

The *Shishi* Interlude in Old
Siam: An Aspect of the Meiji
Impact in Southeast Asia¹

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In dealing with the phenomenon of Pan-Asian thinking in the Meiji period, the historian encounters almost inexhaustible materials that apparently nourish a vague conspiracy theory for Japanese political expansion.² The present study, which focuses on the attempt by a few Japanese activists in the 1890's to plant the seeds of Pan-Asian solidarity in the kingdom of Siam, is no exception. The similarity between the ideas of these activists and those of the more disciplined militarists of the Shōwa era compels us to remind ourselves again of the importance of *conjunction* and context in dealing with the history of ideas. This is all the more true in that this paper must give regrettably short shrift to considerations of *ambiance* and to the historical context to which these Meiji Pan-Asianist ideas were in fact wedded. The purpose herein is merely to discuss and evaluate one brief but instructive interlude in Meiji Japan's relations with Siam in which Japanese Pan-Asianism was put to one of its earliest and severest tests. For the wider context of late nineteenth-century Japan and Siam, the works of M. B. Jansen and D. K. Wyatt are recommended to put the present study in better perspective.³

The Resumption of Official Relations

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the catalyst of European presence in Japan and the emergence there of restless elements thrown up by the political, social, and economic transformations of that age encouraged a number of Japanese to migrate, some temporarily, some permanently, to the kingdom of Siam. Under a succession of community leaders, including the much-romanticized Yamada Nagamasa, these emigrants and expatriates achieved considerable economic and political power in Siam, if only for a very brief period. The exclusionist policies

of the Tokugawa shogunate and Japanese involvement in domestic Siamese political intrigues led to the decline and eventual disappearance of the Japanese settlement in Siam, though it was kept alive in story and legend in Japan throughout the Tokugawa period. Formal contacts between the two states ceased, however, for a period of 241 years (1634 to 1875).⁴

Some of the same factors that in the colorful "Era of Yamada Nagamasa" impelled Japanese to venture into Siam were again operative, *mutatis mutandis*, in the late nineteenth century when a new chapter opened in Japan's relations with Siam. Again there was a European presence in Japan, accompanied by important political and socioeconomic changes that produced a frustrated warrior class and an emancipated merchant class. Once again, therefore, in the 1870's, the eighties, and the nineties, the regions of Southeast Asia, over which the Wako pirates and Red Seal trading ships of old had ranged, were rediscovered by probing Japanese. As each new and exotic tale of these tropic lands appeared in Japan, interest in the region increased.

One of the earliest examples of this Meiji genre of "South Seas" lore was Ōtori Keisuke's *Shamu Kikō* (Journey to Siam), written by the first Japanese to visit that country since the early seventeenth century.⁵ Although the Ōtori mission of 1875 was not an official diplomatic embassy, Ōtori was a government official (of the old ministry of public works or *kōbushō*) and his objective was to investigate conditions in Siam and to arrange for eventual formal treaty relations with that country.⁶ In interviews with Ōtori, the young king Rama V of Siam, first showed an interest that he would long maintain in Japan's response to the common problem of Western encroachment in Asia.

The Japanese did not pursue the matter of treaty relations with Siam, most probably because they themselves became engrossed in treaty revision problems with the West. Four years after the Ōtori visit, however, Siam took the initiative and through an intermediary informed the Tokyo foreign office that they were anxious to pursue the matter of treaty relations brought up by Ōtori.⁷

The full explanation for the Siamese desire in 1879 to conclude a treaty with Japan must await a study of Bangkok archives. It surely stemmed in part, at least, from the initial administrative reforms of the young Siamese monarch Rama V, which included the creation of a Western-style, independent department for foreign affairs in 1875.⁸

The Siamese interest in a treaty may also have been related to her peculiar international position. Siam was under heavy Western imperialist pressure at this juncture and was in need of diplomatic support. She could no longer look to China for this, given the latter's obvious weakness after the Opium War, and the kings of Siam had already begun to ease their country out of the traditional tributary relationship with the Middle Kingdom. China, on the other hand, had rejected Siamese requests in 1878 for a new diplomatic relationship of Western-style equality. Siamese inquiries to Japan in 1879 probably reflected the failure to institute such relations on a basis of equality with China.⁹

In response to the Siamese, Japan replied that it was pre-occupied with its own treaty revision problems but that it ultimately intended to establish regular treaty relations with Siam.¹⁰ No further contact on the official level occurred until mid-1887 when Rama V of Siam transmitted a personal request to the Meiji Emperor that diplomatic relations be resumed. He indicated his "sincere desire to bring to an end any misunderstandings" that might have existed between the two countries—a reference to events in the early seventeenth century that led to the long lapse in official relations. The same letter introduced the king's younger brother and (since 1885) minister of foreign affairs, Prince Theewawoṅ (Devawongse) as minister plenipotentiary to negotiate the resumption of relations with Japan.¹¹

Prince Theewawoṅ was then abroad on a special mission to study Western political institutions; he was scheduled to return home by way of Japan.¹² He arrived in Tokyo in September 1887 and, after an audience with the Meiji emperor, he signed a "Declaration of Friendship and Commerce" with Japan's Vice-Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō.¹³

One important factor behind this Siamese initiative of 1887 seems to have been Rama V's interest in Japan's ongoing educational reforms. This was manifest in January 1888 when another royal emissary, Cawphrajaā Phaadsakōrawoṅ (Bhaskarawongse) journeyed to Tokyo to exchange the newly-ratified "Declaration of Friendship." Phaadsakōrawoṅ, who was soon to become minister of education himself and who figures importantly in this study, was accompanied by an official of the Education Department, Khun Wōrakaan Koson (Thabthim Bunjaradphan, later Phrajaā Phinidsaaraa). The latter spent the next five months in Japan at the behest of Rama V, making a

study of the Japanese school system.¹⁴ His subsequent report does not seem to have been utilized by the Siamese, however, and, in spite of the king's interest, no further steps were taken to implement the 1887 "Declaration of Friendship."

"South Seas Fever" in Japan

Although there were no noteworthy official relations between Japan and Siam between 1888 and 1897, it was in this brief period that an active Japanese interest in the latter country first manifested itself, albeit on an unofficial level. This was in turn related to the shifting emigration and colonization discussions that had been carried on in Japan continuously since the Meiji Restoration of 1868.¹⁵

The idea of colonization in early Meiji years was limited to the Tōhoku and the northern islands—strictly a domestic affair. The Hawaii and Guam emigration ventures were both arranged by the previous Tokugawa government and were carried out in 1868 against the orders (as in the Hawaii enterprise) or without the direct knowledge (as in the Guam affair) of the Meiji government.¹⁶ On a number of subsequent occasions in the first decade of its existence the new government exhibited its reluctance to endorse any emigration projects abroad (other than those in the north).¹⁷

Despite this negative official attitude in the early Meiji period, certain individuals dreamed of more distant fields for Japanese emigration activity abroad. For analytical purposes these individuals can be singled out as exponents of a peculiar form of expansion quite distinct from the more purely political-military expansionism calling for expeditions against Korea or Taiwan.¹⁸ A closer look at these emigration advocates will show, however, that in almost every case their projects are but variants of, and not essentially different from, the general idea of political expansion abroad. The political nuance can be found in the abstract emigration arguments of Taguchi Ukichi, who pioneered in publicizing the need for southward commercial development in Taiwan and the South Seas.¹⁹ The same nuance can be found in the thinking of the leading emigration advocate of the Meiji era, Admiral Enomoto Takeaki. This is of particular relevance here, for Enomoto, more than any other, gave the greatest impetus to Japanese emigration and colonizing attempts

in the Malay Peninsula and Siam in the 1890's. These latter in turn provided the framework in that area for several years of *minshū shishi* (non-governmental activist) activity which highlighted Japan's relations with Siam in the Meiji period.

