

# Sino-Soviet Relations as Conditioned by Competition of Factions and Pressure Groups in the U.S.S.R.

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In surveying here the course of Sino-Soviet relations from 1960 to 1963, it is particularly interesting to see how these events may relate to activities of the factions and pressure groups in the Soviet Union. This relationship is, naturally, a two-way street: the groups or cliques affect the Sino-Soviet diplomacy, and the events, in turn, affect the groups themselves.

As a beginning, let us see just what factions and pressure groups are discernible. We can make them out only dimly or indirectly, as a rule, because the Soviet Union does not have the overt partisanship or the open lobbying and publicity campaigns used by pressure groups and rivals in a Western democracy.

First, in the Soviet Party and government, there has been historically a spectrum of "left, center, and right" leaders within the Bolshevik or Communist Party. Robert V. Daniels, in his *Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*,<sup>1</sup> makes this very clear, particularly with his appended charts of cleavages in the Party from 1917 to 1930. Besides the left-right dimension, he discerns a "hard-soft" dimension among the factions. Thus, in the 1928 to 1930 period, he places Stalin on the "right" end of his chart, and in the "hard" corner, with Bukharin and Rykov on the right, too, but less "hard."

At present, the word "right" or "conservative" may give varying impressions, and so I would prefer to substitute the word "doctrinaire," applying it to the neo-Stalinists, among others. Similarly, for the de-Stalinizers, we might use the term "flexible," rather than "left" or "liberal." At varying times, we have seen in the doctrinaire group such men as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kozlov, while, among those showing more flexibility, have been Malenkov and Mikoyan.\* Between the two groupings, pre-empting the center like the superb politician he is, appears Premier Khrushchev, aided by such other "centrists" as Suslov.

The Twenty-first Party Congress of January and February, 1959, gave indications of how other leaders fitted into this spectrum. Many of them spoke to the Congress about the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov. Spiridonov, the Leningrad Party Secretary, Presidium members Nikolai Ignatov and Nikolai Podgorny, Pavel Yudin (Ambassador to China), and Aleksandr Shelepin, head of the KGB, all denounced them strongly; Shelepin likened them to "Trotskyites and Rightists." Suslov, who had supported and later renounced the anti-Party group, Mikoyan, Aristov, and Kosygin made critical but less violent comments, as did Kirichenko, Kozlov, Furtseva, Brezhnev, and Marshal Malinovsky.

Nineteen other speakers expressed no views on the anti-Party group.<sup>2</sup> Of the ten men in the Presidium of the Central Committee after Stalin's death there remained in the office as of May, 1963, only Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Suslov. The other members in 1963 were: Kuusinen and Shvernik (old hands in the top echelons of the Party), Brezhnev, and Kozlov, both elected in 1957, Kosygin (who, like Mikoyan and Kozlov, is a First

\* Donald Zagoria, in *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), shows on pp. 156, 278, 378 and 405 how, in the 1950's, the latter persons stressed the dangers of nuclear war, the power of mutual deterrence, and the desirability of more consumer goods production. In this, the former group opposed them. The Chinese, of all the Communist Parties, showed the least enthusiasm for Khrushchev's purge of the "anti-Party group," though the Chinese had disliked Malenkov's emphasis on consumer goods because of its bad effect on availability of aid to China. See also "Mikoyan—Communist Trouble Shooter", *Communist Affairs*, December, 1962, pp. 19-22.

Deputy Premier), Kirilenko, Podgorny, Polyansky, and Voronov.<sup>8</sup>

Now aside from being generally doctrinaire or flexible, what pressure groups or cliques have these two schools of political leaders used for their support? Let us take as one potential pressure group the industrial managers and coordinators, the men who actually operate the Russian apparatus of production. Their motives are certainly not altogether homogeneous; for example, the heavy industry specialists surely agreed with the doctrinaire group in its continuing stress on development of heavy industry, and the armaments plant personnel would have a natural professional interest in a continuing high level of production in their area. However, the other segments of the economy are enhanced by an emphasis on consumer goods production, an emphasis that presupposes a relatively peaceable national posture, with a moderated level of armament programs.

Then, too, the typical factory manager or economic planner desires a healthy rate of capital reinvestment, plant expansion, and replacement of obsolescent equipment. With this aim is compatible neither runaway militarism nor excessive catering to the public appetite for consumer goods. We can conclude, really, that the industry people are heterogeneous, but not generally inclined to back up a doctrinaire or ultra-militarist faction. That they are an influential body is best proven by Khrushchev's action in 1957 to abolish many powerful, national-level industrial ministries, for which he substituted less cohesive, less prestigious, regionally organized economic structures.

