujia chubanshe, 1996) 111, depicts Taipei citizens lining the street to welcome the Japanese troops, but it is unclear just how optimistic (at the very least) this interpretation of the events might have been.
33 The map exists in two known versions, one held by Wei Dewen and the other by the Qiu Jiang Museum Prepatory Office, reproduced in Chuanyue shikong kan Taibei (28) and elsewhere, and in Guditu Taibei sanbu (Taibei: Guoshi chuban, 2004) supplement, respectively. Wei is relatively silent about its origins, but the authors of the Guditu Taibei sanbu link its production to the emerging commercial interest in maps during the early Japanese period. Both maps have a cartouche written in classical Japanese, while
Despite its slight Japanese overlay, we have a representation of the city that draws heavily from the conventions of the Chinese gazetteer.\(^{34}\) This map of Taipei, depicted here as conventionalized square and oriented toward the south (Northgate is at the bottom of the map), provides iconic representations of the architecture viewed from changing perspectives. This changing perspective privileges one view of a given site—most clearly seen in the way that each gate is viewed from outside the wall looking in. This, combined with the fullness and detail of the gates’ representation, marks them as the principal architectural feature, and sign, of the city. Much of the architecture is labeled, combined with iconic depictions of the rooflines; again these are conventions shared with the gazetteer and early landscape maps. As conservative as the map is, the hints of the new modernizing city are there. This is most clearly seen in the railroad line that crosses the bottom of the map, passing by the European-style building outside of the wall, terminating at the Taipei train station (tingchezhan).\(^{35}\) The railroad is an index of the modernization efforts brought to the city by the Governor Liu Mingchuan who first came to the island in 1884 to defend it against the French: in addition to the railroad from Jilong to Taipei, these efforts included electrification, schools of western learning, rickshaws, and other material changes that propelled the city toward the leading edge of such change in China. Currently Liu Mingchuan is a figure celebrated by almost every faction in Taiwan cultural debates, including Taiwan and PRC governments, as well as those with pro-independence leanings. For them, Liu is both comfortably “Chinese” (a Qing official) and “local”—he promoted Taipei and Taiwan beyond the expectations of almost everyone. In his most innovative proposals, he had a new vision for Taipei (and Taiwan) that was both cosmopolitan and anti-imperial. This map certainly postdates Liu’s residence in the city, but it makes a graphic statement about change within the limits of accepted urban cartographic conventions. Liu was removed from power in 1891 before he could make much more than surface changes to the city. These were changes, however, that the Japanese colonialists embraced and deepened.

[Figures 11-12] Our other two maps from this transitional period present a different, complementary view of the city—the earliest map is dated December 13, 1895, just six months after the Japanese had arrived; the other (figure 12) is from 1897. There is no substantial graphic difference in the depiction of the city between these two maps, other than the later version is in color. They do differ, however, greatly from the 1896 “Chinese” map considered above; this difference is in their systems of representation, not in content (it appears that both maps represent 1895 conditions). Following modern European cartographic conventions of the city ground plan, which the Japanese embraced as part of their Meiji reforms, the orientation of the map is reverse of the Chinese map (here, north at the top), uniform in its point of view, and planimetric (two

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the later map has hand written notes by the famous Japanese scholar of Taiwan, Inō Kanori, (Guditu Taibei sanbu, 16).

\(^{34}\) I think the arguments made in Guditu Taibei sanbu linking the map’s representation techniques to Japanese Ukiyo-e prints are not as important as its gazetteer orientation, although the arguments that the map is a commercial production, like Ukyio-e prints, is an important one.