At a time when the Meiji government was discouraging the emigration of its people to Southeast Asia, Enomoto was conducting a solitary campaign to ensure a permanent Japanese presence there. His notions were a compound of defensive concern (as an old naval man familiar with the South Seas) about the encroachments of the West in Southeast Asia and a recognition of Japan's need for a secure avenue for maritime trade with Australia and the West through the Indian Ocean. In his mind, the means by which this secure avenue could be effected was emigration and colonization—two words of roughly the same significance for many Meiji emigration enthusiasts. This conjuncture of emigration and political expansion was precisely what captured the fancy of the late-Meiji *shishi* who appeared, most often with the direct backing of Enomoto, on the Malay Peninsula and Siam in the 1890's. In advocating such things as the purchase of the Marianas ("Radorōnen" or Ladrões), and the assimilation of Guam, Papua, and the Solomons by Japan in 1876-77, Enomoto was, as his biographer aptly notes, many years ahead of his countrymen.²⁰

In another fashion too, Enomoto served the cause of emigration to the maritime areas stretching southwards from the Japanese archipelago. In 1879 he and several like-minded individuals formed the Tokyo Geographic Society (Tōkyō Chigaku Kyōkai). The bulletin of this group often carried articles by proponents of maritime emigration ventures and sometimes of outright military expeditions to the south.²¹ These articles constitute the beginnings of a distinctive genre of Japanese journalism and romantic prose devoted to tropical Southeast Asia. During the 1880's, the bulk of this kind of literature gradually swelled *pari passu* with new travel and exploration accounts, as the process of Japanese discovery of the South Seas continued.²²

This progressive accumulation of lore about the maritime south heralded, and no doubt helped to bring about, a shift in emphasis towards that area of the world in the discussions in Japan on emigration and colonization.²³ By the end of the 1880's, the old erudite arguments rationalizing the resettlement of the losers in the Restoration Wars had evolved considerably. Miyake Setsurei, the Meiji publicist, could later write of the new

atmosphere in these terms: "The 'colonial fever' at that time and especially the 'South Seas fever' (*Nan'yō netsu*) was very strong. Most people have forgotten this today, but it was awfully high at that time. It must have been the influence of Germany. . . . It was said in Japan that we had to acquire colonies from somewhere, and every possibility was checked."²⁴

It is clear that the "South Seas fever" of which Miyake spoke was almost exclusively directed towards insular Southeast Asia. The writings and activities of such pioneers in "southern expansion" (*nanshin*) proposals as Taguchi Ukichi, Enomoto Takeaki, Yokoo Tōsaku, Suzuki Keikun, Sugiura Jugo, Suganuma Teifu, Shige Shigetaka, and others in the 1880's are oriented towards the Philippines, the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolinas, but there is almost no attention to Japan's future role in the Malay Peninsula, Siam, and the adjacent areas of mainland Southeast Asia.²⁵ Japan's relations with Siam had been quiescent since the 1887 Declaration of Friendship, with the exception of one or two adventuresome merchants who set up shop in Bangkok. The situation would probably have remained thus for some time had it not been for an unusually energetic and ambitious Japanese diplomatic agent in Singapore, Saitō Miki.

Saitō was Japan's first consul stationed in Singapore, and almost immediately after his appointment there in 1890, he began to draw attention to the potential of the Malay Peninsula and Siam for Japanese emigration and colonization. By the time Admiral Enomoto Takeaki assumed the post of foreign minister in the first Matsukata Cabinet in May 1891, Saitō was already full of ideas about the future of Japan in that part of the world and the role of emigration in making that future. His plans are worth noting because they foreshadow the framework in which the *shishi* emigration movement in Siam would be carried out.

Saitō's plans are revealed in a conversation he held with ex-Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō in Singapore in May 1892. From Saitō's *procès verbale* of this talk we learn that he advocated that Japan undertake colonization in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula (since the southern portion was already too much under British control). He noted that the northern part, roughly from the Isthmus of Kra down along the east coast to Trengganu, was entirely in Siamese territory but that it was inhabited only by savages and that Siamese sovereignty was only nominal. "If suitable areas were located and if the Siamese government were approached to recognise the emigration of our nationals . . .

it may be imagined how greatly it would aid the future expansion of our position and power in Asia." He then came to the *pièce de résistance* of his Siam emigration ideas: Japanese control of a Kra canal, to neutralize the British at Singapore and give Japan control of the maritime commerce plying between the Indian Ocean and the Far East. ". . . If perchance our nationals could emigrate to areas around the Isthmus of Kra and, after occupying this great, wild expanse of land, were to seek out at an appropriate time favorable points for controlling the Isthmus, and if they were to excavate a canal across it, well it is clear as can be that this territory of the Japanese Empire, sitting astride the canal, would mean the seizure of the commercial supremacy of the eastern and western seas."

Saitō was interested in eventual colonization of southwestern peninsular Siam by Japanese, therefore, but he envisioned this as a gradual emigration movement northwards towards the Isthmus of Kra from a base on the southwest coast. For the moment, then, he advocated preliminary emigration surveys all along the southwest coast of the Malay Peninsula from Johore northwards. Aoki Shuzō was enthusiastic, and at his suggestion Saitō wrote of his plans to the new foreign minister, Enomoto Takeaki.²⁶

Enomoto, who had bombarded the government with memorials on the need for a maritime policy in the south since the mid-1870's, was, in his post as foreign minister, in an excellent position to carry out his own plans. In July 1891, over the objections of less visionary members of the Matsukata Cabinet, he set up an emigration section (*imin-ka*) attached to the cabinet secretariat (*daijin kanbō*).²⁷ This was Japan's first government office set up expressly to facilitate emigration abroad. The new section, of course, needed information on suitable sites; and Enomoto, using his position as foreign minister, mobilized various Japanese consuls scattered throughout the South Seas to conduct preliminary surveys for him. He thus welcomed Saitō's ideas and endorsed his plans for the Malay Peninsula. Saitō carried out a survey of that area in 1893 and, in 1894 while on an official mission to Siam, made another survey there.²⁸

It was roughly at this point that the enthusiasm for emigration enterprises and the general "South Seas fever" of the times were translated into action in Japan by a growing number of *shishi-rōnin* (activist-drifter) types who were in the traditions of Ōi Kentarō's Pan-Asianism. The encouragement of emigration schemes by such men as Enomoto and Saitō provided the op-

portunity for a host of Japanese adventurers, ne'er-do-wells, political malcontents and even a few daring businessmen to seek their fortunes in Siam.

The Shishi Interlude in Siam

The *shishi* Pan-Asian movement in Japan in the late Meiji period has already received excellent monographic treatment in English and requires no introduction here.²⁹ Suffice it to say that a number of remarkable representatives of this *shishi* tradition, with all the usual connections with the liberal opposition and the economic and historical ties to southwest Japan—particularly the Kumamoto area—made their debut on the Asian scene in Siam in the mid-1890's, shortly before their main appearance in the Chinese revolution. Their story in Siam is of interest not because they conquered, for they in fact failed miserably in their involute designs there, but rather because these Pan-Asian idealists confronted another independent "Asian" country possessed of an advanced culture, but one not within the Sino-Confucian civilization complex. In a sense Siam was a test case for Okakura Tenshin's thesis that Asia was "one": the very essence of Pan-Asianism.³⁰ Their story is important too because it adds to our cumulative knowledge of the Japanese image of Asia—an image that did not die with the *shishi* failures in Siam and later in China. Finally, their story is important because it forms a hitherto unknown aspect of Japan's relations with Siam and Southeast Asia in the Meiji era.

The first of a number of Japanese *shishi* adventurers who sought heroic destinies in Siam was one Iwamoto Chizuna, a solitary figure not at first connected with the emigration activities of Saitō Miki and Enomoto Takeaki.³¹ It is significant, however, that he soon found he could best translate his own long-range altruistic schemes in Siam into action through the medium of emigration projects. The official history of the Kokuryūkai (Amur River or Black Dragon Society) dubbed him as dissolute, untamed, irascible and temperamental.³² In his own memoirs Iwamoto confided that he was "of a careless disposition" and somewhat "impatient with details and trifles."³³ Born in 1858 the son of a samurai, his entire life was a monument to these characterizations. He was cashiered from the army in 1888 for continuing to associate with liberal opposition leaders (such as

Inukai Tsuyoshi) who were at odds with the government. He thereby joined a horde of other young activists who were deeply concerned about government repression at home and the tense Far Eastern situation abroad.