It is important to remember that the Soviet economy has a less ample base than our own, so that greater allocations of resources to major programs can only mean painful cutbacks elsewhere. A prime example is the Soviet missile and space program: its importance to the Soviet military planners hardly requires explanation, and it is important to the entire regime as a source of public pride and international prestige. At the same time, its budgetary bite is more painful than that of a similar program in the United States. Similarly, the Soviet foreign aid programs, though far smaller than the American ones, make unwelcome demands on the national economy. In this sense alone, the cutback and virtual termination of the loans and aid programs for

China was, without a doubt, very welcome to the Soviet economic and financial planners.\*

Some authorities believe that the Sino-Soviet conflict was caused primarily by the Soviet government's refusal to allot huge resources to develop Chinese industry—a refusal which occurred because the people of Russia could not and would not tolerate a gigantic aid-to-China program.† “Public opinion,” then, big and vague as it may be, is one more pressure of importance in the dynamics even of an authoritarian state. Remember that when Harry Hopkins, talking with Stalin, smiled at the dictator's statement that they must consider the effect of a proposed measure on Russian public opinion, Stalin admonished him, “Don't laugh; we have our public opinion, too.” Hard to measure as a force, but worth noting here, is that special group, the writers and other intellectuals. Often repressed under the doctrinaire influence, they still have managed to get their messages to the public at crucial times.‡

\* There appears to have been no lending of funds for economic aid to China since 1954. The withdrawal of technical and military assistance personnel in 1960—there had been ten thousand or more of them—brought the Soviet commitment down to almost nothing.

† *Time*, April 21, 1961, describes the Sino-Soviet trade agreement of that year as putting trade on a cash basis, with no Russian grain to spare for China. Instead, the U.S.S.R. offered sugar, which was little help, since China was even then committed to take one million tons of sugar from Castro. It is worth noting also that while Sino-Soviet trade, even on a cash basis, shrank greatly in the past five years, Soviet shipments of oil continued. This was truly an essential item for China. Their dependence on Russia for it has given the Soviet government a certain influence over China, even when relations were very unfriendly. Note also that many of the Soviet technicians withdrawn from China in 1960 had gone there to help develop the local oil-producing capability. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 6, 1962.

‡ *New York Herald Tribune*, November 7, 1962. For example, *Pravda* printed Evtushenko's poem, “Stalin's Inheritors,” on October 21, 1962, just one day before the public airing of the Cuban crisis. The poem's words, “Obviously, nowadays, it is for good reason that Stalin's inheritors have heart failure,” served then as a public rebuke to the doctrinaire group, in the person of Koslov, who on April 11 had had a severe heart attack. Its printing on October 21 portended a rejection of the aggressive approach to the Cuban crisis that was probably being urged by the doctrinaire group during those very days.

Add to all the above-described competing pressures and demands the further strain of poor-crop years in Soviet agriculture, as with the 1963 grain harvest, and it is plain that apportionment of resources to the respective national programs occasions a lot of strain and infighting.

Trying to relieve this strain, in November, 1962, Premier Khrushchev undertook a sweeping reorganization of the system of economic control. He appointed Veniamin Dymshits, an engineer and investment expert who had also been made a Deputy Premier in July, 1962, as the highest economic coordinator, and brought the Party more dynamically into the economic planning system. There was also a reshuffling of membership in the Central Committee's Presidium, and in ministerial posts, bringing production specialists to the fore.<sup>4</sup> Four new deputy premiers were named: Dmitri Polyansky, Ignati Novikov, Mikhail Leschko, and Aleksandr Shelepin. Only Shelepin was not an economic specialist; he was a trusted Khrushchev political aide. These reorganizations seem to have implied an all-out effort to achieve more efficiency and productivity, through which the ever heavier demands of pressure groups and national programs might somehow be met.

Also, in November, 1962, British sources were on record as predicting that Russian opinion might go for some disarmament or arms control measures, if only because the economy could not carry all the costly competitive arms and space programs and still take care of the people. This estimate, which has now proven accurate, said: "There are strong indications of widespread skepticism... in sections of the Soviet elite concerning Mr. Khrushchev's promises of better living standards... This attitude... would deepen if it became known that a still greater share of resources was to be devoted to nuclear weapons."<sup>5</sup>

The total government expenditures for 1962 exceeded the budgetary estimates by about 2.3 billion rubles. Only once before, in peacetime, had U.S.S.R. expenditures exceeded estimates—in 1958, and then only by 1.5 billion rubles.<sup>6</sup> By April, 1963, the budget problems were perhaps even worse. Dmitri Ustinov was made the economic czar, as chairman of the new Supreme National Economic Council. It is interesting to note that he was

formerly the overseer of the Soviet arms industry; and it was against this industry that Premier Khrushchev turned in April with public accusations of inefficiency, lack of discipline, and use of security to cover up its shortcomings.<sup>7</sup>

The armed forces are a very strong pressure group which during three hundred years of Russian history have not only influenced governments, but repeatedly have substituted one ruler for another, when the incumbent gave too little consideration to their standing or their aspirations.

During the four years of collective leadership which followed Stalin's death, the military leaders were ranged against the doctrinaire neo-Stalinists. Marshal Zhukov was a member then of the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee; his role in the fall of Beria and in Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-Party group" in the crucial Central Committee vote of 1957 is well known. However, the military weight was probably thrown against the neo-Stalinists in order to secure freedom of maneuver and to prevent a recurrence of a Stalin type of regime—the wholesale purge of the military leadership under Stalin in the 1930's. In fact, Zhukov's removal as Defense Minister in 1957 was on the ground that he tried to subvert Party control in the army.

