

# Communist Party Politics in Israel\*

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Among the countries of the Middle East, Israel is the only one in which a local Communist Party as a regular matter of course has participated openly in electoral and parliamentary life. In all five national elections to date the Israel Communist Party (Maki) has presented and seriously campaigned for a parliamentary slate. These efforts have been partially rewarded by the election of from three to six Knesset (parliament) members under a system of proportional representation which provides for the selection of all 120 Knesset members on a countrywide basis. Within a multi-party system which currently includes eleven distinguishable parliamentary groups the Communist Party occu-

\* This study represents part of a larger research project on the political party system of Israel that involved research trips in Israel in 1960, 1961, and 1963, as well as further interviews and investigation of Zionist materials in the United States. Over 120 formal interviews were obtained in the course of this work. Information secured from the following individuals in one or more interviews per person has been used specifically in this study: Z. S. Abramov, Member of the Knesset, General Zionist and Liberal Parties. Ahmed Daher, Member of the Knesset, Progress and Development List. Emanuel Gutmann, faculty of Political Science, The Hebrew University. Sabhi abu Gosh, resident of the Arab village of Abu Gosh, and doctoral candidate at Princeton University. Mordecai Oren, Secretary-General of the World Union of Mapam. Arie Pyetan, Director of the Israeli Government Press Office, Tel Aviv. Arie Rath, political writer for *The Jerusalem Post*. Moshe Sneh, Member of the Knesset, Communist Party (interviews in 1960, 1961, and 1963). Gideon Weigert, writer for *The Jerusalem Post* and other journals, and specialist in Arab affairs of Israel.

pies a position which in important respects is more distinctly outside the system than within. In parliamentary affairs, for instance, the party finds itself substantially boxed off in terms of other parties, including cooperation by everybody to keep the Communists off certain key standing committees in every Knesset session to date. Communist Party activities, nevertheless, have had an impact in some fields of Israeli political life, such as Arab affairs. In this field the Communists are in significant competition with two socialist parties, namely Mapai (the Israel Labor Party, and the nation's one major party) and the more doctrinaire Mapam (the United Workers' Party).\*

The location of the national headquarters of the Communist Party of Israel in the former Arab city of Jaffa (now a part of one large metropolitan entity, Tel Aviv-Yafo) has, perhaps, some symbolic significance. Every other organized Israeli political party, with the exception of the most orthodox of the religious parties, is headquartered in Tel Aviv proper, the bustling banking and commercial center of the nation. There are perhaps other things about the party's headquarters location which may also strike the inquiring observer as symbolic. In the process of getting there no one seems to quite know or really care where it is. The short street on which the nondescript headquarters building fronts is unmarked at that location. On a return trip a year later the instructions by phone from the top party member being revisited are to get off the bus at the Paz Petrol station, walk a short block, and turn sharply left, with still no address or street designation in the offing.

## THE PALESTINIAN PERIOD

As is the case for every other organized political party in Israel (excluding two "Arab lists" which are satellites of Mapai), the Communist Party has an organizational history running well

\* Mapai is the party of David Ben Gurion and incumbent Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. Its socialist Zionism is of a pragmatic and non-Marxist variety. Mapam's dogmatic socialism is of a distinctly Marxist character. Mapam is clearly within the tradition of Zionism and basic loyalty to Israel, despite a rather extreme left-wing position in foreign affairs.

back into the pre-state period. But while there is a history, it is one which involves such tortuous convolutions in organizational development, shifts of policy, and changes of personnel that the party itself apparently prefers to forget it. Indeed, its difficulties in this respect led it to be one of the few Communist Parties in the world which steered away from writing its own history, even in the form of articles or newspaper accounts.<sup>1</sup> It has not celebrated anniversaries, and prefers to abstain from citing the party press of earlier years. "Though one of the oldest parties in Palestine, it is, or at least wishes to appear, as a party without a past."<sup>2</sup>

