

The Origins of Whampoa Graduates Who Served in the Northern Expedition

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You will carry on the ideals of the revolutionary martyrs, laying down your lives and shedding your blood, making the foundation of the Chinese Republic secure, causing the *San Min Chu I* to be manifested in a practical way; and then the revolution will be proclaimed loudly, like Russia's. . . . If the revolution is not finished, China shall die, and a race of 400,000,000 will become extinct. The death of our country and the extinction of our race [are questions which] are dependent on the life and death of you gentlemen. . . . Therefore, we definitely must open this school, and we must make a revolutionary army of men who will save the country and the people.¹

These words of Sun Yat-sen's inaugural speech to the first class of the Whampoa Military School mirrored the intensity and frustration of the Kuomintang in the mid-1920's. This extremely significant period witnessed the beginnings not only of the strengths but also of the weaknesses of the revived Chinese revolutionary movement.

Despite the intensity and resultant significance of this period, only since World War II has the United States witnessed far-reaching efforts to encourage the systematic study of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist movement as part of the larger Chinese revolutionary fervor and agitation. With the expectation of assisting in these efforts, the author is presently engaged in an investigation of Whampoa Military School, whose commandant from 1924 to 1928 was Chiang Kai-shek.² As far as possible, this

study will be of an institutional nature, and will include emphasis on the geographic origins of cadets and staff, the political training provided within the school, the types of strategic and tactical training and general military philosophy offered, the subsequent military careers of selected graduates, and the varied and changing relationships of the school to other organs of the National Government, and to the Kuomintang.³

As the first step in this plan, the present paper offers an analysis of the geographic origins of the cadets who graduated from the first four classes.⁴ These were the classes which graduated in time to participate in all or part of the Third Northern Expedition (May 1926-1928), which carried the Kuomintang and its National Government to Nanking. Table I indicates the size and dates of attendance of the first four classes.

TABLE I*
SIZE AND CALENDAR DATES OF FIRST FOUR WHAMPOA CLASSES

Class	Number of Graduates	Entered the ranks	Entered Whampoa	Graduated Whampoa
1	613		May, 1924	Dec., 1924
2	449		Oct., 1924	Summer, 1925
3	1,225		Summer, 1925	Winter, 1925
4	2,650	Aug., 1925	Spring, 1926	Oct., 1926

* Chiang, *Last Three Years*, pp. 147-154; *Directory*, pp. 57-66. The column headed "Entered the ranks" refers to the practice, begun with the fourth class, of providing a trial period of training for cadets before they entered Whampoa. While the *Directory* lists 613 cadets in the first class, an initial comparison with various materials of Chiang Kai-shek's authorship leaves some question as to the size. In an undated report written in May, 1924, the first class was noted as numbering 460; see Chiang Kai-shek, *Chiang Kai-shek's Revolution* (Shanghai, 1928), II, A. H. C. Martin Wilbur and Julia Lien-ying How, eds., *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisors in China, 1919-1927, Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid* (New York, 1956), p. 150, gives the same figure; hereafter cited as *Documents*. In a May 11, 1924 speech to the assembled cadets, Chiang stated that there were "more than 500 to 600" in the school; see *Kuo-min ke-ming chün chung-yang chün-shih cheng-chih hsiieh-hsiao*, ed., *Whampoa ts'ung-shu* (*Whampoa Collection*) (Shanghai, 1928), p. 22. Finally, in Chiang, *Last Three Years*, the figure is 500; see p. 154. This all leads to two conclusions. Chiang's figures are probably approximations of the number of cadets in attendance at various times in the late spring of 1924. In approximating, Chiang consistently estimated too low for all of the classes; see *Last Three Years*, pp. 147-154. Secondly, the *Directory* without a doubt lists the number of cadets who graduated at the end of a training cycle.

