

Bitter Diplomacy: Postwar Japan-Korea Relations*

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Studies in international relations commonly assume the concept of national interest, defined in terms of the quest for power, as the key to conduct as well as analysis of foreign policy. The focus of international relations, according to Frederick H. Hartmann, "is on the processes by which states adjust their national interests to those of other states"; therefore, "in formulating a foreign policy it is imperative to express what is to be sought in accurate and modest terms."¹ In other words, rationally calculated national interest is fundamental in foreign policy decisions.

This celebrated concept, though useful for general analytical purposes, falls short of adequately explaining such an emotion-laden diplomatic conflict as the one involving Japan and Korea in the postwar period. As with other ex-colonial countries' relations with their former "mother" countries, Japanese-Korean relations have been influenced as much by the forces of nationalism, anti-colonialism, social revolution and the cold war as by the rationally calculated concepts of national interests. It may even be argued that in such cases the motives usually associated with the concept of interest are greatly subordinated to another set of motives which—though they may seem less rational (if not irrational) from a certain point of view—carry far more powerful and immediate emotional impact.

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The point is not that the conflicts of interest are unimportant, but that the complex forces underlying the conflicts must not be underestimated, especially in attempting to understand more comprehensively the bitterness which often characterizes the relations between underdeveloped and industrialized states and between small powers and great powers. To put it in another way, an interpretation like this must necessarily begin, not with a cool-headed Machiavellian analysis of national interest, but with an endeavor to correlate social, psychological, and historical tensions to the substance and style of their diplomacy.

I

Few countries are so closely related geopolitically, ethnically, and culturally to each other as Japan and Korea; their intimate intercourse goes back through time immemorial. In the remote past, the Korean peninsula served as the main channel through which new elements of continental civilizations were introduced to the island empire, and in the recent past, Japan, though as a conqueror, was instrumental in familiarizing the peninsula with modern technological civilization. Today, Korea is divided, but the Republic of Korea (ROK) stands along with Japan in the camp of the free world; both countries are allied with the United States.² Korea, though independent, is still closely tied economically to Japan; almost 60 per cent of Korea's exports go to Japan.³

Under the present circumstances, involving the threat from the nearby Communist countries, it would seem not only logical but realistic that these two neighbors should be close allies. Yet their relations in the postwar period have been tragically harsh. In the words of William J. Jordan, "there is probably no more bitter diplomatic conflict in the world today than that which divides Japan and Korea."⁴ Standing between them are such issues as fishing rights, the ownership of Dokto or Takeshima Island, financial claims and the treatment of Koreans in Japan, but above all, deep-seated prejudices on both sides, and their uncompromising nationalism. In spite of the numerous conferences between the two countries since 1951, Korea still refuses to allow the establishment on her soil of a Japanese diplomatic

mission.⁵ As a precondition for the normalization of diplomatic relations, Korea has insisted that Japan nullify the old treaty of annexation (1910) which she feels was forced upon her "under duress."⁶ On its part, Japan has never shown any remorse or even offered a mere gesture of apology for her colonial rule, which the Koreans consider to have been vicious. She has stubbornly refused to make amends or to admit the slightest regret for the colonial past. More than that, Japan insists that she developed Korea. "Rather than offering [the] apologies that the Koreans have demanded since the war," says Lawrence A. Olson, "the Japanese still seem to expect a show of gratitude for the exploitation of Korea and the calculated repression of whatever capacities for self-government the Koreans possessed."⁷

Japanese and Western observers used to attribute the estranged Japanese-Korean relations to Syngman Rhee, while entertaining the hope that his disappearance would bring about a better turn. Rhee's "greatest invective," charges Richard C. Allen, "was reserved for Japan," and, rather than attempting to resolve the differences with Japan, he "sought to compound them by a deliberate policy of encouraging anti-Japanese sentiment in the Korean populace."⁸ Such criticism is not without foundation. For example, when some foreign reporters spoke of the possibility of sending a few Japanese troops to the peninsula during the Korean war to help the UN forces, Rhee stated bluntly that in that case the Korean soldiers would withdraw from the frontline to battle with the Japanese. Probably he suspected Japan more than he hated her; he said once to Claude A. Buss that it was difficult for him to imagine "a Japanese *kimono* without a knif in the sleeve."⁹ Few Japanese were allowed even to set foot on Korean soil while he retained the reins of government.¹⁰

Such sentiments, though they might seem irrational in the light of the genuine national interests of the Korean people, were not monopolized by Rhee. Most Koreans harbored similar sentiments then. Rhee's hostility, hatred, and fear of Japan were and still are shared by many Koreans who lived under the "yoke of Japanese imperialism."¹¹ To a great extent, this accounts for the still unresolved diplomatic conflict between the two countries, in spite of Rhee's fall from power, the changes of

government, and increased exchanges, official as well as nonofficial, of visiting missions in the past few years.

II

In order to understand better the specific diplomatic conflict between Korea and Japan, we must first appreciate the socio-psychological and historical tensions which underlie their relations. The socio-psychological tensions, though profoundly important, are not usually admitted by policy makers. Nevertheless, their political decisions are colored consciously or unconsciously, as these tensions are "internalized" in their personalities. It may very well be argued that the outstanding diplomatic issues are not necessarily the causes for their bitter relations; rather, they are symptomatic of the deep-seated roots of bitterness, both socio-psychological and historical.

Japanese international attitudes, like their personal attitudes in group relations, tend to fall into highly hierarchical patterns. *Ittōkoku* (first class country) or *Ittōkokumin* (first class nationals) are familiar words with those who know the Japanese people well. A country is either to be looked up to or it is to be treated with condescension. Korea has been placed in the latter category for a long time. This assumption of their own superiority has been deliberately reinforced even to the point of presenting legendary tales, such as the conquest of Korea by Empress Jingū, as historical facts.

Such condescension is clearly revealed in the Japanese estimation of specific traits of Korean nationals. Heiji Shinosaki, a Japanese police superintendent, writing a reference book on the Korean minority in Japan for the Japanese police forces, says that "Koreans in general are low in their cultural and educational standards, and weak in their spirit of obeying laws; moreover, their character is toadyistic, and they are prone to follow leaders blindly." They are also "emotional and abundantly atrocious"; in addition, they are "cleverly selfish, cunning, extravagant and vain-glorious, and lack the desire for work."¹² *Sankei Jiji* once commented in a similar tone:

We would like to think Koreans are a meek and gentle nation. In the light of our experiences, however, unfortunately we cannot think they are gentle and obedient. Compared with them, really very obedient and lovely is the attitude shown by the Japanese. This makes us feel that the Japanese people are quite irreconcilable with the Koreans. Japan and Korea are neighboring countries. Yet there have occurred too many incidents in which both nations could not reach agreement. We regret it much. This is apparently due to a difference in nature of the two nations.¹³

