

Areas of Rising Interest in Chinese Studies*

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I

Ever since the Communists came to power in China, the question of the interplay of Revolution and Tradition has been an absorbing subject for discussion among scholars. The prevailing school of thought equates the Communist revolution with extremism and China's traditional society with moderation. We are told that sooner or later the traditional moderation will exert a mellowing influence on Communism in China. Yet we have so far seen no evidence that the Communist rule is withering or weakening. In fact, Peking's control is more militant and more firmly entrenched today than ever before.

I believe that one of the most useful contributions that we can make toward a better understanding of China is a new appraisal of her traditional society. We need to recognize that the so-called traditional society means not just one thing but two different things. Communism has destroyed the Confucianist State, which was the privileged rule of the landlord-scholar-official group. This is the phase of the old order that has been swept away. But there is another, and more vital phase which we must not forget: namely, the continuing application of the teachings of Confucius.¹ The heart of Confucianism stresses man's place in society rather than the rights of the individual. It teaches that peace and order should be based on the maintenance of proper social relationships, the key to which is the observance of status and position. The Communist rule today derives its strength precisely from the implementation of these principles.

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If we look at the interaction of the old and the new in this perspective, the continuity between Tradition and Revolution becomes very clear. There is the same emphasis on proper group behavior, on creative group endeavor, and on the subordination of the individual to the social order. This is the main stream of Chinese life and culture. Confucius understood it and championed it; so do the Communists. In November, 1963, a veteran British diplomat, Sir Fitzroy Hew MacLean, published a report on his visit to China in the *Saturday Evening Post*. I was deeply impressed by what he had to say. "China, to me," Sir Fitzroy wrote, "has a different feel from the other Communist countries I have been in. The Chinese have taken Communism to themselves and are making something very much their own out of it, something un-European, something particularly relevant to Asia. Chinese Communism does not seem to be an alien political system imposed from outside, but a system that the Chinese have evolved for themselves and are adapting . . . to their own requirements . . . and to those of their Asiatic neighbors."²

There is no question that moderation was a salient feature of the traditional Chinese way of life. But we must be careful not to take it out of context. Moderation was part and parcel of a paternalistic rule whose objective was to regulate the relations of man to man. Here we touch the heart of the question, that is, the Chinese type of authoritarianism. The paternalistic rule of the past and the Communist rule of today are alike in the expressions of this.³ Chinese authoritarianism may be defined as a system of control over the life and work of the people, that neither grants liberty nor practices tyranny. It maintains that since the masses lack individual initiative, political democracy or economic laissez-faire cannot thrive on Chinese soil. It holds that the elite must lead and determine the objectives of group endeavor. At the same time, however, the Chinese type of authoritarianism keeps the use of violence to a minimum. Like the strong rulers of the past, the authorities in Peking consider forcible coercion, such as that used by Stalin in Russia, both ineffective and impermissible under Chinese conditions.⁴

In a historic speech in 1957, Mao T'se-tung said that the government indeed reserves the right to punish the enemies of the people for reaction, subversion, or any other violation of the principles of socialist construction. But aside from this, he urges persuasion and education as better instruments of government than coercion.⁵ I

think that here is a fertile field for scholarly investigation. The political philosophy of Mao is, in my opinion, the inescapable outcome of the sociological background of the country. We all know that the Chinese people are noted for their industriousness, for their patience, and for their great number. Because the Chinese people are industrious, the government has little need for using violence. Its greatest need is rather to plan for the people or to guide their industriousness toward desired channels of productive work. Also, because the Chinese people are patient, the government can carry out its decrees without opposition so long as they are within tolerable limits. Further, because the population is so congested and the margin of subsistence so close, the government on its part must avoid reckless measures which might jeopardize the people's incentive for production. So Mao's preferred formula is "to issue suitable orders of an obligatory nature." Here is perhaps the best example of the application of moderation within the framework of Chinese authoritarianism.⁴