Iwamoto was too much the man of action, however, and he determined to take positive steps of his own by journeying through the lands of the Orient. By sheer chance he was encouraged to go to Siam by an old samurai from Akizuki Han whose son had been adopted in 1888 by the Siamese statesman Cawphrajaa Phaadsakrawon when the latter visited Japan. The son, Yamamoto Yasutarō, was to be his contact in Bangkok.³⁴

In August 1892, Iwamoto set out alone on a third-class booking from Kobe to Singapore with ten yen in his pocket. Utterly impoverished by the time he reached Singapore, he was able to pawn some clothing and his hat, and with the six yen proceeds he continued his journey to Bangkok, arriving there in September 1892, hatless, shoeless, dressed in a grimy Western-style suit, unable to speak any foreign language. This inauspicious arrival truly foreshadowed a decade of uninterrupted fiascos that awaited him in Siam.

On arrival in Bangkok, Iwamoto sought out Yamamoto Yasutarō. This man, together with another Japanese youth, Yamamoto Shinsuke, had been brought back to Siam in 1888 and given an extensive classical Siamese education at the royal school for nobility in Bangkok, the Suan Kulaab (Rose Garden) School—no doubt the first and perhaps the only foreigners to attend this exclusive institute.³⁵ Educated in the same way as upper-class Siamese youth, both were in 1892 fluent in Siamese as well as English. Very little is known of Yamamoto Shinsuke except that in 1897 he accompanied Iwamoto Chizuna on the latter's 111-day scouting journey through Siam, Laos, and Annam and as a result died in Hanoi. The other Yamamoto, Yasutarō, played a more active role in Siamese-Japanese relations; when Iwamoto arrived in Bangkok in 1892 he was working as an interpreter for the Siamese ministry of education, headed by his adopted "father," Phaadsakrawon.³⁶ Through this Yamamoto, Iwamoto Chizuna was introduced to the latter and also to one of Siam's eminent military men, Minister of Agriculture Cawphrajaa Surasag. Phaadsakrawon, in adopting the two Japanese youths in 1888, had already displayed his sympathies for Japan and would continue to do so. Surasag, a soldier and Siam's most militant nationalist of this period, soon became an even more

obvious admirer of the Japanese and proved to be their greatest support in Siam.⁸⁷

According to Iwamoto's account, it was with the support and endorsement of Phaadsakrawong and Surasag that he returned to Japan in February 1893 to acquaint political leaders with the dangers facing Siam from the West, and the need to revise Japan's Far Eastern policies accordingly. Siam was indeed in a tense struggle with France at this time over the Laos region, but Iwamoto's attempts to persuade his countrymen of the dangers were in vain. He was viewed as an "itinerant swindler," and his warnings were received with "cold smirks" and nothing more. He finally succeeded in interesting a ministry of commerce and agriculture official in a business venture in Siam, and was in Kobe making preparations to return to that country when he heard the news of the "Franco-Siamese Incident."⁸⁸

France had finally broken with Siam over the issue of who was to control the old Siamese vassal states of upper Laos. On July 13, 1893, French gunboats forced their way up the Chao Phraya River and threatened Bangkok in an incident that had profound repercussions not only in Siam but in Europe as well.⁸⁹ Iwamoto's reaction was typically precipitate. When he heard of the incident on July 30, 1893, he dropped everything, boarded a ship the next day, and made a dash to rescue Siam.

On his way, Iwamoto encountered in Shanghai another young Japanese itinerant adventurer who was hurrying to Siam for the same reason as himself. This was Ishibashi Usaburō, another classic representative of the late-Meiji *shishi* activists.⁹⁰ At twenty-four years of age Ishibashi had already worked as a dishwasher in San Francisco, studied politics and economics at Lincoln High School and Oakland Polytech in California, fought with a band of American volunteers in a revolutionary war in Chile, and had now returned to Asia to espouse the cause of Pan-Asianism. When he heard of the French aggression in Siam, he too made a heroic dash to Bangkok. He was stopped short in Shanghai when his funds were temporarily depleted—a commonplace condition for these men.

After talking with Iwamoto, the two evolved a plan to save Siam from the clutches of French imperialism. Ishibashi borrowed funds from another *shishi* friend and reached Siam on the next boat after Iwamoto, but they arrived just after the

Franco-Siamese peace talks had ended and Siam had already signed a humiliating treaty with France (October 3, 1893).⁴¹

Neither of these men was easily discouraged. With the help of the language expert Yamamoto Yasutarō, they contacted the two Japanophiles within the Siamese government, Phadsakrawon, minister of education, and Surasag, minister of agriculture (after 1892). To these men and anyone else who would listen they pleaded the Pan-Asian theme that Siam must not be gobbled up by the Westerners. Their solution to Siam's problems was the emigration of large numbers of Japanese into the country—apparently on the premise that Japan had already successfully resisted the Europeans and could do the same for Siam. To this end, they talked of setting up an emigration company, and even spoke of an eventual Siamese-Japanese alliance, the latter being quite in the traditions of such Asianists as Tarui Tōkichi and Suganuma Teifu.⁴²

The reception in Siam of this kind of peculiarly Japanese sentiment about Asia and its future was apparently not very great. Yet there can be no doubt that at least two high-ranking Siamese nobles in positions of importance in the government lent a very sympathetic ear to these unofficial paladins of Asian solidarity. Phadsakrawon, minister of education, continued to provide the two Japanese with living quarters. Surasag used his influence as a prominent military man and as minister of agriculture to enable them to lease several extensive parcels of ground to serve as agricultural bases for Japanese colonization. It is difficult to locate these leased areas from Japanese descriptions because of the unsuitability of Japanese *kana* for rendering Siamese sounds and because of the arbitrary way in which the Japanese used Chinese characters for Siamese place names at this time. It seems fairly clear, however, that Surasag leased a 700-acre parcel to Iwamoto and Ishibashi in the district of Sapathum, near (at the present time within) Bangkok. Japanese sources point out—correctly—that this land was part of the royal estates of the Siamese Crown Prince (until his death in 1895) Cawfaa Wachirunnahid.⁴³

Other contemporary Japanese sources specifically note leases of land from the ministry of agriculture on "special contract" (*tokuyaku*) at this same time in other areas, notably an approximately nine-square-mile lease on the east (right) bank of the Chao Phraya River in the area of Ayuthia, and another lease possibly near the mouth of the Chao Phraya River.⁴⁴ These, too,

were apparently leased to Iwamoto and Ishibashi. The role of Minister of Agriculture Surasag was essential in the taking of such extensive leases by several obscure Japanese, and this is indeed one of our clearest indications that for a brief moment at the end of the nineteenth century certain members of the Siamese nobility gave some credence to the romantic, Pan-Asian message of the Meiji *shishi*.

Word of the extensive land leases by Japanese in Siam spread quickly among colonization devotees and *shishi* activists, particularly since this was the time when the "colonial fever" was at its peak in Japan. By the spring of 1894 Japanese in Shanghai were telling each other of the large plots of land acquired by their countrymen in Siam, and it was bruited about that the Japanese population there would soon top a thousand.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, Iwamoto and Ishibashi confidently formed the Siam Colonization Society (Shamu Shokumin Kyōkai), and then set about recruiting Japanese peasants to realize their plans. Ishibashi departed for Japan while Iwamoto continued to make preparations in Bangkok. He scurried about enlisting the aid of a few wandering *shishi-rōnin* who were now beginning to appear on diverse missions. Among these latter was one Kumagai Nao-suke, who drifted to Siam in late 1893, apparently on emigration scouting duties for Enomoto, judging from a letter written by him in February 1894.

Kumagai's letter well illustrates the mentality of many of the Japanese activists in the tropics at this time and is worth quoting *in extenso* for its flavor alone. Writing to a friend in Japan, Kumagai noted that he had already finished three arduous "scouting trips" in Siam's interior, and he complains of mountain crossings in the north, river fordings in the south, poisonous serpents overhead, treacherous ground underfoot, malaria, crocodiles and, with humor he adds: "If only I had had some money my trip would have made Stanley's exploration of Dark Africa not worth a poop (*hi ni arazaru koto*)."