These generalizations, though obviously loaded with prejudice, cannot be dismissed merely as isolated impression, for recent Japanese public opinion polls bear out these deep prejudices toward Koreans. A study conducted recently among the students in grade and high schools and universities in Osaka shows that their liking for Koreans was 0 per cent. They rated Koreans as the worst people among the twelve nationality groups with which most Japanese are familiar.¹⁴ A similar study by the Research Committee on Japanese National Characteristics indicates that the Japanese consider Koreans the ugliest, least likeable, and least capable people.¹⁵ Nearly all public opinion polls conducted in Japan from 1951 to 1955 confirm such findings. They also rank the ROK as the most disliked country along with the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Koreans also have their share of prejudices against the Japanese. They continue to call the Japanese *Waenom*—meaning the little barbarians—and to remind them of Korean cultural offerings before the seventeenth century. They have never forgiven the Japanese for their unprovoked aggression in Korea in the sixteenth century, which has often been described as the most ruinous attack on one country by another. Of the Japanese invasion of the peninsula, a Japanese historian has written:

Korean civilization was virtually destroyed... even the graves of her kings were molested and rifled. At the close of the war Korea was a land of ruins, so great had been the devastation. The Koreans have ever since fostered great enmity toward the Japanese. Even today, Korea is filled with monuments, traditions and literature describing the horrors of the Seven Years' war... one of the most cruel and

unprovoked wars that the world has ever witnessed... Thus does Korea keep alive the memory of Japanese atrocities, generation after generation.¹⁷

Also, the Koreans tend to attribute the economic and political underdevelopment of their country to Japan's recent colonialism in Korea. It is not surprising that Koreans are bitter at Japan's persistent refusal to amend her past ruthlessness by a sincere apology. The general feeling of Koreans toward Japan was best described by You-Chan Yang at the first Japan-Korea conference:

I cannot say to you that we Koreans are going to wipe the past out of our minds.

The years of Japanese occupation left us with problems which cannot be easily solved. Our economic processes were tied closely and inexorably into those of Japan and were made to serve as subsidiaries to Japanese development. As a result, our industrial development was unhealthy and was so devised that it should not be able to stand alone. Similarly, during all those years, our own people were barred from technical and managerial training and experience. ... This is the sum of the feelings of our people. I should like to indicate that a fair and full settlement of Korea's just claims will constitute the only basis upon which we can turn from the past to contemplate together the building of a better future. ... We cannot avoid a certain amount of reserve until we may be positively assured that the past is not to be repeated in the future.¹⁸

III

Right-wing Diet members, speaking before a crowd of Tokyo residents not too long ago, flayed Syngman Rhee as "an enemy of mankind," and demanded that the Rhee Line be scrapped, all Korean diplomatic agencies be shut off, and every Korean national in Japan be expelled.¹⁹ Such an emotional outburst stems, in the main, from the embittered dispute over the fishing rights in the maritime zone around the Korean peninsula, demarcated by what the Japanese call the "Rhee Line," and the Koreans call the "Peace Line."

The maritime line extends, on the average, about sixty miles out from the Korean coast, covering some 136,000 square miles.

There exist within this line extensive fishing grounds for mackerel and horse-mackerel, "the richest in Japan's neighboring waters."²⁰ The Presidential Proclamation of January 18, 1952, establishing the Peace Line, states that "its issuance has been urged by impelling need of safeguarding, once and for all, interests of national welfare and defense," and defines in paragraph 1 the Korean sovereignty in the maritime area surrounded by the line:

The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises national sovereignty over the shelf adjacent to the peninsula and insular coasts of the national territory, no matter how deep it may be, protecting, preserving and utilizing to the best advantage of national interests, all natural resources, mineral and marine, that exist over the said shelf, on it and beneath it, known or which may be discovered in the future.²¹

In advancing this claim, Korea contends, though questionably, that it is based on "well-established international precedents." It is also provided that the line may be modified when new situations arise, and that the line does not interfere with rights of free navigation on the high seas. But the proclamation goes much further than such proclamations as President Truman's of 1945.²² The Korean government set up prize courts, and also enacted the Law for the Protection of Fishery Resources in December, 1953, to implement the Presidential proclamation. Under the law, persons fishing within the Peace Line must obtain the permission of the Korean Government. Those who violate this provision are liable to penal servitude, or confiscation of the fishing vessels, fishing equipment, and the like.²³ To put more teeth into the proclamation, orders for the use of force against the fishing vessels violating the line were given occasionally.²⁴

The Japanese Government protested immediately. Japan, theoretically adhering to the three-mile limit of territorial waters, and also frustrated by several other countries' restrictive measures against Japanese fishing, is vehemently opposed to what she calls "illegal, reckless" Korean measures.²⁵ She has consistently maintained that the Rhee Line is not based on fully established

international law, and that the seizures of Japanese fishing boats were all illegal acts which violate the principle of the freedom of the high seas. She contends further that the line is entirely arbitrary, that is, largely politically motivated.

Ever since the establishment of the line, Japan has made the fishing rights issue the most important one in her talks with Korea. While Japan has sought to have the traditional principle of the freedom of the high seas recognized first, Korea has countered by stating that the Peace Line must be recognized first. Japan's position is that, in the last analysis, the extent of the compromise she will make to the Korean claim is entirely dependent upon how far the Korean side will concede to her on the issue.

The Koreans contend that in spite of Japan's obligation to conclude a fishery agreement with Korea under Articles 9 and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, she has been unwilling to do so, presenting one excuse after another.²⁶ They point out that the Peace Line was created as a countermeasure against Japan's unwillingness to conclude such an agreement at the first Japan-Korean conference in 1951. The Japanese are reminded that it was their Government-General in Korea which issued on December 10, 1929, an ordinance establishing a "prohibited zone" in which foreign trawlers were banned from a zone exceeding 100-150 miles off the Korean coasts.²⁷ Korea contends further that, apart from the aim to conserve marine resources, the Peace Line is also intended to forestall disputes between Korea and Japan, to defend the Korean coast against Communist infiltration and also against smuggling.

There are other reasons which are equally significant. Fearful as they are of Japan's superiority in fisheries, Koreans wish to minimize unrestricted Japanese competition with Korea's poorly equipped fishermen; also, they want to make the Peace Line a constant reminder that Korea is just as sovereign as Japan. They are convinced that the exploitation of marine resources may be a significant element in their economic development which, they believe, had been unduly delayed by Japanese imperialism. Korea also knows well the restrictions placed on Japanese fishing by such countries as the Soviet Union and

Communist China, which make the Korean water zone even more attractive than before to Japanese fishermen.

A Korean source indicates that the estimated catch by Japanese is 300,000 tons against the total Korean catch of 340,000 tons per year. "Such reckless fishing within the Peace Line," says a Korean official, "may eventually lead to the exhaustion of Korea's marine resources. This harms tremendously the interests of Korean fishermen as well as the fishing industry."²⁸ Japan claims that the fishing in waters along the Rhee Line involves the welfare of more than 40,160 fishermen, and that the loss suffered by her being prevented from fishing along the Rhee Line runs to about 13 billion yen (360 yen equal to one U.S. dollar) per year.²⁹ Whatever the merit of each claim, it may be reasonably argued that, given the extreme poverty and increasingly serious population pressure in Korea, the marine resources seem more important for Koreans than for the Japanese.