Viewed in this light, the measures of the Communist regime fall into an instructive pattern. The entire nation accepts orders for hard work; yet there is little terror. Control is tight, but the methods used are not coercive. Former landlords and capitalists have been absorbed into the socialist state by a program of selective sentences to hard labor, the purpose of which is to "punish few and reform many." The public security bureaus are engaged in taking the census, maintaining registration forms, checking the people's movements, mediating neighborhood disputes, and mobilizing the masses for public welfare work. The government calls "study groups" to reason with the people, to explain the government's policies, and to inculcate the socialist way of life. It seems that once revolution is accepted in China, the effect of her tradition, far from blocking it, tends to expedite it by giving it the blessings of the national genius. Thus the government holds the initiative firmly in its changing relations with the people. The counter-offensive against the rightist intellectuals following the Hundred Flowers campaign is of course well-known. An even more significant situation has occurred more recently in the Communes. Since the summer of 1963, an end has been put to the relaxation of pressure on the peasants. Once again there are calls for reviving the Great Leap Forward and for an "economy owned by the whole people."⁵

The strategy of the leaders in Peking is to convert the people rather than to terrorize them, to encourage them to be more obedient rather than to destroy them for not being obedient enough. It is my belief that a useful reappraisal of the future of Communism in China should take these factors into primary consideration. To point our study in this direction will enable us to see how China's tradition "Sinifies" the practices of the revolution, not how it reduces the momentum of the revolution. Here lies the secret of the vitality of the new China. She has avoided the ruthless measures of the Stalinist type and replaced them with new versions of traditional statecraft, which at once meet the requirements of the land and give the revolution a sharper cutting edge. The outlook is that Communism in China will last longer without a thaw than that in Russia.⁸

II

The most momentous development in Asia today is not the confrontation of the United States and Communist China nor the ideological conflict between China and Russia. These problems belong to the realm of power politics among nations and do not directly affect the mass welfare of hundreds of millions of people. Fraught with lasting significance is the emergence of a new pattern of village economy in the 24,000 Communes in China. As we all know, the initial years of the Communes (1958-1961) were marred by administrative inexperience and natural calamities. As a result, a temporary retreat was ordered, especially in the agricultural operations which were restored to the smaller units of the producers' cooperatives. However, nothing can be farther from the truth than to say that the Commune movement has ended in failure. On the contrary, the functioning of the Communes has been greatly strengthened. Thus in September, 1962, at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, important decisions were taken to reaffirm and expand the collectivist principle of the Communes. And since the autumn of 1963, Communist Party publications have reopened discussions on the prospects of "transition to Communism."⁹

The real significance of the Commune movement, in my opinion, is the realization of a kind of subsidiary industrialization in the

midst of agriculture. As we all know, a Commune is a hsiang-wide operation. As a unit of administration, the hsiang (or township) is centuries old and is thoroughly familiar to the people in the country. Larger than a ts'un (village) and smaller than a hsien (county), it is ideal in size to insure efficiency in controlling local industries, in undertaking the construction of irrigation works, in allocating capital investments for these projects, and in handling the purchase and distribution of rural commodities.¹⁰ The past six years have proven that by integrating the labor force of the whole hsiang (township), a Commune can carry out large-scale construction projects without being handicapped by jealousies among the village cooperatives. Coordination of different industries is likewise better expedited by the Commune than by the producers' cooperatives. In the field of handicrafts, the larger unit of integrated labor and the control of minimal wage-payments in the Communes are conducive to mass production at low cost.¹¹ So while the government develops heavy industries in specific localities, a parallel drive is going on in the 24,000 Communes to promote subsidiary industries of all descriptions. This program of placing industry in the midst of agriculture certainly represents a challenging formula to awaken, mobilize, and transform China's vast underdeveloped countryside.