He then recounted a trip made recently to the old capital at Ayuthia (where he leased emigration land) to visit the remains of the Japanese seventeenth-century settlement there: "I raised a wooden monument and inscribed on it in large characters: 'REMAINS OF A JAPANESE SETTLEMENT,' and on the back I inscribed: 'JANUARY 1, 1894, KUMAGAI OF GREAT JAPAN ERECTED THIS.' Then, amidst the flowers of the fields and the cool waters, I grieved for the great spirit of Yamada

Nagamasa, and just at that moment the moon came up and the whole scene carried me back to the exploits of 300 years ago; I was suddenly overcome with deep emotion."

He ended with the following appeal to his friend: "... the land of Siam awaits the coming of the Japanese. . . . Why not stop struggling over that little patch of earth and be the first in this heroic attempt? I've fetched some native wine from the village market and I await your coming!"⁴⁶

Romantic, sentimental idealism of this kind was coupled with some very firm ideas on the political objectives of the *shishi* in Siam, as can be seen from the following extract from a letter written by Ishibashi Usaburō, one of the two organizers of the Siam Colonization Society. Writing to a friend in Shanghai in March 1894, Ishibashi confided that his colonization plans were moving forward and outlined the latter as follows:

My ideas on Siam are (1) to expand the work of colonization there and to establish a latent Japanese influence; (2) to install Japanese in the Siamese government; (3) to purchase all Siamese railroad stock; (4) to purchase the Malay Peninsula. While this might appear unkind in regard to Siam, our objective is to compete with the white man in Central Asia and hence does not affect the welfare of the Orient in the least. Thus we expect to put the above four steps into effect.⁴⁷

In Japan, Ishibashi had now made contact with Enomoto Takeaki and a number of other emigration enthusiasts, but his arrangements for a group of emigrants for Siam were delayed time after time. In Bangkok, Iwamoto, the man of action, could stand idle no longer and hurried back to Japan himself to take matters in hand. By December 1894, he succeeded in gathering about thirty colonists together with the aid of Enomoto Takeaki, and departed with them for Siam via Hong Kong.⁴⁸ With his distaste for pecuniary details, he had neglected to secure sufficient funds for himself and his charges to get to Siam. He sailed from Kobe with only nine yen left after purchasing fares as far as Hong Kong. As he later put it, he relied on getting the rest of the money "some way or other" in Hong Kong, and, if this were not possible, he was prepared to "battle tooth and nail" to see that the colonists got through. Despite this resolution, he found himself stranded in the old "*Tōyō Ryōkan*" (Oriental Inn)—a famous inn catering to China *rōnin* in Hong Kong—in March

1895. He was destitute and had thirty hungry, bewildered Japanese peasants on his hands.⁴⁹

Iwamoto's negligence, which was typical of so many of the ill-starred emigration ventures of the time, might have meant an end to the Siam Colonization Society's plans had it not been for the arrival of the Siamese minister of agriculture, Surasag, in Hong Kong just at that moment. His unexpected appearance there while on his way to Japan with his protégé, Yamamoto Yasutarō, enabled Iwamoto to impose upon him for funds to continue the journey, and the first group of Japanese emigrants to Siam finally reached their destination safely.⁵⁰

The Siam Colonization Society was now reorganized into a commercial firm, the Siam Colonization Company (Shamu Shokumin Kaisha), and a host of young Japanese activists, wandering *rōnin*, and self-styled heirs of the samurai tradition were installed on the payroll in various managerial capacities. No president was named (perhaps Surasag was slated for this post), but Iwamoto became vice-president, with Ishibashi (just returned) and Yamamoto Yasutarō as company directors. The scouting enthusiast Kumagai Naosuke became company "advisor," and two other young firebrands, Arakawa Gagoro and Matsuno Yasutarō, were named "company secretary" and "supervisor of emigration" respectively.⁵¹

This was the apogee in the brief history of the Siam Colonization Company. The ebullient Iwamoto Chizuna was especially confident (even arrogant, some said) in April 1895 as he departed for Japan again, announcing that he would return this time with over a hundred emigrants. His spirits were bolstered too by the fact that he carried with him "several thousand yen" in funds borrowed from Minister of Agriculture Surasag to finance recruiting operations, and several hundred yen in "earnest money" from a Japanese firm in Bangkok desirous of hiring workers in Japan. To further enhance his euphoric state of mind, he was carrying a Siamese sword fashioned from gold, a treasured family heirloom entrusted to him by Surasag in the hope that he could have it polished and repaired in Japan.⁵² Little wonder then that Surasag and the staff of the Siam Colonization Company grew increasingly annoyed as the months passed and nothing was heard from Iwamoto.

Surasag gave unstinting aid to the company's efforts in Siam, providing Siamese workers to help the farmers prepare their plots for sowing, for the latter were completely unfamiliar with tropi-

cal soils and cultivation techniques. The seed was about to be sown when the Japanese emigrants suddenly stopped working *en masse* and demanded that the company advance them their loan, "as per the contract." The managers were dumbfounded, never having heard of any sort of arrangements for loans, or indeed of any contract. They were furious when they learned that Iwamoto, in his zeal to attract colonists, had written and signed such a contract with the latter, stipulating, among other things, that each settler could have an advance of 50 yen from the company upon arriving in Siam, to be paid back after the harvest in monthly installments. Iwamoto, with his characteristic distaste for "trivia," had failed to mention the contract to his compatriots and instead had hurried off to Japan armed with most of the company's funds, leaving his compatriots to fend for themselves.⁶³

With the farmers now refusing to labor in the fields until they received their promised advance, Ishibashi was forced to turn to the company's old benefactor, Surasag. This noble gentleman had already funded Iwamoto's and Ishibashi's several trips to and from Japan, the emigrants' fares from Hong Kong, the expense of leasing and developing the settlement area—in short he was the principal financial factor behind the entire colonization enterprise in Siam. The chronic impoverishment and mismanagement of the *shishi* were apparently straining his purse, if not his moral commitment to Pan-Asianism, and he adamantly refused to rescue the company from this quandary.⁶⁴

By May 1895 the colonists, facing imminent starvation, were beset with unexpected danger from another quarter. In that month several "unscrupulous" Japanese then in Bangkok approached the group and recruited a few to work as coolies on the railroads then under construction in the Korat area of the northeast. Nothing more was heard of these unfortunates, and they were presumably casualties in that early "railroad of death" project which reportedly killed some forty Japanese and some three hundred Chinese laborers, mostly because of the malarial conditions there.

In the same month the dwindling emigrant group was approached by recruiters from a French mining concern in southwestern Siam. Since they had few alternatives, fifteen of the Japanese farmers were induced to work in the mines. By September 1895, four of the original fifteen came straggling back to Bangkok, emaciated and sick, pleading for help. They reported

that their fellow laborers were either already dead or dying at the mines. Though the *shishi* managers had tried to warn the emigrants of the dangers in working in the mines, this report nevertheless stirred their samurai instincts. After committing the survivors to a hospital, Ishibashi, Arakawa, and Matsuno set out on the road south for the French mines, presumably bent on settling accounts. They did not get far before they too fell prey to the dangers of the tropics. Two became ill with jungle fever, and the three only succeeded in making it back to Bangkok through the generous aid of a tribal chieftain who rescued them on the road. A further report from the French mines indicated that there were no survivors there. To complete this growing litany of tragedies, the *shishi* were shocked to find upon their return to Bangkok that those emigrants who had not gone to work on the railroads or at the mines had now scattered, some becoming coolies, some domestic servants, all of them swallowed up in the unfamiliar world of tropical Siam. Not one remained with the company.

After this chain of fiascos which left their emigrant charges dead, diseased, or missing (though it was typical of these ventures that the *shishi* were relatively unscathed), the company managers decided to dissolve the firm. With the (presumably enthusiastic) approval of its benefactor, Cawphrajaa Surasag, the casualty-ridden career of the Siam Colonization Company ended in October 1895.⁸⁸

The final chapter in the history of the Siam emigration movement featured a change in *dramatis personae* but did not offer relief from the tragicomic series of fiascos that haunted the *shishi* planners.