We cannot, therefore, consider that the military sympathies rest really with the flexible or left-wing factions. The programs which interest them the most—continued maintenance of large forces—are best supported by a set of views advocated by the doctrinaire neo-Stalinists, and by Mao's China, which may be summarized as follows: (1) the West, especially Germany and the United States, is malevolently aggressive and highly dangerous; (2) full-scale warfare may indeed occur, the alternative being surrender to Western aggression. These views implied that the law of January 15, 1960, which provided for a 1,200,000-man reduction in the Soviet forces by the fall of 1961, should not be carried out as scheduled, and, in fact, it was not.\*

\* Marshal Malinovsky told the twenty-second Party Congress that a nuclear attack against Russia was being prepared and that any war with the West would develop into a nuclear war. Concerning the reduction of forces, he commented that 250,000 officers would be discharged in this reduction. He also remarked that only 35 per cent of a previous group of 70,000 officers

The reduction was temporarily halted in August, 1961, in connection with the Berlin crisis. It seems, however, to have remained a live and controversial issue, because in the summer of 1962, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the official publication of the armed forces, published a violent attack against a protégé of Premier Khrushchev, Marshal Golikov, who was then Chief of the Political Directorate of the Armed Forces. (He was replaced shortly thereafter.) *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported that a conference of the top military leaders had accused Golikov of neglecting the welfare of the officers who were being discharged in connection with the reductions of forces, and it alleged that he had caused the forces to lose many essential specialists. The paper went on to say that a number of the most senior generals considered the political leadership responsible for many improper actions, including the promotion of political officers who should, instead, have been dismissed.<sup>8</sup>

Aside from the pressure group of the victims of force reductions in general, there is at the top of the military pyramid a formidable group of marshals, for whose retirement there is no effective provision in law, and who thus have become an over-age, very conservative, yet prestigious lot, occupying all the top jobs in the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces. Furthermore, some fourteen marshals of the Soviet Union held full membership in the Party's Central Committee, and seventeen other very senior officers are candidate members, totaling about 10 per cent of the aggregate Central Committee.

In April, 1963, almost a year after the removal of Marshal Golikov, his successor in the Political Directorate, General of the Army Aleksie A. Epishev, wrote an article saying: "... the reasoning of some theoreticians about the necessity of refusing to create mass armies, about the replacement of man by technology,

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who were discharged found jobs that did not involve a long step downward on the social and economic ladder. Most of the remainder wound up as laborers, the Marshal said (Frank J. Johnson, *No Substitute for Victory* [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962], p. 90). He could have added that the forces had already been reduced gradually in the 1955-1960 period by about 2,000,000 men, and they stood, according to Khrushchev, at 3,623,000 in January, 1960.

has shown itself to be worthless. . . . The role of mass armies grows with the increasing role and significance of technology in modern wars."<sup>9</sup>

Earlier in 1963, Pavel A. Rotmistrov, marshal and World War II hero, wrote in another magazine of the armed forces that Premier Khrushchev had laid a foundation for Soviet military doctrine, but that "... the detailed development and exposition of the nature of Soviet military doctrine we find in the reports and statements of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky and other military figures."<sup>10</sup>

This really outspoken comment—because most people inferred that the "theoretician" was the Premier—was uttered at a critical stage of decision making: only a week after Epishev said this, Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Rocket Forces, and reports reached the West that this meant the U.S.S.R. had decided to shift further resources to the armed forces, but especially to missiles.<sup>11</sup> Since the previous year, 1962, had seen a 40 per cent increase in the military budget,<sup>12</sup> it can be seen that the nation's resources were being sorely taxed.

Opposition to the large-scale production of ICBM's, which began in 1957-1958, when the U.S.S.R. was already technically ready to schedule it, brought a number of contending interest groups into play. The dominant group among the military, the Ground Force people, probably opposed it, with the help of two other strong groups, the Air Defense Force, which emphasizes AA rockets, and the leaders of the Air Force. The latter group naturally had a relation to ICBM enthusiasts in budgetary haggling that resembled the American competition between advocates of large bomber production as against an all-out ICBM effort.<sup>13</sup>

At any rate, by 1962 the Army's opposition to the "more bang for a buck" or "more rubble for a ruble" approach no longer prevented the programming of large-scale production of ICBM's. Also, 1962 brought the Soviet move to install IRBM's in Cuba. They had as many as two hundred of these altogether, while their grand total of available ICBM's was probably only about fifty.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, their strategic bombers were outnumbered tenfold by those of the United States.<sup>15</sup> This great gap in striking power



would have been narrowed if the IRBM's could have been placed in Cuba and kept there.

It is also conjectured that Khrushchev hoped by thus narrowing the gap to appease his military leaders, without incurring the painful expense of an all-out ICBM-building program. However that may be, the Cuban crisis was the high-water mark, for the early sixties, of dynamic moves or threats against the powers of the Western Alliance. Simultaneously, the threat of renewed doctrinaire, neo-Stalinist power within Russia was relieved somewhat, and the subsequent events led toward increasing trouble with China and peaceful accommodations with the West.