\(^{35}\) In Wei Dewen’s copy of the map this is labeled as a hospital, while in Guditu copy it is labeled as a railway office; this may indicate changing usage of the building over time.
dimensional), with standards of scale and topographic representations formally stated in a legend (more elaborately on the 1897 version). The innovations in these two maps were as if to say: we don’t quite know what we are going to do with this space, but clearly it will be part of a vision that leans more toward Tokyo and Europe, rather than toward the city’s imperial or local origins. Indeed, at the beginning of the colonization period the Meiji government had no clear policy on the future of the island; new to the colonial enterprise, debates on fundamental issues, including whether to keep the colony at all, occupied the Japanese authorities. For the first two years of the occupation, the colonial government’s primary concern was with the pacification of the island, not developing a coherent colonial policy. This awkward transition was common for most new colonial enterprises; and the Japanese were especially without a coherent colonial policy as they lurched into the role of colonial power after the Sino-Japanese war.

The earliest Japanese maps that we have of Taihoku city (1895, 1897) are emblematic of this moment. Over the coming decades the cartographic representations of Taihoku (and of the island as a whole) move ever closer to an alignment with the modern metropole of Tokyo. First, there were concerted efforts to map the entire island with large-scale topographical survey maps, very much part of the scientific accounting of the new colonial possession. These were accompanied by progressively detailed urban planning maps produced for Taipei and other important cities. Each of these maps is filled with graphic statements of ideological intent, if not always full implementation.

**Urban Planning Maps of Taihoku**
The vacillation in early colonial policy would begin to be resolved in 1898 with the arrival of the new Governor General Kodama Gentarō, and his celebrated civil official, Gotō Shimpei. They brought with them a progressive agenda for the island, informed by deep exposure to European colonialism and “western learning.” This was especially so for Gotō, who would go on to become the urban planner for modern Tokyo after the devastating 1923 earthquake and have substantial influence on the construction of the colonial capital of Manchukuo in the 1930s.

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38 These begin with the island-wide mapping in 1895 (see Wei and Gao, *Chuanyue shikong kan Taibei*, 21), and culminate in 1898-1904 survey (*Taiwan Baotu*).

must assume his early experience in Taipei informed both of those later projects. Mark R. Peattie writes:

With the arrival of Kodama Gentarō and his civil administrator Gotō Shimpei, the Japanese presence in Taiwan at last found a policy and a purpose. Superbly trained in the medical profession in Germany, widely read in the contemporary literature of colonialism, Gotō combined outstanding organizational talent with a quick and searching mind. Working under an influential and trusting superior and reinforced by important political connections at home, moreover, he had the benefit of operating in an undeveloped territory with a broad latitude of authority.40

Gotō’s vision would create the fundamental direction for all aspects of the development of the colony, not the least in city planning and architecture: “Taking his clue from the role of the public edifice in British India, he undertook the transformation of the decaying jumble of Chinese Taipei into the stately European-style capital of Taihoku.”41

**[Figure 13]** At this time intramural Taipei was less a “jumble” and more a vacant lot—the 1895 map indicates that at least 50% of the land was undeveloped at that time, and other estimates state as much as 75% of the intramural land was still fields or agricultural land.42 No matter the exact amount, the emptiness of the city was striking, especially by late imperial Chinese standards. This openness presented opportunities for the Japanese urban planners that they clearly seized upon in their first planning map, figure 13, which was issued along with a brief announcement in August, 1900.43 Although much could be said about the intramural details of this map, but here we should note that the space within the wall is primarily reconfigured with a series of new streets that extend and complement the original Qing streets, creating a more extensive grid and piercing the city wall with nine new gates. This grid is then labeled with an overlay of Japanese *chome* blocks, in coordination with older Qing street names, e.g. the area where the Tianhougong temple stood is labeled “Block 7 of Fuhoujie (Prefecture Back Street).” The map is most revealing, however, in what it fails to include in its early vision: the extramural settlements of Mengjia and Dadaocheng where the large majority of the Chinese lived and worked—these were included in the 1895 and 1897 maps. At this point in time,

40 “Japanese Attitudes,” 83.

41 Ibid, 88.

42 Estimates of percentage of undeveloped land in the intramural area range between 70% (1892) and 30% (1895)—see Ye Xiaoke’s *Riluo Taibeicheng: Rizhi shidai Taibei dushi fazhan yu ren richang shenghuo* (Taipei: Zili wanbao chubanshe, 1993), 76-77; Yang Mengzhe (p. 120) suggests 75%.

