

American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia'

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THE GROWING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The protection afforded the United States by the boundaries of two seas, at the same time tended to isolate this country from contact with peoples abroad. The isolation being compounded by distance, the United States was most remote from developments in the countries of the East. The knowledge we acquired was, at best, fragmentary, not very reliable, and generally gleaned from the interested accounts of the small groups of people who had particular concerns in Asia. These were mainly the early traders, who sailed to strange seas and brought back rare and marvelous spices, along with tales of Hindu potentates, exotic palaces, and rich resources; and the second group of American missionaries, often unaware of, and rarely sympathetic to, the ancient Asian cultures. The early interest of Emerson and his associates for oriental civilization and the philosophy of the East, failed to endure, and became, in the end, no more than a brief flirtation with Indian thought.

Our interest in Asia remained, for the most part, a trading and proselytizing one, until the compulsions of imperialism turned our attention to the East. The struggle for political spheres of influence and what seemed like the imminent dismemberment of China, threatened to disrupt our small eastern trade, and forced us to challenge the right of any nation to impose upon the sovereignty of another. This was subsequently expressed in the formulation of the Open Door policy in regard to China. Though we had a superficial acquaintance with another Eastern culture after the "opening" of Japan in 1853, and we had ourselves engaged in expansion in the Pacific inclusive of Hawaii and the Philippines by

1898, we were still largely ignorant of, and consequently indifferent to, the developments in the other countries of South and Southeast Asia. Having no territorial ambitions in this area, and separated from it by thousands of miles of sea and land, we remained apart while the countries of this region succumbed to the domination of the great imperialisms from the West.

There was, in fact, a generally indifferent or apathetic response to the freedom struggles in India, Burma, Indo-China, and Indonesia in the United States until the beginning of World War II. The lands beyond the Pacific were vague and unreal to insulated Americans. They appeared as a unity, indistinct from each other. The people were described racially as "Asiatics," an opprobrious word, and the "yellow hordes" of Theodore Roosevelt's conception came close to being the popular picture of the peoples of Asia. That many of them belonged to the yellow race, as the Europeans, for example, belong to the white, seemed to make them all the same. That this logic was not similarly applied to the nationalities of Europe did not disturb the force of the generalization in regard to the East. That the East contained peoples of several identities who nurtured separate and vital aspirations concerning these identities, became obvious only with the Second World War, and the success of the independence movements shortly after that time. The United States, with new global responsibilities, and unprepared by its past experience to meet them, at least in the countries of Asia, became irrevocably involved in the fate of the new nations which gained independence after 1947.

At the war's end the United States government, and for the most part the American people, were committed to the necessity for an international, in contrast to isolationist, foreign policy. This time there was to be no return to the presumed security of the two oceans or to the Western hemisphere. Residual impulses toward withdrawal, toward some kind of American isolation, remained in the diversified political stream of American life, but these had become and continue to be recessive strains in the body politic. What William James once called the "rivalry of the patterns" polarized the world between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We no longer suffer from the illusion of, if we ever optimistically expected, "One World." But we know—and we know it from the days of World War II—that we are inexorably entwined in this world.

Within the first few postwar years we clearly witnessed the crumbling of old empires, the making of a new one, more dangerous and more ruthless than many of its predecessors. New states, but old nations, were to emerge from the former empires in Africa and Asia, whereas the Marxist-Leninist world of Russia, and later China, gradually engulfed hapless nations and peoples. That a polarized world of competing systems and sovereignties should develop out of the wars was and is ineluctably inherent, according to its believers, in the nature of Marxian dialectical and historical materialism. So long, therefore, as the Sino-Soviet Marxist world professes the belief in the necessary struggle of the "Two-Camps," the artifice of coexistence is merely an interim stage until the conditions necessary for a final transformation in its favor arrive. Some Americans, long before the war, had acquired a clear understanding of Soviet ideology and the uses to which it had been put by the Stalinist hierarchy. But generally the government and the people of the United States throughout the war wished and hoped or acted as if the wartime alliance might be continued into the postwar world.

The organization of the United Nations and its Charter expression of moral and quasi-legal concepts of world order became a cornerstone of United States foreign policy, acceptable to the majority of American people, because it gave expression to their hope of continuing the wartime alliance in the making of peace, and because it seemingly reflected the broad, general, benign self-image we entertain of ourselves and of our country. No better example of this expression need be cited than that of President Truman at a Navy Day celebration in New York on October 27, 1945. In this speech he restates the twelve "fundamental principles of righteousness and justice" on which "United States foreign policy is based":

- (1) We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.

- (2) We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.

- (3) We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

(4) We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.

(5) By the combined and cooperative action of our war Allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful, democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which nazism, fascism, and military aggression cannot exist.

(6) We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.

(7) We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.

(8) We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world.

(9) We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western Hemisphere, must work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.

(10) We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

(11) We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.

(12) We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations Organization composed of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace.²

There is nothing notable or new in these twelve points. Together they express standard American desires for peace, security, well-being, and freedom, and opposition to armed force, coercion, and

territorial aggrandizement as instruments of policy. They lean heavily on the general outline provided by President F. D. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. Not only was the UN required "to insure peace" but President Truman underlined, as a supporting theme, the special responsibilities and hope for the maintenance of the wartime alliance. Communism was not listed along with nazism and fascism, as it came to be; and Russian collaboration, with "other peace-loving people" was a required and invited element for the future.

The difficulty, of course, is not in formulating such principles or objectives—most, if not all states indulge in the exercise—but in applying them. Events somehow get in our way. Their expression is not infrequently referred to as "Idealism" or "Moralism" in foreign policy, whereas their application and modification in terms of "interests" are similarly referred to as "Realism." Such a disjunction is philosophical nonsense, though it causes endless argument between respective proponents, and, as frequently, leads to political ambivalence even within any one group. The "Idealists" or "Moralists" temper their principles with the anticipated difficulties of policy execution; the "Realists" color their expressions of policy with objectives derived from past or future valued goals. In fact all such assertions or propositions about the principles and direction of foreign policy, whether couched in the terms used by President Truman or by others, are made in whatever reality this world has. Their application in concrete situations depends solely upon the administering will of the authorities in any state. Their success or failure in application, that is, the risks of principle, depend solely upon the capacity of a state alone or in concert with others to carry out its "will."

There is no need here to do more than to mention the broad changes which, shortly after President Truman spoke, shattered his hopes for a world of organized peace. Russia under Stalin had no intention of remaining a friendly peacetime ally. In early 1946, Stalin began to make the moves on the Soviet chessboard which led to the 1947 revival of the Comintern, now to be called the Cominform. Gone was the latest practice of the "soft" or "right" strategy which had been revived after the Nazi invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941. Stalin as a good Leninist was determined to use the occasion of war-weariness and depletion as the springboard for a communist political offensive. Non-Soviet Europe was the main

target, or so it appeared. I have suggested elsewhere, that during this crucial period (1946-1949), Stalin, having pushed westward into Europe as far as he could go without further war, was primarily concerned with China; that the communist actions in Europe and South and Southeast Asia were calculated risks designed more to occupy the anti-communist world and thus afford Stalin and Mao a long awaited victory in China. Stalin's defeat at the hand of the Kuomintang in 1926-1927 was never forgotten or forgiven. He could not help but know how badly Chiang was faring in 1946 and 1947—specifically so after General Marshall returned from his "failure of a mission" and after the United States publicly withdrew on January 29, 1947, from any mediatorial role between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek.

Whether or not this interpretation of Stalin's policies in the 1946-1949 period (major concern for communist victory in China) is correct, there is no question that Europe was in a parlous state after the war and could ill-stand any determined onslaught on her weakened economies and political structures. Hence Truman's decision to counter the Stalin offensive in *Europe* was a momentous one. The aid to Greece and Turkey, the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the specific and generalized policy of "containment" went far to give non-Soviet Europe the economic and political stimulation necessary to put its house in some (and better) order.

Containment of the Soviet world came to represent the central conception of our foreign policy. The crisis and challenge in Greece and Turkey which the Truman Doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, sought to meet, and the implementation of the Marshall Plan through the European Recovery Plan, which followed the Secretary's speech of June 5 at Harvard University, were but the opening rounds in the execution of this policy. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, followed by the Soviet bar to Western land traffic to Berlin in June accentuated the United States determination to counter the Soviet European offensive. Peacetime conscription again proposed by Truman in March, 1948, was passed by the Congress in June along with a considerable—for those days—peacetime military budget (fourteen billion dollars) which laid the basis for military preparedness utilizing the Strategic Air Command (and the atom bomb) as the striking weapon of a proposed seventy-group air force. The North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, April, 1949, capped these actions. War with the Soviet Union was a possibility publicly discussed.⁸

THE U.S. POLICY OF AMBIVALENCE

But what of Asia? And more particularly of Southeast Asia? The United States government had attempted to base immediate postwar Asian policy—despite meaningless references to “vacuums” and absence of an Asian policy, we had an Asian policy—affirmatively on a hoped-for strong and free China, a demilitarized Japan, a series of (to be) fortified islands which we acquired as UN trusteeships but which our armed forces had in any event insisted upon controlling. This in a sense was traditional American Asian policy.

These policies interpreted in the setting of the postwar alliances and United Nations sentiment were largely incorporated in a speech given by John Carter Vincent, then Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. The Vincent speech—and it is the Department of State speaking when one of its officers makes a public address—upheld the necessity for “understanding, friendship, and collaboration between and among the four principal powers in the Pacific,” China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as the basis for this traditional Asian policy.⁶ Where the United States had to make a relatively new postwar decision was in the application of its anti-colonial posture to the Asian colonial areas of our wartime allies. In this respect, Vincent repeated what had been generally stated in the various wartime declarations on United Nations policy with respect to dependent and colonial peoples. While affirming the principle of colonial freedom, he vaguely circumscribed it by apparently advocating the goal of “self-government.”⁵ The right to self-government in the vocabulary of colonial policy is not equal to the right of independence.