Communist activities in Palestine go back to 1919-1920, and represent part of the larger current of revolutionary movement and activities which were spreading through Eastern and Central Europe following World War I. Jewish Communists in these areas were as convinced as their party brethren that world victory for the movement was an imminent prospect. Zionism to them was an anachronism, a reactionary movement which would cut Jewish workers off from the larger struggle. There was little reason for Jewish Communists to migrate to a distant and to them unimportant territory, a move which they felt in effect would merely strengthen the hold of British imperialism.<sup>3</sup> Consequently while many socialist-Zionists came during the immediate postwar years, very few Communists did. While some of the new pioneers became Communists, most of them did not remain in Palestine because of the many frustrations and disappointments of those years. Once such persons had become Communists there was little reason for them to stay in the country and contribute any further to the Zionist mission which they now rejected. As a result the Palestinian Communist Party experienced a rapid turnover of membership, a tendency which has characterized the movement throughout its very checkered history and contributed to its organizational weaknesses and other difficulties. By the time of Israeli statehood the party did not have a single member who belonged to the organization since even its early years, let alone from its actual founding.<sup>4</sup>

A number of small groups which had cast themselves away from Jewish labor parties in Palestine and Eastern Europe estab-

lished themselves as the Socialist Workers' Party in September of 1920. This organization lasted for less than one year, showing considerable confusion of purpose and aims, and coming to a sudden end following May day riots in Jaffa. Another group made a new attempt to form a Palestine Communist Party after first making an effort to infiltrate a left-wing Zionist party, Poalci Zion (Workers of Zion).

The pattern that followed throughout the 1920's and into the next decade revealed characteristics of internal feuding, and frequently rapid shifts of leadership as well as of general membership. Recognition as a member party of the Comintern came from Moscow in 1924. Increasingly bad relations developed with the rest of the Jewish groups in Palestine over the development of a pro-Arab policy, which became one of the most consistent features of the local Communist movement.

The pro-Arab orientation of the Palestinian party was directed by Moscow. At the time of its admission to the Comintern that body had called upon the Palestine Party to "support the national freedom of the Arab population against the British-Zionist occupation."<sup>5</sup> The Comintern Executive Committee in 1930 described Zionism as "the exponent of the exploiting, big power, imperialist oppressive strivings of the Hebrew bourgeoisie," and added that "Zionism was converted into a weapon of British imperialism in order to suppress the national liberation movement of the Arab masses, while it converted into its own weapon the Hebrew population of Palestine."<sup>6</sup> The Palestine Party, however, remained a Jewish party until the late 1920's, and it was with the greatest difficulty that it was able to find Arab sympathizers, let alone Arab members for the party. The attempt to obtain Arab support continued, however, with the party propaganda organs saying one thing in its Arab publications, and something else again in its Hebrew and Yiddish materials.<sup>7</sup>

Following the Arab riots of 1929 the Comintern ordered the Palestine Party to appoint an Arab majority to its Central Committee, and at the 1935 Comintern Congress Palestinian delegates were able to report that the "Arabization" of their party was proceeding, and that only "the reliable and honest Jewish comrades in the party ranks" were allowed to continue in their

participation.<sup>8</sup> Successes among Palestine Arabs were insignificant. The small number of urban Arab workers were strikingly uninterested in Communist ideology, and the Arab peasantry tended to prefer the type of extreme nationalism represented by Haj Amin al Husaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. It is interesting to note that during the "Arab Revolt" of 1936-1939 the party cooperated with the ex-Mufti. By mid-1937 the party was in a state of major disorganization again. Two years later there were a number of ragtag Communist factions and not much more. Fewer than three hundred Jewish members were left and only a scattering of Arabs.

The slavish support of Kremlin policy through a succession of twists and turns was nowhere more completely demonstrated by the Palestinian party than in its support of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, after an initial period of shock. A difficult enough test for Communist parties throughout the world, the fanatical character of Nazism with relationship to European Jewry made this support particularly striking and odious. As a consequence another splinter group broke away, unable to stomach Hitler even temporarily for the sake of the larger vision of a world ultimately redeemed by communism. It was not until months after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, that the party line came around to the concept of a united front against the Axis powers.