43 *Taibeixian xianbao*, No. 188 (August 23, 1900), 113-114.
Japanese planners focused their attention on the relatively neutral intramural space that they saw available for occupation and worthy of their colonial aspirations.

**Figure 14** When the planners did turn their gaze to areas beyond the wall, it was toward the east and south, away from these older Chinese settlements. This is first seen in the 1901 “Planning Map for South of the City Wall” that sketched out the new Japanese residential area there. This suburban plan is then incorporated into the first comprehensive city map evolving from the 1900 plan, in which the Qing contents of the city are largely masked by Japanese projections. Still, in this map the Chinese settlements remain unaccounted for. Not for long, however.

**Figure 15** The Taihoku urban planning map of 1905 sets the standard that will carry the colonial vision throughout the Japanese colonial period and beyond, reaching its full form in the 1932 plan for greater Taipei. The 1905 map is a concrete manifestation of Gotó Shimpei’s progressive and expansive urban policy, although he left the island before its plans was fully implemented. The map’s most immediate innovation is in its integration of the Japanese and Chinese sections of the city, as its subtitle, “The Three Towns of Taipei” (*Taihoku sanshigai*), announces. Japanese colonial policy regarding the status of the “islanders” (*hontōjin*) was always ambivalent at best; yet there emerged a stated “assimilation” (*dōka*) policy that captured the imagination of both the rulers and the ruled elite, especially during the 1920s.

As the map clearly shows, the insularity that was by definition part of the intramural city is dissolved into one of porousness and integration. The city wall, that icon of exclusion, disappears and is replaced by large boulevards encircling the city core. This innovation, borrowed from European examples of medieval walls transformed into roadways and promenades, changed the internal composition and symbolic value of the city: a traditional bureaucratic center, walled and imperial, is transformed into a site of colonial modernism. Walls of exclusion and gates of delimited access are replaced by avenues of circulation allowing multiple entries into the city: the city core is no longer ritually penetrated at its gates, but rather circumambulated with the traffic of modernity. And furthermore, that circulation continues out into the Chinese communities, with major streets planned from the central business and administrative areas of the city, extending deep into settlement areas. In the case of Mengjia, this includes the recovery of a major section of marshland upon which the planned streets will be

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44 *Tabeixian bao*, No. 276.

45 There are two versions of this map: the original issued in May (reproduced in Wei and Gao, *Chuanyue shikong kan* Taipei, 74-75), and a December revision held by National Library, Taiwan Branch; this later version (reproduced here) contains an expanded map of the southern suburbs.

46 For a review of that policy see Peatie, “Attitudes.” Leo Ching argues that “assimilation” was always a policy of contradiction where the Taiwanese never could become Japanese, even if they wanted to.
built—that marshland is visible in the 1901 map (figure 14). As significant as those integrative steps were for the formation of Taipei city, it was the extension of the city grid out into the eastern suburbs that signaled its Japanese future: here would develop the extensive neighborhoods of Japanese residential architecture that became, along with the older Chinese residential/commercial sections and the European colonial buildings downtown, the tripartite architectural hallmark of the city. Each incremental step in Taipei’s urban plans over the next three decades continued the work first seen in the 1905 map.

The 1905 urban plan was projected to accommodate a city of 150,000 in twenty-five years, beginning with a population of 86,775 in 1905. When those twenty-five years were concluded, the population of the city had already grown to 244,244 and a new plan was very much in order. There are intervening maps of the city during this period (such as that of 1920) but these represented only the infilling of the plans of the 1905 map, not a new vision for the city.

