National Image and the Japanese-Korean Conflict, 1951-1965*

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In the rapidly growing literature of psycho-attitudinal approaches to the study of international politics,[1] it is often postulated that international conflict arises more often than not from distorted images nations have of each other. "International relations," says Quincy Wright, "concerns relations between nations less than they concern relations between distorted images of nations. Prejudices arising from false stereotypes are an important factor in international conflict."[2] His hypothesis is based on the empirical finding that it is not what the world is really like, but what we think it is like that tends to determine our behavior. Kenneth E. Boulding has also asked us to "recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation . . . but to their 'images' of the situation" and of other nations.[3] But these images have not only varied dimensions of suspicion, trust, hostility, friendliness, and the like; they are also susceptible to either slow or dramatic change. In the case of old nations, however, their self-images as well as their images of others seem quite deep-seated and resistant to change; Boulding argues that the "national image . . . is the last great stronghold of unsophistication."[4] This paper deals with an international conflict which throws such a hypothesis into sharp relief, namely, the postwar Japanese-Korean relations. An attempt will be made to correlate partially the images the two nations have of each other with the substance and style of their diplomacy. No pretense of fully

testing the hypothesis is implied; the analysis and interpretation represent no more than a preliminary elucidation of the hypothesis.

I

Although many newly independent countries had post-colonial conflicts with their former mother countries, none has been so embittered and protracted as the postwar Japanese-Korean rift. That it took fourteen years of intermittent negotiations before their diplomatic relations were formalized last December attests to its intensity. As early as 1957, William J. Jorden noted that "there is probably no more bitter diplomatic conflict in the world today than that which divides Japan and Korea."[5] Ostensibly such issues as property claims, fishery disputes, the Korean minority in Japan, and the territorial claims were the sources of estrangement.[6] Behind these issues, however, there lay the clash of their rather unsophisticated and self-centered national images of each other.

The Japanese have looked down upon Korea for a long time, especially since their late-nineteenth-century overlordship of the peninsula. The assumption of their own superiority, arrogating to themselves divine origins and divine missions, was reinforced to the point of presenting legends such as that of the conquest of Korea by Empress Jingu,[7] as historical facts. This culminated in an attempt at cultural genocide.[8]

Such condescension is clearly evident in the Japanese estimation or image of specific traits of Korean nationals. An official report by the Japanese colonial regime in Korea attributes to the people of the peninsula "dullness, insolvencies, lack of thrift and ambition, and above all laziness."[9] More recently, Heiji Shinosaki, a Japanese police superintendent, writing a reference book on the Korean minority in Japan for the Japanese police forces, says that "Koreans in general are low in their cultural and educational standards, and weak in their spirit of obeying laws; moreover, their character is toadyish, and they are prone to follow leaders blindly." They are not only "emotional and exceedingly vindictive," but also "cleverly selfish, cunning, extravagant

and vainglorious, and lack the desire for work."[10] *Sankei jiji* once contrasted the ill-natured Koreans with the good-natured Japanese:

> We would like to think Koreans are a meek and gentle nation. In the light of our experiences, however, unfortunately we cannot think they are gentle and obedient. Compared with them, really obedient and lovely is the attitude shown by the Japanese. This makes us feel that the Japanese people are quite irreconcilable with the Koreans. Japan and Korea are neighboring countries. Yet there have occurred too many incidents in which both nations could not reach agreement. We regret it much. This is apparently due to a difference in nature of the two nations.[11]

School children, of course, have shown such categorical prejudice. A paper presented by a Japanese junior high school teacher at an educators' convention in 1956 reported the students' belief that Koreans were "wild, savage, obstinate, horrible, stinking, mean, dirty, and poor." Another teacher reported that Korea was described by his students as "a country where there are many wars; a divided country fighting each other; a terrible country; a bad country; a stinking country with many pigs; and a malicious country."[12]

Such pejorative generalizations are obviously loaded with prejudice. But they cannot be dismissed merely as isolated impressions. Japanese public-opinion polls and similar studies bear out these deep prejudices toward the Koreans. Yasuichi Izumi of Tokyo University made a study of Japanese attitudes toward other nations during the two days preceding the San Francisco Peace Conference. Three hundred forty-four Tokyoites were interviewed to examine their preference ranking of sixteen other nations.[13]

The Americans (white) were most preferred, followed by French, British, Germans and Italians. Except Russians and Australians, Europeans and Americans were overwhelmingly preferred over Asian peoples. If Negroes were excluded, Koreans ranked at the bottom of preference, followed by Filipinos, Vietnamese, Chinese, Indonesians, Burmese, Thais, and Indians. Of the Asians listed, most Japanese did not have clear images of Thais, Burmese, Vietnamese, Indians, and Indonesians; with

these nationalities excluded, then, least liked were the Koreans, Filipinos, and Chinese, in that order. "We are compelled," Izumi wrote, "to render the tragic conclusion—that the Japanese do not like those people they ruled or brutally mistreated," and they are especially prejudiced against neighboring Koreans, the chief victims of Japanese cruelty, exploitation, and humiliation since 1910.[14]

The following table shows how respondents in the same study regarded the appearance, national character, political and eco-

JAPANESE EVALUATION OF VARIOUS NATIONALS[15]

Nationals	Respondents	Appearance Civilization			
		Good	Clean	Advanced	Easy to be Friends
Korean	344	1	11	3	34
Chinese	344	7	3	12	48
Filipino	344	1	20	3	16
Indian	344	21	18	13	51
American	344	139	157	268	111
British	344	109	140	248	50
French	344	122	115	240	68
Australian	344	26	25	39	9
German	344	94	61	171	50
Russian	344	38	26	60	22
Negro	344	6	5	7	15

	National Character				
	Cunning	Kind	Amicable	Black-Hearted	Polite
Korean	188	7	7	68	4
Chinese	113	20	28	46	16
Filipino	18	9	11	12	4
Indian	12	46	23	4	16
American	11	197	122	11	32
British	21	74	14	14	60
French	4	61	37	3	34
Australian	11	5	6	16	1
German	2	44	8	2	27
Russian	105	17	10	107	7
Negro	7	14	9	2	7

	Attitude Toward Japan			
	Insult Japan	Politically Beneficial for Japan	Mistreat Japan	Economically Beneficial for Japan
Korean	105	17	21	56
Chinese	56	33	13	113
Filipino	21	15	15	62
Indian	3	56	1	168
American	16	199	4	282
British	16	80	6	126
French	10	42	2	58
Australian	30	16	15	85
German	6	31	1	40
Russian	37	7	91	26
Negro	7	9	1	13

NOTE: The evaluation is based on the actual number of replies, and the higher the number, the higher the evaluation.

nomic behavior, levels of civilization, and friendliness of the eleven nationalities.

The Americans, British, French, and Germans were not only good-looking and clean, but kind. They did not insult or try to mistreat Japan. As compared with them, the Chinese, Filipinos, Indians, but most of all, Koreans were ugly and dirty in appearance. As for national character, the Koreans, followed by the Chinese, were cunning and black-hearted. Also on the whole, Asians were impolite; the Koreans and Chinese insulted Japan. Next to Russians, Koreans were seen as trying most to mistreat Japan.

In another study conducted at Kumamoto University in 1954 and 1959, 232 students were asked to fill out questionnaires designed to reveal their preference and superiority-inferiority evaluation of twenty nationalities. Again Koreans were ranked lowest in preference and second to the lowest (Negroes) in the superiority-inferiority evaluation.[16] These studies reveal that the Japanese attitude toward Koreans has remained remarkably consistent.

In short, then, the Japanese attitude toward Koreans is one of contempt. According to Hatada Takashi, the Japanese people's stereotyped images have been formed since the Meiji Restoration by feelings acquired as rulers in the course of continental expan-

sion. Their consequent feelings of superiority over Koreans in particular, and Asians in general, came to be linked with contempt for nations that are old-fashioned and underdeveloped, in contrast to highly industrialized Japan.[17] Japanese images of Koreans, transformed into stereotypes, "have not been rectified even by defeat in war."[18] Not that there has been no change at all in the substance of prejudice, but its underlying character seems little changed. Lawrence Olson has observed:

> Fifteen years of massive contact and a multiplicity of personal relationships between Japanese and foreigners since the war have not significantly reduced Japan's ignorance of other cultures. Racial integrity remains immensely strong. . . . Japanese politicians have stopped talking about a mystical *kokutai* (national polity) . . . but they have not lost their conviction that Japan should be a *taikoku*, or great country. . . . Conservatives and Socialists alike are apt to condescend to other Asians, even as they seek to restore confidence in Japan's intentions overseas.[19]

Koreans also have their share of prejudice toward the Japanese. They continue to call the Japanese *waenom*—the little barbarians—and recite Korean cultural contributions before the seventeenth century. They proclaim their moral superiority as a peace-loving nation which never committed aggression against another country, in contrast to Japan's record as a pugnacious, insatiable nation. Yung Tai Pyun has written that at no period in the Korean history of forty centuries, "were we even once soldier-ridden in the same degree as the Japanese have always been. Our tradition only for defense, only for peace, should be pursued."[20] Koreans are still prone, also, to attribute the economic and political underdevelopment of their country to Japan's recent colonialism. Not surprisingly, therefore, Koreans were bitter at Japan's persistent refusal to amend her past ruthlessness by a "sincere apology." They were adamant that Japan pay in word and deed for Korea's material as well as spiritual sufferings.