The greatest advantage of this program is that it helps reduce inflationary pressure. More than any other country, China (on account of her fast-growing population) needs to find a way to meet the consumer goods demands of her people without overstraining the limited capacity of her modern industrial plants. Of necessity, she cannot hope to follow the example of Western industrial nations or even of Russia. The establishment of a variety of small industries in the Communes seems to have provided the answer. Certainly a great part of the daily necessities of the rural masses is produced in their very midst. No industrial complexes have emerged to urbanize the countryside. Instead, milliards of small production units turn out goods to meet the basic needs of the population.¹² Eyewitnesses agree that except for the years of natural calamities (1959-1961), the supply of commodities has been ample and prices remarkably low.¹³ Unlike the ruble, the jen-min-pi is stable. There is no need for devaluation or for replacing it with a new currency. Nor is it necessary for the government to increase note circulation or to resort to other painful measures to battle inflation.¹⁴

What gives added significance to the small industries trend in the Chinese villages is its relevance to a capital-poor country. Most of the projects are built in a short time with meager capital, but bring immediate (if modest) returns. Although the methods of production are unorthodox and do not measure up to modern Western standards, the telling fact is that they do meet local needs.¹⁵ Paradoxically, products of Western specifications do not necessarily answer these needs. In any event, China's margin of growth lies precisely in these areas scorned by those using only the Western yardstick. If we are to understand China in this particular stage of her growth and if we are to grasp her impact on the rest of the world, we must not underestimate the idea of "walking on two legs"—a characteristic Maoist term meaning exploiting cheap native techniques as well as adopting the costly modern devices.¹⁶

Today, large numbers of low-cost furnaces and mines are in operation in the Communes. Fertilizer plants, instrument repair shops, and small machine shops are increasing in number. Self-made metallurgists (who have learned how to improve their methods at the backyard furnaces) are constructing electric furnaces which are small in size but produce high-quality steel. Handicraft shops literally cover the countryside. While each of these units has a limited production, the combined output of tens of thousands of them constitutes a powerful sustaining factor for the economy of the people. More significant still, these factories or shops are tied in with nearby towns by agreements to undertake construction work, to supply raw materials or repair parts, or to accept orders for specified finished products.¹⁷ Thus a revolution of stupendous proportions is going on in China's villages. As the trend gains momentum, more and more nations in Asia and Africa will turn to study China's example. Of course, China's experience cannot be duplicated in every case. But there can be no doubt that this new pattern of village economy will change the economic and sociological outlook of a large part of mankind in the years ahead.

III

Our understanding of the transformation of the Chinese villages will not be complete without looking into the social revolution affecting the everyday life of the masses. In the wake of the call for

increased production, there has been a new blossoming of the countryside as a result of elevating the social and cultural level of the people. This tremendous change deserves our attention because it has been brought about without depending on material increases in income. Last Christmas (1963), I received a letter from an Englishman in Swaziland, South Africa, whose task was to improve the educational and social conditions in the Bantu villages. His question was urgent and pointed: What is the secret that enabled the Chinese leaders to raise the living conditions of the masses despite their continued poverty? This correspondence was truly a revelation to me. It convinced me that systematic research in this field would be at once rewarding and imperative.

First of all, we need to evaluate all available data on the conquest of hunger and disease in the fifteen years of Communist rule. We all know that in the old days, many millions ate chaff and wild herbs, many others ate grass and bark, and many more either turned bandit or died of starvation or epidemic. Today these are things of the past. Eyewitness accounts of the Communes state that the people do not live in plenty. But with equitable food distribution, they do not have to starve; and no one is in debt.³⁸ The beggars or bandits of pre-Communist days are now gainfully employed; they live in huts with solid walls and under roofs that no longer leak.³⁹ In spite of the disastrous floods and droughts that lasted for three consecutive seasons (1959-1961), a robust recovery in the rural economy has been reported since the autumn of 1962.⁴⁰ How has it happened? What is responsible for the transformation? In April, 1964, Madame Lucie Faure, wife of the former French premier, after returning from China, wrote: "That every Chinese receive the minimum to enable him to subsist is the goal of the state, and the organization is basically efficient enough to see to it that distribution is equitable and everyone eats. Several products to be had in abundance are placed on open sale at certain seasons. In October, fruits and vegetables overflow the stands. As for clothing, all the Chinese I met had good shoes on their feet and warm clothing for winter."⁴¹