[Figure 16] In 1932, the central government issued a new urban development plan projected out to 1955 for a city of 600,000. That plan has several accompanying maps, but the most revealing is the “Map of Streets and Parks: Plan for Taipei Area.” (Taihoku shiku keikaku: Gairo yo ko’en zu), which presents an expansive vision of the city. This map might be viewed as a local articulation of the imperialist plans that were dominating Japan’s political agenda in the post-Taishō period. Moving aggressively from the downtown area toward the eastern hills, the map plots out a grid of arterials deep into the agricultural land surrounding the city. The ruler-straight lines, with their 90 degree intersections, suggests that no local accommodations needed to be made in these plans—one is reminded of the similarly straight lines of the Qing city wall, which too was laid out in paddy land. Along with the aggressiveness of this design is the articulation of a public park system for the city, expanded to include sixteen parks, all numbered and most of them new and linked by wide new parkways (ko’en michi) in the eastern and northern suburbs. This optimistic plan, in which an efficient transportation systems joins sites of civic leisure, is a statement of progressive modernity that was the logical extension of Japan’s rising prominence in the world and Taipei’s symbolic value in that position. Of course, what would derail these plans were not some local obstructions, but rather the international military entanglements that emerged with that rising prominence. As Japan and its colony moved through the 1930s, less and less attention and resources could go to the luxuries of the modern life; thus these plans for the city, including the park system, were never fully completed, although they

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47 The details of that recovery plan are reviewed by Huang Wuda, Vol. 3, 86-87.

48 Huang Wuda, Vol. 3, 82, 96—this population figure may include a typo; in 1932 it was at 266,066.

49 Taipeizhou bao, No. 765 (March 7, 1932), public notice 54. This plan is reviewed in Huang Wuda, Vol. 3, 95-101.

50 The work on the park system stalled in the late 1930s. The early KMT government used some of the designated park space as temporary villages for the large influx of military immigrants from China in 1949 (most infamously, Japanese Park no. 7); other designated park space was used for new National monuments such as Sun Yatsen Memorial (park no. 6). In the post-martial law period, no.7 park would be reclaimed, to become Da’an District Forest Park.
would remain “on the books.”

Maps for Consumption

[Figure 17] In August 1911, Taipei suffered a major typhoon that destroyed much of the old housing and structures of the city. This was a time when the colonial government, along with its capital, was becoming more self-assured and visionary—the 1910s would bring a series of new building and improvements to the city core, as well as to the near suburbs to the east and south. In this spirit of confidence, the destruction of 1911 was turned into an opportunity to rebuild parts of the intramural city, especially the Kyō ward, into a modern commercial district. The results of this renovation project are celebrated in a photo album that compares the old and new in a series of excellent black and white photographs. With the spreading technology of photography, this sense of “then and now” becomes a dominant way of viewing the city, distinctly imbricated with the agendas of different cultural agents. Here the Japanese colonial government was using the photographs to celebrate its successful “modernization” of the old Chinese capital, implying their beneficial stewardship. In the 1960s and 1970s, the new Chinese government made similar photographic claims for their modernization efforts, but they made these comparisons only with the pre-Japanese city, willfully erasing the interim fifty years—in many ways the renovations of the 1960s would have not compared well with the Japanese city at its height. After the lifting of martial law and the widespread availability of historical materials in the 1990s, these comparisons were made again, both in commercial and government publications. In these latest materials, one often finds a multilayered comparison ranging from the Qing through contemporary photographs, with the Japanese period fully and positively represented, while the modernization efforts of the early KMT period are played down, or even ridiculed—this ridicule is most often associated with the “renovation” of the city gates in the mid 1960s.

[Figure 18] Contemporaneous with the 1911 renovation project is a map that offers the city not in ground-plan representation, but rather in a “near-photographic” three-dimensionality. This map, from October 1911, translates the planning maps of that project period, along with on-site investigations, into a new visuality of the city. This visuality is meant to make the map and

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51 There are numerous post-1932 Japanese maps of the city, including a 1939 Planning map (Taibeishi wenxianhui map no. 50), but it seems to be almost an exact duplicate of the 1932 map. These plans and maps would strongly influence early KMT designs for the city, as well.

52 These photo essays were a common feature of the official government organ, Taibei huakan (Taipei Illustrated) during the 1960s and 70s.

53 One of the most sophisticated public displays of such materials is in the “Discovery Center of Taipei,” a permanent exhibition at Taipei City Hall.