More specifically, the Korean attitude toward Japan was one of resentment, hostility, fear and envy, but above all, suspicion—suspicion deeply embedded in history, especially recent history. To them, all Korean economic development during Japanese rule was accomplished through Korean sacrifice. Politically and

culturally the very existence of their nation was disregarded by the Japanese. These attitudes have recently been strengthened by Japan's stand on such issues as the Kubota statement that Japanese colonialism was beneficial to the Koreans.[21] In Japan's refusal to admit until early 1965 guilt for Korea's suffering during the forty years before 1945 and the unkind treatment of their compatriots in Japan,[22] the Koreans found the enemy still arrogant. They resented the "Japanese penchant for regarding anything done by Koreans as reckless," to the extent of branding the capture of Japanese fishing boats within the Rhee Line as "robbery."[23] An official Korean report of Korean-Japanese relations makes explicit the belief that the Japanese have elected not to treat the Korean as an equal. Although the Japanese rule had ended, "the Japanese have not been able to forget their old role as conqueror and in all dealings with the Republic of Korea have exhibited a badly conceived attitude of smug superiority and contempt for everything Korean."[24]

Only a few opinion polls of Korean attitudes toward Japan were obtainable. In May, 1962, the leading Korean newspaper, *Kyŏnghyang shinmun*, in co-operation with the Korean Social Statistical Center, interviewed 2,723 Koreans of various ages about their feelings toward and beliefs about Japan, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, the Philippines, the Republic of China, South Vietnam, India, and the Soviet Union. The evaluation classifications in this survey were "very good," "good," "not so bad," "bad," and "very bad." Under the category of "very bad," Japan was ranked second (5.8 per cent) to the Soviet Union (44.2 per cent), which showed how intensely anti-Communist the South Koreans were as a result of the Korean War. Equally significant was that Japan was ranked as "very good," after the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, and the Republic of China.[25]

About the same time, 585 college students from nine universities in Seoul took part in an attitudinal survey conducted by the Sŏnggyungwan University and the Korean Social Statistical Center. Of these students 60.2 per cent held Japan responsible for the stagnation of Japanese-Korean negotiations and accused her of insincerity. More than half, 55.4 per cent, believed that Japa-

nese-Korean relations should be normalized only on a step-by-step basis depending on Japanese moves. Moreover, 56.8 per cent believed the deadlock in Japanese-Korean diplomacy was caused by Japan's insincerity toward Korean property claims.[26] More than half of them also opposed the importation of Japanese goods, while only 13.5 per cent favored it.[27]

Even the military dictatorship, in spite of its disrespect for free speech and press, was apparently reluctant to suppress anti-Japanese news articles, which defied junta policy to make some headway in talks with Japan. Although the press ridiculed the policy as "bent-kneed," the military rulers seemed willing to suffer the insult. Note the tone of the following editorial in the leading Korean magazine, *Sasangge*:

> . . . during the fifty years of colonial rule our nation suffered unprecedented exploitation and oppression and in the end was degraded like a slave until we lost our own language and family names.
>
> We cannot help but feel national shame at the servile bent-kneed posture taken by the military regime recently toward the Japanese side and, taking advantage of this, the arrogant high posture taken by the Japanese government.
>
> Before long, Korean businessmen will be degraded to comprador capitalists of Japanese business circles and the traitorous pro-Japanese clique will grow dominant again; there are too many fears that using these people as a foothold, dishonest political money may end up disgracing the politics of our country.[28]

The state of mind of the Korean masses toward their former masters is not really so obvious, however. It is mainly among Korean intellectuals that bitterness, hostility, and fear are substantial. They are the leaders of burning nationalism and are hypersensitive about national pride, particularly in relation to Japan. This is not to say that the masses are indifferent. A high-ranking Japanese diplomat observed a few years ago that "even the most pro-Japanese Koreans still harbor a grudge fostered by thirty-six years' occupation by Japan. . . . It is their raw spot; if it is touched, even a faithful servant snaps at his Japanese master."[29]

Underneath persistent resentment, mistrust, and antipathy lies a latent feeling of friendship and admiration for the Japa-

nese. This stems from Korean intimacy with Japanese civilization.[30] Koreans envy but also respect Japan's miraculous recovery in the postwar era. The constant inflow of an enormous volume of Japanese books and magazines since the Second Republic, and the desire to learn from Japan attest to this. As a Japanese newsman reported recently, "there should be quite a few among the Japanese visitors to the peninsula who are surprised at the unexpected kindness and special friendship shown by Koreans toward them."[31] This ambivalence points to a paradox: many Koreans seem torn between admiration for and hostility toward Japan.

II

After the signing of the Japanese peace treaty at San Francisco in September, 1951, the first and historic preliminary conference between Japan and Korea was convened on October 20, 1951, in Tokyo, at the behest of the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers). As a precondition for the normalization of diplomatic relations, Korea insisted that Japan recognize the invalidity of the treaty of annexation (1910) from the start. The Koreans believe that the treaty had been forced upon them under duress. As if they were a righteous victor facing a wicked, defeated nation, the Korean delegates challenged Japan to demonstrate her desire to live in peace with her former colony. They also demanded an enormous compensation for Korean suffering during the colonial period.[32] William Sebald, who represented the SCAP at the conference, recalls:

> With more hope than optimism, I made an opening statement designed to encourage both sides to take a broad approach toward solving their many outstanding problems. Iguchi [the chief Japanese delegate] followed with a conciliatory and friendly statement, calling for give-and-take on both sides. Yang [the chief Korean negotiator] then proceeded to deliver a scorching indictment of Japanese actions in Korea. . . . He included demands for payment of an indemnity so large that it would have bankrupted Japan.[33]

The Japanese seemed utterly unprepared for such demands. Japan stubbornly refused to make amends or admit the slightest regret for the colonial past, insisting that she had developed

Korea. Instead of being prepared to offer any apology or show any remorse, she seemed "to expect a show of gratitude for the exploitation of Korea and the calculated repression of whatever capacities for self-government the Koreans possessed."[34]

These contradictory expectations rendered the conduct of diplomacy most difficult. The clash of self-righteous national egos culminated in the so-called Kubota statement in 1953. The chief Japanese delegate, Kubota Kanichirō, presumably provoked by the Koreans' insistence that the Japanese had only exploited their country and that Japan had no property claims, retorted, "It does not make sense that we do not have the right to claims while your side does." Thus Korea should compromise, as Japan "is willing to do so."[35] In the ensuing sharp exchange of views, Kubota argued in effect that:

> (1) The repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea was a violation of international law; (2) the establishment of the ROK by the United States and the UN prior to the Japanese Peace Treaty was a violation of international law; (3) the Cairo Declaration by the Allied Powers that there existed an enslavement of the Koreans was nothing but war hysteria; (4) the turning over of Japanese property to the Korean government by the American military government in Korea was a violation of international law in spite of its being written into the Japanese Peace Treaty and also that Japan made an unconditional surrender; and (5) the 36 years of Japanese occupation of Korea were beneficial to the Koreans.[36]

The last point was most offensive to the Koreans, who, probably more than anything else, were anxious to make the Japanese listen to and respect them in order to improve their national reputation. Nothing, as Douglas Mendel noted, "could have been calculated to irritate Korean sensitivities more."[37] Kubota compounded the insult by making disparaging remarks about the legal status of the Seoul government and by questioning the validity of the confiscation of Japanese property in Korea.[38]

So enraged were the Koreans that they refused to meet their erstwhile enemy again at the conference table until Japan officially withdrew the Kubota statement. On October 23 the Korean mission in Tokyo charged Japan with insincerity and demanded that the Japanese admit that "Mr. Kubota's remarks were

wrong."[39] No such admission was forthcoming. More than that, the Korean government was charged with the responsibility for the breakdown of the talks on the ground that Kubota's remarks were nothing more than "trivial" personal views, and that it was unprecedented for any government to ask for a retraction of a statement made in an international conference.[40] The government spokesman told the Diet that the talks "had to be discontinued . . . owing to the high-handed attitude of the Korean side."[41]

The Japanese were doubtless aggrieved by the Korean proclamation establishing what the Japanese called the "Rhee Line" and the Koreans called the "Peace Line," which demarcated an extensive maritime zone around the Korean peninsula primarily against Japanese fishermen.[42] The maritime line extended, on the average, about sixty miles out from the Korean coast enclosing extensive fishing grounds for mackerel and horse mackerel, "the richest in Japan's neighboring waters."[43] From 1952 to 1964, 282 Japanese fishing vessels and 2,784 crew members were seized by the Korean authorities for poaching.[44] The captured Japanese were interned in a compound in Pusan and released after serving their terms. Sometimes even those who served their sentences were not released immediately, an action which the Japanese condemned as "hostage diplomacy." Even Japanese public vessels were on occasion detained by Korea. It is a credit indeed to the Japanese leaders that although some Japanese called for the adoption of a stronger policy, their patrol boats around the Rhee Line were under strict orders not to return Korean fire or use force.