Japan has continued to stress respect for the three-mile limit of territorial waters. She also proposed to set up a joint fishing committee, charged with research of fishing resources and study of conservation measures so as to come up with a fishing agreement which might replace the Rhee Line. Yet no such agreement has been concluded, as Korea assumes that the Peace Line is based on the result of Korean research which it considers as well-developed as Japan's. Only recently, Korea has become more receptive to a proposal for a joint fishing research committee. But in the absence of an agreement, Korea went on strongly enforcing the laws on the Peace Line. From 1952 to September, 1961, 183 vessels and 2,308 crewmembers were seized by the Korean authorities.³⁰ The captured Japanese were interned in a compound in Pusan and only after serving their terms were they released. Sometimes even those who served out their sentences were not released immediately.

At times Korea has been too tough in enforcing its own fishery laws against Japan. In the spring of 1953 two Japanese trawlers were seized by a Korean patrol boat near Chejudo Island, and their chief fishing officer was shot to death during the action. Japan demanded compensation and the punishment of the killer.³¹ Korea replied that it was the duty of the Japanese gov-

ernment not to allow Japanese fishermen to violate the Peace Line. Later Japan decided to use government ships for escort of fishing boats but, since they are not authorized to use force,³² this action brought no positive results, and even government ships are not always immune to Korean detention.³³ One is tempted to ask seriously how long Korea can, in the face of increasing Japanese power and nationalist sentiment, maintain her unrealistic claim on the fishing rights.

The Rhee Line issue has become explosive ammunition in Japanese politics, and a major block to the final solution of the discord between Korea and Japan. The Japanese people regard the Korean measures not only as monopolistic but also as highly insulting and uncivilized. The seizure of fishermen has been described as a hostage policy, meaning that Korea tries to utilize those captured for her bargaining against Japan. The fishing dispute has been linked with the reinforcing of armaments and the exercise of the right of self-defense. In the Lower House on February 21, 1953, a government spokesman stated that "the government, if necessary, might be compelled in the future to protect Japanese fishing boats even by force."³⁴ Similarly, Mamoru Shigemitsu, then the president of the Progressive Party, stressed the imperative need of creating an army of self-defense. He stated:

... the ROK seizes openly outside its territorial waters Japanese fishing vessels, and may in the future even dare to lay hands on Japanese territory... If things were left unrestricted, the South Korean troops might land on Iki and Tsushima islands. In that case, Japan, not possessing the self-defense armament, is bound to surrender... It is natural for an independent country to have the right to self-defense... by possessing the self-defense establishment, it is intended to defend our fatherland, and to protect our fishing vessels on the high seas.³⁵

More recently, in July, 1958, in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House, a representative of the Japan Deep-Sea Trawling Fishery Association, expressing the views of the fishing industry concerning the Rhee Line, called for the adoption of a stronger policy by Japan. He said:

It is extremely questionable whether the rigid policy adhered to with

regard to the Rhee Line for the past several years is applicable today. Are we to be satisfied with the same old passive attitude toward a violent and reckless adversary holding a pointed dagger in one hand? The present age is no time for a foreign policy which turns the other cheek. It is not sufficient merely to retreat before violence from the other party.⁵⁶

There is a danger (though not serious at present) in the tendency to take advantage of the statements made by a small group of parochial nationalists or of businessmen. Fortunately, however, the Japanese on the whole seem anxious to avoid—at least at this time—"an eye for an eye" policy against Korea for fear they might antagonize the rest of the world (especially other Asian countries) rather than because of faith in genuine pacifism. It is a credit to the Japanese leaders that their patrol boats around the Rhee Line are under strict orders not to return Korean fire or use force, thus obviating an open physical conflict between the two neighbors.

IV

Within this maritime boundary there lies a rocky cluster of tiny, barren and economically insignificant islets. It is named *Dokto* in Korean and *Takeshima* in Japanese. Koreans claim that the island belonged to Korea before it was incorporated into Japanese territory. In taking away the island, the Japanese Government took advantage of the weakness of Korea in 1905; at the time, Korea was important diplomatically and militarily, while Japan was fighting the Russians over the control of Korea and Manchuria. Thus, Korea was in no position to protest the loss of the island. The Koreans say further that geologically the island is an offshoot of Ulryöngdo Island, and that the MacArthur Line excluded the islet from the Japanese reach.⁵⁷

The Japanese, on the other hand, assert that the island was legally incorporated into their territory in 1905 by a public notice of Shimane prefecture. It is pointed out that Korea was not under Japanese control at that time; therefore, there is no reason for Japan to accept the Korean position that Korea was too weak to contest the Japanese action or that Korea was then under

strong Japanese influence. Right after the incorporation, the governor of Shimane prefecture toured the island. Japan points out further that the Japanese peace treaty does not specify the islet as belonging to Korea, and that in their first Administrative Agreement with the United States the island was designated as a maneuver area.³⁸

The island is *de facto* occupied by Korea, although the Japanese and Koreans took turns planting territorial signposts on the island and removing those erected by their opposites. In July, 1953, when the Japanese tried to land, they were fired upon by Korean fishing vessels carrying armed police.³⁹ Both governments protested in this incident. On September 25, 1954, Japan tried to obtain an agreement to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Korea rejected the proposal, arguing that it was a clever strategy by which Japan had everything to gain and nothing to lose.⁴⁰ Her government spokesman announced that it would be unwise for Korea "to agree to litigation over a portion of soil—already securely in her possession—[since] it might have been interpreted as uncertainty over the validity of ownership."⁴¹ In July, 1954, Korean guards were stationed on the island. The following month, a lighthouse was erected; then a warning was issued that Japanese boats attempting to invade the island would be fired upon.⁴² In late 1954 the Korean Government issued a new stamp bearing a picture of the island, which caused the Japanese Government to announce that all mail displaying the stamp would be sent back or confiscated.⁴³

Korea denied the Japanese contention that the Rhee Line was partially intended for the occupation of Takeshima. However, Japan, on the basis of her legal position with regard to the island, declared that the Rhee Line is illegal as it includes in its area a part of Japanese territory. As such, they contend that the Korean occupation of the islet is not only outrageous but also clearly an act of illegal occupation. Japan seems to base her claim on the doctrine of prescription and effective occupation. But it appears that what is really involved is the question of the original title or derivative title to the island, or—as even a cynic might very well say—a contest between the incompatible national egos.

V

No less controversial than the fishery and territorial issues was the property claims issue, until Japan withdrew her claims on December 31, 1957, on the basis of the American interpretation of Article 4(B) of the San Francisco treaty. To the Koreans this issue has been the real crux, as they expected from the beginning that Japan would pay what they regard as legitimate and reasonable claims.⁴⁴ Included in these claims are payment from Japan for property and personal damage, confiscation, and services arising from World War II and occupation before the war, refund on postal savings and other bank accounts taken away from Korea during the war, and the return of national relics taken to Japan.