There were setbacks in this process, of course. The budget-related military agitation of January to April, 1963, previously described, was coupled with persistent reports that Khrushchev would give up to the doctrinaire Frol Kozlov either his premiership or his post as First Secretary of the Party. Also, his constructive correspondence with President Kennedy on a nuclear test ban in December, 1962, was superseded by a "difficult" attitude in April, 1963.<sup>16</sup> Simultaneously, in the January to May, 1963, period, Khrushchev found it expedient to say that the Sino-Soviet arguments were only a quarrel between friends, and his government moved toward another conference with the Chinese, held finally in Moscow in July, 1963.

However, Frol Kozlov became ill, and, with other adjustments about which we can only guess, this phase passed. Where in April Khrushchev had called for worldwide Communist unity and for curbs against "war-minded imperialist madmen,"<sup>17</sup> by July the atmosphere was different. The Sino-Russian conference began with strict secrecy, but it was soon evident that the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to reach agreement with the Chinese. Peking Radio on July 10 accused the Soviet government of trying to poison the relations of the two countries.<sup>18</sup> On July 13, Anastas Mikoyan joined the Soviet delegation, which had been led by Mikhail Suslov,<sup>19</sup> but it was not even possible to quiet down the discord in which the meeting ended.

Moving again to friendliness with the West and to talk of disarmament and peace, Khrushchev found himself able to speak out very hopefully on the test-ban treaty as early as July 2, and

by September, 1963, the test-ban treaty was a fully ratified reality.<sup>20</sup>

Now let us review briefly the earlier diplomacy of 1960-1963 which accompanied the internal maneuverings of the Russian pressure groups. The period began when the U-2 affair and the stormy conference of Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Paris showed that the "Spirit of Camp David" was dispelled. Three days after the U-2 shootdown, a surprise session of the Central Committee was held. During it, Kirichenko and Belyaev were dropped from Presidium, and Kirichenko from the Party Secretariat as well. Also dropped from the Secretariat were Aristov, Pospelov, Ignatov, and Furtseva, while Kozlov was the lone addition to that body.<sup>21</sup>

When Khrushchev reported to the Supreme Soviet, in this same week, and cited the U-2 flight, there was an interruption from a member, who interjected, "How does that agree with Eisenhower's unctuous speeches?" The interruption, an almost unheard-of thing, was probably planned by the doctrinaire faction.<sup>22</sup> Next, from May 11 to 14, a major politico-military conference was held, at which Malinovsky discussed "the increase in the readiness to fight."<sup>23</sup>

In June, 1961, came the Kennedy-Khrushchev encounter at Vienna, best described by the President's own word, "somber." The summer of that year brought the building of the Berlin Wall and the related crisis.<sup>24</sup> All the while, there was an unstable, sometimes critical, situation in Laos and Viet Nam, in which the Russians may at times have tried to extend a quieting influence. There was little that they could do, really, to control the Southeast Asian situations, but they admittedly could have made these troubles worse, by cooperating with Red China. From this cooperation, the U.S.S.R. moved farther and farther during this period. The Party conferences at Bucharest and Moscow in 1960 and at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 were increasingly violent demonstrations of deep differences between the two Red giants, with Moscow rejecting the Chinese view that violent world revolution and world war against the "imperialists" is both inevitable and, indeed, desirable.

These conferences were more than mere oratorical competition, of course. Both the Chinese and the Russians used them as

a platform for trying to convince the other Red bloc members and the Communist Parties in both neutralist and Western bloc nations that they were right, and that their respective programs offered more for the future of communism. More important still, they were appealing to the latent opposition in the rival country. The Russians were thinking, for one thing, of the Chinese military leadership, which had everything to gain in terms of modern equipment and technical support by a *rapprochement* with the Russians. The Chinese could appeal to the doctrinaire Russians, on grounds of Marxist dogma, as well as to the Soviet marshals, whose quest for appropriations made them often allies of the doctrinaire group.

The Bucharest Conference of Communist Parties met in late June, 1960. From the fifth to the ninth of June, the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions was in session at Peking, and was used as a forum for a strong indictment of Khrushchev's view that world wars were to be avoided, this indictment being delivered by the Chinese Vice President of the WFTU. He also attacked Khrushchev's belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, and in the possibility of disarmament as a corollary to peaceful existence.