This ambivalence and uncertainty with respect to colonialism is a persistent feature of U.S. foreign policy. No matter how high sounding the declaration for freedom for dependent or colonial peoples, somehow or other “circumstances” or “interests” interfere to water down the application of the principle in the adopted course of United States action. Much of what Wendell Wilkie called the Asian “reservoir of goodwill toward the United States” has been wasted not because of an absence of an Asian policy but rather

because of the disparity between United States profession and practice on colonial issues. For example, Vincent in this same speech said: "In Southeast Asia a situation has developed to the liking of none of us, least of all to the British, the French, the Dutch, and I gather to the Annamese and Indonesians. With regard to the situation in French Indo-China, this government does not question French sovereignty in that area. Our attitude toward the situation in the Dutch East Indies is similar to that in regard to French Indo-China." Such a statement directly contradicts or ignores Presidential and departmental expressions of the United States wartime position with respect to a proposed trusteeship for Indo-China outside the French empire. At no time did the U.S. publicly promise to restore Dutch sovereignty as such. If secret commitments were made they, too, violated the frequent expressions for self-determination and self-government promised during the war. Certainly, Vincent's exposition of colonial policy and its application in Southeast Asia is at variance with President Truman's virtually simultaneous presentation of the "fundamental principles of righteousness and justice" on which "United States foreign policy is based."

Throughout this period (1945-1949), that is before and after the hardening of the lines between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the fall of China, the United States, with the honorable exception of its policy toward the Philippines, was not conspicuous at any stage in living up to its anti-colonial professions of principle. Certainly out of deference to its European allies, it refrained from offering moral or material support to the nationalists of South and Southeast Asia. But if the United States had been largely unaware of the significance of prewar Asian nationalisms, it could no longer take refuge in such ignorance in the immediate postwar period when their strength and their aims were clear. As John C. Campbell sums up:

... the native nationalist movements in Burma, Indo-China, and Indonesia, *already strong before the war* (italics added) made tremendous gains. Their leaders, on the defeat of Japan, were ready to strike out for independence. . . . The colonial peoples were little interested in the world ideological conflict between democracy and fascism except as it affected their own goal of national independence . . .

In the early part of the war certain influential officials in the United States Government hoped for the adoption after the war of a "new

deal" for colonial peoples which would grant independence to those which were ready for it and establish international trusteeships for those which were not. In the absence of international agreement on such a program, the United States pursued a cautious policy calculated not to give offense to its allies, the European colonial powers.⁶

What Campbell calls a "cautious policy," I call a policy of ambivalence; that is, United States policy could be said to be cautious with respect to the Philippines, slowly building up the institutions of self-government, providing for a legislative timetable under the terms of which the Philippines would at a certain time (it came to be in 1946) become completely independent and sovereign. But the many United States wartime statements and the postwar actions flowing from such statements reveal the United States not as "cautious" but as simultaneously verbalizing pronouncements which appear to be in favor of the self-determination of colonial peoples and yet temporizing or withholding or withdrawing from the steps necessary to effectuate the announced policy. Political ambivalence, like psychological or personal ambivalence, consists in developing an approving self-image, replete with pleasant feelings and emotions toward items of conduct, contradicted or inhibited by unpleasant, non-approving feelings and emotions toward other aspects of the same items of conduct.

The United States acquiesced in the British armed intervention which reimposed Dutch and French sovereignty respectively on Indonesia and Indo-China, but it warned its allies "... not to use against the native peoples, lend-lease equipment bearing labels of its American origin."⁷ It took no stand on the policies involved in the return of the British to the Indian sub-continent, Burma, and Malaya. We did, however, use our influence and aid to get Chiang's Chinese armed forces out of Burma and Indo-China.⁸ It was not until after the first Dutch "police action" against Indonesia, in July, 1947, that the United States offer of "good offices" was tendered and accepted by both sides. This led to the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, negotiated by Dr. Frank Graham. Only when this Agreement was violated by the second Dutch "police action," December 18, 1948, did the United States take a strong stand against the Dutch, bilaterally by suspending ECA aid to Holland, and multilaterally through a most forthright denunciation of Dutch policy, given by United States delegate Philip C.

Jessup in the UN Security Council.⁹ Yet the United States continued to balance its decision in favor of Indonesian independence by its concern for Dutch interests in the area, especially after the initial public disapproval of Dutch police actions had waned. The issue of "West Irian" is a prime example of United States ambivalence on a colonial question—especially since originally the claims of the Dutch and the Indonesians to this portion of the island of New Guinea could have been legitimately opposed by a UN trusteeship which might have then been applied to the whole island. Twelve years were to elapse before we devised a basis for, and offered a forum for, negotiating the solution to this festering issue.

The changeover in Britain from the Churchill to the Attlee Government in July, 1945, made this ambivalent United States policy somehow seem more tolerable; for the Attlee Government on December 4, 1945, announced its intention of abiding by Labor's promises for Indian independence. No similar declaration concerning Burma was forthcoming from Britain for another twelve months, during which time the Burmese nationalist movement led by General Aung San pressed the campaign, which eventually was successful. But nonetheless, British Labor policy toward the Indian sub-continent and Burma thus made it possible for the United States in the early postwar years to maintain its cautious or ambivalent stance in this area without suffering from excessive external criticism or twinges of violated conscience at home. The transfer of British power to Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Burma was peacefully completed by January 4, 1948, but it was certain of completion by January, 1947. Through British Labor wisdom in accepting gracefully what I believe was inevitable anyway, the free world scored one of its great victories. If the reservoir of Asian good will toward the United States did not thereby directly benefit, at least considerable English waters were added to its storage.

These events coincided with growing tension between the West and the Soviet Union. U.S. policies in Europe, in contrast to those in Asia, were clear and vigorously executed. The collapse of the wartime alliance during late 1946 and early 1947 was precipitated by the Stalinist political offensive in Europe and Asia, to which the United States responded with the policy of containment.¹⁰

There is no doubt but that containment in Europe and the Middle East was pursued vigorously and effectively by the United States,

culminating in effect in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signed April 4, 1949. But if containment was a sound policy in Europe and the Middle East, as I believe it was—short of the “war” that was talked about in the spring of 1948 (see above, Note 3)—why was it not a sound policy for Asia? U.S. large-scale, but not absolute, withdrawal from China obviously resigned that country to the growing military success of the Chinese Communists who had established contiguous borders and supply lines with Soviet Asia. The Wedemeyer report¹¹ dated September 19, 1947, had if anything strengthened the opinion that the grave situation in China threatened strategic and political interests. Everyone agreed that a victory for the Chinese Communists would be a defeat for the United States. Yet the great debate on China which took place in the United States after 1947, posed the issue as a disjunction: either for or against the Communists; for or against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. Though I do not propose to enter the “China tangle,” it seemed to me then and now that disjunctions may be logical, but not necessarily political, constructs. The terms of the debate and the debaters obscured the real issues and blocked a proper search for alternatives to the Chinese Communists. The difficulty was compounded by the apparent failure to assess correctly the potential danger of an aggressive Chinese Communist regime in control of mainland China. Protected on the north and west by Soviet power, it was predictable that the twin objectives of such a regime would be concerned with its eastern flank where it faced U.S. power in occupied Japan and Okinawa, and with South and Southeast Asia. Here were important sources of minerals, rubber, and rice for China’s growing population and production. And, here as the self-proclaimed inheritors and dispensers of Chinese tradition, the Chinese Communists would especially seek to establish a sphere of influence. The *Nanyang*, Burma, Thailand, and the then Indo-China area, had long been regarded not only as a “spillover” for Chinese population and civilization but also as an area where ancient, and as in the case of Burma, frequently dubious claims of suzerainty might be reasserted. Only the *immediate* choice of tactics to be pursued by the Chinese Communists was open to speculation. But that they would vary or combine standard and well-known international Communist strategy and tactics was also predictable. Meanwhile the Communists succeeded in advancing

their power throughout 1947 and 1948. They were not contained either by the Kuomintang or by diminishing American involvements in Asia.

Obviously, containment as a policy was not applied to mainland China. British—not U.S.—policy made it possible for four newly independent nations in South Asia now to join in the concert of free nations. This left in Southeast Asia, apart from British Malaya, which had been offered a choice but put aside its decision, the problems of the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in Indonesia. Apparently, as indicated above, the effrontery of the second Dutch police action and the effective criticism voiced by the Soviet bloc in the UN finally decided United States policy makers to move in the direction of recognizing and supporting Indonesian independence. This belated action in late 1948 and early 1949 came after, not before, the Indonesian Nationalists in power suppressed an attempt at an armed Communist rebellion (Madiun) in September, 1948.

Throughout the long devastating years from the postwar return of the French in Indo-China to Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the United States supported with incredible consistency the imperialist aims of France in Indo-China. If corruption, mismanagement, failure to win popular support, rejection of necessary reform, indifference to the plight of the overwhelmingly rural masses, dictatorship under the facade of parliamentarianism were among the potent reasons for turning away from Chiang Kai-shek, then U.S. support for French imperialist policy in Indo-China was all the more unwise, for all these factors plus the additional one of white foreigners imposing alien rule were present in the French debacle in Indo-China. If the advent of a Communist regime was regarded by the administration as a tragic, but perhaps inescapable, consequence of Kuomintang inner rot, a view which I have here rejected, then steps could have been taken at the end of World War II, and certainly before 1954, to bring about a genuine transfer of power in the states of Indo-China which would have had a chance of saving more from the Communists than south of the 17th parallel—if, indeed, that will be saved! No amount of rationalization about the need for France in NATO, or in the unborn European Defense Community, or in the stillborn Western European Union serves to explain why the United States continued to support France's

last-ditch Asian colonial venture long after we had become the happy beneficiary of the British decision in South and Southeast Asia and after the United States had belatedly decided that the Dutch should be relieved of most of their self-imposed white man's burden in Indonesia. Support of the French in Indo-China can be made to fit into the policy of containment of Asian Communists only by dubious assumption that the French in Indo-China were the sole alternative to a Communist take-over. If such an assumption had been made, time and circumstance—difficult as it has been—since 1954 have demonstrated its falsity. For there were and are genuine anti-communist nationalists in Indo-China who gave their lives to fight against French and Communist imperialism.