By the time Iwamoto, ebullient and well funded, arrived back in Japan in March 1895, the "colonial fever" of which Miyake Setsurei wrote was at its height. Emigration was no longer a novelty, for sizable groups of Japanese laborers and farmers had already by 1895 gone to such faraway places as Hawaii, New Caledonia, the Fijis, Guadeloupe Island, Australia, India, Canada, America, and Guatemala.⁸⁹ Not all of these ventures were successful, however, owing to the great number of ephemeral emigration firms that had been hastily formed, often by unqualified persons such as innkeepers, drifters or, as in the case of the Siam Colonization Company, visionaries with little concern for detail. A number of emigration disasters had already come to the attention of the Japanese public and were even discussed in the Diet. As a result the government in April 1894

had issued the Emigrant Protection Regulations (Imin Hogo Kisoku) in an effort to curb questionable ventures.⁸⁷

Not surprisingly, one of the first of the undesirable promoters to be prohibited from engaging in emigration affairs was Iwamoto Chizuna, who had returned to Japan for precisely that purpose. He attempted to circumvent the regulations by scheming with some Kobe businessmen to start a company but the government refused to license it, as one chronicler suggests, "perhaps because they lacked faith in its ability to endure."⁸⁸ Iwamoto finally had to ask a legitimate firm, the Hiroshima Emigration Company (Hiroshima Imin Kaisha) to recruit emigrants for him, and they soon had about a hundred men. At this point Iwamoto himself fell seriously ill—possibly because the news of the fate of the Siam emigrants in the "French Mines Affair" was becoming public knowledge in Japan, and he was thus condemned on all sides for his cavalier conduct.

Since returning to Japan, Iwamoto's Pan-Asianist declamations on the need for Japanese "guidance-tutelage" (*keirin*) in Siam had caught the attention of youthful idealists who were casting about for some righteous cause abroad upon which to expend their energies. One of these was Miyazaki Torazō (Tōten).⁸⁹ His primary interest was in China, but he was attracted to Siam by Iwamoto's tales of the powerful overseas Chinese minority there. He saw in Siam and its overseas Chinese population an opportunity to infiltrate China "by the back door," as it were, and also to study the Chinese language and perhaps contribute to the Pan-Asianist reform and strengthening of Siam as well. Originally he planned to accompany Iwamoto and his emigrants to Siam, but, when he heard of Iwamoto's illness, he determined to go alone and visited Iwamoto to bid farewell. Iwamoto, because of his illness and perhaps fearing his own reception in Siam, made an emotional appeal to Miyazaki to take his place at the head of the emigrants and through the Siam Colonization Company (he was unaware it was defunct) to lay the basis for a Japanese colony there. Stirred by this sickbed rhetoric, Miyazaki overcame certain doubts he had previously harbored about Iwamoto's deportment and agreed to become the representative of the Hiroshima Emigration Company. After all the delays, most of the recruits had elected to go to Hawaii, and Miyazaki departed for Bangkok on October 5, 1895, with some twenty farmers.

His arrival in Bangkok in late October 1895 came some

seven months after Iwamoto had departed and only a few days after the Siam Colonization Company had come to an inglorious end. Miyazaki was taken aback, therefore, when he presented a letter of introduction from Iwamoto to Ishibashi Usaburō, and received in reply a barrage of invective aimed at the errant vice-president of the defunct company. He was told of Iwamoto's cavalier disregard for commitments, the breach-of-contract payments that had to be made, the Japanese loss of esteem among the Siamese, even including Cawphrajaa Surasag, and the consequent dissolution of the company.

Surasag had not completely abandoned the Japanese, for they were at that time quartered in one of his former residences on a tributary of the Chao Phraya River—a building large enough to house a thousand men, as Miyazaki described it. With the help of Ishibashi (who left Siam shortly thereafter) temporary employment was found for most of them in Japanese shops then operating in the Siamese capital city.⁶⁰ Miyazaki concerned himself with their welfare, acting as their interpreter and "supervisor," but he also found time to scout for further emigration possibilities in Siam. In this connection he, too, soon made the acquaintance of Siam's foremost military campaigner, Japanophile, and reluctant minister of agriculture, Cawphrajaa Surasag.

Miyazaki's impressions of this Siamese soldier-statesman vividly confirm the picture of him, available in his own memoirs and in Siamese biographies, as an unusually militant patriot. He paints Surasag as a dynamic individual, actively in sympathy with the fraternal, anticolonial, and Pan-Asianist sentiments of the Japanese *shishi* types in Siam. He rightly perceived that Surasag was bitter at having to serve in the unmilitary post of agriculture minister, and he also sympathized with the latter's discouragement at his countrymen's lack of militancy in confronting the Western threat. Miyazaki was no doubt correct in asserting that it was this very absence of any militant reaction on the part of the Siamese to the Western threat that had brought Cawphrajaa Surasag enthusiastically to encourage Japanese colonization in hopes of eventually revitalizing his own countrymen.

Surasag continued to give extraordinary and unwavering support to the Japanese *shishi* movement in Siam, even after the failure of the Siam Colonization Company. When Miyazaki called upon him in November or December 1895, he received a warm welcome. Surasag told of his admiration for Japan's advances in the world (a reference to Japan's victory in the Sino-

Japanese War, perhaps) and also told of his discouragement with his own country's situation. He questioned Miyazaki on Japan's ultimate intentions in "protecting" Korea from China in the recent war. The latter's replies are not recorded, but he apparently reassured the Siamese noble, for Surasag unhesitatingly endorsed further Japanese emigration into Siam, though he indicated he could no longer support the operation financially. "Honest officials are always poor," he told Miyazaki, but he agreed to help all he could in other ways.⁶¹

Miyazaki, impressed by Surasag's sincerity, resolved to persuade the Hiroshima Emigration Company to support further operations in Siam, and, after warning his emigrant charges not to be seduced by high-wage offers of employment on the Korat railway, he departed for Japan.

The Hiroshima Emigration Company rejected Miyazaki's ideas on further operations in Siam, but, despite this setback, he headed there again in March 1896 in the company of several other like-minded *shishi* who were convinced of the future possibilities of colonization projects there.⁶² These hopes were severely jarred when, after a harrowing journey via Hong Kong, Swatow, and Singapore, the *shishi* arrived in Bangkok only to find that seventeen out of the original twenty emigrants Miyazaki had led to Siam earlier were now lying in the old company headquarters, suffering from cholera and malaria. They had disregarded his warnings and had been lured away by "unscrupulous" Japanese in Bangkok to work on the railroad project in the northeast.

There then followed a nightmarish climax to the Siam emigration movement. The most gravely ill peasants were placed in hospitals, and the *shishi* set themselves to care for the others in the company's headquarters in Surasag's former residence. Death was in the air, however, and after three days one of Miyazaki's own *shishi* comrades succumbed to the fever. Subsequently, six of the Japanese emigrants died in the company office, and to compound the imbroglio, even Miyazaki and the other *shishi* were desperately ill for a time.