This clear challenge to the Soviet Premier must have strengthened the Premier's resolve to have it out with the Chinese at Bucharest. There he told the Chinese representative that Mao was an ultra-dogmatist, with the same narrow viewpoint that Stalin had, and that the Chinese were ignorant of the potential of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. The Chinese replied with similar bitterness. However, Khrushchev's speech to the general meeting attacked Mao more vaguely, and the final communique of the meeting avoided a statement of the Sino-Russian discord.<sup>25</sup>

Back in Russia, the Premier appears to have enlisted the aid of Kozlov, Suslov, and other influential Party members to acquaint the Soviet Party with the dispute, and to prepare both the Party leadership and public opinion for the further confrontation that was to come at the Moscow conference of all the Communist Parties in November, 1960. The principal Soviet delegates to this conference are an interesting line-up, especially

if compared with the alignments noted previously with regard to the attack on the "anti-Party group" in 1957, and in later factional maneuverings. They were: Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Suslov, Pospelov, and Furtseva.<sup>26</sup>

In the November meeting, the Chinese complained of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China, which was carried out during the summer. It is significant that the Russian delegation gave as one reason for the withdrawal of the technicians the fact that they were being led astray by Chinese propaganda.<sup>27</sup> This seems to reflect a genuine concern by the Khrushchev leadership that there be no effective infiltration of Russian public opinion on the controversial issues involved—that the doctrinaire position should reach the public only when accompanied by suitable rebuttal. We shall see more of this concern later.

Most significant of all for the shaping up of Russian opinion, the Chinese at this Moscow conference were so uncompromising, so careless about inter-Party harmony except on their own terms, and so brutally inclined to accept or even welcome a nuclear war which might—as they themselves put it—kill 50 per cent of the populations involved, that they lost much of the support their theories had previously enjoyed in the Russian and the other Communist Parties. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was adaptable enough to agree, in the final Declaration of the conference, that the class struggle and anti-imperialist struggle could go on energetically under "peaceful coexistence."<sup>28</sup>

At the Twenty-second Party Congress, in October, 1961, the U.S.S.R. delegation made a pretense of focusing its attack on Albania, while the Chinese, conversely, emphasized a defense of Albania. On later occasions, also, their press quoted Albanian criticisms of Khrushchev, instead of making an original, overtly Chinese attack on the Soviet Premier. In this way, the adversaries avoided attacking one another directly. However, the real importance of the noisy Albanian defiance of Khrushchev, abetted by China, was that it could serve as a rallying point for anti-Khrushchev actions in Russia and around the Communist world.<sup>29</sup>

So it was that Vyacheslav Molotov, who after his fall from power with the "anti-Party group" in 1957 had been sent to Mongolia as the Soviet envoy, was apparently in too convenient a

spot for dealing with Mao's government. Consequently, he was moved to Vienna, where he served with the International Atomic Energy Agency. From there he wrote a letter to the Central Committee denouncing the new, flexible foreign policy. His following was strong enough to draw much attention at the time of the Twenty-second Party Congress in the form of another denunciatory campaign against the "anti-Party group."<sup>80</sup> In January, 1962, his cause was active enough that he proceeded from Vienna to Moscow to present his views on peaceful coexistence, etc. His stay in Moscow was punctuated by an attack on him in the January 17 issue of *Pravda*. On the same day, the *Svenska Dagbladet* of Stockholm reported that Molotov had left certain delicate memoirs on safe deposit in Switzerland as a form of "life insurance." These were reported to include three chapters on Sino-Soviet relations. For one thing, Molotov described anti-Chinese discrimination and abuses affecting 1,800,000 Chinese brought to work in Russia under a Sino-Soviet agreement. Many were allegedly forced to do manual labor, although qualified for skilled work, and the wages were far below the usual Russian scales.<sup>81</sup>

To look further at the simple nationalistic aspect of the Russian side of the dispute with China, there are many factors which helped to focus the attention of many Russians on China as a threat to their country. It is safe to assume that many of the military leaders were sufficiently impressed by these factors to be weaned away somewhat from the doctrinaire emphasis on the Western menace, and to support more flexible national policies, more pacific toward the West. Adlai Stevenson tells us that most of the Russian officials with whom he talked about China were worried about the burgeoning Chinese population, its aggressive government, and their long common border.

Contributing to the hostile feelings also was the traditional Russian security-consciousness and reluctance to share the most advanced technology. The refusal to give the Chinese atomic and missile know-how was the best demonstration of this, and the refusal served, furthermore, to embitter the Chinese against the Russians.

Border incidents were another matter involving, from the

Russian point of view, simple national defense. Their anxiety about the border was given substance by Peking's claim that the territories Russia had gained by the Treaty of Peking of 1860 should be returned, and by Chinese maps which persistently showed parts of the Sino-Soviet border and much of the Sino-Mongolian border as "undemarcated," while Russian maps had, of course, continued to show these borders very precisely.<sup>32</sup> Also, the official Chinese maps up to the Communist period always showed the Pamir region of Soviet Central Asia as Chinese. Although the Mao Regime withdrew those, everyone knows that the Chinese claim there is historically as valid as the claims on the Indian frontier.

There is an unconfirmed report that soon after the Bucharest Conference of June, 1960, the Chinese sent some forces across the Soviet frontier and erected some fortifications, and that Soviet troops proceeded to wipe them out.<sup>33</sup> Late in 1962, Peking finally got around to making a formal border delimitation treaty with Mongolia and a preliminary agreement with Pakistan on frontiers.<sup>34</sup> In a way, though, this underscored the continued absence of any such understanding with the U.S.S.R. or with India.