Another noteworthy milestone occurred in 1943 when, at the time of the official dissolution of the Comintern, permission was granted from Moscow for the establishment of two groups. These were an Arab party and a Jewish party, an arrangement which continued until the fall of 1948. The record of the Arab party during that period of time involved considerably greater successes than was the case for the Jewish group. The Arab Communists appeared as a real nationalist group among the Arabs, and not something in opposition to pan-Arab aspirations.

Even before the end of World War II the two Communist groups had been trying to become more respectable in appearance. New leaders had come to the fore who busied themselves with the bureaucratic affairs of the movement and were quite different from the revolutionary types of the 1920's. These

included people who have continued in leadership positions to the present day, such as Shmuel Mikunis, Meir Wilmer, and Tewfik Toubi of the Arab party. It is interesting to observe that the Jewish party had now lost its former militant anti-Zionism. It still came as a deep shock to the party faithful, however, when Andrei Gromyko in a United Nations speech in the summer of 1947 indicated that although the Soviet Union still regarded a bi-national Palestinian state as preferable, that the establishment of two separate states would also be acceptable. This Soviet turn, however, was ultimately conducive to the new tactics of the Jewish party and its attempt to cloak itself with respectability, which included its efforts to capitalize on the new prestige of the Soviet Union, and its emphasis upon economic and social programs which differed little from those of left-wing Zionist parties. Some Communists even joined the Haganah, the Jewish defense force in Palestine. When the Soviet Union backed the partition plan in the crucial General Assembly debates and vote of November, 1947, the Jewish Communists, after waiting to make sure that they had the correct message from Moscow, fell into line on this as well.\* The party became properly patriotic during the Arab-Israeli War, even criticizing Prime Minister Ben Gurion for discontinuing offensive operations toward Suez!

During the period of Soviet support for partition, followed by a relatively brief period of not unfriendly responses by Moscow toward a Jewish state, the predicament of the Palestinian Arab Communist group known as the "Arab League for National Liberation" was, for a change, more touchy than that of its Jewish counterpart. One group within the League defended the Soviet position, while a second faction took an opposing stand. By August, 1948, however, the pattern of military action had indicated the survival of the new Jewish state. Talks were started

\* The difficulties of slavishly following the Moscow line were nowhere more graphically revealed than over the question of Internationalizing Jerusalem. As usual, Moscow gave no advance warning of a forthcoming policy change to its satellite organization in Palestine. Soviet policy at the United Nations switched twice on the Jerusalem issue, leaving the Palestine Communists up in the air on both occasions with organized drives and demonstrations.

in that month between representatives of the Arab group and the Jewish party, which under the developing circumstances presumed to be the senior partner. Negotiations were successfully concluded, and in October of 1948, Maki, the present Israeli Communist Party, came into being.

### THE COMMUNIST PARTY SINCE STATEHOOD

The position of the Communist Party in Israeli politics has been a decidedly peripheral one, with the exception of its position and activities among Israel's Arab citizens. The Communists participated in the Provisional Government Council during the Arab-Israeli War, although not in the smaller and more important Cabinet. The Communists, along with the right-wing nationalist Herut Movement (with its background in the underground paramilitary organization the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Zionist Revisionist Movement), never have participated in a coalition cabinet since 1949. As has been pointed out, however, the party has been represented in all five Knessets to date. Its current strength is five seats, an increase of two from the Fourth Knesset.