But perhaps we should examine United States relations to Asia and Asian events free from what then should be regarded as the "European" policy of Communist containment once the decision about the withdrawal from underwriting a Chiang victory in China had been taken. This does not mean that the United States was any the less concerned with the dangerous east and west thrust of Soviet imperialism and Communist infiltration, subversion, and revolution. Rather it means that the United States would no longer anchor its Asian policy to the wartime goal of building up a strong, democratic China. What were the alternatives to this? Until further disclosure of classified material, it would appear that pending the final outcome of China, the fearfully awaited victory of Mao Tse-tung over Chiang Kai-shek, a six-fold interim policy for Asia was in the making even before Secretary of State Acheson delivered his National Press Club speech on the "Crisis in Asia—An Examination of United States Policy."¹² First, Japan would replace China as the basic American Asian ally.¹³ Second, American strategic security would be anchored to a line of island defenses running from the Aleutians through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.¹⁴ Third, the United Kingdom would have primary defensive responsibility for the Asian Commonwealths, remaining British-Asian colonies, and Burma. Fourth, belated acceptance of Indonesian independence and recognition, both of which were on the way, while *faute de mieux* there was acceptance of France as having paramouncy in Indo-China. Fifth, non-involvement in such Asian regional efforts as (a) the Nehru-sponsored Asian Relations Conference at Delhi (1947); (b) the abortive Southeast Asian League

(1947-1948), Bangkok, which grew out of the Delhi Conference and had received some impetus from the Burmese; and (c) the second, primarily Indonesian-concerned, Asian Conference at New Delhi (1949) and related phenomena. The exception to this was our interest in the UN agencies concerned with Asia. Finally collective security pacts were considered premature and were therefore to be avoided.³⁵

Whatever future this six-fold interim policy may have had, it obviously came in for critical re-examination and modification as the full force of the Communist thrusts in Asia were experienced. It is to these I now turn.

THE GROWING COMMUNIST PENEYRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I do not wish to suggest that until the collapse of China in 1949 the U.S. ignored the problem of communism in Asia. Quite the contrary. Our postwar efforts and experience in China are rooted in an attempt both unsuccessful, and, from my point of view, errorful, to deal with this problem. Our magnificent responses to the same problem in Europe—already referred to—represent then and now a decisive victory. There we responded to what I have called the hardening of the Stalinist line after the spring of 1946 with alacrity and with the means to stop the forward thrust of Moscow after its initial war and postwar gains. Our responses to the Communist challenge in Asia were initially based on the faulty assumption that if a united-front government between Mao and Chiang were established a viable China could result therefrom, and that in such a process the non-Communist forces would survive and perhaps thrive. This was not to be. In the rest of Asia we were, *until 1950*, content for the most part to accept a secondary posture to the (former) Metropolitan powers. In the case of the French in Indo-China, we persisted in this stance until the first Geneva Conference of 1954 signalled the loss of Vietnam above the 17th parallel. The future of Laos is now tied to the agreements of the Second Geneva Conference (1961-1962), the results of which already indicate the probability of further loss.

Communist activity in Asia in general, and in Southeast Asia in particular, begins, approximately, with the Second Comintern meeting in Petrograd and Moscow in 1920 when Lenin advised a

"turn to the East." From that time forward, whatever the shifts in Communist policies, Communist action was designed to free the "oppressed peoples" from the imperial powers and from those who—in communist jargon—did the bidding of the imperialists. These are always designated as "lackeys," "feudalists," "big landowners," and "big bourgeoisie"—no matter how patriotic and how nationalist (i.e. anti-colonialist) some of them in fact were and are. Ho Chi Minh—among others in Asia—is one of Lenin's leading surviving associates from those early Comintern days.¹⁶

Close students—and others—of communism in Asia have been and are properly attentive to the alternations and variations in Communist ideology, strategy, and tactics. Most recently the public debates within the international Communist movement, especially between Moscow and Peking have aroused considerable interest. The author of the fullest study on this subject finds that there are "three general schools of thought" with respect to Sino-Soviet relations and the world Communist movement. He characterizes these as: (1) those who hold "that conflict between Russia and China, to the extent that it exists, is of little consequence" because the two powers "have a single overriding aim in common—the conquest of the non-Communist world"; (2) those who hold "that a break between the Soviet Union and China is inevitable . . . [their] interests . . . are essentially and ultimately incompatible"; and (3) those who hold that "there are serious differences of interest and outlook" but that "the overriding common aims of both, their joint commitment to an international revolutionary process . . . which they believe is historically inevitable and which they believe it is their duty to aid, their shared determination to establish communism throughout the world, set limits on conflict between the two."¹⁷

This current debate—before and since the elimination of Khrushchev from Soviet leadership—on Sino-Soviet conflict is not a mere hair-splitting exercise—though it could become that if one is so inclined. It is a crucial debate in the sense that if one identifies himself with the second general school, his policy with respect to Moscow and to Peking will vary substantially from advocates of the other interpretations. It may lead to an acceptance of "agreements" or "understandings," as for example the June, 1961 (Kennedy) one with Khrushchev which seriously, and I believe adversely,

affected U.S. policy in Laos. Zagoria and others who share Zagoria's views tend to illustrate their first school with some "strawmen." There is little difference between the first and third school. Both are agreed on the *conclusive character of the overriding common aims of the Sino-Soviet axis*—and this is the quintessentially important point. They vary only on less important matters, such as their estimates of how "serious" the debate really is; how long it may last (e.g., what happens after Mao?), how many times if not continuously in their history Soviet and other communist parties have demonstrated this capacity for fratricidal and literally murderous factionalism. Only degrees of sophistication and historical competence in teasing out and evaluating the propositions of the Sino-Soviet debate separates its members. On the other hand, the second school which expects an "inevitable break" because of the "incompatible" national and other interests between the Chinese and the Russians does represent another and opposing viewpoint.

For the purposes of this paper, whatever the detail of the debate, the Russians and the Chinese have separately and together reaffirmed allegiance to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. That is, they have reaffirmed their adherence to the classical Leninist-Stalinist version of the "two-camp" division of the world: the "old world" system of imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, and fascism versus their "new world" or "socialist system." The complete triumph of the latter is expected. "Objective conditions" provide opportunities of supporting "just wars"—wars of "national liberation."

Since I reject the view of the second school as most probably incorrect, I shall present the main points of Communist penetration in Asia in terms either of Moscow or Peking or both operating in alternation or in concert. For with respect to their overriding aim, that is to drive the U.S. out of Asia, to neutralize what remains there as an initial or parallel move, and then to communize it, the Moscow-Peking axis currently displays itself as if it were dancing a political minuet. What difference has it made to the Royal Laotian Government, to the Republic of Vietnam, to SEATO, to the United States, if the Russians supplied the Communist forces (Pathet Lao, Viet Minh, and Viet Cong) by means of an airlift to Tchepone, the key town on the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the corridor down the eastern border areas of Laos), a town just south and west of the 17th parallel dividing North and South Vietnam? And to

vary slightly this rhetorical question, what difference has it made to these same regimes if the Chinese continuously supply the Pathet Lao, Viet Minh, and Viet Cong by means of contiguous border and water routes to Hanoi? In both instances Communist forces were and are using Communist material and skill to defeat what remains of freedom in Laos, to subvert Vietnam, and to endanger the north and eastern borders of Thailand and northern borders of Cambodia.¹⁸

Between the wars the Communist movement found the means and the manpower to make inroads in Asia. Broadly speaking, it fed on agrarian unrest, domestic petty warlordism, and on the discontent of the "downtrodden" urban masses. It flourished, generally in proportion as it espoused a nationalist, anti-imperialist line. In China and Indo-China, particularly in Vietnam, it built lasting communist parties trained in orthodox Leninist fashion. During World War II the Communist parties largely "supported" the Allies after the Nazi invasion of Russia. In so doing, their leaders became recognized as "national" figures by the Allies and became the recipients of military materiel ostensibly to be used to fight the Japanese. Typical examples of this might be cited in terms of the Hukbalahap,¹⁹ the Tagalog language name for the Philippine Communists, and the Malayan Communist party. Later these Communist parties and others, as in Burma and Vietnam, were able to use this materiel in launching their postwar rebellions.

Though the citation of dates arbitrarily structures the genetic reality of historical developments, it is both convenient and not inaccurate to say that when Stalin on February 9, 1946, made an "election" speech rededicating Soviet energies to the policy of world revolution, he then initiated a new series of events which propelled Communist penetration into Asia. This movement was furthered by the organization of the Cominform in September-October, 1947—the reincarnation of the earlier Comintern—and by the simultaneous organization or rejuvenation of a number of Communist instrumentalities and Front groups which served as the sluices for Communist activity in Southern Asia. Among these were the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Youth Conference of Southeast Asia (sometimes called the Conference of the Youth and Students of Southeast Asia), the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties within the

British Commonwealth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Prague International Youth Conference, and others.

All the meetings and conferences held in 1947-1948 were subject to the new line expounded at the Cominform meeting by Andrei Zhdanov. It called for a fight against the imperialists by the "emancipationist anti-imperialist forces . . . based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies." It called for military force where necessary to get rid of the "ruling classes of the metropolitan countries . . . who . . . can no longer govern the colonies on the old lines."