Substantial border flareups occurred in 1962, though only on September 5, 1963, did Peking bring them to light, with a broadcast charging that Russia, in April and May of 1962, coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into entering the U.S.S.R. China also charged that the U.S.S.R. then tried to overthrow the local government in the Ili district of Sinkiang Province.\* Those who crossed the Soviet frontier at this time were probably refugees, quite possibly belonging to the non-Chinese racial groups which are numerous in Northwestern China. At any rate, the Soviets considered them refugees and refused to return them to the Chinese authorities.

At about the same time, the Russians reported that they caught some Chinese citizens at Naushki, on the Soviet-Mon-

\* *New York Herald Tribune*, September 7, 1963. The U.S.S.R., in the *Kazakhstan Pravda* of September 29, 1963, retorted with accounts of Chinese machine-gunners in Ili massacring the would-be refugees, who were of Kazakh stock. *Ibid.*, October 2, 1963.

goljan border, allegedly smuggling into the U.S.S.R. literature "hostile to the Soviet Union." After some resistance and "hooliganism" by the Chinese, they were expelled from Russia.<sup>22</sup>

The most sweeping charge has come this year in a Soviet government statement that the Peking government has tried "to appropriate individual sections of Soviet territory," and that the Chinese violated the border five thousand times in the year 1962 alone.<sup>24</sup>

Next, let us see how the Sino-Soviet feud and the feuding factions within Russia are related to conditions within the lesser Communist Parties. The Soviet Russian Party and government have, of course, a continuing great interest in leading the worldwide Communist movement. This interest is reinforced by a desire for power and influence around the world which is both a matter of nationalism and of conspiratorial communism, of "world revolution." In taking up this point, we should not forget the split, from the early days of the Soviet regime, between the advocates of "socialism in one country" and "World revolution," the Stalin-Trotsky conflict, known to be a divisive influence in Russia during the first two post-revolutionary decades. Now, in the 1960's, we can conclude at least that world leadership of communism is highly important to the Russian Party and government as a matter of prestige and as a worldwide "resource," that is, as a means of implementing all sorts of Soviet aims or activities. Also, Party discipline and good order around the world is inevitably related to good order and discipline within the Russian Party itself.

Peking has effectively challenged Moscow's primacy in many areas in recent years. The Chinese can do this because of their "non-white" status, and because of their clear record as a past, and allegedly present, victim of European and American imperialism. In their economic problems, too, they have much in common with the poor, industrially primitive areas of the world. As Dr. Walt Rostow would put it, the Russians have reached "technological maturity," while the Chinese are far from doing so. This means that relatively crude Chinese expedients for industrialization, and the Chinese programs in general may seem applicable to visitors from less developed countries, while a Russian

demonstration of a fully automated, highly intricate and costly industrial plant may seem impressive but irrelevant to a nation which lacks the capital to set up such a plant and lacks the technology to support it.

The Chinese, who are at least as conscious of prestige and world position as the Russians are, began in earnest to offer a worldwide challenge in early 1960, when they created the Committee for the Support of Afro-Asian Emancipation Movements, and the Chinese-African Friendship Society. While the latter worked on cultural and economic exchanges, Peking proceeded, in January, 1961, to establish the Chinese People's Committee for the Aid of African Countries against Aggression, a propaganda organ, and the Institute for African Affairs, for the training of African members of the Party. In the field of radio broadcasts to the less developed nations, China competes systematically with Russia, with considerable success as to both quantity of programs and content. At exhibitions and trade fairs, the Chinese have gone to much expense to show what they can offer the newly emergent nations.

Chinese trade and economic aid can hardly be huge in quantity, but it has been carefully placed to supplement the ideological infiltration. The terms of Chinese aid have at times been more attractive than the Soviet terms—with the offering of interest-free loans, for example. In trade agreements, it has not been difficult to rival Soviet terms—the U.S.S.R. is often a notoriously hard bargainer in its agreements.

The U.S.S.R. authorities seem to have tried hard to cultivate the newly emergent nations, through extensive acceptance of Afro-Asian students at Russian universities, to mention one program. As of 1963, there were two thousand Africans studying at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow and one thousand more studying elsewhere in Russia, as compared with five thousand in the United States. These three thousand have been well and carefully treated by the authorities, but still there have been interracial incidents and complaints, as well as dissatisfaction with curricula.\* Other disillusionments for the

\* *New York Times*, August 9, 1963. China also, hosting over three thousand foreign students, has had comparable troubles. In August, 1962, thirty



Soviets came at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Moshi, Tanganyika, where their delegation found that the Chinese representatives were far better received, while President Nyerere of Tanganyika implied that the Russians were just a new type of white exploiters who wished to colonize Africa. As one Russian observer at the conference, Vladimir Kudryavtsev, put it: "Some of the more chauvinistically inclined leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement, not against imperialism and colonialism and its agents, but against all white people."

The Chinese challenge was particularly vigorous, in the politico-military area, in 1962. Not only did the North Vietnamese, with Peking's military support, continue an effective fight in Laos and South Viet Nam, but the Chinese undertook an open invasion of India, in which they were successful. That is, they took over, without great opposition or setbacks, large strips of territory on India's northern borders.