Contrary to the Korean contention that the Rhee Line was based on "well established international precedents," Japan maintained that the line was not based on fully established international law, that the seizure of Japanese fishing boats violated the principle of the freedom of the high seas. Japan argued further that the line had been established largely for "hostage diplomacy" and political gains.[45]

Within this boundary lies a cluster of barren and economically insignificant islets and surrounding reefs less than a tenth of a square mile in area. Naturally it has both Japanese and

Korean names—Takeshima and Dokto, respectively.[46] The islets are occupied by Korea. However, on occasion the Japanese planted territorial signposts on them, which were removed by their opponents. In July, 1953, when the Japanese tried to land, they were fired upon by Korean fishing vessels carrying armed police; both governments protested.[47] In July, 1954, Korean guards were stationed on Dokto. The following month, a lighthouse was erected; a warning was issued that Japanese boats attempting to invade the islets would be fired upon.[48] In late 1954 the Seoul government issued a new stamp bearing a picture of Dokto, causing the Tokyo government to announce that all mail displaying the stamp would be returned or confiscated.[49]

Frustrated by these tough measures, including Korea's refusal to accept deportees from Japan except on Korean terms, and also possibly pressured by public opinion among its own fishermen, Japan decided to withdraw all property claims and the Kubota statement in December, 1957.[50] Yet the Koreans refused to compromise on the Peace Line issue and continued to seize, though in much smaller numbers, Japanese fishing vessels. Understandably, tough enforcement of the Peace Line, liberation of Takeshima, and demands for repentance were taken by the Japanese as blatant insults to the nation's pride. As Ivan I. Morris puts it tersely, the abuse of Japan by Russia or Communist China might have been inevitable, but that she should be defied by Korea appeared as the "very acme of national humiliation."[51]

The Japanese decided to act decisively on another thorny issue, the impoverished Koreans in Japan, by responding to the North Korean call for their repatriation to North Korea.[52] The decision was made without even a token consultation with the Seoul government. Still worse, as an editorial in the New York *Times* pointed out, the Japanese "have known all along that such a repatriation plan would be regarded as intolerable by the free Koreans."[53]

Japan seemed determined to get rid of as many Korean residents as possible, no matter where they were destined. Allegedly, they not only caused a drain on the Japanese treasury, but also constituted a powerful lever for Seoul in its bargaining with Tokyo. Koreans were adamant that the minority be given just

and humane treatment. Moreover, many Koreans were Communist or pro-Communist, making them suspect as a potential, if not the real, bulwark of the Japan Communist party.[54] Above all, Japan probably expected that the repatriation crisis would result in a Korean compromise on the Rhee Line, which she regarded as the crux of her discord with Seoul.

South Korea called the repatriation "deportation" into "Communist enslavement," whereas the Japanese labeled it a "humanitarian" measure based on the principle of residential freedom and on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[55] When Washington refused to intervene in this repatriation crisis, the unhappy, disgraced Rhee regime not only suspended the Japan-Korea conference and trade with Japan, but also went so far as to hint at the use of force.[56] To the dismay of South Korea, about 85,000 Koreans were shipped to North Korea after the first repatriation agreement went into force in 1959.

Considered in the context of the cold war, the repatriation movement boosted the prestige of Communists as a large group of free people sought a Communist homeland. It also discredited the free world to which both Japan and Korea belonged. In a sense, it was an important victory for the Communists' skillfully executed "peace movement" offensive. Furthermore, the repatriation program testified again to the decline in the international effort to protect minorities in the postwar world. For Japan and Korea, it added one more note of bitterness to their entangled diplomatic relations.

It was not until the downfall of Syngman Rhee, the official architect of doctrinaire anti-Japan policy, in April, 1960 (in the April Revolution) that Korean-Japanese relations began to take on a new look. With the birth of the Second Republic, the Chang regime declared that relations between the two nations "should be normalized as soon as possible."[57] In response to the Korean initiative, Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka visited Seoul in September, 1960. There was a strong demonstration against his visit and against the hoisting of the Japanese flag at his hotel. His Korean counterpart received threatening letters and telephone calls.[58]

Meanwhile, Japanese financial circles decided in January,

1961, to dispatch twenty businessmen, led by Dan Ino, president of Japan-Korea Trade Association, to promote economic exchange between the two countries. The trip, however, had to be cancelled, on official advice from Seoul, as they boarded the plane in Tokyo. The rapid change of official mood in Japan-Korea relations had caused extreme public disapproval and even brought about threats of violence against the proposed mission. The "good-will" mission, said the humiliated Dan, was purely commercial, "just to see what we can buy from the Republic of Korea."[59]

Implicit in the suspension of this trip was the widespread Korean disapproval of Chang's weak, inefficient government, as well as popular rejection of strong political and economic ties with Japan until she showed remorse over the past. Koreans particularly feared—and still fear—that neo-economic colonialism could replace former political subjugation.[60] The fact that the most notable feature of Japan's trade with the peninsula since the Korean War had been the abnormal excess in Japanese exports merely accentuated their fear.[61] Chang was accused by his opponents of being pro-Japanese—a terrible sin in the eyes of Koreans. Such popular disapproval of the pace and manner of Japanese-Korean negotiations under Chang's leadership expressed itself in the famous "Four Basic Principles in Restoring Korean Relations with Japan," adopted in February, 1961, by the lower house of the Korean National Assembly:

> (1) Relations with Japan must progress gradually from limited to full intercourse; (2) the Peace Line must be respected and defended from the standpoint of national security and the protection of fishermen; (3) diplomatic normalization will come only after resolution of important pending problems, particularly settlement for damage and suffering caused by Japanese occupation; and (4) Japanese-Korean economic cooperation other than current trade must be carried out only after the opening of formal diplomatic intercourse under state regulations, within limits that prevent damage to national industry.[62]

The Chang regime was toppled three months later by a military coup. The junta led by Chung Hee Park indicated immediately that its Japan policy was to solve as soon as possible the pending issues between the two nations in a way that would sat-

isfy the Korean people. In proclaiming their readiness for negotiation, the new leaders promised that they did not "intend to repeat the diplomatic faults of Syngman Rhee's regime nor those of the inefficient John M. Chang government."[63] Symbolically, they decided to permit, for the first time since the recovery of Korean sovereignty, Japan's official survey trips to Korea. However, they refused to allow the establishment of a Japanese diplomatic mission.[64]

Thus came a real turning point in Korea's Japan policy, which for so long had been perverted by rigidity and unsophisticated leadership. The defeat of South Korea in the repatriation crisis testified to the isolated, enfeebled position of the Seoul government in the international arena. The junta was convinced that it was imperative to abandon the unimaginative, negative, doctrinaire foreign policy in favor of a pragmatic and positive one.

Single-minded in their concern to reconstruct an economic foundation for a self-supporting society with international prestige, the military leaders resolved to gain the support of Japan for the economic rehabilitation of Korea. Indeed, Park declared, "Economic reconstruction is our total concern."[65] Japan's support of Korea would not only benefit that country economically, but would unquestionably enhance the status of Korea and its new regime in the ever competitive international arena.

The sixth formal conference scheduled to begin on September 20, however, had to be postponed a month, due to a ticklish incident involving Seoul's indigination at the choice of Sugi Michisuke, chairman of the Japanese Trade Promotion Association, as Japan's chief delegate. On October 7, the *Gaimushō* (the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was informed by the Korean Minister to Japan, Lee, of his government's dissatisfaction with the selection of this "unexpected" personality.[66] This meant that Japan had failed to choose one of her leading political figures as chief delegate, despite the fact that Seoul had chosen Hō Chŏng, the former provisional President, and had specifically requested Tokyo to appoint a statesman of comparable stature. The *Gaimushō* bluntly rejected the Korean complaint when Lee demanded a change of chief delegate. Koreans charged Japan

with insincerity, as she seemed unwilling to settle her differences with Korea promptly.[67]

No one in Seoul or the Korean mission in Tokyo had heard of Sugi. The Korean side took the selection as an affront to their national "face." To Korea, the appointment of Sugi, a merchant from Osaka, to face one of their top statesmen was an insult. Even when informed that Sugi was a "big shot" in the Japanese business world, the Korean side still regarded the appointment as unacceptable.[68]

In a way it was unfortunate that Japan neglected to consult Korea concerning the choice of her chief delegate. More unfortunate was the fact that the Japanese still seemed to be unable to comprehend the intensity of Koreans' susceptibility to psychological grievance as it related to a stigma of inferiority. Like most former colonies, as well as other underdeveloped nations, Korea did not want to be insulted by more highly developed countries, much less by the islanders.

Notwithstanding the incident, Park met Ikeda in Tokyo in mid-November, helping to accelerate the pace of subsequent negotiations. The summit conference was followed by a foreign ministers' meeting from March 12 to 17, 1962, which dealt mainly with the property claims issue. But it was not until November, 1962, that Kim Chong-P'il, the Korean CIA chief, and Foreign Minister Ohira reached an informal, tentative agreement on the Korean claim, amounting to five hundred million dollars.[69] The Ohira-Kim understanding marked the real beginning of Japan's positive Korea policy.

Behind the rising trend of such positive policy, there was increasing American pressure on Korea. American aid to Korea was being sharply reduced, in spite of the latter's high trade deficit, continuously low per capita income, and a high level of chronic unemployment. American economic assistance, excluding surplus agricultural commodities imported under PL 480, Title 1, had been reduced from roughly $320,000,000 in 1957 to $119,000,000 in 1963, a cut of 63 per cent.[70] American military assistance had also been reduced. Official denial to the contrary, these cuts foreshadowed Washington's decision to have its Korean aid burden shifted in part to Japan. This decision in turn led

American officials into pressuring Seoul to normalize relations with Tokyo.