While many of the newly recruited cadets in any particular class might not have come directly from their native places as listed in the Whampoa *Directory*, nevertheless it cannot be questioned that provincial or local loyalties formed bonds of great

and lasting importance to young Chinese students who had middle school or college backgrounds, and who were thus eligible for entrance to Whampoa. Indicative of this importance is the continuation of provincial groupings in the contemporary Chinese Communist and Nationalist political scene.

A number of conclusions may be drawn from Table II. First of all, in all four classes three provinces furnished roughly 50 per cent of the total number of cadets. Hunan, Kwangtung—and Shensi and Kiangsi in a tie for third place—provided over 50 per cent of the first class while Chekiang was next. Kwangtung, Hunan, and Chekiang were the most important for the second class, followed by Kiangsi and Szechwan. In the third class, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Chekiang furnished 50 per cent

TABLE II
ABSOLUTE NUMBERS OF CADET GRADUATES AND PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS BY
PLACE AND CLASS*

(Percentages refer to the relationships between place and total class numbers)

Place of Origin	First Class Number:		Second Class Number:		Third Class Number:		Fourth Class Number:	
	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent
Anhwei	26		15		77		49	
Chekiang	34	6%	67	15%	171	14%	148	6%
Chihli (Hopeh)	6		2		2		51	
Fukien	10		6		15		54	
Honan	10		0		10		129	
Hunan	188	31%	72	16%	221	18%	843	32%
Hupeh	16	3%	25	6%	78	6%	150	6%
Kansu	4		0		0		3	
Kiangsi	43	7%	52	12%	101	8%	127	5%
Kiangsu	22	4%	11	2%	102	8%	79	3%
Kwangsi	32		17		35		83	
Kwangtung	94	15%	98	22%	224	18%	265	10%
Kweichow	12		13		25		24	
Shansi	5		2		13		111	
Shantung	10		6		24		58	
Shensi	45	7%	4	1%	7	1%	154	6%
Szechwan	20	3%	50	11%	94	8%	206	8%
Yunnan	11		3		18		44	
Inner Mongolia	2		1		0		24	
Manchuria	3		0		2		11	
Korea	0		0		4		24	
Taiwan	0		0		0		2	
Unlisted	19		5		2		11	
Totals	613	76%	449	85%	1225	81%	2650	76%

* *Directory*, pp. 37-66, for the raw data. Percentages are here given only for the eight provinces which furnished the largest total number of cadets for the four classes.

of the total number, while Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Szechwan were tied for the next position. Hunan, Kwangtung, and Szechwan held the important positions for the fourth class, while Shensi, Chekiang, and Hupei were tied for the following place.

Quite obviously, Hunan ranked first overall as a source of cadets. Of the total of 4,987 who graduated from the first four classes, Hunan furnished more than one quarter: 1,324. The historical analysis at the end of this paper hopefully will shed light on the reasons for the importance of Hunan. Kwangtung, the base of the Kuomintang's financial and military strength, might have been expected to furnish the largest number, but ranked only as a poor second, with a total of 682 graduates. In descending order, even fewer came from Chekiang, 420; Szechwan, 370; Kiangsi, 323; Hupeh, 269; Kiangsu, 214; and Shensi, 210. Below this, provincial representations fell to very minor significance.*

While the eight important provinces have been identified, it is possible to locate the geographic sources of cadets even more precisely. The index for each class listed in the Whampoa *Directory* indicates the native place—district (hsien), or city (shih)—for each cadet, except for the group whose place origins are entirely unlisted. In order to analyze further, the terms, "rural hsien," and "urban units" may be applied.† For reasons of economy and emphasis it may be helpful to summarize for the eight important provinces the rural hsien and urban units which furnished cadets for at least three of the first four classes. The map will further clarify the situation.⁵

In Hunan, the valleys of the Hsiang and Tzu Rivers, and the area to the west of Tung-ting Lake were significant. Interestingly enough, Hsiang-t'an, the native district of Mao Tse-tung, who had not yet begun to rely on the masses as a source of power, accounted for less than 5 per cent of Hunan's representation in

* See pp. 10-12 for a discussion of the variation in provincial representations from class to class.