Next, let us take the battle against illiteracy. We all know that for many years Jimmy Yen and other education experts tried crash programs for mass education. But the Ting Hsien experiment has long been forgotten. The Communists have followed a more practical procedure. The campaign against illiteracy is carried out on the

basis of mass mobilization, as an integral part of the drive for socialist transformation and socialist construction. Determined to speed up cultural progress in the villages at the same time as socializing agriculture, the Communist authorities have required everyone, young and adult alike, men and women alike, to receive some schooling in ad hoc classes, as a part of their work routine. Furthermore, a basic vocabulary (in simplified script) is taught to thousands of illiterate people in short but intensive classes. Upon completing the work, the students turn instructor to teach others the same basic vocabulary. It is officially reported that by 1970 every Chinese will have learned the most rudimentary reading and writing. Granting that the stress is on ideological indoctrination, a cultural stride on such a vast scale (changing 500 million people from illiterates to literate people in less than two decades) truly staggers one's imagination.²²

I would also like to call your attention to the reports of recent travelers that describe the increasing modernization in China's rural areas. Formerly, schools were found only in hsien (county) capitals; now there is one school for every four or five ts'un (villages). Ninety percent of the children over seven years of age attend school. In every Commune, kindergarten-nurseries are well developed, thus enabling women to do productive work. At the same time, homes for the aged take care of old people who have no children to support them.²³ The great variety of local industries (such as slate and tile works, brick kilns, cart-and-animal transport service, fertilizer plants, carpentry shops, blast furnaces, small power plants, and telephone systems) makes it possible for the villagers to enjoy modern amenities which they never dreamt of before.²⁴ Telegraph and post offices, too, are available in every corner of the country. Radio broadcasting stations, shops and stores, public baths, and cinemas are found everywhere. Although the people's annual per-capita income remains extremely low (less than fifty dollars), their cost of living is kept at an unbelievable minimum. Brick apartments with terraces are in most cases rent-free. Electricity and utility charges are nominal. Medical examinations are free. Hospital beds cost twenty cents a day. Childbirth charge is three dollars. Sanitation and public hygiene, which were unknown to the peasants, are now part and parcel of their everyday living. The changes are far-reaching. New ideas spread fast. This is what I mean by elevating

the social and cultural level of the people.²⁵ The changes not only make more intelligent citizens of the peasant masses, but they foster a better understanding between town and country and narrow the gap between the urban and rural points of view.

But most important of all, the changes demonstrate that cultural progress is possible without material increases in income. The many improvements described above were not retarded during the years of flood and drought and bad crops (1959-1961). Many things indeed cannot be achieved without capital. But there are also matters of great moment, in which capital is not the all-important factor; they are to be achieved through the successful mobilization of the spirit. In the social progress in China's vast countryside, the Communist leaders have found the key to unlock powerful forces of mass optimism and dedication.²⁶

IV

There is yet another aspect in the development of Communist China which calls for careful study: namely, the winning of a genuine measure of decentralization. It is significant that as early as 1956 (only three years after the launching of the First Five-Year Plan), the Chinese Communist Party Congress made the decision that certain necessary commodities were to be produced in regional units in accordance with local supply and market conditions. Thus most of the enterprises formerly controlled by the central Ministries of Light Industry and of Food were placed under the control of the provincial authorities, while construction projects, transport projects, and small industrial projects were placed, one tier lower, under the control of the county authorities.²⁷

In more recent years, along with powers of control, the local authorities have been given powers in the allocation of materials, in the management of enterprises, in making decisions for investment, and in controlling the movements of personnel. Further reflecting confidence in the loyalty of the local governments, powers have been delegated to them to float bond issues, to control the proceeds of certain taxes previously accruing to the Central Government, and to retain surplus profits obtained from the sale of their products. Under this system of "decentralized control within centralized planning," more than eighty percent of China's

light industries and many of the small heavy industries have been turned over to the local authorities. As a result, the Central Government is able to concentrate on the development of the heavy industries (such as large mines, power installations, iron and steel works, heavy and precision machinery factories, oil refineries, etc.), on overall planning and coordination, and on the development of improved techniques.²⁸

It may be recalled that shortly after he came to power, Khrushchev also moved to decentralize the economy of Russia. But his reorganization plan has not brought results comparable to those in China. Indeed, by cutting up the Soviet Union into a hundred economic regions and by placing each region under an economic council (sovnarkhoz), a decentralization in the execution of the central plan has been carried out. There is a notable reduction of red tape in Moscow's central bureaucracy. But what the Khrushchev plan has done for Russia is to break up the great horizontal monopolies and to replace them with a hundred regional economic councils each representing a collection of vertical monopolies. In the wake of this, new difficulties have arisen which threaten to deprive the reorganization of the true benefits of decentralization.