54 These arguments are most strongly made by architect and historian, Li Qianlang, in his Taibei guchengmen (Taipei: Taibei wenxianhui, 1993).
city “easy to read” even for “women and children.” In his accompanying note the map’s editor, Iwahashi Shōzan, writes:

This map is based on the Revised Map of Taipei City, made from a survey directed by the Department of Public Works of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, with additional changes based on a recent survey. My main purpose for having this made is to provide a map of the city that is popular in style and comprehensible to all. For that reason we have drawn the buildings and vegetation as if viewed from the side, giving the impression of the actual scenery projected from an elevated position, thereby allowing viewers without special cartographic training, such as women and children, to comprehend easily the layout of the whole city. We hope this will lead them to pursue the formal study of maps. I understand that some might not approve of this type of illustrative, three-dimensional cartography; I ask your indulgence: my sole purpose here is to make the general outlines of the city easier to visualize.  

As this note makes clear, this map’s intended function was not for planning or even navigating the city, but rather for making the city an object of contemplation and admiration. In its function and design, the map shares a position something akin to the 1895 Chinese map of the city; this is especially seen in the shifting perspectives on the city where each piece of architecture is viewed from a privileged near-ground view, usually oriented toward its street frontage. This shifting point of view is seen occasionally in some early Japanese maps, although not with the regularity of the Chinese maps—it is not used in the popular Japanese “town-plan” or travel itineraries of the seventeenth century, for example.

[Figure 19] In its bid for “readability” the 1911 map includes the labeling of architectural pieces throughout, which we saw also in the maps from the 1895 transition, but here these labels appear as standing cartouches oriented with their architectural referent. We should note, however, that this map is claiming another, very new technology: the title of the map Saishin Taihokushi hikōki chōmoku zenzu (literally, The Airplane Bird’s Eye Complete Map of New Taipei) seems to prefigure the arrival of aerial photography to modern mapping. Yet the map’s continuation of the shifting perspectives of early gazetteer maps is an indication that the actual technology of aerial photography had yet to penetrate the cartographic world (this would not

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55 The map, reproduced and discussed in Wei and Gao, Chuanyue shikong kan Taibei, 33-34, includes auxiliary maps of the near-city areas, in ground-plan, three-dimensional mapping, and sketches.

56 From cartouche on map; reproduced most clearly in Ibid., 35-36.

happen until the 1920s. The neologism “chōmoku,” which normally might be translated as “a bird’s eye view,” perhaps should really be translated as “bird views” of the city. Here the representation is modulated with a sense of “photo realism” that must trace its source to actual photography, taken from the street level, of the city.

[Figure 20] In the 1930s we find the emergence of another type of colonial mapmaking that verges even more toward the Japanese and pictorial: these are the panoramic, landscape “bird’s-eye maps” (chōkanzu/niaokantu) of the island. These maps present the island and selected localities as picturesque places in three-dimensional, full color representations, but by this time, the point of view has been unified and elevated as the bird/airplane seems to approach the site at shadowless noon, thousands of feet off the ground. These maps are a graphic celebration of the island both in its natural and colonized beauty, combining stunning landscapes with significant signs of modern progress (including airplanes overhead, but under our gaze). The popularity of these maps in the 1930s is testimony to the economic progress of the island (both as it is represented in the maps, and as luxury items themselves), as well as the island’s commoditization as a site of pleasure. They help document the transformation of the island into a postcard destination inviting the tourist’s gaze: the island of rebels and head hunters had become one of tropical fruits and hot springs. The maps’ extensive use of the place-name cartouche provides the image with its verbal analogue, giving the viewer all the information needed for an enjoyable sojourn.

In the lush renderings of the island in these panoramic maps of the 1930s, there is a consistent pictorial style, with points of view, in both elevation and direction, conventionalized. Edward Casey believes this pictorial style ultimately derives from Ukiyo-e prints. Views of the entire island are almost always from the west side looking east, just as in the Qing maps, but the new technology invites views from “twenty thousand feet” so that the east side of the island is also partly visible. Views of specific sites along the coasts are, however, backed by the barrier of central mountains, of which Emma Teng has written—as we will see, Taipei presents an interesting variation on this orientation. The maps are no doubt derivative of aerial photography of the time, yielding horizons and perspective not found in the early Japanese and Chinese maps. In this case the new technology is enhanced by the old, as the paintings increases the depth of

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59 This term chōmoku/niaomu, which literally means “bird’s eye,” is not the standard term for “bird’s eye view” (chōkan) that will be used later.