Although the Communist Party is and has been a marginal force in Israeli politics, it has shown itself to have a greater attraction than during previous decades. As far as Jewish voters are concerned it would perhaps seem surprising that the party should be able to attract any support, considering the overall pattern of Soviet hostility toward Israel, accompanied by Soviet wooing of Middle East Arabs. On top of this was the Communist Bloc campaign against the "cosmopolitans" (i.e., Jews) as represented in the Prague treason trials of the early 1950's, and the weird "doctors' plot" in Stalin's last days, to say nothing about discrimination against Soviet Jews in more recent years. Furthermore, after its stand during the Arab-Israeli War and with the turning of Soviet policy, Maki returned to an anti-Zionist position. It has faithfully followed every turn of the Soviet line, and when Soviet-Egyptian relations have been such as to permit it, it has blatantly campaigned among "Nasserites" in the Arab districts of Israel as being the next best thing to a vote for Nasser, and

as the party that would further Arab interests in the country as well as work for a "peaceful solution" to outstanding issues in the Middle East.

That the Communists would have an appeal to many of the nation's Arab citizens is not surprising. It should be observed that apart from the built-in advantages that the Communists have concerning anti-Zionism, and the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Middle East, there are other factors which contribute to the party's appeal. In some elections over half of its voter strength has come from the Arabs, although probably less than half of its actual members are Arabs.<sup>9</sup> The Communist Party, along with the doctrinaire Marxist party Mapam, is the only general party on the Israeli scene which Arabs can belong to as members. Mapai has organized and operated several satellite Arab political entities (the term "party" can hardly be employed). These emphasize family ties, standing in the community, bloc voting within related social units, and an almost complete lack of organizational structure and systematic activities. These Mapai Arab representatives in the Knesset have not been very impressive. The type of system they represent is not the kind of political vehicle that younger Arab voters in the country want, and there is increasing evidence of disaffection among rank-and-file Arab voters with the traditional lists.

In addition to the points already suggested concerning the Communist appeal among Israeli Arabs there is another factor of obvious significance. The Communist Party is the only party that actively works in the daily affairs of the Arab population on a reasonably systematic basis. The party has recruited competent and energetic Arab leaders from young intellectuals. It has been observed that a number of prominent Arab members of the Communist Party are indeed the only Arabs in the country who enjoy political stature of a wide, almost national significance.<sup>10</sup> Emil Toma, the party's main Arab ideologist, and the author of a controversial book on Arab history, is one such individual. Even more in this category are Tewfik Toubi and Emil Habibi, both members of the Knesset and journalists. The influence of these men extends much beyond their home communities and reaches all Arab Communists as well as a not inconsiderable



group of non-Communist Arab workers. The persistent opposition of these men to both the Israeli Government and traditional Arab dignitaries, expressed as it is in Knesset speeches, at public meetings, and in newspaper articles, all contribute to their popularity.

The popular totals for the Communists over the years in Knesset elections have had an overall increase from around 15,000 votes in 1949 to over 42,000 in the election to the Fifth Knesset in 1961. The percentage figure for this latter contest was almost exactly the same as for the first election (4.1 per cent in 1961 and 4.0 per cent for 1949). In the face of the very great expansion of the state's Jewish population during the intervening years, it is interesting to speculate on how the Communists have held their own in the scramble for new votes. Indeed, in the 1961 Knesset contest, the Communist percentage actually increased somewhat among the Jewish population.<sup>11</sup>

A number of explanations can be suggested for this development, which would hardly be expected considering the deterioration in Soviet-Israeli relations since 1948-1949 and the generally pro-Arab policies in the Middle East of the Soviet Union. The hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants who have flooded into Israel since 1949 had no experience or any particular sophistication concerning the Communist record in Palestine during the previous decades. More immediate issues involving jobs, housing, and other pressing matters faced these people. While the Communists have not had the organizational advantages and entrenched positions in governmental and/or economic and social organizations which the Zionist parties have had, their relative competitive position still has not been as unfavorable as was the case during the Mandate.\* Out of a situation of considerable economic and social dislocation, coming as a natural consequence

\* Second only to the government itself in terms of economic power in Israel is the great labor federation and system of economic enterprises, the Histadrut. By a "key system" concerning jobs, positions, and more or less under-the-table election campaign expenses, the various parties that share in Histadrut's management have staked out areas or realms of interest where their respective positions are preeminent. By common agreement of all these other parties the Communist Party is denied these perquisites.