The decisions of the Cominform were carried around the world by Communist couriers and other Communist channels cited above, making an appearance in Asia at a series of meetings in Bombay in November-December, 1947, and in Calcutta in February-March, 1948.²⁰ The Cominform had determined to increase the tempo of its activities in South and Southeast Asia. Emissaries and nationals of the various parties in attendance at "Calcutta" returned to their respective countries. And then, as if on signal, Communist uprisings began in Burma in March, 1948; in Malaya in June, 1948; and in Indonesia in September, 1948. Previously launched uprisings were now intensified in Indo-China, the Philippines, India, and Malaya-Singapore with guidance from the French, American, and English-Australian Communist parties.

Nehru in India and Sukarno and Hatta in Indonesia were successful in quickly suppressing the rebellions with force. The Philippines had to wait for Ramon Magsaysay. First as defense minister in 1950 and later as president—until his tragic death in 1957—he carried out a counter-insurgency plan which in time deprived the Huks of any genuine platform. British armed forces, gradually gaining support of the Malay community against the predominantly Chinese membership of the Malayan Communist Party, took a decade to liquidate that rebellion. The Burmese government with little outside aid is still wrestling with the remnants of the Communist rebellion. (However, Burma has also had to face dissident and insurrectionary ethnic groups.) Thailand and Cambodia thus far have escaped open insurrection. North Vietnam slipped behind the Communist curtain in 1954, while South Vietnam now with stepped-up military assistance from the U.S. has been fighting the Viet Cong (the Communists) since 1955.

Obviously Communist activity in Asia has been continuous, especially since the revival of the Cominform. Whether the leadership and materiel were provided by Moscow, or after 1949 by Peking or by both, are interesting questions but politically and otherwise irrelevant to the fact of Communist subversion, infiltration, insurrection, and warfare. Though the Communist line in Asia always made some doctrinal distinctions between the imperialists (the enemy) and the non-communist anti-imperialists and nationalists (the occasional friends of the Communist Party-led urban and rural masses), Communist action has always been directed, in varying strategy and tactics, against both the "imperialists" and these anti-imperialist nationalists. The Communist rebellions of 1948 which continued as long as possible in South and Southeast Asia were, except in Indo-China and Malaya, directed against newly independent, anti-colonial, nationalist regimes.

Two extraordinary facts emerge from this period of intense Communist activity in South and Southeast Asia. First, their rebellions were not successful in the newly independent countries. The indigenes in these countries, *without* any large scale Western support, fought to preserve their independence and succeeded. Nor were the rebellions successful in the case of Malaya; there in time British policy, after a false start, found a key to Malaya's independence, and its military effort enlisted cooperation from the Malay nationalist elite. When British arms could supply protection to the rural inhabitants, both Malayan and Chinese, the Communist rebellion was defeated.

The second fact is that in Indo-China the reverse of the Malayan situation occurred. There the French were unwilling to support genuine anti-communist nationalists—many of whom were liquidated by Ho Chi Minh's Communist Party while the French were "negotiating" with him. Some six weeks after the Chinese Communists took Peking (January 23, 1949), the French hastily renegotiated the conditions, whereby the puppet emperor Bao Dai returned to Vietnam as Chief of State. But he, under the constraints of the French, was politically and morally incapable of arousing and sustaining national belief in Vietnamese freedom. And so, in time, Ho and Giap won the North, symbolically at Dien Bien Phu on May 6, 1954.

The United States contributed a considerable, though minority,

portion of the estimated eight billion dollar cost of this French misadventure. Before its final denouement, in early 1954, Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles publicly attempted to arouse American public opinion for American military intervention in support of the French. But their "trial balloons" were quickly burst.²¹ They had not only started too late, they were also proposing to back the wrong horse. And certainly the memory of the recent costly war in Korea with its inconclusive ending was too fresh in American memory to undertake another unpromising situation.

On June 19, 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem became premier of the South Vietnam government, and on July 21 the Geneva Agreements were signed (the U.S. did not sign; we issued a separate declaration taking note of the terms), formally ending the Indo-Chinese war. Under these Agreements Vietnam was divided into the recognized Communist regime north of the 17th parallel and the Republic of Vietnam south of that line. The agreements called for the cessation of hostilities in, and the continued recognition of the independent kingdoms of, Cambodia and Laos. But they also recognized the Communist Pathet Lao presence in the two provinces adjoining the province of Luang Prabang, namely Phong Saly on the north and Sam Neua on the northeast, both bordering on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), the Communist state.²²

Herein remained the source of the continuing crisis in Laos.²³ For these two provinces of Laos have been used as forward bases by the Communists to train and to infiltrate Pathet Lao and Viet Minh cadres. Phong Saly and Sam Neua became the Pathet Lao "Yenan" for further insurgency, not only against the kingdom of Laos but also against the Republic of Vietnam. This area, contiguous to and supplied from the DRVN, is the northern anchor of what has become the Ho Chi Minh Trail running down the eastern borders of Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam.

Stalin's death in March, 1953, and the Geneva Conference in 1954 represent a convenient landmark for a summation of the Communist advances in Asia since 1946-1947. They had won mainland China and had taken Tibet. They maintained the partition of Korea at the 38th parallel. (The Geneva Conference also ended the negotiations provided for in the Korean Armistice Agreement which looked toward a peace treaty based on free

elections throughout Korea. There is, of course, no peace treaty, and no elections have been held or are presently contemplated.) They had won North Vietnam above the 17th parallel and had an internationally recognized toe-hold in two provinces in Laos. So much, by the force of arms.

Now, a new turn was in the making. Again to use a date, though there is some evidence that Stalin before his death was already pointing to yet another shift, Chou En-lai at the end of April, 1954, began a series of successive meetings with Asian premiers Nehru, U Nu, and Ho Chi Minh. Out of these came the so-called "Five Principles" of peaceful coexistence (the *Panchsila*), and, in a not unrelated fashion, the Bandung, Indonesia Conference which, among other things, endorsed these principles. For the next few years the Communists were to use the "soft" or "right" line in order to press for new gains. Ho Chi Minh, however, warned the Free World via a broadcast heard from the Peking radio, July 22, 1954, that "we must devote all possible efforts during the peace to obtain the unification . . . of the nation . . . We shall struggle infallibly . . . the struggle will be long and difficult . . . to conquer victory."²⁴

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE COMMUNIST PENETRATION, 1950-1954

The effort made by Secretary Dulles to secure united action, that is, armed intervention, to prevent the loss in Indo-China, was a belated move to counter the Communist advances just cited. But it was not the first such move; it came as a logical development, as we shall see, from the events following the fall of China in October, 1949. Once the Truman Administration had come to the conclusion that it could not affect the course of events in mainland China after the failure of the Marshall and Wedemeyer missions (1946-1947), it elected to play a "wait and see" role in that quarter. Subsequently, certainly until 1949, the above-referred-to six-fold interim policy in Asia appears to have been operative. That it was inadequate seems to be evident; that it may be partially, but only partially, explained by our heavy involvement in countering effectively the Communist advances in Europe seems to me to be also evident. We could not serve, or more precisely we did not see ourselves serving, as the global gladiator in defense of freedom. Nor were our actual

and potential allies geared for the collective struggle. It is questionable even today whether some of them in Western Europe have as yet made the necessary decisions! Whatever the explanation, the full victory of the Chinese Communists and the June, 1950, Communist aggression in Korea mark the end of this less than satisfying period and its Asian policies.

Secretary of State Acheson's speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, is the watershed for the former interim policy. In this "defensive perimeter" speech U.S. military, political, and economic policy was drawn off mainland East Asia. South Asia would be helped, Acheson said, but the major "responsibility is not ours." Our European allies—whether or not they deserved the praise, as England then did, and as the others (France and Holland) then did not—were applauded for making progress with the colonial and ex-colonial areas. Essentially the speech was a masterful lawyer's statement, but also an evasive one. It was an apology for a past policy already in transition.

From the viewpoint of formulating and executing a strong U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, late 1949 may well be regarded as the beginning of an *annus mirabilis*. Stung by the criticism at home because of the administration's policy toward China, and galvanized by the complete victory of the Communists in China, the Department of State initiated a series of moves which led to a long-needed overhauling and expression of administration policy in and for free Asia. The most significant, though not always consistently executed, aspect of this change was the unexpressed, but nonetheless clearcut, decision to replace our Western allies as the primary power with respect to free Asia. Our allies for one reason or another could not sustain their past roles. It is useful and pertinent to look at these moves:

(1) On August 5, 1949, the Department released its unprecedented study, *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*. Secretary Acheson's preface "closed the book" on Nationalist China. "We must face the situation as it exists." The fact was the failure of the Kuomintang to hold China—a failure "which this country tried to influence but could not."

(2) On August 15 the State Department *Bulletin* (Vol. 21, pp. 236-237) announced that a committee composed of Philip C. Jessup, Raymond B. Fosdick, and Everett Case (later John Leighton Stuart was added to this committee) had been appointed to study

and make recommendations concerning Asian policy. The committee did not publish any report, but its general views were presented by Raymond B. Fosdick in a *New York Times Magazine* article, February 12, 1950.

(3) On December 15, 1949, Philip C. Jessup was designated as an ambassador-at-large to go to Asia in order to review the situation, take part in the conference of American diplomats in Bangkok in February (see 6 below), and make recommendations on his return, March 15, 1950.²⁸

(4) On January 12, 1950, Secretary Acheson delivered his already referred to "defensive perimeter"—"Crisis in Asia"—speech (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, pp. 111-118), which he repeated several times during the next few months, notably at the San Francisco Commonwealth Club, March 15, 1950. The Secretary of State seems to have been one of the last to voice the changes then in preparation.

(5) On January 31, 1950, Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee addressed the New York Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry on "United States Economic Relations with South Asia" (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, pp. 334 ff.).

(6) On February 15, 1950, the Department announced the conclusion of its "Regional Conference of U.S. Envoys in Bangkok" which had been called to consider "the affirmative steps which could be taken by the United States to carry out its announced policies of extending friendly support to the states in Asia which may desire such assistance" (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, p. 502). The support would be both military and economic for those states resisting Communist aggression.