The Soviet Union's role in the same year, 1962, must have seemed contrastingly passive or unsuccessful to many Afro-Asian and Latin American observers. The Soviets tried, at least through general statements, and perhaps through more pointed representations, to restrain the Chinese in Southeast Asia and in the Indian invasion. If they produced any effect, there was certainly no overt evidence or recognition of this.

Likewise, in the encounter with the United States about the missile installations in Cuba, in October and November of 1962, the Khrushchev leadership appeared in a hesitant or compromising role, in the eyes of highly aggressive Communists everywhere, and the Chinese leaders repeatedly and raucously denounced the Soviet Premier for this, calling his action "appeasement" or a new "Munich."<sup>37</sup> The large segment of world opinion, and of Russian public opinion, which took some comfort from the Soviet Premier's policies, would probably agree with Walter Lippmann, when he said of the Indian and Cuban affairs: "But while the two crises on opposite sides of the world are not connected, they are in highly important ways related. In Cuba the

Cameroonian students left China or were expelled, after they complained of racial discrimination and lack of contact with the people. *Communist Affairs*, October, 1962, p. 15.

Soviet Union has had to abandon an effort to extend its power in the Americas; in the Sino-Indian conflict it is confronted with a distinct and dramatic loss of influence and power in the heart of Asia."<sup>38</sup>

It is interesting to note, in both the Indian and Cuban crises, a double shift in Soviet day-to-day policy making which strongly indicates rival factions at work. There was the Soviet offer to provide MIG jet fighters to India or to assist in having them built in India. As of August, 1962, angry Chinese representations against this step had apparently produced no effect.<sup>39</sup> By November, however, a "high Soviet Military source" indicated that the Russians had canceled their agreement to sell a dozen MIG 21 jet fighters to India, and *Pravda* and *Izvestia* had dropped their neutrality in the Indian frontier issue and had begun to support the Chinese case against the McMahon Line of frontier demarcation.<sup>40</sup> However, on November 10, Prime Minister Nehru stated that the Soviets had unofficially indicated that sixteen MIG 21's would be delivered on schedule,<sup>41</sup> and Russia offered other technical support, such as a \$15,000,000 contract for oil-drilling equipment,<sup>42</sup> as well as shipment of spare parts for the transport planes and helicopters which the Soviets had furnished India early in 1962.<sup>43</sup>

On December 1, 1962, in another reversal, the New Delhi Government was notified that the U.S.S.R. would not deliver the sixteen MIG 21's, but would build a MIG manufacturing plant in India and deliver a token number of MIG's while the factory was being built.<sup>44</sup>

Similarly, at the height of the Cuban crisis, the three principal stages in the position of the Soviet Premier featured abrupt changes from (1) an aggressive attitude to (2) a much less belligerent position, with apparently anxious concern for peace to (3) a perceptibly firmer posture, permitting, however, terms that both nations could accept.<sup>45</sup>

Not only had there been disharmony among the policy makers in Moscow on the Indian and Cuban issues, but the two affairs led to further discord among the Communists. There had been some Latin Americans all the while among the pro-Chinese minority which, at the Sino-Soviet confrontations in Moscow

in 1960 and 1961, supported the Chinese.<sup>46</sup> In 1961, for example, five senior members of the Brazilian Party left it and founded their own pro-Chinese Brazilian Communist Party.<sup>47</sup> The Cubans themselves seemed to sympathize with the Chinese line, but simply had to get along with the Russians, from whom came their only worthwhile financial and material support. Those Latin Americans who desired violent Marxist revolutions, early and at any cost, now found that their hearts were with the Chinese, even if their hands were in the Russian pocket. In Europe itself, the Stalinist or "Chinese" minority in the Belgian Communist Party announced its full support for Castro and, in the same breath, condemned "Nehru's imperialist aggression."<sup>48</sup> In Italy, Red leader Togliatti, formerly a Stalinist, but supposedly a firm Khrushchev supporter, declared in November, 1962, that he would not take sides between India and China because he did not know on which side the truth lay.<sup>49</sup>

In Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet dispute was entangled with Party feuds and factions and also with national aspirations for autonomy. In discussing China, India, or Cuba, some East European leaders could, at least, indulge in expression of their own views, and could use these issues to prod the U.S.S.R. into concessions of various kinds. That they did this at all indicates their belief that the Soviet Union itself was far enough from unanimity on the issues that they might get away with it.