to mass immigration and other growing pains of the new state, the Communist Party was able to make at least some capital. Promises are easy enough when unaccompanied by responsibility in either governmental administration or trade union economic affairs. Furthermore, indeterminate numbers of new immigrants had been Communist members or sympathizers in the Eastern or Central European countries of their origin. An additional pressure along this line may very well be the continued presence of relatives and close friends in Iron Curtain countries, and consequent concern for their safety. In more recent years Soviet technological achievements, including space and missile successes, have not passed without admiring notice and comparison, regardless of what Russia and the Communist world do in other matters.

During the early years of Israeli statehood the Communists made important inroads into Mapam, after the establishment of that entity in 1948 through the merger of two Zionist socialist-pioneering parties. During the first years of its existence, Mapam followed a slavishly pro-Communist line, which Moscow snubs or embarrassing policy positions seemed incapable of jarring. Mapam opened its eyes to some extent after the Prague Treason Trials of 1952. One of the prominent members, Mordecai Oren, ironically was returning from a Communist-sponsored conference in East Berlin when arrested and convicted in Prague.\* This disquieting event was followed shortly by news of the Moscow "Doctors' Plot" with its additional anti-Semitic overtones. The strongly pro-Communist faction in Mapam had been headed by the able Dr. Moshe Sneh, whose previous career, interestingly enough, had included a top leadership position in the Haganah and membership in the free enterprise General Zionist Party before joining Mapam. In the face of attacks within Mapam by

\* Oren had been warned by the Israeli ambassador in Czechoslovakia and some trade union people in Prague. His trial was secret and, he feels, of a completely mock nature, including the activities of his lawyer, over whose selection he had no control. It is interesting that it was hinted to Oren at Prague that if he would follow a pro-Communist group leaving Mapam he would be allowed to go home. In October of 1963 the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia overturned Oren's conviction.

other factions and individuals, Dr. Sneh and his supporters attempted to brazen out the situation by demanding that the party accept the orthodox Stalinist position on the Prague and Moscow trials. The immediate consequence was the "expulsion" of Dr. Sneh and a few hundred of his group from Mapam in January of 1953. Their attempt to form a Left Socialist Party following the complete Communist line failed, and finally the Sneh group joined Maki in November of 1954. It is interesting to note that although Sneh was a relative latecomer to the Communist Party, he has been its most important voice in the Knesset, where his debating skills and personal qualities among parliamentary colleagues of many parties have been prime assets.

In organizational structure and operations the Communist Party does not appear to differ from Communist organizations elsewhere. Maki operates formally under a party constitution, a matter of very little real importance. An elected national convention, which is required to meet every three years, is provided for, but the traditional "democratic centralism" of Communist parties is strongly present. A Central Committee, a Secretariat, and a small Political Bureau headed by the party's Secretary-General are the most important bodies. The seven-man Political Bureau is clearly the key body. It included all of the party's parliamentary members in the Fourth and Fifth Knessets and had a composition of five Jews and two Arabs.

It is interesting and ironic that the party distinguishes itself by its lack of organizational work in the field of collective and cooperative agricultural settlements, for which Israel is well known. The Communist Party cannot be thought of as a labor party either in terms of its leadership or of its electoral record among workers.

Reference has already been made concerning Maki's echoing Moscow's foreign policy line. That line more often than not has been a difficult burden for the party to bear. This was particularly the case during the period of the Suez-Sinai Campaign and its aftermath. The party lumped "imperialist aggression against Egypt" with the "counter revolution in Hungary," and complimented the "brave resistance of the Egyptian people."<sup>12</sup> Widespread resignations of Jewish members followed this stand. *Kol*

*Ha'am* (Voice of the People), the party newspaper, lost heavily in circulation, and party workers met with physical resistance on numerous occasions.<sup>13</sup>

The party now seems to be on less precarious grounds than was the case during earlier decades, and its difficulties during and immediately after the Suez-Sinai events were not as disruptive as had been the case in earlier crises. Certainly its Arab support is more substantial than in pre-World War II days, and it has already been noted that the 1961 Knesset balloting brought at least some recouping of Jewish support as well.