Equally significant in the above context was recognition, by both the United States and Japan, of the latter's important role in the Western bloc, especially in Asia. For instance, Prime Minister Ikeda went to Washington to visit President Kennedy in June, 1961, and in the communiqué of June 22 the two leaders agreed to hold close consultations to find ways and means of achieving stability in Asia, and to exchange "views concerning the relations of their respective countries with Korea."[71] In his European trip of late 1962, Ikeda spoke of "diplomacy by three pillars—the United States, Europe and Japan."[72] Further, he stressed Japan's role as a stronghold against "the encroachment of international Communism in East Asia."[73] Indeed, in the words of Ohira, the role of Japan as one of the pillars of the West was "to strengthen the free world in Asia by expediting the Japan-ROK talks . . . and to take over America's aid burden to help developing Southeast Asian nations and extend economic cooperation to them partly to assist America's dollar defense policy . . ."[74]

Added to this, it was unquestionable by the end of 1962, if not earlier, that Japan had fully recovered from the war. When the Ikeda government began a series of policies known as the ten-year "income-doubling" program, it did not come as a complete surprise. As a result, the majority of the Japanese seemed freed from grievance and frustration generated by their defeat in the war. All this, together with the world's recognition of Japan as a pivotal power in a loosely bipolarized world, helped enlarge the vision of conservative Japanese leaders concerning the role of their country in world affairs. They were also concerned with developing outlets in Asia and elsewhere for their growing economy. Moreover, intransigent and self-righteous Syngman Rhee, whom most Japanese had held responsible for the exacerbated discord with their former colony, was no longer reigning. This probably rendered it less penalizing (electorally) for Japan's leaders to undertake cautiously a new, positive step to settle the embarrassingly protracted rift.

The major issue in 1963 was the Rhee Line. Although the

military regime consented to a narrowing of the Korean offshore limits to forty miles, the Japanese insisted on a twelve-mile limit. Nor were many Koreans happy over the concession, since they considered the Rhee Line as their lifeline against Japan.

Once the Third Korean Republic was inaugurated in December, 1963, under his presidency, Park, confident of his consolidation of power, started to push Japanese-Korean talks in a highly pragmatic, resolute spirit. From March, 1964, the agricultural ministers of the two countries began making progress on the Rhee Line issue, and by the end of that month the fishery talks seemed to have reached a final stage.

The opposition forces in both countries, however, were unhappy over such progress. The opposition parties in Korea formed the Pan-National Struggle Committee for Opposing Humiliating Diplomacy. It vowed to use all means to prevent the success of the Tokyo talks. A leading opposition figure called upon the Koreans to rise up against Park's Japan policy, asserting that "in doing so, we must unite . . . as we did during the 1919 anti-Japanese rising."[75] The Japanese were not silent either; sixteen thousand Japanese Leftists rallied against the Tokyo talks, while pledging to form a united front against the government's Korea policy.[76]

Most serious of all, under the slogan of "Defend the Rhee Line to death," the greatest demonstration since the April Revolution of 1960, attended by more than sixty thousand students in eleven cities, took place toward the end of March. About five hundred opposition party leaders joined the demonstrations. Park's courageous statement that if "there were any dishonest secret deals in the [Japanese-Korean] negotiations, I would be willing to be called a traitor and punished" did not assuage the students.[77] In early July Park was compelled to declare martial law after street violence erupted in Seoul.[78]

To appease the opposition parties and students, the Korean Home Minister ordered the police coast guard to step up patrols and seize all Japanese fishing boats violating the Rhee Line. The Foreign Minister was even more emphatic, declaring that the Japanese boats would be captured "without mercy."[79]

In sharp contrast, Ohira and Ikeda told the Diet that Japan

should be sympathetic and understanding toward Korea. Ikeda specifically advised Japanese people to refrain from "going too far" in criticizing the internal situation of Korea.[80] Ohira also ordered the *Gaimushō* to map a concrete plan to extend aid to Korea at an early date.[81] Needless to say, these magnanimous gestures were emblematic of self-assurance in the conduct of Japan's new Korea policy.

It was not until December 7 that the seventh Japanese-Korean conference was formally convened, followed by Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to Korea in February, 1965, at the invitation of the Seoul government. In spite of hostile Korean demonstrations against his visit, Shiina made an epoch-making gesture toward Korea—he expressed official regret for the past:

> We must express our regret . . . over the unhappy relations which have existed between our two nations during a certain period in the long history of the two countries, and over which Japan is engaged in serious self-reflection.[82]

Korea was further gratified by his statement to the Diet that it was wrong for Japan to have ruled Korea during the prewar years.[83] This was the first time a Japanese Foreign Minister had made such a statement officially.

Such rapid progress in Japanese-Korean negotiations reflected the dynamic interaction between the international system and its subsystems. North Korea's Afro-Asian diplomacy worried the Seoul government. In January, 1964, the Peking government was recognized by France, and in October that government detonated its first atom bomb. As a consequence, the Japanese began seriously to re-examine their international role and responsibilities. One result was the demand for an independent Japanese foreign policy. Secondly, the Japanese came to alter their strategic outlook, particularly in relation to Korea and China, a fact clearly indicated in two comprehensive defense studies by Japanese military planners. One study, code-named "Flying Dragon," hypothesized a second Korean conflict, in which the Japanese homeland would be subjected to retaliatory Chinese measures because of Japan's alliance with the United States.[84] The study was undoubtedly an expression of Japan's heightened alarm about China.

Indeed, Prime Minister Sato told the Diet that China was "threat enough without being armed with nuclear weapons. This threat to Japan's security is real, now that China is a nuclear power."[86] The other study, known as the "Three Arrow Project," was completed in the spring of 1964. It provided for the emergency dispatch of Japanese troops to South Korea in the event of another Korean war, coupled with a simultaneous attack against Japan.[88]

In addition, in January, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk stopped over in Tokyo and Seoul, giving covert encouragement to the normalization of relations. In October, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, while denying the American mediatory role in the Japanese-Korean conflict, nevertheless stated that "there will be absolutely no change" in the American commitment to help Korea economically and militarily. This was an apparent attempt to allay Koreans' intense fear of Japan's economic encroachments following a diplomatic settlement.[87] His pledge was reaffirmed by President Johnson in his conversation with President Park in Washington.

At last, on June 22, 1965, Japan and Korea signed the Basic Relations Treaty, four agreements, and related minutes, despite the rising tide of anti-treaty sentiment in both countries. The treaty called for the exchange of embassies and consular representation; the four agreements concerned Korea's property claims and economic co-operation, fisheries, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, and the return of Korea's cultural assets taken by Japan during its colonial occupation. Very briefly, the agreements provided: payment by Japan of eight hundred million dollars (three hundred million more than the amount promised in the Ohira-Kim understanding), three hundred million dollars of it in nonrepayable grants-in-aid; establishment of the exclusive fishing areas of both countries inside boundaries twelve miles offshore; guarantees to Korean residents in Japan of permanent resident rights and equal status with Japanese in admission to public schools and qualification for social security benefits; and the return of Korean cultural objects in the possession of the Japanese government.[88] As for the ownership problem of Dokto, both sides agreed to solve it after diplomatic relations were formally established.[89]

In his special message on the signing of these documents, Park declared that the current world situation "makes it imperative for us to normalize our diplomatic relations with Japan. We can hardly wipe out our past rancor. But if so doing promotes our cause, will it not be more patriotic to become friends with our past enemy?" And he concluded that the Japanese "have robbed us of national independence, killed our forefathers, and pillaged our properties," but "we cannot stick to our old rancor in this practical world of today."[90]

Although Korea had much more to gain than Japan from renewed contact, many Koreans, especially a large segment of the intellectuals, feared that diplomatic normalization would open their country once more to Japanese economic colonization. In Seoul the opposition Minjung party, as well as students, called the agreements "sell-out" concessions. They contended that the Park government had bartered away the just claim of the Koreans for a meager recompense. More than 60 opposition members, including former President Yun Po-Sŏn, resigned from the National Assembly in the hope of forcing new elections. In the wake of their resignation, a group of university students also demanded dissolution of the Assembly, pledging to wage a "bloody struggle" if the treaty should be ratified despite the opposition boycott.[91] More than 350 college professors joined the anti-treaty campaign, issuing a declaration that called the treaty humiliating and unequal.[92]

On August 14, however, the National Assembly ratified the treaty in the absence of the opposition members. The Minjung party declared the ratification null and void.[93] The opposition members and the students continued their demonstrations, and on August 26 a division of front-line troops had to be called into Seoul to quell the student riots. Park issued a stern warning: "From this very moment the government will resolutely block demonstrations regardless of their size, which would lead the nation to ruin and benefit nobody but the Communists."[94]

It was now the Japanese turn to ratify the treaty. The lower house was the scene of riotous behavior by the Socialists when the Korean treaty was approved on November 12. The upper house was kept idle for weeks from then by the Socialists' boy-

cott. In opposing the treaty, the leftists vowed to surpass in fury the anti-security treaty riots that had ended the Kishi government and caused the cancellation of a state visit by President Eisenhower in 1960. They charged that the treaty made a divided Korea permanent and obstructed the unification of South and North, thus increasing the danger of war throughout Asia. To embarrass the government, they contended that the treaty was American-inspired, secretly intended to foster a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul-Taipei military alliance against China, Russia, and North Korea, and that the Park administration was neither stable nor democratic. To fan popular opposition, they pointed out that the government had reneged on its pledge to the people and made large concessions to the Koreans, especially on the question of the sovereignty of Takeshima and the proposed payment of the Korean claim. They also tried to associate the treaty with American and South Korean involvement in Vietnam, which many Japanese fear.[95] In comparison with the riots of 1960, however, anti-treaty demonstrations were small and peaceful.