60 A collection of these maps is reproduced in *Taiwan niaokan tu*, ed. Zhuang Yongming (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 1996).

61 Li Qinxian discusses the important painter, Yoshida Hatsuzo, who was trained both in Japanese and Western painting techniques (*Taiwan niaokan tu*, 236-37).
field and the width of the lens, creating “encompassability, partial exaggeration, and density of composition.”

[Figures 21-22] There are several chōkanzu maps of the greater Taipei area, but none is so celebrated as the one issued on the eve of the 1935 Taiwan Exposition (figure 21). The exposition was part of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the island as a colonial prize, and the map that prefaces the exposition sets the tone for that celebration—the map marks the sites of the exposition, but presents the city in its pre-exposition configuration—see figure 22. We can also view this map as complementary to the 1932 planning maps: iconic versus symbolic, isometric versus planimetric, and pictorial versus engineered.

[Figures 23-25] Both types of maps present an overly optimistic representation of the city; the chōkanzu map celebrating what “was,” while the 1932 maps project what was to come. In the 1935 map we find all the conventions of the chōkanzu panoramic map: the wide unified view in perspective, the detailed rendering of architecture, cartouche labeling, and even the airplanes casting their noon shadow on the airfield south of the city (Matsuyama Airport had yet to be built). However, instead of the conventional onshore view of most other sites, the gaze here is from southwest of the city, looking north, down the Tamsui River. This perspective foregrounds the newer, Japanese sections of the city in favor of the older Chinese sections. It also affords a view out to sea where, through artistic license of both distance and direction, Japan, with emblematic Mount Fuji, looms, along with a necklace of other colonies (Korea and Manchukuo) and coastal temptations (Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou)—see figure 23. Needless to say, the view is one both of colonial acquisition and desire. In the foreground, Taihoku is laid out as an exciting, teeming but orderly city; its multicolor cartouches reminding us of all its civic activity, although its streets are nearly without traffic. Celebration of colonial success fills the map. The bottom left hand corner of the map is pushed down and the Xindian River bent sharply enough to allow for the depiction of the new Taihoku Imperial University (figure 24). And in the upper right hand corner, just beyond the city, rise the great Taiwan Shinto Shrine and mountain spas of Yangming Moutain and Beitou (figure 25).

[Figure 26] The rail line down the river valley leads finally to picturesque Guanyin Mountain where one can watch modern ships cruise along the coast. Unlike the 1932 planning map, however, the new eastern suburbs are cropped from view, although there are trains, busses, and cars headed that way.

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62 Edward S. Casey describes similar Japanese maps from the pre-Meiji period as “Ukiyoe” maps that “were at once cartographic and painterly, equally and fully both” (209). He goes on to describe the power of these maps in terms of their “depth, encompassability, partial exaggeration, and density of composition,” all qualities well displayed in the later Taiwan maps. We can thus read these maps as more “traditionally” Japanese and pre-European.

63 Da Taibei niaokantu, October, 1935. Held in Taibeishi wenxianhui, map. no. 15. This map has been widely reproduced during the last fifteen years as part of the small nostalgia industry reproducing materials from the Japanese period.
Viewed through the lens of current cultural discourse this map seems to embody the now often cited positive qualities of the Japanese period—a well-run society where order, discipline, and fairness prevailed (at least in hindsight), as it progressed steadily toward the future. In contrast, that sense of order and direction seems to have been quickly lost in the lack of planning and congestion that took over Taipei in the post-war period, especially as it entered its “economic miracle” phase of rampant capitalist growth. Today, young urban professionals of Taipei often speak of the need for a “quality of life” (shenghuo pinzhi); that seems to be what you may be able to recover from this map. The 1935 Taiwan Exposition turned out to have been the final extravagant celebration of Japanese colonial rule on the island. By that time, Japan was already beginning its military entanglements, which would continue to intensify through the late 1930s and early 1940s.