The fact that after this experience the *shishi* were not utterly disillusioned with the future of Japanese colonization in Siam is evidence of the heroic perseverance of these activists. One suspects, nonetheless, that it was, as Miyazaki's memoirs indicate, more out of a sense of obligation for the faithful support of Cawphrajaa Surasag than out of faith in their ideas that the

shishi agreed to make one last attempt to cultivate a crop and harvest it, just to demonstrate that all the financial expenditure and effort to date had not been in vain. They were taking no chances with the farmers, however, and resolved to rely on them no more. They would work the fields themselves. Yet even in this last gesture, they were obliged to call once again on Surasag to provide them with implements to do the job. Such was this unusual nobleman's unflagging faith in the Japanese that he even agreed to furnish them with Siamese peasants to work the land. They declined this latter offer, perhaps somewhat hastily, for these heirs of the aristocratic samurai were quite lacking in agrarian skills. Inevitably, their crops failed and, finally disconsolate, the *shishi* drifted back to Japan in the late summer of 1896, eventually to move on to more fertile fields for their bravado in China.⁶³ A few solitary activists appeared in Siam in subsequent years on diverse, arcane missions, but the thrust of the *shishi*-led Siam colonization movement ended on this inglorious note, and the *shishi* interlude in Siam was over.⁶⁴

It is the private, non-governmental *shishi* activities in Siam that alone lend a certain character and historical interest to the relations between that country and Japan in the Meiji era. There were, of course, exchanges on other levels, including the governmental, in this era, but they were for the most part desultory, and were not pursued with much enthusiasm by either side. Thus, in the field of education, there were some indications in the 1880's and 1890's of an apparent Siamese interest in Japanese progress, as Professor Wyatt's researches in the Bangkok archives have recently shown.⁶⁵ Such information as the Siamese did gather on Japanese education was apparently never acted upon, however. The several Japanese "advisors" who came to Bangkok after 1892 at the request of the Japanophile Minister of Education Cawphrajaa Phaadsakrawon were far outnumbered by European advisors and, with the possible exception of the (much later) prominent woman educator Yasui Tetsuko (who was principal of the Raachanii School, 1903 to 1906), clearly made little impact on the Siamese educational system.⁶⁶

In the field of legal institutions, as elsewhere, the Western influence predominated. Even the legal expert, Masao Tōkichi, who was sent in 1897 by the Tokyo foreign office to assist in the revision of Siam's legal codes, was trained at the Yale School of

Law. He remained in Bangkok for sixteen years as a legal advisor to the government and, though his specific influence is difficult to assess, he was probably the most respected Japanese ever to serve in an advisory capacity in Siam. He became Japanese minister to Siam in 1920 and died there in 1921.⁶⁷

Exchanges in the economic sphere were similarly unimposing, and whatever progress or experience Japan had accumulated by late Meiji times in this regard excited no curiosity in Siam. Only the old campaigner and Japanophile, Minister of Agriculture Cawphrajaa Surasag, consistent in his admiration for things Japanese, was active in this respect. He invited about ten sericulture experts from Japan in 1903, but their experiments in the Korat region failed, and the last one returned to Japan in 1913, shortly after Surasag left the ministry.⁶⁸

The record of official political-diplomatic exchanges between the two states in this period was similarly unspectacular, and the details of this are in any case beyond the scope of the present paper. Suffice it to note here that the brunt of the negotiations for a regular treaty (to replace the 1887 Declaration of Friendship) was borne on the Japanese side by two officials who were conspicuous for their Pan-Asianist sentiments: Saitō Miki (discussed earlier in this paper) and Inagaki Manjirō.⁶⁹ The latter, in particular, had lengthy pre-treaty talks in Bangkok with the Siamese negotiator, Foreign Minister (Prince) Theewawoṅ, in which such sentiments emerged.⁷⁰ There is reason to think that Theewawoṅ was utterly unimpressed by this kind of talk. In any case, Inagaki's orders from Tokyo to extract from the Siamese consular jurisdiction and other "unequal" privileges enjoyed by the Western powers there quite undercut the Pan-Asian rhetoric he used.⁷¹ With the signing at Bangkok of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation on February 25, 1898, Siam was saddled with another unequal treaty, and it had little reason to consider the Japanese as any different from the Western powers, despite Inagaki's appeals in this regard.⁷² Accordingly, since the two states appeared to lack any abiding mutual interests at this juncture in their histories, relations between them lapsed thereafter into an unspectacular torpor that would continue undisturbed until the repercussions of World War I began to transform the Far East.

In view of this absence of any mutual vital concerns or tangible interests between the two states, it is primarily the *shishi* interlude, as discussed in this paper, that draws the atten-

tion of the historian. In this regard the outstanding issue was, of course, the Japanese gospel of Pan-Asianism, and the always-fascinating question of to what extent it was applicable or acceptable outside of Japan—in this case in the very foreign soil of Siam. It would appear that the conspicuous roles of Cawphrajaa Phaadsakrawon and Cawphrajaa Surasag were the exceptions here that prove the rule. The very frequency with which they are mentioned in the Japanese sources, to the utter exclusion of other Siamese, shows how narrow was the Japanese base of support and acceptance in that country. Obviously Pan-Asianism and anti-Westernism, as preached by Iwamoto, Ishibashi, and Miyazaki, did not greatly excite the Siamese, even in the dangers in the 1890's.

There are a number of possible reasons for the failure of Pan-Asianism to evoke a response in Siam, many of them intangible, such as cultural, religious, and linguistic differences and the like. It seems safe to infer, however, that a principal one was the fact that the Western presence in Siam was never extensive or obtrusive enough to generate the kind of resentment that led to a limited acceptance of romantic Pan-Asianism by certain South Chinese and Annamese anti-Western activists such as Sun Yat-sen and Phan Boi Chau. The attitude of Surasag, however, who was more familiar with the bitter side of (French) colonialism than most of his countrymen, provides a hint of how the Siamese might have responded to the *shishi* missionaries had their land indeed been colonized. Siam was not colonized by the West, however, and accordingly the heroic *shishi* interlude there was a futile exercise, "*acribus initiis, ut ferme talia, incuriosa fine.*"

NOTES

1. The transliteration of Thai words herein generally follows Mary Haas, *Thai-English Student's Dictionary* (Stanford, 1964).

2. On the term "Pan-Asianism" see Hirano Yoshitarō, *Dai-Ajiasugi no rekishiteki kiso* (Historical basis of great Asianism; Tokyo, 1945), esp. pp. 1-133.

3. Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, 1954); David Wyatt, *The Politics of Reform in Thailand* (New Haven, 1969).

4. On seventeenth-century Siamese-Japanese relations see Iwao Selich, *Nan'yō Nihonmachi no kenkyū* (Studies on the Japanese settlements in the

South Seas), rev. ed. (Tokyo, 1966), and Gunji Kiuchi, *Jū-nana seiki ni okeru Nittai kankei* (Japan-Thai relations in the seventeenth century; Tokyo, 1943).

5. I have been unable to locate a copy of this rare book. It has been quoted extensively in Kurama Takudō, comp., *Nanōoku jūreiiki* (Record of a pilgrimage to the southern countries; Tokyo, 1916), pp. 130-32. On Ōtori Keisuke see Nakajima Masao, ed., *Taishi kishōroku* (Reminiscences on China; Tokyo, 1936), II, 689 ff.; Heibonsha, ed., *Shinzen daijimeiji jiten* (Newly selected biographical dictionary; Tokyo, 1937), I, 566-67.

6. This point I infer from Gaimushō kiroku (Foreign office records; hereafter cited "GK"), "Nissen Shūikō Tsūshō Kōkai Jōyaku teiketsu ikken" (Re the signing of the Japan-Siam Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation), File No. 2-5-1, No. 17, letter Shinagawa (Shanghai consul) to Inoue (foreign minister), Jan. 20, 1880. Some material in this file is reproduced in Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaihō bunsho* (Diplomatic papers of Japan; Tokyo, 1936-), Vols. 13, 20, 29, and 30.

7. See Shinagawa to Inoue letter cited.

8. Sala Siwarag, *Nag kanthawd Thaj* (Thai diplomats; Bangkok, 1962), esp. pp. 7-9; and Somded Kromphraja Damrot Raachanuphaab, "Lagsana kaanpogkrōng prathed Thaj tze boraan" (Outline of the administration of Thailand in ancient times; Bangkok, 1955), p. 27.

9. In 1852 a Siamese tribute mission to Peking was attacked by bandits in South China and proved to be the last sent. In 1862, in reply to China's inquiries, Siam said it would resume the tribute whenever China could quell internal disorder (connected with the Taiping Rebellion). In response to further Chinese inquiries in 1863 Siam's Rama IV decided to temporize, since he was not yet convinced of China's helplessness, and the final decision was left to the next reign. In 1869 the Siamese regent sent a mission to Peking asking that the tribute custom be abolished and that relations be on a basis of equality (Western style), but China refused. In 1878 a Chinese emissary, Tseng Chi-tse, passed through Siam and again insisted that Siam send tribute as of old. Siam countered with a request for a commercial treaty of equality, saying it would not send envoys under any other circumstances. China rejected this, and the next year Siam pressed the matter of treaty relations with Japan. See Hsieh Yu-jung, *Hsien-lo kuo-chih* (Siam gazetteer), rev. ed. (Bangkok, 1953), p. 61; Chadin Flood, tr., *The Dynastic Chronicles, Bangkok Era, The Fourth Reign* (Tokyo, 1965-66), I, 86 ff., II, 280-84, 300-04, III, 61-63, 151-53; G. W. Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand* (Ithaca, 1962), pp. 1-26.