On December 11, the Japanese side completed the ratification when the upper house approved the Korean pacts. Finally, a week later, the amity accords went into effect after a solemn ceremony in Seoul. Foreign Minister Shiina remarked on the occasion, "Before us, at long last, the door has been opened for a new and glorious history."[96] The ceremony was historic indeed, marking the formal ending of fourteen years' bitter diplomacy, if not of a half-century's rancorous conflict, between the two close neighbors. Moreover, to consummate diplomatic normalization in the face of violent opposition intent upon capitalizing on the pervasive forces of fear and prejudice was a real triumph for the courageous and imaginative leadership of both the Sato and Park governments.

III

Japan's image of Korea, and Korea's of Japan, were born of their gross difference in power; the conqueror-conquered relationship of the past; the bitterness, frustration, and fears of the Koreans; and the superiority complex of the Japanese. The great

scars opened by the past and kept open by the long drawn-out postwar diplomatic conflict have not been closed, but remain as deep and abiding as ever. This is not to imply that the protracted bitter discord between the two was made inevitable by historical backgrounds, prejudices, and power imbalance. One need only turn to the relations between Vietnam (North and South) and France. The war for independence there was much bloodier than the Koreans' fight for liberation. Yet once independence from France was attained, relations with her became normal. So did Algerian relations with France and Indian relations with Great Britain. Although some might disagree, even Dutch-Indonesian relations have not been as bitter as the Japanese-Korean. The differentiating factor in the Japan-Korea case in contrast to those of other countries with colonial experiences is the intense and pervasive prejudice of both sides.

Japanese and Western observers used to attribute the Japanese-Korean estrangement to Syngman Rhee; they expected his disapparance to bring about rapprochement. Rhee's "greatest invective," charges Richard C. Allen, "was reserved for Japan," and alone in Asia, he "pursued a policy of attempting to isolate Japan from the Free World." Rather than attempt to resolve the differences with Japan, he "sought to compound them by a deliberate policy of encouraging anti-Japanese sentiment in the Korean populace."[97] Such criticism is not without foundation. For example, Japanophobia was incorporated into his educational policy. For a long time he resisted making any distinction between the Japanese and the Communists. Thus when some foreign reporters spoke of a few Japanese troops coming to the peninsula during the Korean War to help the UN forces, Rhee remarked that in that case the Korean soldiers would withdraw from the front lines to battle the Japanese. Few Japanese were allowed even to set foot on Korean soil while he held the reins of government; he did not even want Japanese nationals to help rebuild Korea during and after the Korean War.[98]

Probably he, like most Koreans, suspected and feared Japan more than he hated her; he said once to Claude A. Buss that it was difficult for him to imagine "a Japanese *kimono* without a knife in the sleeve."[99] His doctrinaire anti-Japanese policy began

to emerge after Japan demanded the return of her property in Korea. Rhee was especially angered by this demand in view of the Koreans' desperate fight for their very existence against the North Korean and Chinese Communists who were playing havoc with their country. Furthermore, he was not unaware of Japan's phenomenal prosperity, generated in large measure by the "special procurements" of Japanese goods and services for the execution of the war, and for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. He must have resented this historical irony. He was alarmed, if not frightened, by the extreme imbalance that began to develop in Japanese-Korean trade, in favor of the former enemy.

Such resentment and fear, though they might seem irrational in light of the practical, objective needs of an underdeveloped and impoverished Korea, were not felt by Rhee alone. Most Koreans harbored, though by no means with equal intensity, similar ideas at that time.[100] Indeed, Boulding has pointed out, "It would be quite fallacious to think of the images as being cleverly imposed on the mass by the powerful. If anything, the reverse is the case: the image is essentially a mass image. . . . Especially in the case of the old, long established nations, the powerful share the mass image rather than impose it."[101]

To reiterate, while Rhee's boundless Japanophobia must not be played down, his hostility, resentment, and fear of Japan are still shared in one way or another by many Koreans, as the Dan mission incident, the famous four principles toward Japan, and the wide-scale student riots testify. Even President Park, whose attitude of eagerness for better relations with Japan has been more constructive than that of any other politician in either country, wrote a few years ago: "We do not . . . want to pass over the past deeds of Japan. . . . Even if our property claims are solved, the spiritual damages done during the decades of domination are not easily forgotten."[102] To a great extent, these bitter thoughts, coupled with the prejudice of the Japanese against their former subjects, help account for the long unresolved diplomatic conflict between the two nations.

A simple expression of regret and apology from Japan over her colonial rule might have paved the way more readily toward reconciliation. But as a high *Gaimushō* official confided to Law-

rence Olson, "public opinion will not allow us to take the initiative toward Korea."[103] Such public opinion, however, was merely intensified by Korea's posturing as a victorious power, persistent pretense to the virtues of innocence and moral superiority, and overt manifestations of hostility. And it was not until Japan emerged as the great power of Asia that she chose to express her regret.

The present analysis, therefore, tends to support the interpretation that diplomatic issues were not necessarily the roots of the tragic antipathy between Japan and Korea. Not that the issues in conflict were unreal or that they could have been easily resolved, but rather they were reflections of the highly emotion-laden historical and sociopsychological tensions between the two nations. Manifestations of enmity, arrogance, distrust, fear, and pride have found explicit as well as implicit expression in the substance and style of their diplomacy, rendering prompt diplomatic adjustment difficult and painful.

While Japan's foreign policy objectives demanded amicable relations with Korea—a geopolitical dagger pointed at the heart of Japan—she could not, or was unwilling to, satisfy readily the Korean demand for an apology for suffering inflicted during the colonial rule. This unwillingness must, to an extent, be attributed to the Korean propensity to harp continuously on the evils of Japanese colonialism, and their occasional reckless treatment of Japanese fishermen. But an early formal expression of regret and apology might have gone a long way toward convincing the Koreans of Japan's intention to live amicably with her former subject. A nation highly advanced technologically and adequate militarily which refused to defend with force its fishermen against a much weaker, underdeveloped neighbor is unlikely to pursue aggressively imperialistic goals in the near future. To that extent, there is considerable credibility in the often professed Japanese claim that they have no designs on Korea. But the weight of this claim has been minimized by the continual insulting of Korea which perpetuates her grievance and fear. The epitome of the insult is found in the living example of the plight of Korean residents in Japan.[104] In such a situation, it is hard to trust in Japan's good intentions.

In view of the highly pragmatic measures adopted by Japan and Korea since late 1962 to settle their conflict, some may contend that the evidence presented here is insufficient to support the hypothesis which was suggested initially. But where the nexus between historical, sociopsychological tensions on one hand, and the substance and style of the two countries' diplomacy on the other is identified, it should be clear that the linkage does exist. What other evidence is more convincing than the fact that the settlement of the rift did not come before the fourteen years' bitter diplomacy? Whether or not the established relationship between the national images and the substance and style of diplomacy has strengthened the hypothesis must await further research.[105] A crucial theoretical question here is whether the national image—be it endogenous or exogenous—is a significant variable in the study of *any* international conflict. This is certainly an area requiring more research, since there has been little rigorous effort so far to relate national images to international conflict. Even less readily available are systematic studies showing the relationship between the national image and the systemic variables on the international level.[106] This relationship would seem to require much more attention than it has been given in light of the formal resolution of the Japan-Korea conflict despite the fact that the two nations like each other "as little as any two people on earth."[107]

Japanese-Korean relations are now making a fresh start amidst lingering memories of hostility, resentment, fear, and contempt. So the day has arrived when the two nations must try to take more sophisticated attitudes toward each other in search of common goals. Prime Minister Sato aptly told the Diet recently: "The enactment of the treaty and agreements between Japan and the Republic of Korea is the beginning of Japanese-Korean relations."[108]

It is imperative that Japan and Korea strive to modify the existent national ethos to meet successfully the broad challenge for co-operation in the nuclear age. This task requires, above all, visionary and dedicated leaders to help stimulate better understanding, sympathy, and tolerance of one another. Not that better relations between any two nations inevitably follow improved

understanding of one another. In the present world where the bell tolls for us all, however, little benefit can be derived for any nation from uncritical and unrestrained emotional displays or cries for national uniqueness, self-righteousness, superiority, and hatred.

Ikeda, Sato, and Park seemed to believe in the above imperative, even admitting it as such, in spite of violent opposition. Indeed, it is a tribute to these and other leaders, especially to Sato and Park, that they have started to lead the public in their respective countries toward a growing recognition that co-operation between the two neighbors is only common sense in a highly competitive world antagonistically divided and heavily armed.

NOTES

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1. See for example R. Fisher (ed.), *International Conflict and Behavioral Science* (New York, 1964); H. C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York, 1965); O. Klineberg, *The Human Dimension In International Relations* (New York, 1965); E. B. McNeil (ed.), *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965); J. D. Singer (ed.), *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago, 1965). See also D. J. Hekhuis *et al.* (ed.), *International Stability* (New York, 1964), Chap. 3; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, 1962), Chap. 16; V. Van Dyke, *International Politics* (2d ed.; New York, 1966), Chaps. 8, 9.

2. Q. Wright, "Development of a General Theory of International Relations," *The Role of Theory in International Relations*, ed. H. V. Harrison (Princeton, 1964), pp. 42–43. See also his "Design for a Research Project on International Conflict and the Factors Causing Their Aggravation or Amelioration," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (1957), 263–275.

3. K. E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 120. See also his *The Image* (Ann Arbor, 1956); and L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill., 1957).

4. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," p. 141.