(7) On February 23, 1950, the Department announced that a mission headed by R. Allan Griffin (who later became ECA Southeast Asia Director) would visit Saigon, Singapore, Rangoon, Bangkok, and Djakarta "to prepare the way for the most expeditious and efficient use of whatever technical assistance funds may become available for that area." (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, p. 411; see also p. 791 for Griffin's return in May, recommending a sixty million dollar economic and technical assistance program, the funds of which would come from the unexpended balance of China aid funds.) Earlier, on January 19, Assistant Secretary McGhee had announced U.S. support for the newly launched Colombo Plan.

(8) On March 21, 1950, General MacArthur announced a SCAP-Japan and Burma trade agreement—"the first formal trade agreement" between these two countries—for the exchange of forty-nine million dollars worth of goods during calendar 1950 (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, p. 525).

(9) On March 27, 1950, Ambassador to India Loy W. Henderson delivered an important address on "Objectives of U.S. Policies Toward Asia" before the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi (*Bulletin*, Vol. 22, pp. 562-567).

(10) On the same day Deputy Undersecretary Dean Rusk, with a strong interest in Asian affairs, "was transferred to head the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs." This occurred at a time when George F. Kennan, "the third ranking officer in the Department," secured his leave for Princeton's Institute of Advanced Studies (announced by Secretary Acheson later, April 22, 1950). Mr. Kennan's departure from the Department gave an added impetus to Asian interests. I think it can be demonstrated that his major diplomatic concerns furthered the Europe-centered orientation which had so largely dominated the viewpoint of the Department in the previous years.

After 4:00 a.m. on June 25, 1950—an event which according to one spokesman of the Department had not been anticipated—the Asian interest became even more accentuated. There is no question that the administration had determined several years before the final event that it could not stop the Communists in China; there is equally no question that within hours of the event the administration determined that it would contest by arms this further evidence of Communist aggression in Korea. The final onrushing debacle in mainland China and the response to it by sincere, as well as malevolent, forces at home precipitated this need for an accentuated Asian policy. The Korean War gave additional urgency and character to the formulation and execution of this policy. As John Foster Dulles, then a consultant to Secretary Acheson, said, "the Korean attack opened a new chapter in history. No one knows how that chapter will end. . . ." Over and over again the administration gave expression to Asian policies directly arising out of the Korean War. It also kept in view its concern for policies in Asia not immediately connected with Korea. I shall close the list of the *annus mirabilis* with two policy statements, both by Dean Rusk:

(11) "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy," speech before the American Veterans of World War II, September 9, 1950, and "Security Problems in the Far East," speech of November 15, 1950, before a National Conference on Foreign Policy.²⁷

Inspection of any or all of the foregoing entries reveals both the shape and content of the new policy. Though this is nowhere explicitly stated, it would appear that our new posture in Asia had been concerted with that of our major Western allies. The United Kingdom had convened a ministerial Commonwealth conference at Colombo, Ceylon, in January, 1950, which paralleled U.S. actions. This led to the organization of the Colombo Plan for Asia²⁸ to which we gave some kind of commitment. And following the January 29, 1950, French National Assembly ratification of the recognition of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as independent states within the French Union, the United States and the United Kingdom extended recognition to these states on February 7.

Thus it was clear at the beginning of 1950 that in the first instance we would by choice and by agreement assume a more active role in the area of former British responsibility (South Asia, Burma), and toward the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and that we had made basic if questionable decisions with respect to what had been French Indo-China. Secretary Acheson had announced that the United States accepted the "necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan" and that the defensive perimeter of the Pacific defined as "the Aleutians to Japan and then . . . to the Ryukyus . . . must and will be held."²⁹

The essentials of this new policy before the outbreak of the Korean War can perhaps best be examined in the presentation of the "Objectives of U.S. Policies Toward Asia" by Ambassador Loy W. Henderson at New Delhi.³⁰ After a careful introduction which referred to the character of the United States, the early remoteness from but interest in Asia, and the nature of U.S. global responsibilities, Ambassador Henderson turned to his two main themes: the "handicaps," including "elements of mistrust" in U.S.-Asian relations, and the specific U.S. "policies toward Far Eastern countries." He found and bravely catalogued the difficulties (handicaps and mistrust) as:

- (1) deficiency of knowledge and understanding, on the part of large sections of the American people, of the points of view and the particular

problems of various peoples of Asia [which] sometimes results in lack of action, when action should be taken, or in the wrong kind of action. . . . (2) insufficiency of human and natural resources in the United States in the face of the world-wide demand. . . . (3) a high degree of sensitivity at any action on the part of foreigners which might even remotely be construed as an effort to influence the conduct of their (Asian) internal affairs or of their relations with other countries. This sensitivity in some instances is so acute that the United States hesitates to take or suggest certain measures which might be helpful for fear that such action may do more harm than good . . . (4) people in Asia who are sincerely convinced that efforts . . . to extend technical or financial aid are prompted not by a desire for a peaceful, orderly progressive world but by some kind of economic imperialism. . . . (5) people who really believe that actions taken by the United States through the UN or through other channels . . . are motivated by great power politics and selfish considerations. . . . (6) influential [Asian] groups who apparently do understand and appreciate the objectives of the United States with regard to Asia but who shrink from close cooperation with the United States lest such cooperation create hostility toward them on the part of powerful forces of the world [the Sino-Soviet bloc but not named]. . . . (7) the existence . . . of national, religious, race, class, and other animosities also renders difficult efforts to bring about a prosperous, peaceful, free and progressive Asia.

After completing this impressive and still relevant delineation of the difficulties, he then enumerated specific policies, beginning with the reaffirmation of the absence of any U.S. territorial ambition and of any desire to obtain special political or economic position in Asia. In turn he rapidly covered Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and the other two Associated States, Burma, China, and India. He reiterated our security interests in Japan and the Philippines and our intentions and agreements respectively with these countries. He outlined practical considerations (e.g., mistreatment of American consular and business representatives) in contrast to the (Communist) nature of its political leadership as the basis for U.S. non-recognition of the Peking regime. He defended the atomic and hydrogen bomb policy of the United States. And in referring to each country he specified U.S. willingness to give "appropriate assistance" to further its progress in the direction of economic stability, political independence or self-government, and territorial integrity.

The unexpected Korean War further clarified, deepened, and extended the objectives of U.S. policies toward Asia. It is indeed questionable whether the administration would have had the opportunity of carrying out its objectives if the Korean War had not occurred. The first half of 1950 witnessed the height of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's vicious, irresponsible attacks on the State Department. The bipartisan foreign policy approach associated with the names of Senator Arthur S. Vandenberg and consultant John Foster Dulles was under increasing handicaps from within the Republican Party.³¹ Congress was in no mood to give the President the funds required for his \$42.2 billion budget based on an estimated \$5.1 billion deficit. Seldom in the twentieth century had a Secretary of State been so much the target of opposition forces as was Dean Acheson during this period. National and international confidence in his concept of a "defensive perimeter" supported by "situations of strength" was not widely exhibited. However, Communist aggression in Korea changed most, if not all, of this. It permitted the administration to go forward with the process of developing and executing the Asian policy-in-the-making from late 1949.

One of the most striking expressions of policy toward Free Asia during this *annus mirabilis*, which remained basically unchanged until the disaster of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, was voiced by Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Policy, on September 9, 1950, in his "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy." The "Fundamentals" were sharply and clearly set forth. We entertain, said Rusk, "hopes for Asia and the world," hopes of "freedom, equal partnership, security, peaceful process, material well-being, cultural exchange and good neighbors," which are "policies not facts." In describing obstacles within the United States to achieving these objectives, he noted that "we have much to learn and unlearn . . . we are inclined to forget that we have relations with other people, not control over them." We err, he observed, in proposing solutions to them "which often [have] nothing to do with their situation in fact, nor with their cultural traditions, their moral codes, their capabilities or their needs." Most important, Rusk felt, "is our example. . . . what about the Asians (and other races) in our communities . . . The peoples of Asia are sitting as a great jury and are passing judgement upon

our way of life; there is no place for us to hide from our own performance."

Rusk then outlined an eleven point "program for action" in order to get on with our objective and to overcome the principal obstacles. These were freshly and vigorously stated; and by September, 1950, they had been frequently heard: We can help Asians and governments, "we cannot take over"; we have no desire for privilege. We shall support the national aspirations of the peoples of Asia to be free, to determine their own institutions. We shall act vigorously and loyally as a member of the UN to deal with aggression, to carry out UN resolutions in favor of a free and united Korea. We shall seek a peaceful settlement of the Formosa problem by international action while sustaining the historic ties of friendship between the American and Chinese peoples. We shall strongly support the full and equal participation of the nations of Asia in the family of nations. We shall move toward a Japanese peace settlement. We shall support applications for membership in the UN of Ceylon, Indonesia, Nepal, Korea. We shall view with sympathy and interest Asian security or welfare regional efforts. We shall work with our friends in Asia to strengthen their own institutions—that means military assistance to Indo-China and the Philippines and to others in Southeast Asia whose security is being threatened.³² It means economic and technical assistance following the investigations of the R. Allen Griffin Mission, the Daniel Bell Mission (Philippines); it means support for Point Four and UN aid programs for Asia. We should expand our information and exchange programs.

The Rusk, Henderson, and other statements of 1949-1950 constituted a sufficiently broad and forward-looking range of Asian policy. One could point out that the policy in these statements retained the now typical, grave inconsistency or ambivalence: the oft-repeated reference to supporting the national aspirations of the peoples of Asia to be free and our simultaneous support for the French in Indo-China.³³ It also seemingly defended certain illusions such as Secretary Acheson's view: "We still believe that the Chinese are going to be Chinese before they are going to be Communists. We believe that the people of Indo-China will see this menace which is coming towards them."³⁴ But no one could deny that here was a reasoned and reasonable, full U.S. Asian policy on which action was expected. In the final analysis, the test of the policy was

its application to Asia in general, and to specific Asian countries. Then, as now, the presence and threat of Communist China, on or off stage, helped to stimulate the formulation and execution of Asian policy in the United States.