Rather than considering the Korean demands with sympathy, Japan insisted that Koreans pay for Japanese private property which had been confiscated and transferred to Korea by the United States. "There have been no other problems," says a Korean professor, "throughout the fifteen years of history of the postwar Korea-Japan relations that made the Korean people [more] indignant and dumbfounded than the problem of the Japanese property claim."⁴⁵

This Japanese counterclaim was probably intended both to counter the Korean claim for reparation and to bargain for the Japanese fishing rights. However, Japan has clearly committed herself in her peace treaty to renounce all property rights—public as well as private—in Korea. Articles 2(A) and 4(B) of the treaty read as follows:

Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claims to Korea. Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in Korea.⁴⁶

Paragraph 4(B) needs some clarification, as it bears reference to the initial American disposition of Japanese property in Korea. Section 2 of USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No. 33 (December 6, 1945) states:

The title to all gold, silver, platinum, currency, securities, accounts in financial institutions, valuable papers and any other property . . . owned

or controlled by the Government or its nationals is hereby vested in the Military Government of Korea as of 25 September 1945, and all such property is owned by the Military Government in Korea.⁴⁷

This ordinance, read along with the provision in the peace treaty, makes it unequivocally clear that the Japanese private and public property was legally confiscated by the USAMGIK. These assets, viz., vested property, were later released to the constitutionally instituted Korean Government under the Initial Financial and Property Settlement between the Korean and American governments, signed on September 11, 1948.⁴⁸ In addition, the United States expressed her opinion that "all right, title and interest of Japan and of Japanese nationals in property within the jurisdiction of the ROK have been divested. Accordingly valid claims to such assets or to an interest therein cannot be asserted by Japan."⁴⁹

However, the Japanese side at the conference table acted entirely contrary to her promise in the treaty. She started to compound the property issue by playing with words which are so clearly stated that little room is left for speculation. The Japanese delegation said at the conference in 1952:

The U.S. Military Government in Korea effected the *de facto* transfer of Japanese property to the Korean government. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. Military government transferred to the Korean government full rights over said property. If the legal right of disposal held by the U.S. Forces as belligerent or occupation forces is construed as having been transferred to a third party which was neither a belligerent nor an occupation army, it would be following a logic which is quite against the principles of international law. . . . Japan recognizes the validity of disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the U.S. Military Government in Korea . . . but does not waive her original rights and claims to property in Korea.⁵⁰

The Korean delegates were reportedly shocked by the Japanese claim to the property. Their chief delegate, You-Chan Yang, issued a formal statement insisting that ". . . unless Japan . . . drops her transparently obvious attempts to *bargain* on matters in which [she] has no legal or moral foundation for *bargaining*," good relations with Japan were impossible.⁵¹ As for the Japanese

claim to legality in the light of international law, he commented with bitterness:

It is also interesting, in view of our people's long and intimate knowledge of *how* the Japanese acquired some of this property (by duress, bribery, terror, and other standard methods of the police state) to find a pious reference in your statement to "the principles of international law."

Syngman Rhee's reaction was even more biting; in his letter to Toyohiko Kagawa he claimed that

the Japanese representatives presented a preposterous claim to what amounts to 85% of all Korean property as belonging to Japan. By solemn oath, Japan signed the San Francisco Treaty which fully settled all these questions, but almost before the ink was dry... Japan was ignoring the terms...⁵²

The legal reasoning in the Japanese argument not only sounds much like a Lockean argument of property rights but it is extremely legalistic. The Japanese have argued that the phrases "...vested in... and owned by" do not affect the final transfer of ownership. In other words, the USAMGIK did not acquire the ownership, but only a trusteeship. Ordinance No. 33, according to their contention, does not order confiscation but control of property of the enemy nation and should be "subject to arrangements." A Japanese professor, writing on this problem, argues:

... the Japanese property in Korea has been merely "vested" in the United States military government, but has never been confiscated by the same authorities. Furthermore, under paragraph B of Article 4, Japan "recognizes" the validity of such a disposition as the vesting of her property, but does not abandon her claim for its return.⁵³

The Japanese, in defense of their assertion, cited Article 46 of the Regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907, which prohibits the confiscation of private property.⁵⁴ However, it is applicable only to such a case as belligerent occupation. The article therefore seems inapplicable to the occupation of Korea by the Allied armed forces, which was not an army in enemy territory. Korea ceased *de facto* to be a part of Japan by virtue of Japan's unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration

and their final surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945. The objective of the Allied Powers' occupation of Korea was also different from that of belligerent occupation; their ultimate aim was to implement the declaratory promises toward the achievement of Korean independence. Moreover, the secession of Korea from Japan was made absolute when Korea attained its independence and received international recognition of such attainment.

However, the chief Japanese delegate, Kanichiro Kubota—presumably provoked by the Koreans' insistence that the Japanese have only exploited their country—declared in 1953 that the repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea was a violation of international law; that the establishment of the ROK by the United States and the United Nations prior to the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty was also a violation of international law. He continued quite insensitively that the statement of the Cairo Declaration that there existed an enslavement of the Korean people, was nothing but war hysteria. Moreover, the transfer of Japanese property to the Korean Government by the USAMGIK was alleged to be a violation of international law. Finally, the thirty-six years of Japanese occupation of Korea was declared beneficial to the Koreans.⁵⁵

The last point was most obnoxious to the Koreans, who were probably more anxious than anything else to make the Japanese listen to and respect them in order to improve their national reputation. So enraged were they that they refused to meet their erstwhile enemy again at the conference table until Japan officially withdrew the statement. Japan, however, refused to retract the statement, probably because the Japanese believed seriously the full content of the statement or because it was unthinkable for them to apologize to a country of third-class nationals.

Pressed by the issue of the detained Japanese fishermen and also by the desire to overcome the impasse over the Rhee Line, the Japanese Government at last, on December 31, 1957, agreed to withdraw formally the Kubota statement. It also agreed to abandon its property claim in Korea.⁵⁶ After the United States Department of State had given its view that Japan had no right

to confiscated properties in Korea, and that Japanese-Korean claims in effect canceled each other, the Japanese apparently abandoned their blanket demand for compensation.⁵⁷

However, this did not remove the Korean claim for compensation and the return of their cultural property, nor did it eliminate the argument over the Japanese claims completely. As late as 1961 in the Upper House of the Japanese Diet, a councilman questioned the government strenuously on the issue. The government spokesman did reply that the Japanese claim was not abandoned but that it had simply disappeared completely when the peace treaty was signed.⁵⁸ As for the Korean claim for reparation payments, it is still unsettled. It remains the central issue in the minds of Koreans as they are preoccupied with their economic reconstruction. Japan has reportedly offered \$150 million in grants and \$150 million as a loan, whereas Korea has reportedly demanded a grant of \$600 million;⁵⁹ Japan has already returned to Korea—in the words of Japanese officials, “given as gifts”—over one hundred cultural property items, but Korea charges that they are not gifts but stolen national treasures, and insists that many more are still to be restored.⁶⁰

VI

The most disturbing problem of all in the exacerbated relations, from the standpoint of human rights and the cold war, is that of the Korean minority in Japan.⁶¹ As is evident in various discriminatory measures adopted by the Japanese against the Koreans, Japan simply wants to get rid of them in an ostensibly humanitarian and legal manner irrespective of where they are shipped—even to a Communist country. On the other hand, the government of Korea wishes to protect Korean nationals who have, so it believes, been viciously exploited by Japanese imperialism. The Korean position is that their minority must be sent to the ROK only after they are adequately compensated for their services to Japan in the prewar period.