† A rural hsien is defined here as a district capital of less than 100,000 population, and its surrounding hsien. An urban unit includes a city area (shih) of over 100,000 population, and the hsien (singular or plural) surrounding the city. These units are further subdivided as large (with a city of over 500,000 population), or small (with a city of 100,000-500,000 population). See footnote 7.



any one class. Indicative of the then current Kuomintang-Communist interest in areas of modern labor concentration as fertile sources of revolutionaries was the importance of the rural hsien of Li-ling. Midway up the Hsiang valley and on the Ping-hsiang-Lu-k'ou railway, Li-ling furnished for three classes a larger percentage of Hunan's representation than any town of similar size:

first class, 22 per cent; third class, 7 per cent; and fourth class, 5 per cent.

The rural hsien of Wen-ch'ang, Ch'ung-shan, Teng-mai, and Wan-ning on Hainan Island furnished a surprising portion of the cadets in the Kwangtung totals: first class, 23 per cent; second class, 43 per cent; third class, 25 per cent; and fourth class, 21 per cent. Elsewhere, the valleys of the Hsi (West) and Tung (East) Rivers provided cadets for three classes, the Canton urban unit furnishing cadets for four classes, with a high of 3 per cent of Kwangtung's total in the first class. Finally, rural hsien seventy-five to a hundred miles north of the Hai-lu-feng area east of Canton were represented by cadets from at least three classes.

In Chekiang, rural hsien south of Hangchow, on the extension of the Shanghai-Hangchow railroad into the central part of the province, were the outstanding sources of cadets for at least three classes. Secondly, the area from Ningpo south along the coast was significant. The rural hsien of Feng-hua, Chiang Kai-shek's birth-place, accounted for 29 per cent of the province's representation in the first class, but fell to insignificance thereafter, furnishing only seven cadets in the last three classes.

The region south from Chengtu to a distance of about a hundred miles, i.e., the area between the valleys of the Min and Fou Rivers, was significant in Szechwan. Secondly, the urban unit of Chungking furnished cadets for four classes, with a high of 18 per cent of the provincial total in the second class.

In Kiangsi, the important area was to the south of the Yangtze River and west of Po-yang Lake. This included the urban unit of Nanchang, the provincial capital. Secondly, the small urban unit of Ping-hsiang, a major coal-mining center economically oriented by railroad toward Lu-k'ou in the Hsiang valley of Hunan, furnished large groups of cadets for each class: first, 14 per cent of the provincial total; second, 12 per cent; third, 6 per cent; and fourth, 20 per cent.

As for Hupeh, the areas to the east and north of Wuhan furnished cadets for at least three classes. In Kiangsu, the important areas were adjacent to the Yangtze, south along the Grand Canal, and in the northwest along the divergent course of the Hwang-ho. And finally, in Shensi the important area was the

valley of the Wei River, including the capital of Sian, a small urban unit.

From the above analysis, it is clear that in the eight most important provinces, the cadets came from the densely populated Han areas—river valleys and along railroad rights-of-way. Within these areas, the majority of cadets were recruited from rural hsien having capitals of less than 100,000 population. Variations in the number of cadets from class to class were proportional roughly to the rise or fall in the number of their native places. As the classes rose in size beginning with the third, not only were existing sources further exploited, but now large additional numbers of rural hsien were tapped for the first time, many of them providing only one cadet for a particular class. Only in Kwangtung, where four rural hsien furnished a heavy percentage of cadets, were so few hsien of such great importance.