10. See memo, Inoue to Sanjō Sanetomi, March 17, 1880, in *Nihon Gaihō Bunsho*, Vol. 13, p. 330.

11. GK, File 2-5-1, No. 17, Chulalongkorn to His Majesty Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan, May 5, 1887 (English translation: original not in file). On Prince Theerawong see "Sawwanid" (pseud.), "Phraanam Cawfaa, Phraotcaw, Mōmjaw" (Royal names of Cawfaa, Phraotcaw, and Mōmjaw; Bangkok, 1962), pp. 74-75. On the seventeenth-century break, see Iwao Seichū, "Taijin no tai-Nichi kokkō bōki fukkatsu undō" (Thai movement to revive state trade relations with Japan), *Tōa Bōnō* (Collected treatises on East Asia), IV, 80-122 (1941); Caraan Chajchana, *Prawadtraad Thaj* (Thai history; Bangkok, 1954), pp. 310 ff.

12. Somded Kromphraja Damrot Raachanuphaab, *Theeraphiban* (Provin-

cial viceroys; Bangkok, 1960), p. 4; Penari Duke, *Relations entre la France et la Thaïlande* (Bangkok, 1962, p. 104; Siwarag, *Nag kasanthud Thai*, pp. 1-2; Wyatt, *Politics of Reform*, p. 91.

13. Texts in *Nihon gaijō bunsho*, XX, 183-88, *British and Foreign State Papers*, LXXIX, 319-20 (1887-88). See also Thawad Radhhanasaphichad, "Samphanthaphasab rawasā Thai kab Jipun" (Bonds of friendship between Thailand and Japan; Bangkok, 1961), p. 165.

14. I differ from Wyatt, *Politics of Reform*, pp. 137-38, on the dates for Khun Wōrakān's sojourn in Japan and follow the latter's brief biography in Phrajaa Phimidsaraa, "Nansy hitoopathed kham khloot" (The Hitōphathēd in verse; Bangkok, 1935), pp. ii-iii. For biographical data on Phadaakawōt, see Prajuun Phidaanaka, *Hae-nib Cawphrajaa* (Fifty Cawphrajaa; Bangkok, 1962), pp. 124-35; Wyatt, *Politics of Reform*, pp. 145 ff; Gaimushō, ed., *Gaijō nenpyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho* (Chronology and key documents on Japanese diplomacy; Tokyo, 1955), I, 102 (notes his sojourn in Japan).

15. For the following discussion I have relied heavily on the analysis of Kuroda Ken'ichi, *Nihon shōkumin shisō shi* (History of Japanese colonial thought; Tokyo, 1942), esp. pp. 181-251.

16. Irie Toraji, *Hōjōn kōsai asten shi* (History of Japanese diffusion abroad; Tokyo, 1938), I, 9-25; Irie Toraji, *Meiji nanshin shikō* (Draft history of the Meiji southern advance; Tokyo, 1943), pp. 10-17.

17. Details in Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 21-30.

18. Purely political-military expansionists would include such men as Saigō Takamori and Fukushima Jūshin. See Matsushita Yoshio, *Meiji gunsei shiron* (Historical treatise on the Meiji military system; Tokyo, 1956), I, 449 and note 1.

19. Kuroda, *Shōkumin shisōshi*, pp. 211 ff.

20. Kamo Giichi, *Enomoto Takeaki* (Tokyo, 1960), p. 239; *Dai Nihon gaijō bunsho*, IX, 365-93; Enomoto Takeaki, *Sibiriyu nikki* (Siberian journal; Darien, 1939), pp. 11-12; Irie, *Nanshin*, p. 36; Gō Ryū, *Nan'yō hōeki go-jū-nen shi* (A history of fifty years of South Seas trade; Tokyo, 1942), p. 179.

21. For example, the ninth number (1880) of the society's bulletin carried an article by one Sasaki Mōhō, proposing that Japan should seize New Guinea. Noted in Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 39 ff.

22. Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 38-40. For a bird's eye view of this increase in South Seas literature see *Nihon Takushoku Kyōkai*, ed., *Zōho nanshō bunken mokuroku* (Revised and enlarged bibliography on southern regions literature; Tokyo, 1943).

23. Kuroda, *Shōkumin shisōshi*, pp. 239 ff.

24. Miyake Senzai, *Yōrioka Shōsō den*, quoted in Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 116-17.

25. For Yokoo, see Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 73-77, and J. M. Saniel, "Four Japanese in the Philippines," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, IV.2: 1-11 (Sept., 1963). On Suzuki Keikun and the Marshall Islands surveys of 1884, see Suzuki Keikun, *Nan'yō senken jikkō* (Journal of South Seas exploration; Tokyo, 1892), esp. p. 15; Yanaibara Tadao, *Nan'yō Gunpō no kenkyū* (Research on the South Seas Islands; Tokyo, 1935), pp. 39-40; Gō Ryū, *Nan'yō hōeki*, pp. 174-76. On Sugiura, see Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 77-82; Saniel, "Four Japanese," pp. 1-11. On Sukanuma, see *ibid.*; Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 81-93; Itō Kan'ichi, ed., *Nanshin Nihon no senkōkushitachi* (Japanese pioneers in the southern advance;

Tokyo, 1941), pp. 193-223, and Kuroda, *Shōkumin shisōshi*, pp. 24-42. On Shige, see Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 65-73; Gō Ryū, *Nan'yō bōeki*, pp. 179-83. Biographies of all these South Seas enthusiasts are available in *Shinsen daijūmei jūen* and Nakajima, *Taishō Kaiōron*, II.

26. Quotes from Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 192-94.

27. Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 111-12.

28. Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 195; Irie, *Nanshin*, pp. 113, 118.

29. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, passim*.

30. On Okakura, see Marlene Mayo, "Attitudes toward Asia and the Beginnings of Japanese Empire," *Imperial Japan and Asia, A Reassessment*, comp. Grant Goodman (New York, 1967), pp. 20 ff.

31. Iwamoto Chizuna, *Siamu, Rōka, Annan, senkōku senken jikkō* (A journal of exploration in Siam, Laos and Annam; Tokyo, 1897), is an autobiographical work; Kuzuu Yoshihisa, *Tōa senkōku shishi kiden* (Biographies of East Asian pioneer activists; Tokyo, 1936), II, 827 and III, 29-31 ("Retracer" section); *Shinsen daijūmei jūen*, I, 386.

32. Kuzuu, *Tōa senkōku*, II, 827.

33. Iwamoto, *jikkō*, pp. 1-2.

34. Anon., "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," *Taikoku Nihonjin Kai*, ed., *Sōritsu go-jū shūnen kaidō kinen-go* (Association bulletin fiftieth anniversary commemorative number; Bangkok, 1963), p. 60.

35. On Yamamoto Yasutarō see "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," *passim*. The only extended mention of Yamamoto Shinsuke comes in Iwamoto, *jikkō*, *passim*. See note 64 below.

36. Yamamoto Yasutarō's career, like Iwamoto's was marked by a number of tragedies, usually hardest on those around him. In 1892 he was suspected of carelessness in the drowning death of a Siamese artist en route back to Siam in his charge. Sometime later he bought a steamship and went into the trading business in Siam, but the ship eventually blew up, killing the entire crew. In the late 1890's he became interpreter in the Siamese legation in Tokyo. Yamamoto finally drifted into revolutionary work in South China's Yunnan Province, where he dropped from sight in 1916. "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," *passim*.

37. See Surasag's autobiographical account: Cawphrajaa Surasagmontrū, *Prawadkaan khooj Cōomphon Cawphrajaa Surasagmontrū* (Chronicles of Field Marshal Cawphrajaa Surasagmontrū), 4 vols. (Bangkok, 1962). See also Phidsanaka, *Haa-rōb Cawphrajaa*, pp. 208 ff., and Sūphanom Sindhooj, "Sib-sooj Cōomphon Thaij" (Twelve Thai field marshals; Bangkok, 1963), pp. 671 ff. None of these sources mentions his interest in the Japanese at this time.