Today there are about six hundred thousand registered Koreans living in Japan.⁶² The 1930 census shows that the proportion of Korean residents actually born in Japan was only

8.2 per cent of the total. In 1962, however, it rose to over 60 per cent. The lives of most Koreans living in Japan are then already deeply rooted in Japan.

There were more than two million Koreans in Japan when the war ended, whereas less than three hundred resided there before Korea was made a protectorate of Japan in 1905. The mass movement of Koreans across the Strait of Korea to Japan resulted directly from that country's systematic exploitation of the Korean people during the thirty-six years of her colonial domination.⁶⁵ The migration was enormously accelerated by Japan's ill-fated imperialistic drive clothed in the slogan of "Asia for the Asians." Before and during the war, most of the migrants lured or taken by force to Japan worked for low wages at the hardest labor, that which the Japanese laborers were unwilling to undertake.⁶⁶

"Poverty-stricken" is too mild an expression to describe the economic position of most Koreans in Japan. Just as they did before 1945 as colonial people, the Koreans now residing in Japan find themselves in the depths of poverty and humiliation. Japanese people continue to call them *Daisankokujin* (third-class nationals). Some of them even call the minority Jews, but in economic position there is no parallel at all between the Korean minority and the Jews in Europe or between the former and the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The overwhelming majority of Koreans in Japan are without decent, secure occupation, and many others eke out a scanty livelihood with the relief subsidies handed out reluctantly by the Japanese government. No wonder that Ardath W. Burks describes the Japanese treatment of the minority as "shameful."⁶⁷

Almost all of the Koreans are concentrated in large metropolitan areas; in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka many of them reside in slum areas. In Edagawamachi, Fukukawa-ku, Tokyo, for instance, 180 Korean families live, and of these families, Udai Fujishima, an eminent Japanese political commentator, explains,

70 are on relief subsidies. With only 8,000 yen assistance, however, an average family of seven or eight can hardly live. This plight forces them to work on a job, if they can find one, even when it pays only 100 yen a day. With all the income added together, they can live about half a month fairly decently. Of the 180 families, only 10 have stable

jobs, and the rest are day laborers, rice scavengers, used-nail collectors, and other like occupations.⁶⁸

Even Koreans with college degrees cannot find a decent occupation because of vocational discrimination. Some of them are compelled to work as scrap-iron collectors earning \$40 a month.⁶⁹ Most companies have rules barring the employment of Koreans, which forces even honest and serious youths to use false Japanese names.⁷⁰

Some Koreans in Japan have been successful as businessmen, but find it virtually impossible to obtain bank loans even for mere survival, much less for expansion, in the midst of Japanese competition. When they do succeed in getting loans, the terms are much stiffer than those granted to Japanese loan applicants.⁷¹

Socially, too, the Korean minority in some ways shares the lowest rank with the *Eta*, who are practically an outcast group living amidst the very hierarchically oriented Japanese. In the words of Hugh H. Smythe, "Japanese racialism, rising out of a rigid class pattern and an abhorrence of an intranational group physically like themselves, shows itself most forcefully . . . in Japanese antipathy towards the Koreans."⁷² More than that, "for decades the Korean minority has been made the scapegoat for one misfortune after another."⁷³

It is not surprising then that the incidence of crime among the Koreans in Japan is high. The number of persons convicted during 1957 was 4,200 or 7 per 1,000 of the population, approximately ten times the corresponding rate for the Japanese population.⁷⁴

The socioeconomic plight of Koreans in Japan explains in part why hundreds of them have gone over from Japan to Communist North Korea, exchanging freedom for economic security, despite the bondage to communism. True, politically the two competing governments in Korea, each claiming for itself the allegiance of all the Koreans in Japan, have had a great impact on the Japan-based Koreans' communal politics. Although some of them are politically neutral or genuinely Japanese-minded, they are, generally speaking, divided into two main groups parallel to those in tragically divided Korea.⁷⁵ These

groups are represented by Mindan and the more powerful Chōsōren; the former aligns itself with the ROK, and the latter with North Korea.⁷⁶

In spite of the presence of South Korean diplomatic agents in Japan, presumably promoting the interests of the Korean minority, the Japanese (and Korean) Communists have succeeded overwhelmingly in winning that minority's friendship. This is in part because they have been the only Japanese political group that has openly sought the support of Koreans in Japan and, in turn, supported their demands, and in part because of the influence of events in Korea itself. Even when Korea was a Japanese colony, it was the Japanese Communists who supported both secretly and openly the political aspirations of Koreans.⁷⁷ Since the war, the party has successfully exploited the national and racial resentments of Koreans in Japan; their influence has reached the point where they can sway a substantial part, if not all, of the Chōsōren group. As early as 1949 there were 28,000 Koreans in the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).⁷⁸

Politically and economically, Koreans have become undesirable for the national interest of Japan; the connection between the JCP and the minority especially constituted a threat to Japan's security. Moreover, the Japanese government, inflamed by the uncompromising attitude of the ROK with regard to the Rhee Line, was readily persuaded to conclude a repatriation program of Koreans in Japan with North Korea in order to get rid of as many Koreans as possible. Not only do they allegedly cause a drain on the Japanese treasury but also they constitute powerful leverage for the Seoul government in its bargaining with Japan.

Also, the strict enforcement of the Immigration Surveillance Law of 1951 was accompanied by an increased number of Korean detainees for violation of other Japanese laws. The Korean Government accepted their deportation, but suddenly, beginning in 1954, refused to accept any except those who entered Japan illegally after the liberation of Korea.⁷⁹ In the opinion of the Korean Government, those Koreans who went to Japan before the end of World War II should be released there in view of their permanent residence resulting from the peculiar circumstances in

which they were taken to Japan. In addition, Korea, after the Korean war, was too poor to absorb more people into its economy. South Korea was already too crowded with thousands of refugees from North Korea. Also, the Korean Government was so enraged by the Kubota Statement that it was unwilling to show any sign of weakness to Japan.

As the Japanese Government grew tougher in dealing with the Koreans, so did the Korean Government in enforcing the fishery laws. This irritated the Japanese Government further. In spite of Japan's efforts to induce Korea to come to an agreement on Japan's own terms, the Korean side did not retreat an inch from its position of defending the Peace Line and continued to capture Japanese fishermen violating it. This is a serious insult to Japan's traditional sense of superiority; particularly for the more conservative Japanese, the Korean defiance appears "as the very acme of national humiliation."⁸⁰

Japan, frustrated by the Koreans' refusal to accept the deportees unless compensated, and also anxious to get rid of the minority, decided in 1959 to repatriate to North Korea those Koreans who chose to go there "voluntarily."⁸¹ Haunted by intense poverty, misery and discrimination, more than 75,000 of them as of June, 1962, were lured by Communist promises of food, jobs, and education.⁸² Yet the Japanese government asserted that its repatriation policy was based on the principle of freedom of residence and genuine humanitarianism in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁸³ This self-righteous contention raises a question as to why Japan, if she was so humanitarian, had done so little toward providing decent opportunities for the minority before this.