Table III will illustrate the general unimportance of small urban units, i.e., with cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population. Even less important were the large urban units with cities of over 500,000 population: Peking, Tientsin, the Wuhan complex, Chungking, Soochow, Shanghai, Foochow, Changsha, Hangchow, and Canton. With the exception of Changsha, Chungking, and Canton, each of these urban units furnished a smaller total number of cadets than any of the units listed in the table.*

In general both large and small urban units were of lesser importance as sources of cadets. This statement is subject to some qualification, however. First of all, both in Hunan and Szechwan all urban units when grouped together consistently furnished from about 20 per cent to 40 per cent of each province's cadets, depending upon the class. These percentages were higher than those for urban units in any other province. Secondly, Chungking and Changsha, together with the units noted in the table—excepting Ping-hsiang, Ling-ling, and Ningpo—provided greater percentages of provincial totals for the second than for any other class.

* Changsha provided a grand total of 76 cadets, with a high of 10 per cent of Hunan's total in the second class, while Chungking furnished 36, with a high of 18 per cent of Szechwan's total in the second class; and Canton provided 13 with a high of 3 per cent in Kwangtung's total of the first class.

Indeed, the entire pattern of recruitment for the second class was characterized by a restriction of effort. Not only were small urban units drawn on intensively, but also the total number of native places was the fewest of any class, while the class itself was the smallest of the four. At the same time, the eight numerically important provinces furnished a high of 85 per cent of the total class, as against 76 per cent to 81 per cent of the other three classes.

TABLE III
REPRESENTATIVE SMALL URBAN UNITS AS SOURCES OF GRADUATES*
(Percentages refer to the relationships between urban and provincial numbers within the class)

Unit	First Class Number:		Second Class Number:		Third Class Number:		Fourth Class Number:	
	Abs- olute	As Percent	Abs- olute	As Percent	Abs- olute	As Percent	Abs- olute	As Percent
Hengyang, Hunan	3	2%	5	7%	3	1%	24	8%
Huang-pei, Hupeh	3	19%	5	20%	7	9%	12	8%
Ling-ling, Hunan	0	0	3	4%	9	4%	11	1%
Nanchang, Kiangsi	3	7%	8	15%	7	7%	2	2%
Nanking, Kiangsu	1	5%	5	45%	1	1%	3	4%
Ningpo, Chekiang	0	0	2	3%	6	4%	3	2%
Ping-hsiang, Kiangsi	6	14%	5	10%	6	6%	26	20%
Sian, Shensi	2	4%	1	25%	0	0	21	14%
Tzu-chung, Szechwan	1	5%	3	6%	1	1%	4	2%

* *Directory*, pp. 57-66, for absolute numbers.

The marked variation from class to class in the number of cadets from any particular province may be explained in general terms. Ever since the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, China had been sadly disunited. *Tuchuns* (provincial military governors appointed by the Peking government) and other militarists wielded supreme military and political power in every province with little regard for the interests or needs of the central government at Peking. Consequently, the effectiveness of Whampoa recruitment efforts in any particular province were dependent upon both the provincial military situation—the presence or absence of warfare—and the relationship between the local military chiefs and the Kuomintang.

For example, in September, 1924, war broke out in Kiangsu between two rivals. Within a month, interlocking military alliances had turned this struggle into a much more significant one

involving Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, North China's most powerful militarists, both unfriendly to the Kuomintang. The issue was settled in November when Feng Yü-hsiang, one of Wu's satellites, revolted and forced Wu to flee. During the precise period of this struggle, the second Whampoa class was recruited. Undoubtedly, the small size of this class was due in part to the general military unrest in north and central China.

By the end of 1924, Feng joined Chang in an uneasy alliance which lasted until October, 1925. During this period, generals in Honan, Chihli, Shensi, Kansu, and Inner Mongolia allied themselves with Feng,⁶ while others, such as Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, tended to follow Feng's general direction. Thus, Feng was a pivotal figure in the year 1925.