Specifically, there is a strong tendency for each region to strive for self-sufficiency. To quote one American economist who recently visited Russia: "The sovnarkhoz in the city of Moscow, for example, experienced difficulty in getting shipments of polyethelene from a factory in Stalingrad, which is, of course, under the jurisdiction of another sovnarkhoz. The solution of the Moscow sovnarkhoz was to allocate capital for a new polyethelene factory within its own economic region. The overwhelming factor in this decision was the supply problem in Moscow; little thought was given to the question of whether Moscow was the best location for such a plant, or whether, in terms of the entire economy, this was the best use of capital."²⁹

By contrast, the Chinese program for decentralization stresses interdependence rather than independence. The Chinese slogan is: "Make the whole country into a chessboard." China's decentralized control within centralized planning is leading the country away from the autarchy of her villages. Between the Communes, fairs are organized to promote commodity exchanges. Municipalities are given jurisdiction over hinterland country to promote "mutual

support" between industry and agriculture. Agreements for exchanges of products and services are entered into by neighboring provinces. There is also increasing cooperation between big state factories on one hand and rural Communes on the other—the Communes to receive technical assistance in return for doing processing or repair work for the state factories.³⁰

What makes decentralization effective in China? The answers are many. Russia's sovnarkhoz program was launched twenty-eight years after the inception of the First Five-Year Plan. This was an attempt to break up the monstrosity of over-centralization (horizontal monopolies) after it was an accomplished fact. Chinese decentralization was ordered before such a monstrosity could come into being. Soviet decentralization is implemented by a specially created regional organ which in fact complicates the task. Chinese decentralization is carried out as a routine function of the regular provincial and county administrations.³¹

But the most important reason for China's success is the fact that her decentralization program has grown out of formulas and practices of proven value in the past. The Chinese Communists are clearly benefitting from experiences dating back to the 1930's. The Red bases in those years were widely scattered and unconnected. Operating as guerrillas, the Communists could not implement doctrinaire policies. Circumstances forced them to practice "dispersed industrialization" of the countryside. They improvised small munitions workshops, small coal and iron mines (crushing ore by hand), small paper, shoe, and soap factories, and factories to make simple clothes. It was manufacturing for survival. Some projects were run by the army; some by cooperatives; some by individuals. All had to yield quick returns with low investment and low construction costs. This historic ordeal, which was the unique experience of the Chinese revolution, seems to be paying dividends now in helping the Peking government to develop measures for achieving genuine decentralization.³²

SUMMARY

To conclude, I have presented for your consideration four selected topics: (1) The nature of Chinese authoritarianism as a key to the understanding of the interaction of Revolution and

Tradition. (2) The small industries trend in the Communes as the harbinger of a new pattern of industrializing the villages without urbanizing them. (3) The social and cultural progress of the vast countryside as an achievement not contingent upon increases in income. And (4) The genuine decentralization of Chinese economy as a contrasting study alongside the sovnrarkhoz program of Khrushchev.

Daily we hear all manner of generalizations about the rigid and oppressive society under the Peking regime and about the economic plight of the Chinese people. Much of this is no doubt true. But as scholars we dare not limit ourselves to a concern with ideological implications. We cannot close our minds to other aspects of a changing China which contain elements of strength. Each one of my topics touches upon a major phase in the rejuvenation of China. The social and economic changes that are slowly but surely taking hold may well have an importance reaching far beyond China's borders. The many new and underdeveloped nations are not searching for an ideology. They are looking for a workable master plan that will open the way to a solution of their own needs. They know that they will find it most readily in a country where the sociological background holds some resemblance to their own. China may well prove to be the country to point the way in this respect.