Japan's claim that the repatriation of Koreans was voluntary and humanitarian was echoed by the North Korean Government. Contrary to South Korea's expectations, even the government of the United States refused to pressure Japan to abandon the repatriation plan. The unhappy, disgraced Seoul government labeled it as inhuman expulsion, compulsory deportation, and, at best, a forced political repatriation, and immediately suspended the Japan-Korean conference and trade with Japan. It went so far as to hint at the use of force to prevent Japan from

carrying out the repatriation program.⁸⁴ It maintained that "deportees" were being sent for political reasons into enslavement in a Russian satellite country which is still technically at war with the ROK and the United Nations. It insisted that those who wished to leave Japan must be compensated by Japan for the wartime hard labor and military services rendered to their Japanese exploiters and then must be repatriated to South Korea. The Seoul government contends that it alone is the legal government of the entire peninsula; hence, the Koreans in Japan are citizens of the ROK. Further, it asserts that those who want to remain in Japan should be guaranteed the right to earn a decent living in view of Japan's responsibility in taking them there and of the many hardships they have suffered already.⁸⁵

Considered in the context of the cold war, the repatriation movement "has boosted the prestige of Communists and their" peace movement in that it is a reversal of the flight of people from the Communist world and, conversely, a discredit to the free world in which both Japan and Korea are allied with the United States. In a sense, it was an important victory for the Communists for their skillfully executed "peace movement" offensive. Also, this movement testifies again to the decline in the international effort to protect minorities in the postwar world. For Japan and Korea, it proved to be one more point of bitterness in their already entangled diplomatic relations.

These diplomatic conflicts, sharply aggravated by their old as well as new enmities, keep Korea and Japan bitterly embroiled even after a decade of negotiations toward the normalization of their relations. The problem is much more than the mere conflict between law and politics or between a *status quo* country and a revisionist country. Even the Communist aggression in Korea, which was a Soviet attempt directed more against Japan than against Korea, failed to narrow the basic cleavage between the two neighbors. Nor did the downfall of Syngman Rhee, who had allegedly been responsible personally for the intense Korean feeling against Japan, diminish animosities. In fact, it was not under the Rhee government but under the Chang Myun government that the Korean legislative assembly, alarmed by the possible

emergence of neo-Japanese colonialism through economic means, formally adopted in 1961 the so-called "four principles" with reference to the normalization of Korea-Japan relations. The four principles are: relations with Japan must progress gradually from limited to full intercourse; the Peace Line must be respected and defended for the sake of national security and the protection of fishermen; diplomatic normalization will come only after resolution of important pending problems, particularly settlement for damage and suffering caused by Japanese occupation; and Japanese-Korean economic cooperation other than current trade must be carried out only after the opening of formal diplomatic intercourse under state control, within limits that prevent damage to national industry.⁸⁶ Even the present military regime which, under increased American as well as internal economic pressure, has shown a much more positive interest in attempting to resolve the conflict with Japan, has never explicitly renounced these principles, although it indicts harshly its predecessors for the failure of negotiations between the two countries.⁸⁷

The present analysis tends to support the interpretation that the pending diplomatic issues are not necessarily the causes for the tragic antipathy between Japan and Korea. Not that the conflict of their national interests is unreal or that it can be easily resolved, but it is rather indicative of the highly emotion-laden historical and socio-psychological tensions. Manifestations of hostility, arrogance, hatred, distrust, fear and pride find explicit as well as implicit expressions in the issues that keep Japan and Korea apart. These well-nigh irreconcilable tensions have rendered a prompt removal or adjustment of diplomatic impediments most difficult.

While Japan's national interest demands amicable relations with Korea—a geopolitical dagger pointed at the heart of Japan—she cannot satisfy the Korean demand that Japan apologize for the suffering during the thirty-six years of colonial rule. A simple expression of regret and apology at the beginning of their conference might have gone a long way toward achieving reconciliation. But, as a high official in the Japanese Foreign Office confided to Lawrence Olson, "public opinion will not allow us to

take the initiative toward Korea."⁸⁸ Nevertheless, because the prejudices are "internalized," the leaders have done little or nothing to re-educate public opinion to reduce the deep-seated prejudices. Evidence suggests that, on the whole, Japanese public opinion, in spite of the conflicting attitudes between the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Socialists with regard to the Japanese-Korean relations, does not speak with myriad voices about Korea;⁸⁹ instead, it crystalizes on one side—the contempt of Koreans.

Korea, on the other hand, resents the Japanese arrogance, symbolized by the Kubota Statement and the treatment of their compatriots in Japan. The Koreans hate the Japanese for causing suffering in the past, and are fearful of a resurgent Japan. No other country has so much mistreated and exploited Korea as the Japanese; Japan's past diplomacy has been such that Koreans suspect her as much as they do the Chinese and Russians. The Koreans seem determined to gain once and for all a firm guarantee of security and real equality with Japan, no matter what it takes. More broadly stated, their nationalism, as with the same movement in other developing countries, is extremely assertive, seeking to find self-respect and to overcome the inferiority of self in the face of the old ruling country. This explains partially why American military assistance to Japan is not welcomed by the Koreans. They are fearful of a well-armed Japan, inasmuch as they have been the major target of Japanese aggression historically. This is intensified by Japan's dazzlingly prosperous economic expansion and growing international prestige and her refusal to satisfy what Koreans regard as a just claim. Korean desire to be treated as an equal, their hatred and fear of the old enemy, are therefore the crux of the impediment in their relations with Japan.

One may contend that the evidence presented here is insufficient to support the hypothesis which has been suggested initially. But where certain nexus between historical, socio-psychological tensions on one hand, and the substance and style of the two countries' diplomacy on the other is correctly identified, it should be clear that the linkage does exist. To one degree or another, all the issues in conflict are caught up in that linkage.

To that extent, it can be stated that the concept of national interest, as conventionally used, is inadequate for a well-balanced interpretation of such international conflicts as the Japanese-Korean debacle. The Czech-German, Anglo-Irish, and Arab-Jewish relations are also cases in point; many other similar cases can be cited. In these instances, the idiom of national interest tells one little about the differences between national communities, differences in attitudes, motives and purposes, which are revealed through the human beings who are involved directly and indirectly in conduct of foreign policy. It should then be stressed that systematic and rigorous studies of international conflict in particular and foreign policy in general must carefully take into account the interaction of historical socio-psychological tensions and other relevant variables.

Lest this interpretation, however, be regarded as deterministic, it must be added in haste that the possibilities for reconciliation between Japan and Korea are not without any hope. Even Germany and France, after three centuries of conflict, have finally emerged as partners in an attempt to create an enduring, peaceful and stable community of European nations. But blended into the unpleasant memories of those two nations are mutual respect, pride, and immediate, as well as long-term, idealism and ambitions, shared by the peoples of both countries within the great traditions of European civilization. Almost none of these "shared experiences" seem cherished by the Japanese and Korean peoples, although both nations owe their cultures to a significant extent to the Chinese civilization. Nevertheless, if their leaders patiently endeavor to ameliorate the intense prejudices for the development of enlightened public opinion, the two neighbors may eventually be able to accommodate their problems, needs, tensions, and their manifold implications. Inasmuch as historical, socio-psychological factors are dynamic, the people's moods and attitudes can continuously be created and recreated by wise and responsible leadership.

NOTES

1. Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1962), pp. 5-7 *passim*.