The Communist explanation of Soviet hostility to Israel has been that Israel has brought about such hostility by her own actions, including alignment toward the West. Maki also maintains that the Soviet bloc's arms aid to Egypt in 1955-1956 was to help Egypt prepare for self-defense against British and French colonial aggression, with the ultimate hope of trying to help establish a "neutralist" Middle East.

This type of approach continues to be the cornerstone of Maki's position on international questions in the Middle East, as is illustrated by written remarks to the *Jerusalem Post* in early August of 1963 by Shmuel Mikunis, Secretary-General of the party and ranking member of its Knesset delegation.<sup>14</sup> Returning from a mission to Moscow, which was for the purpose of "an exchange of view," Mikunis maintained that it was not the Soviet Union which was an obstacle to the lessening of Middle East tensions and the stopping of the arms supplies, but "At fault are the Western powers and the ruling circles in Israel and neighboring countries who base their power in an arms race."

Following a position that Maki has taken over the years in deprecating persistent reports of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, Mikunis took strong exception to a question whether the East-West detente of 1963 might influence the Soviet regime to allow Russian Jews to rejoin their families in Israel. Referring to a "slander campaign" on this question, he insisted that "The key to any improvement in Russo-Israel relations lies in the hands of the Israeli Government," adding that only a radical change in Israeli policies could bring this about.<sup>15</sup>

In the field of Israeli domestic politics the Communist Party

has taken a consistent position of hostility toward dealings with the Federal Republic of Germany, although this is by no means an isolated position in Israel. American economic aid and capital investment are condemned.

The position of the party on domestic policy is not surprising. Its call for the nationalization of land is a rather incongruous one, however, considering the fact that more of the land in Israel is collectively or cooperatively run than is the case in many of the "peoples' democracies" and that the Communist Party has taken no working interest in the hard-grinding job of agricultural pioneering. The party calls for a ceiling on profits without any accompanying wage freezes, higher property taxes, and lower expenditures on defense and security forces.

### PROSPECTS

The future of the Communist Party in an independent Israel is a most unpromising one, with the exception of prospects among the country's Arab citizens. It has been suggested that even in this respect it is doubtful that the party has a great deal more leeway for success beyond its 1961 election gains. Indeed, if the other parties were to make a serious effort in Arab districts (particularly on a sustained basis in the non-campaign periods), including the granting of party membership to Arab citizens, the Communists probably would be hard pressed to hold on to what they have. It should be noted, however, that there are enough uncertainties present on the Israeli political scene, including the presumed passing of Ben Gurion's active public role, to give pause to any reasonably confident predictions on future electoral prospects for any of the parties.<sup>16</sup> A drastic decline for Mapai or its client Arab lists in Arab districts is at least a possibility, particularly if the pervasive system of Military Government obtaining in such districts should be abolished.\* That the Com-

\* Mapai has insisted upon the necessity for continuing such military government, beating down attempts to wipe out the system by very close Knesset votes in February of 1962 and 1963. In the fall of 1963, however, Prime Minister Eshkol announced the relaxation of some of the restrictive features of the system pertaining to travel permits.

munist Party would be an important gainer from such a development, however, can not be taken for granted. Indeed, the emergence during the 1961 campaign of the first serious independent Arab Knesset candidates since statehood suggests to some competent observers that such lists can and likely will be effective competitors for the Arab vote in the future. It is important to remember, however, that Arabs constitute only 11 per cent of the nation's population, and by the very nature of things represent a substantially less important force than even this in Israeli public life.