In a very real sense, the 1960's is a Development Decade for China even as it is for America. But the concepts and techniques are of necessity different. It seems to me that nothing is more important for us as scholars than to open up new paths of investigation in the direction of those differing concepts and techniques and to learn what is happening at the base of the ideological superstructure.

NOTES

1. For a fuller explanation of the need to differentiate between Confucianism and the Confucianist State, see Ping-chia Kuo, *China* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 34.

2. *Saturday Evening Post*, November 16, 1963.

3. To put it differently, Communism is moving in the traditional groove of Chinese civilization which was paternalistic and authoritarian. The most likely trend is not stopping Communism, but rather making out of it a Chinese type of authoritarianism rather than a Soviet type of authoritarianism.

4. See Guy Wint, *Common Sense about China* (London: Gollancz, 1960), pp. 31, 121; Ping-chia Kuo, *China: New Age and New Outlook* (Penguin Books, 1960), pp.

176-218; Simone de Beauvoir, *The Long March* (Cleveland: World, 1958), pp. 282-286; and Ping-chia Kuo, *China*, pp. 18-22.

5. Speech on "Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People."

6. Useful reference may be made to Chapters 6 and 7 of John Wilson Lewis (ed.), *Major Doctrines of Communist China* (New York: Norton, 1964).

7. H. Arthur Steiner has a succinct discussion of this trend in "China to the Left of Russia," *Asian Survey*, January, 1964, pp. 634-636. See also *The Red Flag* for July 10, 1963.

8. Former French Premier Edgar Faure made the following astute observation in 1958: "The Chinese state is by no means meek and mild, but it is economical to the point of miserliness of the human material at its disposal. It does not want to lose anyone who might serve it, even were it in the most menial manner. It may well be that such a system of repression, with its unforeseen changes and its penitentiary [sic] fantasies, attains a more realistic and rigorous control than the demonstrations of police force in other countries which are very much more evident and more offensive to our feelings." *The Serpent and the Tortoise* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), p. 47.

9. *Asian Survey*, January, 1964, p. 635.

10. T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 69.

11. Alexander Eckstein wrote: "... it became clear by early 1958 that the collectives (officially referred to as agricultural producers' cooperatives of the advanced type) were too small in size and too large in number to serve as adequate instruments for administering and controlling vast labor projects; there were about 740,000 collectives averaging less than 200 households each. Communes, representing an amalgamation of close to 30 collectives with an average membership of about 4,330 households, proved much better suited to this purpose." See his article "On the Economic Crisis in Communist China," *Foreign Affairs*, XLII (July, 1964), 659.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 658.

13. Mervyn Jones, "Three Weeks in the Middle Kingdom," *Horizon*, VI, No. 3 (Summer 1964), 63.

14. Hughes and Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960*, pp. 55-56.

15. For a graphic description of this trend, see Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 210-211.

16. Mervyn Jones, in "Three Weeks in the Middle Kingdom," has another phrase for this psychology—"an evenhanded dualism." See p. 60.

17. Hughes and Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960*, pp. 67 ff.; Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, p. 210; and Choh-ming Li (ed.), *Industrial Development in Communist China* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 22. Li wrote: "Among the basic points of the General Line put forward by the Party in May 1958 were... 'to develop, under centralized leadership and with overall planning, proper division of labor and coordination, centrally controlled industries simultaneously with local industries, large enterprises simultaneously with medium-sized and small enterprises,' and, as was added later, 'foreign methods' of production simultaneously with indigenous methods.... As a result, manufacturing

plants of all sorts sprang up all over the countryside. . . . By the autumn of 1959, some 700,000 workshops were found in operation among the 26,578 communes."