2. For American interest in the Japanese-Korean relations, see *United States Foreign Policy, Asia: Studies Prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, by Conlon Associates, No. 5, 1959 (86th Congress, 1st sess., committee print) (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 5-12, 90-118 *passim*.

3. Probably the most comprehensive study on the trade between the two countries is included in Asahi Shimbun Research Bureau (ed.), *Namboku Chosen no genjō. (Part 1—South Korea)*, (Tokyo, 1962), pp. 192-232. See also Republic of Korea (ROK), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Oemu haengchong ui sipnyon* (Seoul, 1959), pp. 29-36.

4. William J. Jordan, "Japan's Diplomacy between East and West," in Hugh Borton *et al.*, *Japan between East and West* (New York, 1957), p. 250.

5. The sequence of conferences: the preliminary conference (October 20—November 20, 1951); first formal conference (February 15—April 25, 1952); second (April 15—July 24, 1953); third (October 6-21, 1953); fourth (April 15, 1958—April 19, 1960); fifth (October 25, 1960—May 16, 1961); and sixth (October 20, 1961—).

6. ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

7. Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Korea: The Bitter Legacy," *American Universities Field Staff, East Asia Series*, IX, No. 7 (1960), 2.

8. Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee* (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 183-185.

9. Claude A. Buss, *The Arc of Crisis* (New York, 1961), p. 191.

10. Even during the Korean war Japanese harbor workers employed by the UN forces, when they set foot on Korean soil, were arrested and tried by the Korean Government. Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York, 1954), p. 150.

11. The most common Korean expression denoting Japanese colonialism.

12. Heiji Shinosaki, *Zatsuchi Chosenjin undō* (Tokyo, 1955), p. 190.

13. American Embassy, Tokyo, *Daily Survey of Japanese Press*, February 20, 1958, p. 5.

14. Tatsuo Haratani *et al.*, "Minzokuteki stereotype to kōaku kanjō ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu," *Kyōiku Shinrigaku Kenkyū*, VIII, No. 1 (1960), 6. Similar reports can be found in *Gendai Asia shi* (Vol. IV of *Sekai shi ni okeru Asia*) (Tokyo, 1956), 87-89 *passim*; and *Japan Times*, June 11, 1962.

15. Research Committee of Japanese National Character, Institute of Statistical Mathematics, *Nihonjin no kokuminsei* (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 335-345 *passim*.

16. C. M. Wilburn, "Some findings of Japanese Public Opinion Polls," in Hugh Borton *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-306 *passim*.

17. Y. S. Juno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, I (Berkeley, 1987), 175.

18. His opening statement at the conference, ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korean Report (1952-1953)*, II (1955), 53-55.

19. S. Griffin, "The Japan-Korea Deadlock," *Japan Digest*, August, 1954, p. 42.

20. "High Seas and Japanese Fisheries," *Oriental Economist*, June, 1960, p. 262.

21. Tsuneo Mura, "The Rhee Line," *Japan Quarterly*, VI, No. 1 (1959), 24-25; and Kosaku Tamura, "The Rhee Line and International Law," *Contemporary Japan*, XXII (1953), 389-390.

22. Cf. Il-Yŏng Chŏng, "P'yŏnghwason' ui kukjŏpŏpchŏk kunkŏ," *Sa-sangŏ*, June, 1960, pp. 254-261.

23. ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 168. See also Mura, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; *Asahi Shimbun*, October 5, 6, 1952.

24. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 8, 1952.

25. Yoshihiko Seki, "The Foreign Policy of Japan," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York, 1963), p. 538.

26. Article 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. Article 21. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty. *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, XIII, January 1-December 31, 1951 (Princeton, 1953), 470-479.

27. Tae Ha Yiu, "The Real Tragedy" (n.d.), p. 12 (mimeographed). This is reproduced under the title, "A Series of Articles on the Korean-Japanese Overall Talks Released by Minister Tae Ha Yiu through the *Japan Times* between December 12 and 27, 1958," in ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *#291 nyŏndo juyo sŏngmyŏng mit yŏnsol jip (Supplement)* (Seoul, 1958), pp. 170-215.

28. Young-dal Ohm, "Problems and Prospects of Korea-Japan Talks," *Korean Journal*, II, No. 4 (1962), 54.

29. Mura, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

30. Japan, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), *Chŏsen binran* (Tokyo, 1962), p. 42.

31. *Nippon Times*, February 14, 20, 1953. The incident is described in detail in *Asahi Shimbun*, February 30, 1953.

32. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1961), p. 188; and *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 1952. On several occasions fishery organizations, prefectural assemblies and governors conferences in western and southern Japan appealed for the forceful removal of the Rhee Line to the central government, but the latter stated consistently that such a forceful measure is unreasonable. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, December 24, 1955, and January 22, 1956.

33. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 29, 1953.

34. "Japan-Korea Relations Doomed," *Oriental Economist*, March, 1953, p. 114.

35. Quoted in "Japan-Korea Relations in Crisis," *Oriental Economist*, October, 1953, p. 480.

36. Cited in Mura, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

37. For the Koreans' official account, see *Oemu haenghông ui sipnyôn*, pp. 174-179. See also Byeng-Do Lee, *Kuksa daekwan* (Seoul, 1948), pp. 453-457. It is interesting that an article by a Japanese in 1930 claims that Takeshima belongs to Korea. Sekko Okehata, "Nipponkai ni okeru Takeshima no nissen kankei ni suite," *Rekishi Chiri*, LV, No. 6 (1930), 590-591. North Korea also claims the island belongs to Korea. This is interesting because the P'yongyang government's basic policy toward Japan is to prevent her reaching rapprochement with South Korea—declaring, for instance, that it does not recognize the Peace Line—and conversely, to bring Japan closer to the Communist bloc. See *Outline of Korean Geography* (P'yongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), p. 5.

38. For a detailed background study on the island and the official Japanese position, see Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Takeshima no ryôyû* (Tokyo, 1953). See also Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report*, (January 15, 1957), pp. 7-10.

39. *Nippon Times*, July 14, 1953.

40. *Ibid.*, September 26, 1954; *Asahi Shimbun*, September 25, and October 29, 1954.

41. Hong Kee Karl, "Questions at Issue between Korea and Japan," *Korean Survey*, IV (May, 1955), 4.

42. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 29, 1954.

43. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1954.

44. This sentiment was made very clear by Syngman Rhee at a press conference in 1959 when he said: "Time after time, we have asked Japan to give evidence that it wants good relations with Korea. We suggested such demonstration of good feeling so that the Korean Government could convey it to the Korean people, and indicate that the Japanese had changed and wanted to make amends for the forty-year occupation and its accompanying oppressions. But to date the Japanese have returned nothing that they took away from Korea, and all too often have implied that they still harbor sentiments of thirty or forty years ago toward Korea and the Korean people." ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ROK Bulletin*, No. 18 (June, 1959), p. 2.

45. Kwan Sook Park, "Some Criticisms on Japanese Claims for Property in Korea," *Koreana Quarterly*, III, No. 1 (1961), 42.

46. *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, *loc. cit.*

47. ROK, Office of Public Information, *op. cit.*, p. 57. See also SCAP, *Summation of Non-Military Affairs in Japan and Korea*, No. 3 (December, 1945), p. 199.