5. W. J. Jorden, "Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West," in *Japan Between East and West*, ed. H. Borton *et al.* (New York, 1957), p. 250.

6. Numerous articles on these issues have been written, mainly in the Japanese and Korean languages. To my knowledge, no book analyzing them comprehensively has been published. Exceptions may be Republic of Korea,

Han-il hoedam pyaekso (The Korea-Japan Talks White Paper) (Seoul, 1965); and Naokichi Tanaka, *Nihon o ugokasu nikkan kankei* (The Japanese-Korean Relations and Japan) (Tokyo, 1963).

7. According to Japanese history, the three kingdoms of ancient Korea were subdued in 200 A.D. by the Japanese Empress Regent Jingu. Their hoary legend says that "Empress Jingu put a stone in her sash to delay the birth of her child in order to make the expedition against Korea. The god Sumiyoshi was the pilot of her fleet, and when a storm arose, big fishes came to the surface of the sea to prevent her boats from floundering. When the empress returned to Japan, she gave birth to the Emperor Ojin, who later was deified as Hachiman, the Shinto god of war" (T. McNelly, *Contemporary Government of Japan* [Boston, 1959], pp. 198–199). Although this episode, including the date, has little historical validity, it was once widely used by the Japanese as proof of Japan's superiority over Korea.

8. Admittedly the term "cultural genocide" is rather strong, but is not an exaggeration at all. In summing up the Japanese record as Korea's overlord, Edwin O. Reischauer, who can scarcely be accused of being a pro-Korean scholar, writes that throughout these colonial years the Koreans were "cruelly dominated and exploited by their Japanese masters. Virtually all positions of leadership had been monopolized by Japanese. Very few Koreans had been allowed to gain any knowledge of problems of government . . . Korea was in fact a police state. . . . [T]he Koreans had been forbidden any sense of national pride or even of national identity; they were to become second-class Japanese. They were prohibited the use of their own language. . . . They were denied all freedom of opinion; nothing but complete and servile submission to Japan was tolerated. [T]he spiritual oppression of the Koreans was more terrible than anything we have known in modern times outside . . . the Nazi concentration camp. . . . Korean bodies were of use to the Japanese militarists, but there were to be no Korean souls" *Wanted: An Asian Policy* [New York, 1955], pp. 16–17.

A serious lack of impartial studies of Japanese colonialism in Korea derives partly from deliberately Japanese reticence. Available studies, quite apart from their accuracy or anything else, are open to more than one interpretation, according to whether the Japanese rule is indicated as ruthless exploitation or as beneficence. See A. J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York, 1944); and Hatada Takashi, *Chōsen shi* (Korean History) (Tokyo, 1951). Professor Hatada is one of the leading Japanese scholars on Korean history. Cf. Chōsen sotokufu, *Shisei sanjūnen shi* (History of Thirty Years of Colonial Administration) (Keijō, 1940).

9. Bank of Chōsen, *Economic History of Chōsen* (Keijō, 1920), p. 11.

10. Shinosaki Heiji, *Zainichi chōsenjin undō* (The State of Koreans in Japan) (Tokyo, 1955), p. 190. See also Kaigai jijō chōsasho (ed.), *Chōsen yōran* (Korea Handbook) (Tokyo, 1960), p. 178; Hirano Yoshitarō, *Asia no minzoku kaihō* (The Liberation of Asian Peoples) (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 344–348; and W. Sheldon, *The Honorable Conquerors* (New York, 1965), pp. 215–216.

11. American Embassy, Tokyo, *Daily Survey of Japanese Press* (February 20, 1958), p. 5.

12. Iizuka Kōji *et al.* (ed.), *Gendai asia shi* (Modern Asian History), Vol. IV of *Sekai shi ni okeru asia* (Asia in World History) (Tokyo, 1956), p. 87. These negative attitudes were attributed to ignorance about Korea and to blind conformity to the influence of parents and mass media (*ibid.*).

13. Izumi Yasuichi, "Nihonjin no jinshuteki henken" (Racial Prejudice among the Japanese), *Sekai* (March 1965), pp. 85 ff. Professor Izumi teaches cultural anthropology at Tokyo University.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. Kuzutani Takamasa, "Minzokuteki kōaku to sono jinshuteki yōin" (National Likes and Dislikes and Their Racial Factors), *Kyōiku shinrigaku kenkyū*, VIII (1960), 8–17. See also in the same issue of the journal Tatsuo Haratani *et al.*, "Minzokuteki stereotype to kōaku kanjō ni tsuite no ichi-kōsatsu" (A Study of National Stereotypes, and Likes and Dislikes), pp. 1–7; Tōkei sūri kenkyūsho, Kokuminsei chōsa iinkai (ed.), *Nihonjin no kokuminsei* (The Japanese National Character) (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 335–345; M. Wilburn, "Some Findings of Japanese Public Opinion Polls," in Borton, *Japan Between East and West*, pp. 300–306.

17. Cited in Iizuka, *Gendai asia shi*, p. 89. Hugh H. Smythe, however, says, "Japanese racialism, rising out of a rigid class pattern and an abhorrence of an intranational group physically like themselves, shows itself most forcefully . . . in Japanese antipathy towards the Koreans." See his "A Note on Racialism in Japan," *American Sociological Review*, XVI (1951), 822–824.

18. Izumi, "Nihonjin no jinshuteki henken," p. 86.

19. L. Olson, "The Elite, Industrialism, and Nations: Japan," in *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development*, ed. K. H. Silvert (New York, 1963), pp. 416–417.

20. Yung Tai Pyun, *Korea, My Country* (Seoul, 1954), p. 68.

21. See below, pp. 41–42.

22. See below, n. 52.

23. "Nikkan kaidan o kentō suru" (The Japanese-Korean Conference is Examined), Symposium, *Sekai* (February, 1964), p. 49.

24. Republic of Korea (ROK), Office of Public Information, *Korea and Japan* (Seoul, 1954), p. 8.

25. *Kyŏnghyang shinmun*, May 15, 1962; see also Ko Byŏng-Wu, "Hanku-kin ui tai-il kwan" (Korean Image of Japan), *Sasangge* (October, 1964), pp. 64–72.

26. *Korean Republic*, May 27, 1962.

27. *Kyŏnghyang shinmun*, May 15, 1962. One might be tempted to attribute the unfavorable Korean image of the Japanese to the ignorance of the average Korean about the new Japan. Such a conclusion might seem cogent, inasmuch as Korea had little access to comprehensive, objective information about Japan during the Rhee era, except for what came through official chan-

nels. The government information media such as the *Korean Republic* merely reinforced the strong Japanophobia of Korean intellectuals by anti-Japanese headlines such as "Japan's deception," "Japan's trade duplicity," "Japan broke promises," "Japan—the arsenal of Communism," and the like. See *Korean Republic*, August–December, 1955. See also Kawashima Fujiya, "A Study of the Attitudes of Korean Political Leaders Toward Japan Under the Syngman Rhee and the Military Regime" (Master's thesis, Yonsei University, 1964), pp. 84–85. But it is not realistic or even logical to place all the blame for Korean attitudes on inaccuracy of information or ignorance. For instance, after Rhee's downfall nearly all the leading Korean newspapers, while urging the normalization of Japanese-Korean relations, demanded a firm Japan policy. They demanded that Japan recognize the traumatic experiences of the Koreans under her colonialism. Such leading papers as *Hankuk ilbo* in late 1962 repeatedly attacked the Tokyo government for its tardy response to Korean diplomatic initiatives and its insincerity in negotiating with Koreans. See *ibid.*, p. 93.

28. Editorial, *Sasangge*, August, 1965.

29. Ushiroku Tarao, "The ROK a I Saw It," *Shinwa* (November 1962), in American Embassy, Tokyo, *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines* (February 4, 1963), p. 11. Mr. Ushiroku was the chief of Asian Bureau, *Gaimushō*.

30. Conlon Associates, *United States Foreign Policy: Asia*, Study No. 5, prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 116.

31. Matsumoto Hirokazu, *Gekidō suru kankoku* (The Republic of Korea in Convulsion) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 186–187.

32. For the opening speech of the Korean chief delegate at the conference, see *Korean Report* (1952–1955), II (1955), pp. 53–55.

33. W. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan* (New York, 1965), p. 288. No official data regarding the exact amount of the initial Korean demand for compensation were obtainable. According to one source, however, in 1957 Syngman Rhee demanded eight billion dollars. Rhee's reasoning was allegedly based on the assumption that if the Philippines received eight hundred million dollars for four years of military occupation by Japan, Korea should get eight billion dollars for forty years of subjugation. See Mitari Tatsuo *et al.*, "Korea-Japan Diplomacy," *Oriental Economist* (April 1958), p. 188.

34. L. Olson, "Japan and Korea: The Bitter Legacy," *American Universities Field Staff, East Asia Series*, Vol. IX, No. 7 (1960), p. 2.

35. *Asahi shimbun*, October 22, 1965, which has a detailed discussion on the Kubota statement. Extended legalistic analyses of the claims dispute are Yamashita Yasuo, "Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea," *Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 2 (1958), pp. 38–54, and Kwan Sook Park, "Some Criticisms on Japanese Claims for Property in Korea," *Korean Quarterly*, III (1961), pp. 40 ff.

36. ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korea and Japan*, pp. 11–19; You Chan Yang, "The Aspirations of Korea," *Annals*, CCXCIV (July 1954), 44.