38. Quotes translated from Iwamoto, *jikkō*, p. 3.

39. On the July 13, 1893 "Franco-Siamese Crisis," see Henry Norman, *The Peoples and Politics of the Far East* (New York, 1895), Chap. XXIX; Duke, *Relations entre la France et la Thaïlande*, pp. 143 ff; Capitaine Seauve, *Les Relations de la France et du Siam* (Paris, 1907), pp. 53 ff; Le Boulanger, *Histoire du Laos française* (Paris, 1931), pp. 251 ff; W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 43 ff.

40. For background on Ishibashi see Kuzuu, *Tōa senkōku*, III, 47-48; *Shinsen daijūmei jūen*, I, 233; Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 213-31 and II, 347-49.

41. Kuzuu, *Tōa senkōku*, II, 828 and III, 47.

42. Tarui Tōkichi, *Daiō gōhō ron* (For the great East uniting with Japan; Tokyo, 1885), esp. p. 140 concerning an "Asian Coalition" and joint Siamese-

Burmese defense of the Malay Peninsula. See Kuroda, *Shokumin shisōki*, pp. 240-42, quoting Suganuma Teifu's *Dai Nihon shōgyōshi* (Commercial history of Great Japan) on the need for a China-Korea-Siam coalition headed by Japan.

43. "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," pp. 62-63, gives the size of the lease as 300 *chō*, which is close to the figure of 250 hectares given in Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 213. Both these sources locate the seven-hundred-acre lease in the Supathum area. Kuzuu, *Tōs senkōka*, III, 48 ("Retnuden") speaks of a lease in the Saladang area acquired through the good offices of Phadsakorawon and Surasag. Surasag's mansion was located in Saladang.

44. Kumagai letter, Feb. 3, 1894, in Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 195-96.

45. Agawa, *Shamu ōkoku* (Kingdom of Siam; Tokyo, 1898), preface, notes that he first went to Siam on the strength of such rumors in June, 1894. He operated a business there for several years after that.

46. Quotations from Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 195-96. On Kumagai (Tada Naosuke) see Nakajima, *Tairi kōshōroku*, II, 712, and *Shinsen daijūmei jiten*, II, 449.

47. Kuzuu, *Tōs senkōka*, III, 47-48.

48. Iwamoto, *Jikkō*, p. 4; Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 214-15; "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," p. 62.

49. Quotes from Iwamoto, *Jikkō*, pp. 4-5; "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," p. 61.

50. "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," p. 62.

51. Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 215.

52. Iwamoto, *Jikkō*, pp. 4-5; Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 215-16; "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," p. 63.

53. Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 215-17 including a text of the contract. Iwamoto's own work, *Jikkō*, naturally omits these details.

54. Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 218-20. Surasag's refusal to further support the Japanese financially reflected his own deep indebtedness to his government. At the time of the Franco-Siamese crisis of 1893 he had recalled to service a force of five hundred veterans of his earlier campaigns against the Haw rebels in the north, although this move had no support from anyone else in the government with the possible exception of the King. Surasag outfitted, fed, paid and drilled these troops on funds he "borrowed" without authorization from his ministry of agriculture account, trusting that the ministry of defense would later reward him for these martial services. It did not, and he was left with the bill, which he was in the process of trying to settle at this time (1895). See his own account in *Pravādhān*, IV, 278-97.

55. Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 220-22; "Yamamoto Yasutarō den," pp. 61-62.

56. See Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 101-20, and II, ". . . Nenpyō." According to foreign office figures there were 2,226 Japanese emigrants abroad in 1885 and 12,016 abroad by 1895. Tōgō Minoru, *Nihon shokumin ron*, pp. 257-58.

57. Text of the Imin Hogo Kisoku in Irie, *Hattenshi*, I, 114; discussed in Tōgō, *Nihon shokumin ron*, pp. 254-55. There were thirty-six legitimate emigration companies operating by 1903: Tōgō, pp. 276-79 (names). Of these, two had operated earlier in Siam or the Malay Peninsula: Tōyō Imin Kaisha (Orient Emigration Company) and the Hiroshima Imin Kaisha (Hiroshima Emigration Company).

58. *Hattenshi*, I, 223.

59. On Miyazaki see his autobiographical *San-jū-san nen no yume* (A

thirty-three years' dream), 3rd ed. (Tokyo, 1943), esp. pp. 73-118; Yamaguchi Kōsaku, *Miyazaki Tōten ron* (On Miyazaki Tōten; Kobe, 1964), esp. pp. 29-36; Kuzuu, *Tōs senkōshū*, III, 684-85; Nakajima, *Taishō kōshōron*, II, 873-75; Jansen, *Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, esp. pp. 57-58.

60. Ishibashi returned to Japan in December 1895. He was active in the Pan-Asian oriented *Seiryōka* (Political Education League) in Tokyo until his death in March 1898 at the age of thirty. Kuzuu, *Tōs senkōshū*, III, 47-49 ("Retruden").

61. Miyazaki, *San-jū-san nen no yume*, pp. 86-88. On Surasag's clash with his less militant colleagues, his resignation as army commander, his subsequent appointment as minister of agriculture and his dislike of this non-military post, see his own account in *Pravadaśāsu*, IV, 265-69. On his financial problems see note 54 above.

62. The *shishi* who accompanied Miyazaki on this occasion included several individuals who later attained a certain measure of fame in the Chinese revolution as Pan-Asian agitators, particularly Hirayama Shū, Suemaga Setsu, and Miyazaki's own brother-in-law, Maeda Kyūnishiō. *San-jū-san nen no yume*, p. 105.

63. For Miyazaki's subsequent activities see *ibid.*, pp. 118 ff; Yamaguchi, *Miyazaki Tōten ron*, pp. 37 ff; Jansen, *Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese*, pp. 59 ff.

64. Iwamoto's subsequent career is recounted in his *Jikkō*, pp. 5 ff and 221 (of 1943 edition). In 1896 he made an arduous 111-day journey on foot from Bangkok to Hanoi in the company of Yamamoto Shinsuke, both disguised as yellow-robed Buddhist monks. Iwamoto's *Jikkō* is a day-by-day journal of this "scouting trip" which took them through the treacherous jungles of Siam, Laos, and Tonkin and cost the life of Yamamoto, who died in Hanoi in 1897. The journey was certainly one of the most remarkable feats by Meiji activists anywhere. "Ironlegs" Iwamoto, as he thereafter dubbed himself, survived until 1920.

65. Wyatt, *Politics of Reform*, pp. 137, 160, 224, 330, 360.

66. Agawa, *Shōmu ōkoku*, pp. 143-51; Amada Rokuō, "Shinkōbukai Nitai kankei" (Friendly Thai-Japanese Relations), MS (ca. 1962), unpag.; *Shinsen daijūmei jiten*, VII, 530, s.v. "Yasui Tetsuko."

67. *Shinsen daijūmei jiten*, VI, 108, s.v. "Masao Tōkichi"; Kuzuu, *Tōs senkōshū*, II, 833-34.

68. Shamu Kyōkai, ed., *Shōmu kōkōjō* (Conditions in Siam; Tokyo, 1929), pp. 228-30, 850-51.

69. Agawa, *Shōmu ōkoku*, p. 150; Nan'yō oyobi Nihonjin Sha, ed., *Nan'yō go-jū nen* (Fifty years in the South Seas; Tokyo, 1938), pp. 140-41. For Inagaki's biography: Kuzuu, *Tōs Senkōshū*, III, 37; *Shinsen daijūmei jiten*, I, 319.

70. GK, File 2-5-1, No. 17, Inagaki to Okuma, June 28, 1897, App. 1; Saionji [sic] to Devawongse, June 25, 1896, attached side memoir.

71. *ibid.*, Inagaki to Okuma, June 28, 1897, App. 1; Saionji to Kirkpatrick, "Obogaki" (side memoir), June 25, 1896.

72. Texts of the treaty in *ibid.*, and in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XC, 66-72 (1897-1898).