48. George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 96-99.

49. Cited in Jin Won Lee, "Brief Survey of Korean-Japanese Relations (Post-war Period)," *Koreana Quarterly*, I, No. 1 (1959), p. 77.

50. Quoted in ROK, Office of Public Information, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

52. A copy of the letter (sent at Christmas, 1955) was made available by Professor P. Allan Dionisopoulos of Northern Illinois University.

53. Yasuo Yamashita, "Japanese-Korean Relations," *Contemporary Japan*, XXIV, Nos. 10-12 (1957), 705. See also his "Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea," *Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 2 (1958), pp. 38-54.

54. Article 46 and some of the important relevant points are concisely discussed in Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (New York, 1952), pp. 72-75.

55. You Chan Yang, "The Aspirations of Korea," *The Annals*, CCXCIV (July, 1954), p. 44. A detailed discussion on the Kubota statement is in *Asahi Shimbun*, October 22, 1953.

56. For the text of the agreement see *Asahi Shimbun*, January 1, 1958. It was also agreed that the American interpretation of property issue, dated 31 December 1957, would not be disclosed.

57. Tatsuo Mitari *et al.*, "Korea-Japan Diplomacy," *Oriental Economist*, April, 1958, p. 188. See also *Japan Times*, January 7, 1958.

58. 38th Diet, *Sangin Kaigiroku*, No. 9 (*Official Gazette* extra, February 24, 1961), pp. 9-12. See also *Sangin Kaigiroku*, No. 8, p. 84.

59. C. A. Johnson, "'Low Posture' Politics in Japan," *Asia Survey*, III, No. 1 (1963), p. 27. According to another source, the Korean side asked recently for a settlement of \$800 million. Ohm, *op. cit.*, p. 20. Whatever the case, the recent Korean property claims are far below what Syngman Rhee demanded in 1957—\$8 billion. Rhee's reasoning was allegedly based on the assumption that if the Philippines received \$800 million for four years of military occupation by Japan, Korea should get \$8 billion for forty years of subjugation. Mitari *et al.*, *loc. cit.*

60. Yiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-9.

61. The overall aspect of the minority is well described in Edward W. Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan 1904-1950*, (New York, 1951) (Mimeographed). Probably the more comprehensive is Jae-il Pak, *Zainichi Chosenjin ni kansuru sōgō chōsa kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1957). See also Kwang-Chōl Lim, "Zainichi Chosenjin mondai," *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* (*Chosen-shi no mondai tokushū*) (July, 1955), pp. 66-72.

62. Of the 600,000 Koreans, at least 97 per cent are of South Korean origin. Japan, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), *Chōsen binran* (Tokyo, 1960), p. 67. This figure does not include unregistered Koreans, estimated at about 200,000. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 5, 1959.

63. "Basic Trends," *Japan Quarterly*, VI, No. 2 (1959) 158.

64. *Japan Times*, June 11, 1962.

65. Udaï Fujishima *et al.*, "Zainichi Chosenjin rokujū-mannin no genjitsu," *Chōsō Kōron* (December, 1958), pp. 175-180. See also Kenichi Hisama, "Chōsen

nōmin no naichi ishutsu no hitsuzensei," *Shakai Seisaku Jihō*, January, 1941, pp. 44-86.

66. David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI, No. 4 (1947), 43. See also J. B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis, 1949), pp. 326-328 *passim*.

67. Ardath W. Burks, *The Government of Japan* (New York, 1961), p. 252.

68. Fujishima *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 185. See also Kanichi Tanaka, "Kaihōchi Etagawa machi," *Kaizō*, July, 1952, pp. 180-190.

69. Dan Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan* (New York, 1960), pp. 363-366.

70. Fujishima *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 190. See also "Zainichi Chōsenjin no seikatsu to iken," *Chūō Kōron*, September, 1952, p. 70; and *Japan Times*, June 15, 1962.

71. Yiu, *op. cit.*, p. 20; Fujishima *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190; "Zainichi Chōsenjin no seikatsu to iken," pp. 70, 76.

72. Hugh H. Smythe, "A Note on Racialism in Japan," *American Sociological Review*, XVI, No. 6 (1951), 822-824.

73. Delmar M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan* (Berkeley, 1955), p. 271. In 1923, for example, following the famous Kwantō earthquake, angry mobs in Tokyo, releasing their pent-up anti-Korean sentiment, massacred thousands of innocent and helpless Koreans. Shigeki Toyama *et al.*, *Shōwashi* (new ed., Tokyo, 1960), p. 18; Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 1955), pp. 324-325.

74. "Basic Trends," p. 135.

75. On the breakdown of Koreans by their political orientation, see Isamu Togawa, "Nihon no Korean Lobby," *Chūō Kōron*, June, 1959, p. 242.

76. The Koreans' political activities in pre-war Japan are described in detail in Senji Tsuboe, *Chōsen minzoku dokuritu hishi* (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 193-399.

77. For a brief discussion of the relationship between the Koreans in Japan and the Japan Communist Party, see Roger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 259-265. See also Japan, Kōan chōsa chō, *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (Tokyo, 1955), pp. 76-93; *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 116-134; and Nikkan Rōdō tūshin sho (ed.), *Sengo Nihon kyōsantōshi undō* (Tokyo, 1955).

78. Shinosaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235. According to Shinosaki, when Chōren (the predecessor of Chōsoren) was dissolved, the Japan Communist Party decided to increase its Korean membership by 32,100. This was an attempt to absorb the more active Chōren members. Another official source, however, put the Korean members of the party at 1500. Kinya Niiseki, "The Postwar Activities of the Japan Communist Party," in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Problems* (Tokyo, 1954), p. 73. Still another official source put the number at 2800. *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (1957), p. 117.

79. *Oemu haengchōng ū sipnyōn*, p. 171.

80. I. I. Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan* (New York, 1960), p. 70.

81. For the text of the repatriation agreement between Japan and

North Korea, see *Contemporary Japan*, XXVI, No. 2 (1959), 365-369. In form the agreement involved neither the Japanese nor the North Korean government, but only their respective Red Cross societies.

82. *Japan Times*, June 16, 1962.

83. The official Japanese account of the repatriation issue is given in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waga gaikō no kinkyō*, No. 4 (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 67-77; Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report*, February 5, 1959, pp. 2-3.

84. *New York Times*, February 15, 1959; *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2 and 28, 1959. See also *Voice of Korea*, XVI, No. 2 (1959).

85. Korea's official viewpoint is indicated in ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ROK Bulletin*, No. 17 (March, 1959), pp. 95-124. See also Korean Foreign Policy Association, *Truth About Deportation of Korean Residents in Japan* (Seoul, 1960).

86. *Asahi shimbun* Research Bureau, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

87. For the indictment, see Editorial Commission of the History of ROK Revolutionary Trial, *Hankuk hyōksmyōng jaep'ansa*, I (Seoul, 1962), pp. 122-127, 210-213.

88. Quoted in Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

89. For the Japanese Socialist position on the Japanese-Korean relations, see Jotaro Kawakami, "Party Stand on Japan-ROK Normalization Talks," *Japan Socialist Review*, No. 23 (October, 1962), pp. 7-18.