37. D. H. Mendel, Jr., *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1961), p. 172.

38. Note Articles 2(A) and 4(B) of the San Francisco peace treaty, which read as follows: "Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claims to Korea. Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in Korea." The text of the treaty is in *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. XIII, January 1–December 31, 1951 (Princeton, 1953), pp. 470–479. Article 4(B) needs some clarification, as it is directly related to the initial American disposition of *all* Japanese property in Korea. Section 2 of USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No. 33 (December 6, 1945) states in part: "The title to all gold, silver, platinum, currency, securities, accounts in financial institutions, valuable papers and any other property . . . owned or controlled by the Government [of Japan] or its nationals is hereby vested in the Military Government of Korea as of 25 September 1945, and all such property is owned by the Military Government in Korea." Cited in ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korea and Japan*, p. 57. See also SCAP, *Summation of Non-Military Affairs in Japan and Korea*, No. 3 (December 1945), p. 199; and E. G. Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York, 1951), pp. 206–211. These confiscated assets were later released to the constitutionally instituted Korean government under the Initial Financial and Property Settlement between the Korean and American governments, signed on September 11, 1948. See ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korea and Japan*, pp. 57–58; and G. M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 96–99. See also Chong-Do Hah, "Bitter Diplomacy: Postwar Japan-Korea Relations," *Studies on Asia, 1964*, ed. R. K. Sakai (Lincoln, Nebr., 1964), pp. 75–79.

39. ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korea and Japan*, p. 19.

40. *Asahi shimbun*, October 22, 1953.

41. Foreign Minister Okazaki's speech at the opening of the Extraordinary Session of the Diet, October 29, 1953. Embassy of Japan, *Press Release*, No. 27 (November 6, 1953).

42. The text of this proclamation is included in Kosaku Tamura, "The Rhee Line and International Law," *Contemporary Japan*, XXII (1953), 389–390. Cf. Il-Yŏng Chŏng, "'P'yŏnghwasŏn' ui kukjepŏpchŏk keunkŏ" ("The Peace Line" and Its Basis in International Law), *Sasanggo* (June 1960), pp. 254–261; and Jong Sung Park, "An Analysis of the Korea-Japan Fishery Dispute," *Korean Quarterly*, V (1963), 65–83.

43. "High Seas and Japanese Fisheries," *Oriental Economist* (June 1960), p. 262.

44. *Chōsa geppō*, No. 115 (July 1965), p. 49. *Chōsa geppō* is an important monthly report issued by the Japanese Cabinet Research Office, and this particular issue is entirely devoted to Korea (North and South), the Japanese-Korean talks, and the Koreans in Japan.

45. For the text of the initial protest of the Japanese government, see Tamura, "The Rhee Line and International Law," pp. 390–391. It was not until 1962 that Japan finally backed down on her insistence that the Korean maritime boundary should be limited to three miles offshore.

46. For a detailed background study on the islets and the official Japanese position, see Japan, *Gaimushō, Takshima no ryōyū* (The Ownership of Takeshima) (Tokyo, 1953). See also Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report* (January 15, 1957), pp. 7–10. For an official account of the Korean side, see ROK, Oemubu, *Oemu haengchŏng ui sipnyŏn* (Ten Years of Foreign Affairs Administration) (Seoul, 1959), pp. 174–179. See also Li Byŏng-Do, *Kukza daekwan* (A Survey of National History) (Seoul, 1948), pp. 455–457; Minagaiwa Akira, "Takeshima ronsō to kokusai hanrei" (Takeshima Controversy and International Legal Precedents), *Kokusaihōgaku no shomondai*, ed. Maebora kyōju kanreki kinen ronbunshū kankō iinkai (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 349–371; Okehata Sekko, "Nipponkai ni okeru takeshima no nissen kankei ni tsuite" (Japanese-Korean relations on Takeshima in the Sea of Japan), *Rekishi chiri*, LV (1930), 590–591; Pak Kyŏng-Nai, "Dokto" (Dokto Islets), *Kukhoe bo*, No. 35 (March 1964), pp. 113–124.

47. *Nippon Times*, July 14, 1953.

48. *Asahi shimbun*, August 29, 1954. Japan tried in September, 1954, to obtain an agreement to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Korea rejected the proposal, arguing that it was a clever strategy by which Japan had everything to gain and nothing to lose (*Nippon Times*, September 25, 1954; *Asahi shimbun*, September 25, 1954).

49. *Asahi shimbun*, November 19, 1954.

50. Japan, *Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō* (Recent Trends of Our Diplomacy) No. 2 (1958), pp. 48–49. Hereafter cited as *Kinkyō*. For the text of the U.S. memorandum, see *Japan Times*, March 9, 1961. See also *Asahi nenkan* (Asahi Annual), *1962*, p. 298; *Kinkyō*, No. 5 (1961), pp. 66–67. It was also agreed to resume the long suspended over-all negotiations on March 1, 1958. The agreement on the mutual release of detainees was concluded, providing for simultaneous release of Japanese fishermen detained in Pusan and Koreans in the Omura compound. Furthermore, to create a better atmosphere for the talks and especially to "consummate the homecoming of detained fishermen as soon as possible," Japan returned secretly 106 of the least valuable items of former Korean cultural property. The secret restoration brought considerable repercussions from the Japanese public, forcing the government spokesman to admit in the Diet that the 106 items "were donated [as distinguished from 'returned'] as gifts to the independent Korea" (*Asahi shimbun*, May 31, 1958; Kimura Shūzō, "Nikkan kōshō no keii" [The Development of Japanese-Korean Negotiations], *Nikkan kankei no tenkai*, ed. Nihon kokusai seijikai [Tokyo, 1965], p. 119; *Korean Report*, VI [1958], 2; *Kinkyō*, No. 3 [1959], p. 71).

51. I. I. Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan* (New York, 1960), p. 70.

52. Today there are slightly less than six hundred thousand Koreans living in Japan; over 60 per cent of them were born there and do not even know the Korean language. There were more than two million Koreans in Japan when the Pacific war ended, whereas less than three hundred resided there before Korea was made a Japanese protectorate in 1905. The mass movement of Koreans across the Strait of Korea to Japan resulted largely from that country's exploitation of the Korean people during the colonial era. In addition, during the Pacific war the migration was enormously accelerated to meet the labor demand for the war efforts. Before and during the war, most of the migrants lured or taken by force to Japan worked for low wages at the hardest labor—that which the Japanese laborers were unwilling to undertake. "Poverty-stricken" is too mild an expression to describe the economic position of most Koreans in Japan. The overwhelming majority of them are without decent, secure occupation, and many others eke out a scanty livelihood with the relief subsidies handed out reluctantly by the Japanese government. No wonder that Ardath W. Burks describes the Japanese treatment of the minority as "shameful" (A. W. Burks, *The Government of Japan* [New York, 1961], p. 252). The over-all aspect of the minority is well described in E. W. Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan 1904–1950* (New York, 1951). Probably more comprehensive is Pak Jae-Il, *Zainichi chōsenjin ni kansuru sōgō chōsa kenkyū* (A Comprehensive Study of Koreans in Japan) (Tokyo, 1957). See also David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI (1947), 43 ff.; Fujishima Udai *et al.*, "Zainichi chōsenjin rokujūmannin no genjitsu" (The Truth about the 600,000 Missing Koreans in Japan), *Chūō kōron* (December 1958), pp. 175 ff.; Fujishima Udai *et al.*, *Nihon o tsukuru hyōjō* (Expressions of Japan) (Tokyo, 1959), especially pp. 96–141; Shinosaki, *Zainichi chōsenjin undō*. For the text of the repatriation agreement between Japan and North Korea, see *Contemporary Japan*, XXXVI (1959), 365–369. In form the agreement involved neither the Japanese nor the North Korean government, but only their respective Red Cross societies.

53. New York *Times*, February 14, 1962.

54. For a brief discussion of the relationship between the Koreans in Japan and the Japan Communist party, see Roger Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 259–263; Shinosaki, *Zainichi chōsenjin undō;* Japan, Kōan chōsachō, *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (Present State of the Japan Communist Party) (Tokyo, 1955), pp. 76–95; *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (1957), pp. 116–134; Nikkan rōdō tsūshinsho (ed.), *Sengo nihon kyōsanshugi undō* (The Postwar Japanese Communist Movement) (Tokyo, 1955); Tsuboe Senji, *Chōsen minzoku dokuritsu hishi* (A Secret History of Korean People's Independence) (Tokyo, 1959); Yoshihara Jirō, "Nitchō jinmin no yuruginai yūjō" (Unchanging Friendship of the Japanese and Korean Peoples), *Zenei* (March 1960), pp. 94–97.

55. The official Japanese account of the repatriation issue is given in *Kinkyō*, No. 4 (1960), pp. 67–77; and Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report*, February 5, 1959, pp. 2–3.

56. New York *Times*, February 15, 1959; *Asahi shimbun*, February 2, 28, 1959. See also *Voice of Korea*, XVI, (1959). Korea's official viewpoint is shown in ROK, *ROK Bulletin*, No. 17 (1959), pp. 95–124. See also Korean Foreign Policy Association, *Truth About Departation of Korean Residents in Japan* (Seoul, 1960).

57. Chŏng Il-Hyŏng, UN *kwa hankuk munje* (The United Nations and the Problem of Korea) (Seoul, 1961), pp. 348–351.

58. Kawashima, "A Study of the Attitudes of Korean Political Leaders," p. 19.

59. *Japan Times*, January 24, 1961; New York *Times*, January 24, 1961.