Just prior to the new year, Feng and Chang invited Sun Yat-sen to Peking in the interests of national unity. Sun accepted the invitation, and although in the name of Kuomintang he soon became disgusted with the two generals, the feeling was not entirely mutual. Feng gradually assumed a favorable attitude toward not only the Kuomintang, but also its Russian sponsors, who were willing to send arms to militarists who espoused revolution. In April, 1925, the first Russian military mission arrived to advise one of Feng's three armies, and by August a group of cadets was dispatched from Whampoa to serve in Feng's personal army in Shensi.⁷

In general, under Feng's rule "Kuomintang and Communist members were able to engage in propaganda and organizational activities with far greater freedom than under the previous regime. . . ." ⁸ Certainly both the relative peace and Feng's favorable disposition facilitated recruitment in north and central China for the third, and especially the fourth, Whampoa classes.

Meanwhile, during the period of August to October, 1924, strong opposition threatened the very existence of the Kuomintang in Canton and on Whampoa Island, about seven miles downstream on the Pearl River. The Canton Merchants' Association armed its own militia in these months in an effort to limit or eliminate the power of the Kuomintang. Although Whampoa cadets of the first class in their first military action aided other troops to disband the militia, the very immediate threat prob-

ably accounted in part for the restriction of effort in the recruitment of the second class. When the effects of the unsettled situation in north and central China were added, it was inevitable that the second class would be smaller than the first.

No sooner had the threat of the Merchants' Association subsided than the Kwangtung general, Ch'en Ch'ung-ming (Ch'en Hsiung-ming), in alliance with other militarists from Yunnan and Kwangsi, renewed his extended struggle against the Kuomintang. Only after two hard-fought Eastern Expeditions in the spring and fall of 1925 did the Whampoa cadets and the Kuomintang armies eliminate Ch'en's power along the East River, and end his military career. Significantly, no rural hsien and only one urban unit furnished cadets for three classes from this valley, which had been the preserve of Ch'en ever since 1923.⁹

Obviously, during 1925 the Kuomintang's prospects for recruiting young men as cadets improved markedly. In the South, the Kuomintang armies with their spirited Whampoa junior officers and cadets were in the process of conquering Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and of developing a reputation for success in battle, while in the North, Feng Yu-hsiang was progressing along the road to greater cooperation with the Kuomintang and the Russians. As a result of these favorable conditions, the third and fourth Whampoa classes, which entered the school and the ranks, respectively, in the summer of 1925, greatly exceeded the size of the previous classes.

While we can analyze in a general way the political and military factors bearing on the origins of the Whampoa graduates, any attempt to explain these origins in historical terms within a particular province becomes exceedingly complex. Nevertheless, at least several significant developments can be brought to light as they bear on the most important province, Hunan.

Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, Hunan had been a center of creative and sometimes aggressive reaction to the Western impact. In the longer historical view, this reaction must also include the willingness, even eagerness, of Hunanese youth to enroll in the Whampoa School, thereby fulfilling Sun Yat-sen's principle of Nationalism, i.e., the reestablishment of

the political unity which the Western impact had helped to destroy.

The first significant response to the Western penetration of Hunan occurred during the Taiping rebellion when Tseng Kuo-fan successfully lead Hunanese troops against the Taiping rebels, who advocated a bizarre form of Christianity. In the process of defeating the Taipings, Tseng developed a military system which served as a model for regional and provincial military rule down to the middle of the twentieth century. While he saved the central government in his own day, the system which he fostered lay the groundwork for an insidious erosion of the central power in Peking. Thus, Hunanese leaders, followed by those in other provinces, began to acquire the custom of ignoring the central administration.

Early in the twentieth century when Hunan was deep in the morass of regional politics, local Hunanese investors provided the capital necessary to construct one section of railway which later was incorporated under foreign pressure into the Canton-Hankow-Peking line, nominally controlled by the Peking government. The use of local financing was quite unusual, and certainly manifested a spirit of positive reaction to the usual practice of utilizing foreign railway loans. Indeed, in Hunan, Szechwan, and Kwangtung, local revolutionaries opposed foreign railway loans, and local merchants established railway protection clubs in 1911 to protest the nationalization of the proposed Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechwan lines. This nationalization under the nominal control of Peking was viewed as a cover behind which Britain, France, the United States, and Germany could penetrate the economy of interior China.