18. Mervyn Jones, in "Three Weeks in the Middle Kingdom," wrote about an early morning walk in Hankow: ". . . soon I was surrounded by about a hundred staring children. Not one was in rags; not one had running eyes, or sores on his face; not one looked skinny or underfed. There may have been hunger in the critical years of 1959 and 1960, and there may be hunger now in remote places away from the main railroad lines. But I saw no hunger in days of walking round the towns and more days of travel by slow train the length of China. The rice ration—I finally got the figures, and checked them elsewhere—is twenty kilos, or forty-four pounds, a month. The meat ration is normally one or one and a half pounds a month; most Chinese have a vegetable diet. Chickens, fish, and eggs are unrationed and always seemed to be plentiful. Prices are high in terms of wages, but not impossibly so. On a railroad platform, you could buy a whole roast duck for two yuan—\$1.25 on the exchange rate, and about half a day's [Chinese] wage. I never saw a queue for food, other than a dozen people waiting to be served at the numerous little stalls that sell cakes and snacks." See p. 62.

19. David Crook, *The Manchester Guardian*, May 9, 1963.

20. Fang Chung, "All-round Improvement in China's Economy," *Peking Review*, August 23, 1963. In an interesting commentary on this article, Michael Freeberne wrote: "But the evidence suggests that Chinese progress in 1963 is something more substantial, and, furthermore, there are indications that Chinese confidence is becoming inflated in an aggressive sense. Two extremities present themselves: first, and perhaps the least likely, that this militancy will turn outwards and seek territorial aggrandizement; secondly, that this same force will turn inwards and that the energy it generates will be harnessed in some new leap forward; this latter possibility could conceivably take place before the end of the Third Five-Year Plan. This domestic upheaval is not imminent, and the launching of such a project would be dependent upon at least one more good harvest in 1964. In fact, the probable course of events is likely to lie between these extremities: a foreign policy which concedes nothing, and a stubborn, austere and unremitting internal effort." *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie*, August-September 1964, pp. 197-198.

21. Report written for France-Soir and Opera Mundi. Abbreviated version in the *Southern Illinoisian*, April 10, 1964.

22. On this subject, the U.S. Office of Education has recently issued two excellent studies: Robert D. Barendsen, *Half-Work Half-Study Schools in Communist China*; and Paul Harper, *Spare-Time Education for Workers in Communist China*. Both were published by Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C. in 1964. See also Beauvoir, *The Long March*, pp. 243-245.

23. Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, pp. 482-491; Frederick Nossal, *Dateline—Peking* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1963), p. 76.

24. Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, pp. 480-481.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 541. Mr. Snow's assertions are supported by many other eye-witness accounts, most recently by that of the Canadian correspondent Richard Harrington. See his "Report from Inside Red China," *Parade*, November 29, 1964.

26. For a dramatic description of the transplanting of a mountain by means of

straw baskets and bamboo poles, see R. M. Fox, *China Diary* (London: Robert Hale, 1959), pp. 153-154. Mr. Mervyn Jones, in "Three Weeks in the Middle Kingdom," makes this interesting observation: China's "innumerable mouths—or at all events most of them—are also hands. While Soviet Russia has always had to contend with an acute labor shortage, China has labor enough and to spare. . . . If one were to walk out of the People's Central Department Store in Peking and travel westward across the Communist world, one would reach Prague before finding another store so well filled with consumer goods." See p. 63.

27. Hughes and Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960*, pp. 59-60.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63; see also Li (ed.), *Industrial Development in Communist China*, p. 24.

29. Francis M. Boddy, "Soviet Economic Growth," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (eds.), *Soviet Union: Paradox and Change* (New York, Holt, 1962), pp. 83-84.

30. Hughes and Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960*, pp. 73-74.

31. In an article entitled "Centralization versus Decentralization in Mainland China and the Soviet Union," Dwight H. Perkins draws the following conclusion: ". . . there is a greater tendency in China to experiment with various forms of decentralization. In the agricultural sector, this is the result of the much lower per capita income and the comparative surplus of labor which exist in Mainland China. In industry, it is a result of the relatively greater importance and large number of small-scale industries using disparate and comparatively primitive technology. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has stuck closely to centralized controls even though this has become increasingly difficult as the economy has become more complex." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 349 (September 1963), p. 70.

32. Ping-chia Kuo, *China: New Age and New Outlook*, Chapter II.