Thus, in response to this threat, and with extraordinary rapidity, first under the Truman Administration and then continued by the Eisenhower Administration, the United States proceeded to negotiate a series of bilateral and multilateral "mutual defense" treaties culminating in the Manila Pact and Treaty of September, 1954. It was this which created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO. It is important to note these treaties, for every one is still "on the books," and some of them (e.g., Japan, 1960) have been renewed, or otherwise re-emphasized (e.g., our agreement with Thailand, March 1962) under SEATO. They are, in chronological order:

The Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, August 30, 1951.

The Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), September 1, 1951.

The Peace Treaty and Security Treaty with Japan, September 8, 1951.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, October 1, 1953.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China, September 2, 1954.

The Manila Pact and Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, September 8, 1954.⁸⁵

The promotion of stability with freedom and justice, improvement in the conditions of living, and security against aggressive communism were and are the bases for all these instruments—including the economic aid agreements—of policy. That is, beginning with 1950, and especially after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, we had determined to no longer wait and see, to no longer play a secondary role in an area of major importance, other than in the fatal exception of French Indo-China. The unexpected and unprepared for Korean War deepened and extended these commitments.

In short, between 1950 and 1954 the United States had redefined its policies and instituted programs consonant with its new treaty obligations. In addition to those security treaties mentioned above, we negotiated aid and other types of agreements with every country of Free Asia. It appeared as if we had determined to brook no further advance of international Communism in that area.

Containment—to use that somewhat difficult word—was at long last to be applied to Asia as it had already been applied in Europe. In effect our bilateral security treaty arrangements with Korea, Japan, Republic of China, and the Philippines; our multilateral security arrangements and accompanying protocols with Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, and Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and our aid agreements with the neutralists in Asia signified our determination to redraw the “defensive perimeter” roughly at the Himalayas, the 17th parallel, the 38th parallel, and the China Seas. During the remainder of this decade we, on occasion, as in the case of Quemoy and Matsu, were called upon to demonstrate our determination to hold this line. And, at least on one major occasion during the contest in Laos, the United States and its SEATO allies issued a preventive warning which momentarily dampened hostilities in that quarter.³⁶

I do not mean to suggest that all was clear or easy sailing in this post-Korean, post-Geneva 1954 environment. There were, as there always are, genuine problems which demanded careful consideration and application of policy. Those familiar with the international situations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia can pick from memory and from the news files the particular problems which loomed in any one year. But on the whole, with the exception of the threat to the off-shore islands, still held by the Republic of China, there was no issue which seemed to require the mobilization of American and allied military power to back American and allied policy—other than the deepening crisis in mainland Southeast Asia. And it is to this that I now turn.

THE CRISIS IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CHOICES BEFORE US

Some recent facts are worth noting before proceeding to the main issue. We have helped to settle the vexing question of West Irian which paved the way for the still primitive restoration of Dutch-Indonesian relations. This means that with the minor exception of a portion of the island of Timor, Western imperialism has disappeared in Southeast Asia. In terms of policy this fact should be used vigorously to counter the strident and false propaganda charges made by some Southeast Asians and all Communists. However, its un-

lamented departure did not add any insurance to the peace of Southeast Asia. Though Malaya has proceeded with its determination to make "Malaysia" work, it is saddening to note that both our ally the Philippines, and our "friend" Indonesia continue to fish in the troubled waters of the North Borneo territories. All the meetings since June, 1963, including the prestige intervention of both the UN and the then attorney general, Kennedy, have failed to dissuade Sukarno from his militant "confrontation" with Malaysia. The 1962 rebellion in Brunei, which has not yet joined Malaysia, obviously designed by the Indonesians to accomplish that end, appears to be under control. But subversion and guerrilla activity continue in Sarawak and North Borneo, while Singapore is in danger from the Communist-infiltrated, if not led, Barisan Sosialis party, the major opposition to the Peoples Action Party Government. The United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members have come to the support of Malaysia as a member of the Commonwealth. Indonesia's spurious claims and guerrilla-type aggression won little support—outside of Communist countries—in the UN from which she has now separated. Burma carefully nurtures her neutralist, non-aligned posture, while Cambodia, using the same words to describe policy, is enjoying the luxury of pulling at Uncle Sam's beard and of seeking all kinds of candy-bribes for "good behavior" from her new-found friends in Peking and Paris. Thailand has cause to be worried about infiltration and disorder in her vulnerable provinces abutting on Laos, and to be concerned while her ally the United States fully determines its policy in Laos and Vietnam.

Additional facts and factors could be cited to demonstrate that at this time Southeast Asia is experiencing a rising temperature of instability, which automatically conspires to put it high on any conceivable Sino-Soviet target list. Initial U.S. disengagement in Laos following the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and political deterioration in Vietnam after the November 1963 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem contributed to the crisis. What the United States determines to do for its friends and allies on mainland Southeast Asia will shape the security of these countries. The main issue in 1965 is the same as it was in January, 1950, when Acheson described the crisis in Asia: Where *is* the perimeter of the defense against Communist imperialist aggression? Will it be once again withdrawn

from the mainland of Asia? Or, will the still free countries of Southeast Asia—among others—be given the means and the continuing support to remain free?

From 1950 onward there has been little doubt that the United States has resolved to maintain a position of strength and direct interest in Asia. It has sought to create and ensure a defensive shield of anti-Communist power to prevent any further large-scale aggression from Communist China. It has exerted its efforts to assist in building up viable economies and stable political institutions which, it hopes, will be democratic but in any event able to nullify both external and internal Communist efforts to dominate or subvert these countries. In certain instances it has trained and equipped local defense and police forces capable of dealing with border incidents, guerrilla actions, and local insurrections. Behind these there has stood the capacity to use conventional and nuclear weapons from Pacific Ocean and related bases as an ultimate deterrent to overt Communist aggression.

However, throughout this period the United States has tended "... to treat foreign relations as a series of crises, of moves and countermoves in the cold war, in which ... [it] attempted to combine firmness in holding the line against Communist expansion with measures to build up defensive strength in the free world."⁸⁷ But a crisis-approach has not supplied the answers to the main issue noted above. Our disengagement in Laos after Geneva 1962 proved by 1963 to be an invitation to further aggression from and loss to the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh complex in Laos. As a consequence, on invitation from the Lao premier we have become re-engaged in Laos.

Our task in this Southeast Asia area is to identify our interests if any and to identify what we mean when we say, if we continue to say it, that the security of the United States is involved in the defense of Southeast Asia. That we said it during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations is a matter of record. "Interests" and "security," however, are words or concepts which we bandy about rather lightly and freely, and we frequently do not take the pains to define them. Let us therefore look at the problem of interests and security more closely.

Lest there be any doubt on this subject, at least with respect to present U.S. policy, let me refer to one of the many statements of

the Secretary of State on the question of objectives or interests. Secretary Rusk says in *Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Department of State Publication 7432, October, 1962), "We ought to deter or to defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics—that is, 'security through strength.'" He has repeated this theme on numerous occasions: for instance, in a careful address at Valparaiso University on April 25, 1964, in which he insisted that the "security of the United States—and of the free world as a whole—is deeply involved in the Western Pacific. . . Southeast Asia also is vital to our security;"³⁸ and again before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 9, 1965, when he said that "we are pledged to meet challenges—whether direct attack or subversion—which threaten our security or the security of those who want to be free . . ." (*New York Times*, March 10, 1965).

That there are limited war and subversion and guerrilla tactics now occurring in mainland Southeast Asia, none could deny. If the Secretary's language means what it appears to mean, then, according to his conception of U.S. goals, we are or ought to be involved in the defense of Southeast Asia because our interests are there and because its defense involves in some way or another our security. But, on the other hand, if one reads the *Report* of Senator Mike Mansfield and his Presidential Study Mission colleagues on *Vietnam and Southeast Asia*,³⁹ one may be driven to conclusions on policy which lead in an opposite direction to that implied by Secretary Rusk's statement of goals. The content of this *Report* appears to me to be factual, yet its conclusion and its interpretation of the facts seem to represent a sad indication of a tendency to withdraw from Southeast Asia, a tendency to say that our interests are not in Southeast Asia, a tendency to extend the disengagement tried in Laos. More recently Senator Wayne Morse has charged that the United States is a "provocateur of military conflict in Southeast Asia," that we have violated the UN Charter and that we should withdraw from Vietnam.⁴⁰ The only appropriate response to this charge is "nonsense." But the voices for withdrawal mount.⁴¹

In the light of such actual or potential differences between leading members of the same political party apparatus, what then *are* our interests in the area?

If China had not become communist, if the Soviets had not moved

to the East as they have regularly since 1920, then I would say that our interests in Southeast Asia, especially after we legislated for the independence of the Philippines, were minimal. We would still have our ancient historical interests in the "Spice Islands," and the ordinary trading and commercial interests of one nation with another, more, rather than less, friendly wherever possible. However, these do not constitute overwhelming U.S. economic or political interests in Southeast Asia. We would wish its 225 million people well. Now especially that they have attained their independence, we would hope that in time and in accordance with their respective rich cultures they would build viable political and democratic states, and that they would move out of the more or less monocultural economies of their past and move toward more fruitful and effective economies as they developed their resources. In all this we would help in terms of our capabilities and their requests.

But 1949 changed this low-key picture. From January, 1950 on we too turned to the East. In one policy statement and action after another, we have said in no unmistakable language, and we have signed treaties and agreements sanctioning our words, that we will do what Mr. Rusk said we would do in the above-quoted statements. These are comparable with the ones he made when he became Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East in 1950. Then and now we have said that we will seek to deter aggression in the area in whatever form it arises, and that we will do so because we have recognized the nature of the enemy who seeks to destroy the freedom of others. We wish to deter him from further encroachment and aggression in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. *That* is our interest in Southeast Asia. All other interests flow from and around this primary one.