**Figures 27-28** The American bombing of the island began October 1944, coordinated with the allied approach to the Phillipines. Bombing intensified once the American forces had taken control of Luzon (March, 1945), reaching Taipei City in earnest in May. On May 31st, downtown Taipei was bombed by 124 sorties of B-29 bombers. In the beginning, those attacks were in preparation for an assumed, deadly invasion; later, they were in support of military actions in the region, especially the battle of Okinawa. When the American military drew its 1945 bombing map of Taipei, it drew on Japanese maps as well as its own aerial photography. This time, however, the “bird’s eye view” is that of a military reconnaissance plane. The labels are all there, including those of the celebrated colonial sites (residence of Governor General, city park, colonial museum, medical school, and Shinto shrine); yet there is also the labeling of the soft underbelly of the city—prison, freight yard, ice plant, and officer barracks. (There also appears to be what we hope is labeling for later on ground operations—almost all the schools and hospitals are labeled, for example.) The details of the core city, with its central governmental buildings, are of course especially dense—even the path ways in Taipei Park are clearly delineated. In the eastern suburbs, where the Japanese had planned parks and sweeping arterials, the Americans found, rather, storage facilities and railway yards—see figure 28. In the face of wartime footing, the dream of “green” eastern suburbs never materialized. Some of those dreams would be fulfilled fifty years later.

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65 The map contains information on the reconnaissance flights whose photographs, along with Japanese maps, were used to construct the map. In the evolution of aerial photography, the technique of using multiple, overlapping photos to build accurate panoramic maps of given sites emerged toward the end of World War I, and became standard in the inter War period—see Grover Heiman, *Aerial Photography: The Story of Aerial Mapping and Reconnaissance* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972).

66 In the 1990s one of those parks, no. 7, was recovered from its occupation by military dependent families (sort of a shanty town) and turned into Da’an District Forest Park.
Conclusion

Just as Taipei was wrenched out of late imperial China and thrust into colonial Japan in 1895, in 1945 it would fall abruptly into the hands of the Chinese state, or at least one version of that state. Conditions in the city were similar during those two disruptive transitional periods. Again, there was a period of uncertainty regarding policy toward the island, with a lively debate about the status of the former Japanese colony in the Nationalist Government agenda.67

[Figure 29] Some sense of this uncertainty is seen in a map from April 1946 in which the Japanese, Chinese, and American elements meet to map a new city: there are new Chinese names for the streets, but there is also a finding list between the Japanese and Chinese names; the Chinese governmental organs are in place in the Japanese colonial buildings, but there is a label that points out “the old Sotokofu;” the “Places of Interest” emphasizes the Chinese (Confucius, City God, and Sun Yatsen), but also includes Japanese sites, including a hand-written cartouche that says, in English, “Many cozy [sic] restaurants a la Japanaise located here.” But just as Gotō and Kodama brought new direction to the colonial enterprise in 1898, this ambiguous postwar pastiche of cultures ended in 1947, when the KMT government “finds its direction” with the brutal suppression of the Taiwanese elite and the attempted erasure of the Japanese legacy. There would be no more “finding lists” and the street names would not only be Chinese, but be “China”: Northgate Street (Beimen jie) becomes Chiang Kaishek Road (Zhongzheng lu); Westgate Street (Ximen jie) becomes China Road (Zhonghua lu), etc.

Finding lists, both material and metaphorical, re-emerged within the industry of nostalgia that built through the 1990s, culminating in the government sponsored exhibitions at the turn of the millennium. Old and new maps are overlaid, lists are compiled to remind us of what something once was, and inventories are made of what has been lost. If there is silence now, it is about the city in the immediate postwar period, that important if somewhat jerky transition toward becoming a “Chinese” city. That is a story that must wait another telling.