In the period of World War I, local fear of foreign economic penetration was not limited to the merchants or revolutionaries. The United States' consul at Changsha noted that Hunanese officials actively opposed foreign economic development in the province:

The official attitude toward foreign investments is characterized by caution and a fear that the free introduction of foreign capital into Chinese mining enterprises will take the mining property away from

[provincial] Chinese official control. Every obstacle has therefore been placed in the way of allowing foreign investors a free hand.¹⁰

Another group, often akin in its ideas to the revolutionaries, came to prominence in the twentieth century. Ever since 1900, some Chinese intellectuals had been tantalized by the prospect of solving China's problems through the establishment of a federal type of government, based on the French or American patterns. During the period of Yüan Shih-k'ai and the succeeding *Tuchuns*, non-military groups, including certain of the Kuomintang membership, favored a federal system which would separate civil and military authority on the one hand, and local and central authority on the other. After Yüan's death, the *Tuchuns* and lesser military chiefs in Hunan, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi began to support their own brand of federalism: the political and military autonomy of each province under its own militarist unless he were strong enough to acquire another province. In any case, wide separation from the Chihli clique which controlled Peking and north China was essential.

In Hunan, the demands of the intellectuals and pragmatism of the military coalesced in the years 1921-1922. In the light of history, the resulting provincial constitution stood as the only one enforced even in a nominal way during the period of the Chinese Republic. Hunanese political and military authority were sharply differentiated from the authority of the nominal government in Peking; certain rights were reserved to citizens, both men and women; a governor was to be elected by a small electorate; and the provincial assembly was to continue to function. Although this constitution continued to operate until the conquest of Hunan by the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang and National Government in 1926, the Hunanese generals, with their varying political and military sympathies, continued to hold paramount power within the province, and their fratricidal warfare did not abate.¹¹ Quite to the contrary, their struggles seem to have intensified because of the assumption of unique rights and powers by the Hunan government. Meanwhile, the population of the province could only wait and hope for peace, prosperity, and an orderly

government.

Early in 1925, T'ang Sheng-chih, a divisional commander in the Hunan army, waged a military campaign which drove Chao Heng-ti, the commander-in-chief, out of the province. At this juncture, T'ang despatched an emissary to Canton to begin negotiations for an alliance with the Kuomintang.¹² Obviously, T'ang wished to prevent Chao Heng-ti or any of the Chihli men from taking Hunan, but only an alliance with a superior counterforce would assure the success of this policy. Too weak to resist the Chihli military force, too late not to accept the provincial constitution, and just in time to face the growth in demand for power among the non-military groups in Hunan, T'ang indeed held an impossible position.*

On the other hand, the opportunities of others rapidly evolved after 1925. In Canton, the Kuomintang and its newly formed National Government and National Revolutionary Army preferred the Hunan route to the Yangtze. In this preference, they were not only following the pattern established in the two earlier Northern Expeditions of 1922 and 1924, but also working to prevent the extension of Chihli power into Hunan.

If we assume the importance of provincial bonds, then it appears that a large Hunanese representation in the National Revolutionary Army would be of critical importance to the success of the Third Northern Expedition of 1926. These young men were especially suited for the role of revolutionary cadre, having grown up with a heritage of aggressive response to the West and to the Peking government. As we know, extraordinarily large numbers of Hunanese were recruited for the third and fourth Whampoa cadet classes in the summer of 1925. Both of

* Whatever their internal quarrels, T'ang and his military subordinates in Hunan apparently felt compelled to support the constitution as a tool for unifying the province against exterior military threats. Simultaneously, other groups with the Hunanese heritage of aggressive action demanded new rights. Not only were there the young intellectuals and revolutionaries such as Mao Tse-tung, but also, beginning in the autumn of 1922, union labor struck frequently for better working conditions in central Hunan, including Changsha. Until 1926, these strikes were not led by members of the Kuomintang, or by Communists.

these classes graduated in time to participate in all or part of the Third Northern Expedition. Undoubtedly, the presence of these young, spirited men facilitated the success of the National Revolutionary Army as it pushed up the Hsiang valley.