Among the overwhelming majority of Jewish voters the Communist Party has no standing or prestige in the slightest. The party's record and statements offer little to attract any meaningful segment of the Jewish population, either among the earlier settlers from Europe and their offspring, or the more recent Oriental Jewish immigrants. While these latter (who along with their children now constitute over half of the Jewish population) have many economic and social grievances against the existing state of affairs, their backgrounds in terms of religious observance and/or tradition and as settlers from surrounding Arab countries tend strongly to predispose them against Communist blandishments, despite their lower degree of political sophistication.

Communist activities in the pre-state period were adversely affected from time to time by internal factionalism and splintering. There are some recent evidences that suggest the Israeli Communist Party may be entering a significant internal crisis, although the trend of this crisis and its consequences are difficult to assess at this stage. A pro-Chinese faction emerged in 1963 and published several issues of a journal, which by July, 1963, was quite open in its sentiments, including detailed and favorable treatment of Mao Tse-tung. This movement appears confined to Jewish party members. Presumably, it can have serious consequences within the party as a disruptive force, affecting the internal balance of power between Arab and Jewish members.<sup>17</sup>

There are, of course, uncertainties about the future role and standing of the Communist Party in Israel. However, barring a radical realignment of the international situation and the role of

the Great powers (particularly the Soviet Union in the Middle East), there is no reason to anticipate that the basic position of the Communist Party (or parties, as the case may be) will change in any material respect from the long-term minor and isolated role.

## NOTES

1. A. Hiram, "The Communist Party of Israel," *Jewish Frontier*, July, 1951, p. 14.

2. Walter Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (Praeger, 1956), p. 102. This volume contains excellent material on the detailed development of the Palestinian Communist Party, with some treatment of the post-independence period as well.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 74; Hiram, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

4. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

5. Martin Ebon, "Communist Tactics in Palestine," *The Middle East Journal*, July, 1948, p. 256.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

7. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

8. Ebon, *op. cit.*, p. 257. There was definite resentment within the party at Moscow's demands for "Arabization," but at the Seventh Conference of the Palestine Party there was an acknowledgement of previous errors that "we enclosed ourselves in a Jewish ghetto and viewed the Arab question from a Jewish angle" (Hiram, *op. cit.*, p. 15).

9. The percentage of the vote cast in Arab towns, villages, and Bedouin camps for the Communist Party in the five Knesset elections to date has been as follows: 1949, 23.6%; 1951, 15.1%; 1955, 15.6%; 1959, 11.2%; 1961, 22.5%. The Communist figures run higher in Arab towns than is the case in villages and Bedouin tribes, coming to 45% in the 1961 election. It should not be assumed at all that these represent actual Communist strength. A large part represents as strong a protest as possible against the government.

10. Jacob Landau, "A Note on the Leadership of Israeli Arabs," *Il Politico*, XXVII, No. 3 (University of Pavia, 1962), 631.

11. Approximately 7,000 additional Jewish voters cast their ballots for the Communists in 1961. It should be noted that Arab and Jewish votes are not cast separately as such, and that there is a considerable sprinkling of mixed polling stations around the country.

12. "Resolutions of the Central Committee of The Israeli Communist Party for the Approaching Thirteenth Party Convention" (1957). Translated and published by a Near East Documentation Project, the University of Michigan, pp. 1-10. The comments on Suez-Sinai and its implications run on for many pages in a document that is mainly concerned with foreign affairs.

13. Oscar Kraines, *Government and Politics in Israel* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 73.

14. *The Jerusalem Post Weekly*, August 9, 1963, p. iv. Mikunis refused to allow himself to be interviewed, requiring instead that questions be submitted to him by phone, with the replies given in writing.

15. *Ibid.*

16. For some thoughts on these topics see the following article by the writer (Johnston): "Election Politics and Social Change in Israel," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1962, pp. 309-327.

17. In the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking the Arab Communist parties are reported to have sided strongly with the Soviet Union. One commentator sees the explanation in the fact that they see the Soviet Union as a shield against Israel. Edward Crankshaw, "The Split Between Russia and China," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1963, p. 63.