We may have lost sight of this primary objective. For if we were to continue to disengage ourselves in Southeast Asia as Senators Mansfield, Morse, and others, and De Gaulle propose, there is little doubt, it appears to me, that the Sino-Soviet Bloc would continue its move further into the *Nanyang*—the move to the South Seas. It will do so because Southeast Asia is a desirable and desired target area. It is an area which the Bloc needs for political, as well as economic and demographic, purposes. It has at times pursued this objective by the current method of revolution as in Laos and Vietnam. And it has also used the current method of the "carrot and

the stick," of aid and trade, selecting specific target countries such as Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia, to each of which the Bloc has presently made sizeable commitments—Indonesia up to \$1.1 billion, including significant military aid; Cambodia about \$75 million; Burma about \$103 million. (Total Bloc aid to Asia, 1954–1963, amounts to \$2.5 billion.) These are not small sums in Southeast Asia.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations inherited the Southeast Asian policies of its two predecessors. The basic guidelines have not been changed. They also inherited the growing crisis in mainland Southeast Asia. The seeds of that crisis were left implanted in Laos in the two provinces already named (Phong Saly and Sam Neua), and in the continuing determination of the Communists to take over South Vietnam by any and all means. But the cause of the crisis is the determination of the communist world to use the occasion(s) of the weaknesses of the non-communist world to advance its objectives. Since the end of Geneva 1954 and the beginning of SEATO, Communist forces in Southeast Asia have carried on a continuous above- and underground campaign against Vietnam and against the Royal Laotian Government.⁴² The Communists' campaigns have been aided by inabilities among the leaders of these two countries, by their failures to win and hold the support of the people, and by other indigenous factors. But the Communists have also been aided by indecision and irresoluteness among Western leaders to apply policies which they so solemnly adopted. And, they have also been aided by the failure of the neutralists publicly to recognize and to condemn or otherwise act on Communists' machinations.

In Khrushchev's view—despite the Chinese Communist charge of "revisionism"—endlessly repeated in a variety of Communist jargon, we are to be "kicked out" of Laos and Vietnam "like the French." He and the comrades are equally clear about the future. "Sooner or later the red flag will fly over the whole world" (the *New York Times*, May 19, 1962). It is noteworthy that Khrushchev coupled the Laotian and Vietnamese situations, for though both countries regained their independence as a consequence of the demise of French imperialism in Indo-China, he described us as the partners or protectors of those whom he calls "the feudal lords," that is, the "class enemy." Hence, of course, the Communists in and out of these countries are cooperating in a fight for "national

liberation"—a just war by Communist definition! The Geneva 1962 agreements in no way deflected these efforts. The successors to Khrushchev are not likely to change these views which he so pithily expressed.⁴³

What difference does it really make to us if it is Communist China or Communist Russia or both which achieves paramouncy in the area? Would our security be any the less affected? Would our interests be any the less imperiled?

I can find only negative answers to these questions. It makes no difference whether it is China or Russia, separately or together, that wins victories in Southeast Asia. Our interests and our security would be imperiled to the extent that a Communist takeover in mainland Southeast Asia would strategically divide the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean. Mainland Southeast Asia in Communist hands could interdict free flow between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and would give Communist China an outlet which she sorely needs and one which traditional China has always sought by conquest. If Southeast Asia were to go, piecemeal, behind the curtain—iron or bamboo—then our physical position in the Western Pacific Ocean would be jeopardized, our Pacific and Indian Ocean allies (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan)—and our friends—would be in danger, and our free access to the Persian and Aden Gulfs, as well as to the East coast of Africa could be, to say the least, made difficult. Our direct interests and security have become involved in Southeast Asia as never before in our history.

Perhaps a more significant question should be asked: How long should we tolerate "wars of national liberation"—that is, planned Communist insurgency? And this question is directly related to the final one: What becomes of our commitment, endlessly repeated since 1950, "to help those peoples and nations of Asia who are determined to be free to maintain their freedom and security"? (Secretary Rusk, "Policy, Persistence and Patience," cited.) To paraphrase the words of Cicero to Cataline: How long will our patience endure the abuse of such wars?

It is at this point that we have been given what appears to be four choices by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, confirmed in effect by Secretary of State Dean Rusk.⁴⁴ These are "withdrawal," "neutralization" or "negotiation," concentration "on helping the

South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country," and "initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North Vietnam, in order to supplement the counter-insurgency program in South Vietnam."

A full analysis easily reduces these options to variations on two themes. The first is in fact what Senators Mansfield and, even more, Morse recommend, namely, withdrawal. For any negotiation leading to so-called neutralization is at this stage tantamount to U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. And withdrawal, based on previous experiences with negotiations at Geneva in 1954 and 1962, permits and encourages Communist forms of subversion and "underground" warfare. The second option embraces in two stages McNamara's third and fourth options. This is engagement in some to-be-defined sense. Until February 7, 1965, we were apparently content to sacrifice Vietnamese and American lives on an *exclusively defensive war fought on South Vietnam's soil*. This strategic and tactical military anomaly could not remain constant. It had to yield to the clamor for neutralization and withdrawal or be "escalated"—in current jargon—*so as to punish the aggressor, the Communist North, on his soil*.

At this writing (early March, 1965) it is not yet clear how far the present Administration has determined to pursue this course of engagement. What is clear is that, for the first time since 1954, the Communist North begins to experience in the southern one-third of its terrain the military punishment it has been inflicting for a decade on South Vietnam and Laos. If the implications of such a military policy were to call for the *destruction* of the Communist regime in North Vietnam, then the risks of optimum escalation—that is, bringing Communist China into open warfare—are real. However, if such a policy was designed, as I argued some years back, "to maintain the current defensive perimeter" of South Vietnam, then I believe that these risks are both necessary and minimal.⁴⁵

How long will we tolerate externally inspired, led, and fed Communist "wars of national liberation"? The answer to this question ought, it seems to me, to be clear. That is: we ought to do more to make understandable and acceptable at home and abroad the notion that Communist "wars of national liberation" will not be tolerated by us and, specifically, that we have a present commitment in mainland Southeast Asia. We probably cannot afford in

fulfillment of this commitment to consume even the three years, suggested at one time by Admiral Harry Felt's optimistic estimate of the situation, because Americans will either get tired or enraged by their continuing casualties in the area. If we are going to try to hold Southeast Asia because it is our purpose to deny it to the enemy so as to give it the chance of finding its own way in freedom, then in terms of interests and security we are faced with an immediate need to move forward on Southeast Asian policy decisions in South Vietnam.⁴⁶ These decisions require of us a combined military-political-economic investment in South Vietnam as a full partner, under a joint or combined military command, capable of two major military tasks, simultaneously supported by a civilian political-economic reconstruction effort designed to give stability to the Republic of Vietnam. The military tasks relate to (1) threatening, penetrating, undermining, and attacking North Vietnam so as to compel its Communist regime to cease and desist in and withdraw from its war against the South; and (2) securing the borders of the RVN and gradually, by a "clear and hold" campaign, establishing law and order throughout the land. The civilian tasks relate to assisting a Vietnamese constituency (1) to establish and maintain a government; and (2) assisting that government in the manifold tasks of reconstruction and development in such a way as to provide elementary livelihood, security, and welfare for the majority of the citizens. In the simplest terms I can devise this means giving to the South Vietnamese cultivator—be he lowlander or montagnard—a change from almost a quarter of a century of continuous warfare to two or three peaceful crop-years with one legitimate, protective, and concerned government. Such a boon would have the possibility of winning the "hearts and minds" of men without whose loyalty no regime is worth the candle.

If this were to be done, the United States would be well on the road to fulfilling its international, moral, and political commitments to the people of Southeast Asia who wish to enjoy their *own* freedom—as we do ours.

NOTES

1. Material in the first two sections of this paper, presented at the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, Southern Illinois University, October 1959, is based on my forthcoming study, *Burma's Independence*.

2. Harry S. Truman, "Restatement of Foreign Policy of the United States," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 13 (October 28, 1945), pp. 653-656.

3. John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949* (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 6.

4. John Carter Vincent, "The Post-War Period in the Far East," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 13 (October 21, 1945), p. 644. Note that this speech closely paralleled in substance and in time President Truman's Navy Day speech cited above.

5. Vincent essentially did not go beyond the "right of presently dependent Asiatic [sic] peoples to self-government" and preparations for this with timetables. (This is a narrow construction of the 1943 United States "Declaration by the U.N. on National Independence.") However, later in the year, Ralph Bunche, speaking for the Department, offered a curious and politically untenable definition of "self-government" as "independence." Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 13, p. 1039.

6. John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947* (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 300.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 301. (There were no penalties attached to removing labels.) The warning was issued by Secretary of State Byrnes on October 24, 1945. In December 1945, the United States urged "all parties to resume conversations (in Indonesia) and to seek a peaceful solution in harmony with the U.N. Charter."

8. The Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 13, pp. 261, 338, had announced that the United States and Thailand had resumed diplomatic relations following a Thai statement on August 19, 1945, "declaring null and void the declaration of war, January 25, 1942, against the United States" and describing, briefly, the Free Thai Resistance movement against the Japanese. However, on January 16, 1946, the United States announced its refusal to recognize Thailand's occupation of Indo-Chinese territory, and in November, Thailand and France signed an agreement in Washington in which Thailand ceded back the disputed territory while withdrawing her UN Security Council complaint against the incursion of French troops.

9. For a concise and useful account, see Williams Henderson, *Pacific Settlement of Disputes: The Indonesian Question, 1946-1949* (New York: The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954).

10. See X (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25 (July 1947), pp. 566-582.

11. Department of State, *United States Relations with China, . . . 1944-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, 1949), pp. 764-814.