In Bulgaria, this sort of opposition did not come off very well. Anton Yugov, veteran Party boss and Premier, was dismissed in a November cleanup of eight Peking supporters, and before the month was over a second wave of dismissals removed twenty more key oppositionists—almost one-third of the old Central Committee membership.<sup>50</sup> In the same month, however, the Bulgarian Party Congress had provided another airing of the opposing positions: delegations which were present from China, Burma, and Malaya spoke against the U.S.S.R.'s disengagement from Cuba and against its criticisms of Albania. All nine of the East European satellite delegations, on the other hand, supported the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> Even so, while Janos Kadar of Hungary delivered a suitably violent anti-Chinese reply in the argument at Sofia,<sup>52</sup> he did support China's position vis-à-vis India at the Hungarians'

own Party Congress which concluded on November 24, 1962.<sup>53</sup> The Czech Party boss, Novotny, who is of Stalinist inclination, like Ulbricht of East Germany, nevertheless brought the editorial policy of his party paper, *Rude Pravo*, firmly into consonance with the Khrushchev side of the Sino-Soviet dispute at this same time.<sup>54</sup> The Rumanian Party made just enough pro-Peking moves to extract economic concessions from the U.S.S.R.<sup>55</sup>

In Asia, the Chinese influence predominated in the Japanese Communist Party, and there was nothing surprising about the Chinese control of the North Korean and North Viet Nam satellites; but in the case of the Mongolian People's Republic an interesting conflict came into the open on January 8, 1963, when the First Secretary of that country's Party, Yumshagin Tsedenbal, addressed a special "ideological conference" in Ulan Bator. He declared that Peking had busily built factions in almost every Communist Party, and had irresponsibly sown discord everywhere. He accused the Chinese of using the ideology of nationalism as a weapon, while disguising this nationalism as ultra-revolutionary. The conference denounced the pro-Chinese nationalist faction of D. Tumur-Ochir, former Mongolian Party Secretary and Politburo member. The importance to the U.S.S.R. of the Sino-Soviet tug-of-war over Mongolia was underscored at this time by prominent mention of large-scale Soviet economic aid to the Mongols, and by the arrival of a special Soviet delegation to this conference, headed by Leonid Ilichev.<sup>56</sup>

So far, in discussing the Sino-Soviet rivalry in various nations, we have considered mainly the effort to dominate the parties of Communist faithful in each country. In addition to that, the Russian leaders must be concerned with their appeal to socialists of many types—in popular front movements, where those are expedient—and with the prospect of support under some conditions from many sorts of "peace advocates" around the world—a group, however amorphous, to which Moscow's "peace campaigns" often have been directed in the past two decades. The appeal of peace as an issue could be strong, as we have seen, within the U.S.S.R. itself and everywhere.

Now the result of Peking's belligerence has been to leave these promising fields to the Russians. Moderate Socialists were alienated by China's aggressive moves, particularly those of such

Chinese neighbors as India, Japan, or Indonesia. For example, the Indian Socialist magazine, *Link*, which had for years described the Chinese Communist government as peace-loving and progressive, came around, after the 1962 invasion, to the issuance of an article strongly denouncing that government as a chauvinistic government of Chinese mandarins in Marxist disguise. *Link* noted that Mao Tse-tung had declared in 1939, in a pamphlet called "Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," that China must regain her territories seized by the imperialists, including Korea, Viet Nam, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal.<sup>57</sup>

With regard to peace as a worldwide issue, the World Women's Congress in Moscow, in the summer of 1963, arrived at a solid affirmative vote on a resolution for peace and against the arms race, with the Chinese and Albanian delegates as the lone but vocal dissenters. (They wanted to include a denunciation of the United States and NATO in the resolution.) A move by the pro-Chinese delegation of Japan to call for withdrawal of U.S. forces from all points in Asia and Latin America was countered by the Italian delegates, who said: "We are here as women to work for peace and not to engage in cold war polemics."<sup>58</sup>

In another aspect of the peace issue, the nuclear test-ban treaty, under attack from the Chinese People's Republic, as well as from factions in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., was pointedly denounced by Premier Chou En-lai in a message to the 1963 World Conference against Nuclear Weapons, held in Hiroshima on the anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6. Chou said that the treaty would increase the danger of nuclear war, while his delegates accused the U.S.S.R. of selling out to the United States.<sup>59</sup> This Chinese criticism continued throughout the negotiation of the treaty and even after the ratification.

As this paper is being written, the Chinese are pressing to bring the Sino-Soviet dispute before a "World Court of Communists" for settlement. The Indonesian Party leader, D. M. Aidit, has called for such a "jury trial," while the Parties of Portugal and Paraguay, more in line with Moscow's feelings, have implied that the world meeting would contemplate a denunciation of the Chinese Party.<sup>60</sup>

To sum up this discussion, Sino-Soviet relations in the sixties

have been influenced by the changing ways in which the Russians have met the following problems: (1) How to allocate the limited Soviet resources among many programs and many demanding interests? Most influential among these have been the competing demands for large, *un-reduced* ground forces, and/or an all-out missile and space effort; the need of industry for capital investment, and the people's aspiration for a better standard of living. (2) How to keep the authority and prestige of the Soviet State and the Soviet Party at the highest possible level? This problem brought many changes in Soviet politics and government policies, including decisions on economic aid and military backing for the "comradely nations."

The Khrushchev approach to these problems has been repeatedly challenged by the Chinese, who looked for support from neo-Stalinists in the Russian Party and other Communist Parties. The challenge to Khrushchev's group was sustained also by the Russian ground force leaders, as recently as the spring of 1963.

## NOTES

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