60. As early as 1950, one of the outstanding Western scholars on Korea wrote: "Korea, especially a weak Korea, has particular cause to fear an economically strong Japan. Korea, with an economy in no respect stronger than before the war, is vulnerable to renewed exploitation by Japan. The inference of further parallels of this sort between the past and the reasonably possible future offer ample cause for Korean fears since the loss of Korea's independence in 1905 was a direct result of Japan's economic penetration of the peninsula" (McCune, *Korea Today*, p. 258).

61. Probably the most comprehensive study on the trade between the two countries is included in Asahi shimbun chōsakyoku (ed.), *Namboku chōsen no genjō* (Present State of South and North Korea), Vol. I: *Nan-chōsen* (South Korea) (Tokyo, 1962), pp. 192–232. See also, ROK, Oemubu, *Oemu haengchŏng ui sipnyŏn*, pp. 29–36; Ch'oe Ho-Jin, *Hankuk kyŏngje ui chemunche* (Various Problems of the Korean Economy) (Seoul, 1962), pp. 247 ff.

62. Asahi shimbun chōsakyoku, *Namboku chōsen no genjō*, p. 240.

63. ROK, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, *Revolution's First Two Months' Achievements* (Seoul, 1961), p. 6. For the indictment by the junta of its predecessors for the failure of negotiations between Japan and Korea, see Republic of Korea, Editorial Commission of the History of ROK Revolutionary Trial, *Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng jaep'ansa* (History of the ROK Revolutionary Trial), Vol. 1 (Seoul, 1962), pp. 122–127, 210–213.

64. *Kinkyo*, No. 6 (1962), pp. 72–73.

65. Park, C. H. *Kukka wa hyŏkmyŏng kwa na* (The Country, the Revolution and I) (Seoul, 1963), p. 159.

66. Nakayasu Yosaku, *Kankoku dokuhon* (Fundamentals of Korea) (5) (Tokyo, 1962), pp. 42–43; *Kinkyō*, No. 6, pp. 72–73.

67. For perceptive interpretations of the Korean reaction, see Nakayasu, *Kankoku dokuhon*, pp. 40–43; Ariyama Wataru, "Okiku shinten o miseta nikkan kankei" (Great Progress in Japanese-Korean Relations), *Tōa jiron*, III (1961), 2–10; *Japan Times*, October 6, 1961.

68. *Kinkyō*, No. 6, p. 74.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88; Tanaka, *Nihon o ugokasu nikkan kankei*, pp. 175–176. Of five hundred million dollars, three hundred million were to be in non-repayable ten-year grants-in-aid. Shortly before the Kim-Ohira accord was reached, an editorial in the New York *Times* commetned: "As a major bene-

ficiary of Free World stability, Japan might well take a broader view of the part she can play in assisting . . . stability in Korea. South Korea's new military regime is quite prepared, almost eager, to settle differences with Tokyo, and Japan now is mainly responsible for the continuing rift. Exploratory talks on points at issue were begun early this year but were suspended because of the recent Japanese elections. The Koreans would now like decision-making, high level negotiations, but the Japanese hesitate to begin such talks. The Japanese economy could easily afford a settlement satisfactory to the Koreans on property and aid, and the Koreans, in return, appear ready to make concessions on fisheries and other matters. The Ikeda government, for political reasons, is reluctant to take a step that would signify a new Japanese commitment to the anti-Communist half of Korea and the West" (New York *Times*, August 6, 1962). For the official explanation of the Ohira-Kim agreement, see foreign policy address before the 43rd regular session of the Diet, January 23, 1963, in "Shiryō" (Documents), *Kinkyō*, No. 6, p. 7. See also "Gaimu daijin Ohira Masayoshi ni kiku" (An Interview with Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira), *Chūō kōron* (June, 1963), pp. 287 ff.

70. *Economic Statistical Yearbook*, 1961, p. 192; *monthly Statistical Review* (August, 1963), p. 72; *Korean Annual*, 1964, p. 579. Cited in James W. Morley, *Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific* (New York, 1965), pp. 56, 182–183. See also United States, AID, *Proposed Program for Fiscal Year 1963* (Washingotn, D.C., n.d.), pp. 127–131.

71. Kennedy and Ikeda reportedly agreed that the stability of South Korea was a prerequisite to blocking the penetration of Communist forces in the Far East. In order to ensure South Korea's stability, it was decided that both Japan and the United States should extend positive economic assistance to South Korea which was facing an emoonomic crisis (Asahi shimbun chōsa kyoku, *Namboku chōsen no genjō*, p. 242. For the text of the Kennedy-Ikeda communiqué, see *Contemporary Japan*, XXVII (March 1962), 354–355. American officials in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo often attempted to act as "catalysts," encouraging Japan and Korea to reconcile their differences. Throughout the Rhee era and to some extent thereafter, the American role in the Japanese-Korean dispute was rather haphazard, with a few exceptions, because the American officials were aware of Korean fear and Japanese caution. In a way, covering up the rift by guaranteeing the security of both nations, the United States had removed, though unintentionally, pressures for an earlier settlement between Japan and Korea which might otherwise have arisen from common security requirements. Even before the fall of Rhee, Robert Scalapino, for example, urged Washington to apply pressure or mediation (Conlon Associates, *United States Foreign Policy: Asia*; D. C. Hellman, "Basic Problems of Japanese-South Korean Relations," *Asian Survey*, II [1962], 19–24).

72. "Gaimu daijin Ohira."

73. A. Axelbank, "Japan's Politics and the Far East," *Orient/West Magazine*, VI (1966), 22.

74. "Gaimu daijin Ohira."

75. *Japan Times*, March 5 and 10, 1964.

76. *Ibid.*, March 19, 1964.

77. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1964.

78. *Ibid.*, July 5, 1964.

79. *Ibid.*, September 12, 1964.

80. *Ibid.*, June 7 and 11, 1964.

81. *Ibid.*, June 14, 1964.

82. *Ibid.*, February 18, 1965.

83. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1965.

84. A. Axelbank, "Japan's 'Non-Military' Buildup," *Reporter* (January 13, 1966), pp. 35–37.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*; G. R. Storry, "Japan's Position as a World Power," *World Today*, XXI (1965), 217–222. See especially "'Mitsuya kenkyū kokkai gijiroku (Shūgiin yosan iinkai) zenbun" (Unabridged Diet Record—Budget Committee, House of Representatives—Concerning the 'Three Arrow Study'), *Chūō kōron* (April, 1965), pp. 155–182; C. L. Sulzberger, "A New Look at an Old Alliance," New York *Times*, December 17, 1965.

87. *Japan Times*, October 4, 1964; *Chōsa geppō*, p. 56. For the role of W. G. Brown, American ambassador to Seoul, see New York *Times*, November 15, 1964.

88. For the texts of the treaty and the agreements, see *Mainichi shimbun*, June 23, 1965; *Japan Times*, February 21, March 28, April 4, and June 23, 1965. See especially *Contemporary Japan*, XXVIII (1966), 677–686.

89. The name of the islets was not mentioned at all in the accords, but the "Notes on the Peaceful Disposition of Disputes Between the Two countries" were understood as referring to the territorial dispute. See *Japan Times*, June 23, 1965. To pacify the opposition forces, however, Seoul insisted that Dokto has always been a Korean possession, and is not subject to negotiation under the terms of the above notes.

90. New York *Times*, June 23, 1965.

91. *Ibid.*, August 7, 13, 1965.

92. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1965; see also *Tong-a ilbo*, June 26, 1965. Japanese reactions to these events in Korea are discussed in detail in Ikeziri Mamoru, *et al.*, "Kankoku ni kansuru jūni no shitsumon" (Twelve Questions about Korea), *Chūō kōron* (November, 1965), pp. 125–149.

93. New York *Times*, August 15, 1965.

94. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1965.

95. "The Tempestuous Treaty," *Japan Quarterly*, III (1966), 3–6; New York *Times*, November 7, 1965. See also Kawakami Jotaro, "Party Stand on the Japanese-Korean Relations," *Japan Socialist Review*, No. 23 (October 1962), pp. 7–18; Kuroda Hisao, "Naze nikkan kōshō ni hantai suruka" (Why I am Opposed to the Japanese-Korean Negotiations), *Chūō kōron* (February 1965), pp. 200–206; Ishino Hisao, "Beigun tett ai ga 'toitsu eno michi'" (The

Road to [Korean] Unification is the Withdrawal of American Troops), *Gekkan shakaitō* (July 1965), especially pp. 12 ff.

96. "Korea, Japan Normalize Relations," *Korean Report*, V (1965), 5.

97. R. C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee* (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 183–185.

98. M. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York, 1954), pp. 150 ff. See also Jorden, "Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West."

99. C. A. Buss, *The Arc of Crisis* (New York, 1961), p. 191.

100. For additional evidence in support of this interpretation, see Kawakami, "Party Stand on the Japanese-Korean Relations," pp. 98–99.

101. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," p. 122.

102. Park, *Kukka wa hyŏkmyŏng kwa na*, p. 160.

103. Quoted in L. Olson, "Japan and Korea," p. 11.

104. See above, n. 52.

105. Available studies in this connection, for example, are O. R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (September 1962), 244–252; Kelman, *International Behavior*, pp. 43–334.

106. Kelman, *International Behavior*.

107. L. Olson, "Political Relations," in *The United States and Japan*, ed. H. Passin (New York, 1966), p. 82. In this context, Olson goes on to argue, "The actions of Japanese government and business in Korea would bear watching as a test case of Japanese intentions elsewhere in Asia."

108. Quoted in "Tempestuous Treaty," p. 6.