12. This is the "Defensive Perimeter" speech, January 12, 1950, after the fall of China. The Department of State *Bulletin* Vol. 22 (January 23, 1950), pp. 111-118. It should be remembered that this speech was given while a review of, and new perspectives for, American Asian policy were in the process of formulation by a State Department committee. Philip C. Jessup, Raymond B. Fosdick, President Everett Case of Colgate, and our last ambassador to China, J. L. Stuart, were consultants to this committee. Its appointment had been announced in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 21 (August 15, 1949), pp. 236-237.

13. "By the end of 1948 . . . it was agreed among American policy makers that

the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States had reduced the importance of the effort to change Japanese society, and that it was of greater significance to rebuild Japan as a useful base for American power and to reduce the strain on American resources. . . . The United States consequently encouraged the development of a Japanese army—the national police reserve, trained and equipped by the American Army—despite the anti-war provision of the American-drafted Japanese Constitution." William Reitzel, M. A. Kaplan, C. G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956), pp. 173-174. It is interesting to note that in this closely written 535-page book, South and Southeast Asian policy is treated rather sketchily on pp. 222-229; 312-318, and *in passim*.

14. Interview with General Douglas MacArthur, *New York Times*, March 2, 1949. Quoted in Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949*, p. 303.

15. On May 18, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson endorsed a statement by Nehru "to the effect that a Pacific Defense Pact would be premature until 'present internal conflicts in Asia' were resolved." Quoted in Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949* (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 61. NATO had already been signed (April 4, 1949).

16. I do not propose to detail here the history of the Communist movement in Southeast Asia. See Frank N. Trager *et al.*, *Marxism in Southeast Asia, A Study of Four Countries* (Stanford: University Press, 1959). See also, F. N. Trager, "The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia," *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy*, ed. William Henderson (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), Ch. 6. I shall, however, attempt to sketch in the main points of reference so that the reader can approach today's problems with at least a supporting background.

17. Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* (Princeton: University Press, 1962), pp. 3-6. Zagoria had been closer to the second school in his earlier writings on this subject. He now classes himself within the third school, close to those who hold to the idea of "break" but a break which "need not make less serious the challenge presented by the Communist world."

18. The Department of State has issued two important "White Papers" which amply document this. See, *A Threat to Peace*, Publication 7309 (Washington, D.C., 1961), Parts I, II; and *Aggression From the North*, Publication 7839 (Washington, D.C., February 1965).

19. This is an abbreviation for *Huk-Bong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon*, the People's Anti-Japanese Army (later, the *Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan* or the Peoples' Liberation Army). See, J. H. Brimzell's *Communism in South-East Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 194-219, especially, for wartime roles of the Malayan and Philippine Communist parties.

20. I have frequently referred to their presence at this time in Asia as "the Calcutta story" and have treated it in some detail in Trager, *et al.*, *Marxism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 263-273.

21. See the useful collection, Allan B. Cole (ed.), *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions, A Documentary History, 1945-1955* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 172-174, which contains the Dulles-Nixon references. Secretary Dulles proposed, but failed to get, "united action" for an Allied military intervention based presumably on a French commitment for "real independence"

for the Indo-Chinese states. See also, Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1954* (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 221-225. This failure to secure "united action" in 1954 is a prototype of the similar failure to achieve united action for Laos at the March 27-29, 1961, SEATO meeting.

22. See, Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), esp. Chs. XVI-XVIII. The official documents of the 1954 Geneva Agreements have been frequently published. See *Documents relating to . . . Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27-June 15, 1954*, Cmd. 9186, and *Further Documents . . . Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954*, Cmd. 9329 (London: HMSO, 1954).

23. For the continuation of these events, see Frank N. Trager, "Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia," *Orbis*, VII (Fall 1963), 550-582.

24. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1954*, p. 256. There is nothing, I repeat, nothing enigmatic or mysterious about Communist policy for all who care to read.

25. See, Philip C. Jessup, "Report to the American People on the Far East," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 22 (April 24, 1950), pp. 627-630. This was delivered as an address over the ABC network on April 13, 1950.

26. John Foster Dulles, an address, San Francisco Commonwealth Club, July 31, 1950, Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 23, pp. 207 ff. I have omitted from the forgoing list of policy statements on Asia, President Truman's inaugural "Point Four" address of January 20, 1949, and its Act for International Development incorporated in the June 5, 1950, Foreign Assistance Act, because these did not become especially important for South and Southeast Asia until fiscal years 1952 and 1953, respectively.

27. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 23, pp. 465-468; and pp. 809-894.

28. British Commonwealth Consultative Committee, *The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia* (London, 1950), Cmd. 8080. Burma, Thailand, the Associated States of Indo-China, and Indonesia were also present for the first meeting. The United States expressed "complete sympathy" for the effort and together with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was expected to furnish funds for the execution of projects which fell within the £898 million required from external sources in order to complete the projected six-year program. U.S. funds would be presumably counted as a consequence of U.S. bilateral aid agreements in the area.

29. Acheson speech, "Crisis in Asia," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 22, pp. 115-116. In his Commonwealth Club address of March 15, 1950 (Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 22 [March 27, 1950]), the Secretary of State went at least one step further. He suggested, without further clarification, that the United States would support free peoples resisting subversion by armed minorities or outside pressure.

30. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 22, pp. 562-567.

31. For a personalized, valuable, and brief account of this episode, see John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 120-137, 178-184. See also his chapter on "Policies in Asia" in which he claims that these policies did not have the benefit of "bipartisanship with respect to Far Eastern policies. So far there has been none, and none has been sought." (p. 232.)

32. In the later speech of November 15 Rusk gingerly led up to the question of a Security Pact for Southeast Asia but stopped at the point of giving it "thought." Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 23, p. 893. This seems to foreshadow the Manila Pact of 1954. In a speech one year later, November 6, 1951, he indicated that "initial steps" had been taken toward such a pact and expressed hopes for "further cooperation." Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 25 (November 19, 1951), pp. 821 ff. Earlier in 1949, the Congress "over the Administration's objections" had written into the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (Pl. 329, 81st Congress), a declaration supporting a joint or regional security organization for the free countries of the Far East. This may have influenced the State Department.

33. Dean Rusk appears to have recognized the inconsistency. In a speech, "The Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy" (Seattle: World Affairs Council, November 6, 1951), he said, "Many Americans have been troubled in the past about the issue of colonialism in Indo-China. We believe that the question is well on the way to solution . . . it is not surprising that doubts remain in Indo-China and among other countries of Asia." Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 25 (November 19, 1951), pp. 821 ff. However, he did not say what kind of solution was on the way.

34. "Foreign Policies Toward Asia," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 23 (September 18, 1950), p. 464.

35. These documents and explanatory texts are conveniently gathered in *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955* (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. I, Part V.

36. On September 26, 1959, SEATO announced that "in the event of its becoming necessary to defend the integrity of Laos against intervention, SEATO has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly within the framework of the Manila Treaty." Quoted in Pote Sarasin, *Report of SEATO 1959-60* (Bangkok: Post Publishing Co., April 1960), p. 3. The warning was issued at the time of the "revival of Communist (Pathet Lao) insurgency . . . supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam." Here SEATO was "acting" under Article IV, Section 2 of the Treaty, and in connection with a Lao government entirely sympathetic to its purposes. When subsequently in 1960 another government was installed at Vientiane following a military coup (Prince Souvanna Phouma and Captain Kong Le) SEATO as such was silent though the event brought satisfaction to the Sino-Soviet bloc and encouragement to the "Communist (Pathet Lao) insurgents." When this government was displaced by Lao forces friendly to the West, and when its security was threatened by the Sino-Soviet bloc and the "Communist (Pathet Lao) insurgents," SEATO was publicly and hopelessly divided in its counsels, to the obvious satisfaction of its Communist opponents.

37. "Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy," a study prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy* (Committee Print No. 7, 86th Cong., 1st sess.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 8.

38. "The Situation in the Western Pacific" (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, n.d. 1964), p. 1. See also, "Policy, Persistence and Patience," Publication 7809 (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, January 1964).

39. *Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963). The *Report* endorsed the view that U.S. aid should be diminished in South Vietnam, and that consideration should be given to President De Gaulle's suggestion calling for the neutralization of South Vietnam. See also Senator Mansfield's related statement as quoted in the *New York Times*, February 20, 1964.

40. Wayne Morse, "The U.S. Must Withdraw," *Christianity and Crisis* (November 2, 1964).

41. Advocates for "negotiations" usually recognize that the ensuing "neutralization" of Vietnam and Laos necessarily implies the withdrawal of the United States. But they take comfort in the supposition that the Communist forces will then also withdraw. See for example "The News of the Week in Review," *New York Times*, February 28, 1965, for a rather full view of this situation and debate on it.

42. See Frank N. Trager, "'Never Negotiate Freedom': The Case of Laos and Vietnam," *Asian Survey*, I (January 1962), 3-11.

43. Soviet Military Chief Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky repeated such views while voicing criticism of Khrushchev's "subjectivism and hasty decisions." *New York Times*, February 23, 1964.

44. See speech by Secretary McNamara, March 26, 1964, at the James Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner (release; Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 26, 1964); and Secretary Rusk's News Conference, *New York Times*, September 14, 1964. See also, Secretary McNamara's review of Southeast Asia as the "most acute" area of Communist expansion and of which "South Vietnam is the keystone." House Armed Services Committee on . . . 1966 Defense Budget, *Statement* (Washington, D.C.: Armed Services Committee, February 18, 1965), pp. 10-14.

45. See Frank N. Trager, "The Far East," *National Security, Political Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead*, eds. D. M. Abshire and R. V. Allen (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 327-363; 432-442. My thesis was that the way to defend "Saigon" is to penetrate, undermine, threaten, and if necessary attack "Hanoi" . . . "at his bases on his terrain."

46. I have described elsewhere the specific requirements for this policy. See Frank N. Trager, "To Guarantee the Independence of Vietnam," *Christianity and Crisis* (November 2, 1964), pp. 213-215; and "Vietnam: The Military Requirements for Victory," *Orbis*, VIII (Fall 1964), 563-583.