Within Hunan itself, it was not only the ardent youth, merchant-landlord groups, industrial proletariat, and intellectuals who craved something new in society.¹² As Mao-Tse-tung learned so well during his agitation among the peasants in 1926, the peasantry was ripe for a change, although not necessarily one compatible with landlord interests. Most of the population was ripe for overturning, and in the name of bringing order, self-respect, and a new life to China, the Kuomintang, the National Government, and the National Revolutionary Army with its Whampoa graduates were preparing to capitalize on this sentiment. By 1928, not only Hunan, but most of the country, would find itself in a new era.

NOTES

1. Excerpt from Sun Yat-sen's inaugural speech to the first cadet class of the Whampoa Military School; see Sun Yat-sen, *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi* [Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen], Chung-yang tang-shih shih-k'o pien-tsuai wei-yüan-hui, ed. (Taipei, 1957), III, 437. The speech is also printed in Chung-yang lu-chün chün-kuan hsieh-hsiao ti-shih-san-ch'i t'ung-hsüeh lu [Student Directory of the Thirteenth Class (1938) of the Central Military Officers' Academy] (Tung-liang, 1958), unnumbered section in front of Directory. Hereafter cited as *Directory*. While the School opened early in May, 1924, Sun did not speak until June 16.

2. The name of the school changed several times during the period 1924-1928. From May, 1924, to January 12, 1926, the title was Whampoa chün-hsiao (Whampoa Military School); from this time until January, 1928, the name was Chung-yang chün-shih cheng-chih hsieh-hsiao (Central Military and Political Academy); in January, 1928, the school was formally moved from Whampoa Island in the Hsi River near Canton to Nanking, and from then until 1937 was known as Chung-yang chün-kuan hsieh-hsiao (Central Military Officers' Academy). See Chiang Chung-cheng, *San-nien-lai ti kuo-min ke-ming* [Chiang Kai-shek, *The Last Three Years of the National Revolution*] (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 147-154. Hereafter cited as *Last Three Years*.

3. The best English treatment of Whampoa is included in Frederick F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton, 1954).

4. *Directory*, pp. 37-66. The *Directory* includes not only personal and

family names, but also the hsien or city native places for virtually every cadet in the first thirteen classes.

5. Albert Herrmann, *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, 1935), is the basic source for the sizes of populated places. The present terms "rural hsien" and "urban unit" are based on Herrmann's three population categories, see p. 68. Because relatively reliable population figures for cities were unavailable during the period in question, Herrmann's figures were checked against those found in Julean Arnold, compl., *China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, Number 38 (Washington, 1926), pp. 3-15, and relevant chapters in the book; and in *The China Year Book, 1926-1927*, p. 31.

6. Wilbur, *Documents*, pp. 320-321.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 321, 323.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 321.

9. On the Canton Merchants' Association and Ch'en Ch'ung-ming see Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls, trans. and eds. (Princeton, 1956), pp. 464-466, 495-496. Cited hereafter as *Political History*.

10. Julean Arnold, compl., *Commercial Handbook of China*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Miscellaneous Series, Number 84 (Washington, 1919), I, 417.

11. Materials on federalism in Hunan may be found in Li, *Political History*, pp. 402-405 and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 77-78. On women and the Hunan constitution, see Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement, Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 258-259; cited hereafter as *May Fourth*. Li and Ch'ien disagree on the question of the longevity of the Hunan constitutional government. Since Li gives more detailed and specific information on Hunan, his dating is accepted as correct.

12. Wilbur, *Documents*, p. 230, n. 109.

13. Chow, *May Fourth*, pp. 74-75, 258-259, and 348-349 gives some understanding of the vast and complex ferment of ideals current among Hunanese intellectuals and youth in the 1920's.